International Migration Outlook 2026

50th Edition



International Migration Outlook 2026



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Foreword

This publication constitutes the 50th report of the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration. The report is divided into six chapters plus a statistical annex. Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent trends in international migration flows. It also analyses recent changes in the labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. Chapter 2 monitors recent changes in migration policies, while Chapter 3 looks at the recent changes in policies that support the integration of immigrants and their children.

Chapter 4 looks at migration and long-term care. This chapter was drafted in the context of the ILO-OECD-WHO Working for Heath programme and complements the work on international migration of doctors and nurses that was published in the 2025 edition of the OECD *International of Migration Outlook*. It focuses on how countries structure their labour migration channels to contribute to addressing skill shortages in the care workforce. It reviews current labour migration channels for care work across the OECD, discusses policy trade-offs related to the recruitment of foreign workers and identifies policy levers for improving retention in the sector.

Chapter 5 examines the mechanisms through which immigration may affect productivity growth and reviews the evidence from OECD countries. It considers the effects of immigration on the skill composition of the workforce, firms' investment and technological choices, and the contribution of immigrants to innovation and entrepreneurship. The chapter also assesses how the distribution of immigrants across firms and sectors with different productivity levels shapes aggregate productivity outcomes. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for migration and integration policy.

Chapter 6 presents succinct country-specific notes and statistics on developments in international migration movements and policies in OECD and selected non-OECD countries in recent years. Lastly, the statistical annex includes a broad selection of recent and historical statistics on immigrant flows, asylum requests, foreign and foreign-born populations, and naturalisations.

This year's edition of the OECD *International Migration Outlook* is the collective work of the staff of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Chapter 4 was drafted by Melissa Buckle (OECD) and Jonathan Chaloff (OECD). Chapter 5 was drafted by Ana Damas de Matos (OECD). Jean-Christophe Dumont edited the report. Statistical work was carried out by Philippe Hervé and Sebastian Higuera and co-ordinated by Cécile Thoreau. Editorial assistance was provided by Dominika Andrzejczak and Marie-Aurélie Elkurd as well as Lucy Hulett.

Editorial

Migration and productivity growth: Unlocking the potential

Productivity growth across the OECD has slowed markedly over the last two decades. With the OECD working-age population set to decrease by 8% by 2060, pushing overall growth downwards, reviving productivity growth is key to maintaining living standards.

Immigrants now account for 16% of employment across the OECD, 3 percentage points (p.p.) more than a decade ago. In half of OECD countries, immigrants accounted for 50% or more of employment growth in the decade to 2024. Given this growing contribution of immigration to OECD labour markets, it is increasingly pertinent to question how immigration affects productivity growth.

A view often advanced in public debate is that migration is bad for productivity growth. According to this view, migrants are primarily employed in low-productivity jobs, either because they are low-skilled or because they are unable to use their skills fully in the host country. In addition, the steady supply of migrant labour allows firms to delay or avoid necessary adjustments to improve productivity, working conditions and worker retention. The affected sectors get stuck in a low-productivity, low wage, low capital investment equilibrium – as has happened in some countries in the long-term care sector, a case which is considered in detail in a special chapter of this Outlook. To the extent that this is true more generally, continued reliance on migrant labour would weigh on productivity growth.

On the other hand, migrants may boost productivity by bringing skills, entrepreneurship and innovation. Many OECD countries benefit from large inflows of highly educated workers. One in five STEM graduates in OECD countries is now foreign-born. Migrants are also heavily represented among researchers and founders of innovative firms. Moreover, while many migrants initially work in low-productivity sectors and firms, they move to more productive jobs over time.

The chapter on Migration and Productivity Growth in this edition of the Outlook analyses the various channels through which migration affects productivity growth. It argues that migration is neither inherently productivity-enhancing nor productivity-reducing. Its effects depend on the characteristics of migrants, the functioning of the labour market and, crucially, the design and effectiveness of migration and integration policies.

The relevant question for policymakers is not whether migration is good or bad for productivity, but how policies can maximise its potential. The chapter identifies four policy priorities.

First, attract, retain and make better use of talent. Competition for international talent has intensified, and migration policies make a difference. Half of OECD countries could virtually close their talent-attractiveness gap with the top performer by making it easier for highly skilled migrants to enter and settle. Retention is weak in many countries. Access to permanent residence and family reunification, less discrimination and better career prospects all contribute to higher retention of skilled migrants. Skills of all immigrants must also be put to use. The solutions are well-known: faster recognition of foreign qualifications, occupation-specific language training, fewer licensing barriers and hiring based on skills.

Second, fill today's shortages without stalling tomorrow's productivity. Migrants help address labour shortages in OECD countries. However, when migrant recruitment is used to circumvent structural issues and enable firms to delay or avoid necessary adjustments to improve productivity and working conditions, it may create a vicious circle negatively affecting long term productivity growth. Labour migration should complement broader strategies to raise productivity and job quality, not replace them.

Third, let migrants move to where they are most productive. Reallocation of labour towards more productive firms and sectors is a driver of productivity growth. Yet immigrants often remain stuck in *entry* sectors and firms. Policies to improve job matching should explicitly target the barriers immigrants face.

Fourth, unlock migrant entrepreneurship. Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to be entrepreneurs, from small own-account businesses to founders of some of the most successful firms in the OECD. Too often, however, limited access to finance, weaker professional networks and administrative obstacles linked to residence status hold them back. Credit guarantees, incubators and help with administrative procedures can ease these constraints.

Migration policies cannot be determined solely by considerations of productivity, of course. After all, in some sectors, such as health and care, agriculture and transportation, productivity may be low, but the social and strategic value of ensuring migrant labour is high. And anyway, migration will not solve ageing-related pressures or weak productivity growth on its own, nor can it substitute for reforms that foster innovation and investment. But well-designed migration and integration policies are one of the elements that contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy.



Mark Pearson,

Acting Director of the OECD Directorate
for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs

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Executive summary

Migration flows remain historically high despite a second consecutive decline

Permanent migration fell for a second consecutive year by 1.6% in 2025, reaching 6.1 million new permanent immigrants. Despite this decrease, migration levels remained historically high, 12% above those observed in 2019.

Southern European countries recorded strong growth, with particularly large increases in Portugal, Italy and Spain, while several major destination countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, experienced notable declines. Family reunification remained the principal channel of permanent migration (45% of total inflow). Labour migration (20%) continued to expand, reflecting persistent labour demand across many sectors, whereas humanitarian migration (10%) declined significantly.

About 2.2 million temporary work permits and authorisations were issued in 2025, remaining one-fifth above pre-pandemic levels. Seasonal worker programmes continued to grow, while most other temporary labour categories either stabilised or declined modestly. The number of posted workers in European OECD countries also continued to increase, reaching almost 3.5 million in 2024.

International student mobility changed significantly. While total inflows of tertiary students fell from 1.9 million in 2024 to 1.6 million in 2025, this decline was concentrated in traditional English-speaking destinations. In contrast, European countries continued to attract growing numbers of international students, with particularly strong increases in Italy, Germany and Austria. China and India remained by far the largest source countries.

Asylum applications declined across most OECD countries in 2025 after reaching record levels in previous years. Excluding the United States, applications fell by more than one-fifth compared with 2024, although they remained above pre-pandemic levels. The composition of asylum flows also changed, with applications from Syrian nationals falling sharply, while several African nationalities gained importance. Indicators of irregular migration likewise declined in many OECD countries, while returns continued to increase.

Labour market outcomes remain resilient but challenges persist

Despite signs of economic slowdown in some countries, labour market outcomes for immigrants remained robust in 2025. Migrant participation rates increased in most OECD countries and continued to exceed those of the native-born in many cases. While employment rates improved in over half of OECD countries, unemployment rates increased in a majority of countries, highlighting growing labour market uncertainty.

As in recent years, the situation of migrant women improved the most. Their employment rates increased in a majority of OECD countries, contributing to a continued narrowing of gender employment gaps.

Nevertheless, significant differences remain, with migrant women still substantially less likely to be employed than migrant men.

Migration and integration policies are becoming more selective and conditional

Many OECD countries introduced measures to reduce irregular migration through strengthened border management, enhanced enforcement and expanded return policies. Several countries also tightened asylum systems through stricter eligibility criteria, faster procedures and a greater emphasis on the temporary nature of protection and return. Within the European Union, implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum advanced significantly, accompanied by broader reforms to migration governance.

Concern over competition for highly skilled workers led many OECD countries to expand talent visas, fast-track procedures and recruitment programmes for strategic sectors including technology, healthcare and research. International researcher mobility emerged as a growing policy priority, reflecting broader concerns about innovation, competitiveness and technological leadership.

Integration policies also reflected the new emphasis on conditionality and targeting. Fiscal pressures, housing shortages and growing demands on public services have encouraged governments to place greater emphasis on activation, conditionality and labour market participation. Integration measures are increasingly tailored to different migrant groups, introduced earlier in the migration journey and linked more closely to employment outcomes. At the same time, many countries have strengthened language, civic knowledge and residency requirements for long-term residence and citizenship.

Migration plays a growing role in addressing labour shortages in long-term care

Demographic ageing is generating rapidly growing demand for long-term care services while simultaneously reducing the number of available workers. As a result, labour shortages in the care sector are expected to intensify.

Migrants already represent a substantial share of the long-term care workforce in several OECD countries and are increasingly viewed as part of the solution to workforce shortages. However, migration is only one component of a broader policy response that must also include workforce development, productivity improvements and technological innovation. OECD countries rely on diverse migration pathways to recruit care workers, although dedicated migration programmes remain relatively uncommon. Significant differences in qualification requirements, language standards and professional recognition systems continue to create barriers to mobility and recruitment.

Retention remains a major challenge for the sector. Policies that improve working conditions, support career progression and facilitate longer-term settlement are likely to be important to ensure a sustainable care workforce, including among foreign workers.

Maximising migration’s contribution to productivity growth

Reviving productivity growth is top of the policy agenda across OECD countries. As migration plays an increasingly important role in these economies, a challenge for migration and integration policies is to harness its potential to support productivity growth, maximising economic benefits while mitigating possible adverse effects.

Migration influences productivity through multiple channels. It alters the skill composition of the workforce, supports innovation and entrepreneurship, influences firms’ investment decisions and affects the allocation of labour across sectors and occupations. Migrants remain disproportionately represented among

researchers, innovators and entrepreneurs, while at the same time facing barriers that may prevent their skills from being fully utilised.

The report finds that migrants are often concentrated in lower-productivity sectors and firms, which can weigh on aggregate productivity outcomes. However, productivity effects can improve over time when migrant workers move towards more productive activities and when policies promote better matching between skills and jobs. Effective migration and integration policies therefore remain critical for maximising the long-term economic contribution of immigration while balancing wider objectives, including maintaining essential public services and addressing demographic challenges.


Key findings

- Permanent migration to the OECD fell by 1.6% in 2025, but excluding Portugal, Italy and Spain the decline reaches 8.2% (-7.9% among European OECD countries).
- Despite a sharp decline, India remained the top origin country of migration flows to the OECD in 2024, ahead of China and Colombia.
- Immigrants made up 12% of OECD countries' population in 2025, up from 9.2 in 2015.
- Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries increased in 2025 to reach 3 million.
- On average in the OECD, almost 71% of migrants are employed while the employment rate for migrant women is still at 63.4%.

Infographic 1. Key facts and figures

Permanent migration dips, yet remains well above pre-pandemic levels


Permanent migration flows to the OECD, 2019-25, in millions



Despite the drop, the total of 6.1 million new permanent immigrants in 2025 remains historically high – 12.5% above 2019 levels.

Labour migration growing, with humanitarian migration dropping sharply


Growth in migration by category, 2025, %



Labour migration grew by 13% in 2025, while humanitarian migration declined by 26%. Family remains the main reason for migration with 45% of total flows.

Migrant populations have slightly increased over the last decade


Foreign-born population as % of total population



Migrants accounted for 12% of the total population in 2025 across OECD countries, which is 3 percentage points higher than in 2015.


Number of people acquiring citizenship in OECD countries continues to increase

Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries, 2000-25, in millions




In 2025, about 3 million people were granted citizenship in OECD countries.

Employment rate for migrant women is rising but still lower than that of men



The employment rate for migrant women is increasing, but remains 15 percentage points lower than that of migrant men.

Drop in international students in traditional English-speaking destinations



Inflows of tertiary students to OECD countries fell from 1.9 million to 1.6 million in 2025. This decline was concentrated in traditional English-speaking destinations.

1 Recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants

This chapter provides an overview of recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries.

The first section analyses migration flows over the past decade, up to 2025, covering both permanent and temporary movements by migration category. It also explores patterns in international student mobility, as well as recent trends in asylum applications, irregular migration, and returns.

Additionally, it considers the demographic characteristics of migration flows and stocks – such as sex and country of origin – and highlights trends in the acquisition of nationality across OECD countries.

The second section of the chapter examines recent trends in the labour market outcomes of immigrants, with a detailed analysis by sociodemographic characteristics and region of origin.

In Brief

Key findings

Migration trends

- Permanent migration to OECD countries declined for a second consecutive year in 2025, but the slowdown was more moderate than in 2024 (-1.6% vs. -4.7% in 2024), following three years of sharp post-pandemic increases. Despite the drop, the total of 6.1 million new permanent immigrants remains historically high – 12.5% above 2019 levels.
- The moderate decrease in 2025 masks sharply diverging trends across OECD regions. Strong growth in Southern Europe and to a lesser extent in France, contrasted with marked declines in several major destination countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany.
- Southern Europe and France were the main contributors to the increase in permanent type migration to Europe. Conversely, substantial declines were observed in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom. Excluding the three Southern European countries, permanent migration to OECD European countries declined in 2025 by 7.9%.
- Family reunification remained the main reason for permanent migration to OECD countries, while labour migration continued to grow (+13%, -10% excluding Italy, Portugal and Spain), and humanitarian migration declined significantly (-26%).
- Long-term migration under free movement to OECD EU-EFTA countries is estimated to have fallen by 6% relative to 2024, while flows from New Zealand to Australia remained stable and arrivals in New Zealand increased by 14%.
- The number of posted workers in European OECD countries has been rising since 2021. In 2024, there were almost 3.5 million postings, 5% more than in 2023 and 10% more than in 2019.
- Approximately 2.2 million foreign workers were granted temporary authorisations or work permits in OECD countries (excluding Poland and Israel) in 2025. This represents a 4% decrease compared with the peak reached in 2023 and 2024 but 2025 level remains 19% higher than in 2019.
- With the exception of seasonal programmes, which rose by 3% compared with 2024, all major temporary worker categories declined or remained stable: working holiday (-3%), trainees (+1%), ICT (-4%), and other national temporary worker programmes (-12%), with drops in key settlement countries like Canada, Korea and the United States.
- Inflows of mobile tertiary students declined from 1.9 million in 2024 to 1.6 million in 2025. The decline was concentrated in some traditional English-speaking destinations, notably the United States (-33%), Canada (-57%) and Australia (-13%), while inflows to EU-EFTA reached their highest recorded level in 2025. In particular, strong increases were observed in Italy (+76%), Germany (+45%) and Austria (+28%).
- China and India remained by far the largest countries of origin of international students enrolled in OECD countries in 2024 with 850 000 and 829 000 students respectively. The gap between them narrowed considerably over the past decade as number of Indian students recorded a particularly strong growth.

- In 2025, the number of new asylum seekers in OECD countries (excluding the United States) declined to about 1.1 million (−22% compared to 2024). Despite this decrease, applications in 2025 remained around 10% higher than in 2019, confirming that demand for international protection is still at historically high levels.
- In 2025, the United States remained the main destination for asylum seekers, according to partial data. The estimated number of new asylum requests remains much higher than in 2019 but shows a steep decline compared to 2024.
- The top origin countries for asylum applicants within the OECD in 2025 were Venezuela, Mexico and Haiti. In European OECD countries, applications from Syrian nationals dropped significantly (-71%) and a growing relative importance of African origin countries was noted, notably Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt.
- Despite a sharp decline, India remained the top origin country of migration flows to the OECD in 2024, ahead of China and Colombia.
- Immigrants made up 12% of OECD countries' population in 2025, up from 9.2 in 2015. In half of OECD countries, more than 15% of the population was foreign-born, with the highest shares recorded in Switzerland (33%), Australia (33%) and Luxembourg (52%).
- Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries increased again in 2025 to reach 3 million. Germany (309 000 grants of citizenship) and Spain (300 000) registered record levels and rose to second and third place respectively, behind the United States at almost 900 000. Relative to the stock of foreign population, the ratio was the highest in Canada (7.7%) and Norway (5.5%). Over the period 2020-2024, 925 000 Indian citizens acquired citizenship of an OECD country, followed by Syria and Mexico, both at 590 000.
- Detections of irregular entries declined in many OECD countries in 2025, in particular in Chile, Mexico and the United States. The estimated number of overstayers fell in Korea (-10%) and in Japan (-5%) and increased slightly in Australia (+4%). Forced and voluntary assisted returns from the EU and the United Kingdom continued to rise in 2025, standing at 139 000 and 39 000 respectively, but fell slightly in the first quarter of 2026.

Labour market integration


- In 2025, employment and participation rates remain at historical highs for both native-born and immigrants, despite some signs of weakening in labour markets.
- Migrant labour market outcomes continue to show mixed results in 2025. Participation rates of migrants increased in 23 out of 34 OECD countries with available data and exceeded that of the native-born in most OECD countries. Migrant employment rates increased in 18 countries, while migrant unemployment rates increased in two out of three countries.
- As has been the case in the overall population, the employment gap between men and women narrowed in 2025. This was mostly driven by migrant women, whose employment rose in 22 out of 35 countries, narrowing the gap with men in 24 countries. Migrant women's employment rate has now reached 63.4% on average, still 15.1 percentage points (p.p.) below that of migrant men.
- Outcomes diverged sharply by education: low-educated migrants outperformed the native-born, and this gap has slightly increased over time (from +6.0 p.p. in 2024 to +6.5 p.p. in 2025), while employment of tertiary educated migrants is still 6.8 p.p. lower than for their native-born peers.
- The foreign-born youth employment rate fell in 24 out of 34 countries, and their NEET rates exceeded that of the native-born in all but 6 countries, notably in the EU27 (16.2% vs. 9.8% respectively on average).

Recent trends in international migration

Permanent migration

Permanent migration to OECD countries declined for the second consecutive year in 2025, although the decrease was smaller than in 2024, falling by 1.6% compared with a 4.7% decline the previous year. This follows three years of sharp increases in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1). A total of 6.1 million new permanent immigrants were recorded in 2025. Permanent migration remained nevertheless at a historically high level, 12.5% above 2019 levels. (See Box 1.1 on concepts and definitions).

Figure 1.1. Permanent migration to the OECD, 2017-2025



Note: Sum of standardised and unstandardised figures, including status changes and migration within free-movement areas (data and notes can be found in Table 1.1). Data exclude Türkiye for which partial data and metadata can be found in the Statistical Annex.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/31n.

StatLink https://stat.link/wgfzy3

Box 1.1. OECD permanent and temporary migration statistics

The statistics on annual migration flows presented in this chapter distinguish between temporary and permanent movements. This classification is based not on how long migrants actually stay in the host country, but on their legal status – specifically, whether they have a clear legal pathway to remain indefinitely.

For example, seasonal workers, international students, and asylum seekers typically do not have the right to stay permanently in the host country unless their status changes. In contrast, recognised refugees, family migrants, and certain labour migrants either arrive with permanent status or can apply for it after a few years of residence.

Migration within free movement areas, such as the EU-EFTA or the Trans-Tasman Area, is treated separately. In these cases, migrants do not need a residence permit to live, work, or study in another country. Here, a migrant is considered permanent if they have lived – or intend to live – in the host country for at least one year, which is a common criterion for inclusion in the resident population.

It is important to note that the exceptionally high migration levels observed in 2022-2023 do not include Ukrainians fleeing Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine who are still under temporary protection. These movements are reported separately in this chapter due to the temporary nature of the protection they received (see Box 1.2). Nevertheless, an increasing number of displaced Ukrainians have since obtained a more permanent legal status and are therefore starting to be included in the more recent figures presented in this section.

Half of all permanent migration to the OECD is concentrated in the five largest destination countries. In 2025, the United States remained the leading destination, accounting for around 20% of total permanent migration to the OECD, with 1.2 million new permanent immigrants. Germany, Spain, Canada and France were the next largest destinations, with each receiving between 6% and 9% of the total permanent migration to the OECD.

Permanent migration trends across OECD countries were mixed in 2025, with substantial differences across regions and destination countries. Among countries with standardised data (first set of receiving countries in Table 1.1), permanent migration to European OECD countries increased by 4.7% compared with 2024, reaching 3.1 million.

By contrast several non-European OECD destinations recorded sharp declines. This is the case for example of Israel (-31%), Canada (-19%), Mexico (-15%), the United States (-14%) Korea (-11%) and New Zealand (-4%). Despite recent trends, migration levels remained well above those observed in 2019 in all these countries except Israel and Korea. The decline to the United States occurred amid a broader shift towards a more restrictive immigration policy environment following the change of administration in 2025. Moderate increases were observed in Japan (+9%).

The observed increase in permanent migration to Europe was driven primarily by Southern European countries, and to a lesser extent by France (+9%), Czechia (+8%) and the Slovak Republic (+10%). Conversely, permanent migration declined in the United Kingdom (-32%) and in Germany, the second-largest destination country (-6%). Other notable declines were recorded in Austria (-20%), Belgium (-14%), Ireland (-13%) and Sweden (-11%).

The increase in permanent migration to Southern Europe reflected a combination of regularisation measures, processing of large numbers of pending applications and expanded labour migration opportunities. The particularly large increase recorded in Portugal[1] reflected the clearance of a large backlog of residence permit applications, which resulted in granting around 300 000 permits between September 2024 and December 2025. The Italian government expanded labour migration pathways and increased planned admissions in sectors facing persistent labour shortages. These developments partly drove the overall 46% increase in permanent flows to Italy in 2025. In Spain, the 25% increase in flows is associated with the entry into force of a major immigration reform in May 2025 that simplified residence procedures and broadened access to regularisation mechanisms. Excluding those three Southern European countries, permanent migration to EU and EFTA countries decreased by 4% in 2025.

Among countries with unstandardised data that include many temporary migrants (second set of receiving countries in Table 1.1), Chile (+66%), Costa Rica (+37%) and Poland (+5%) also recorded increases. In Chile, a sharp increase in MERCOSUR residence permits issued to Bolivian nationals after Chile and Bolivia signed a migration co-operation agreement in 2023 facilitated access to this permit. The 5% increase in Poland is partly driven by the ongoing transition of Ukrainian nationals from temporary protection to standard residence permit schemes.

Table 1.1. Permanent migration to OECD countries, 2015-2025

	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2025/24 change	2025/19 change
	Thousands								%	
Standardised statistics										
United States	1 051.0	1 031.0	581.5	835.4	1 048.7	1 193.7	1 431.8	1 231.9	-14%	20%
Germany	716.6	643.3	521.1	533.1	668.8	664.3	574.7	538.3	-6%	-16%
Spain	269.6	244.6	178.6	262.0	323.3	374.9	368.0	460.5	25%	88%
Canada	275.8	341.2	184.5	406.0	437.6	471.8	483.6	393.8	-19%	15%
France	268.1	284.5	228.0	276.6	305.9	306.2	306.4	333.7	9%	17%
Portugal	36.4	114.9	92.4	100.1	129.3	149.8	131.5	313.7	139%	173%
United Kingdom	366.5	356.1	199.8	369.0	487.1	741.6	433.9	295.8	-32%	-17%
Italy	218.6	167.1	112.0	204.4	235.4	204.1	170.8	248.8	46%	49%
Australia	227.9	195.6	158.9	170.4	170.9	238.7	239.3	234.2	-2%	20%
Japan	83.5	137.6	83.6	56.8	144.5	163.1	175.5	191.8	9%	39%
Netherlands	128.0	165.7	134.2	172.4	205.9	195.9	181.9	170.5	-6%	3%
Switzerland	112.7	106.5	102.3	109.1	130.0	144.5	135.6	132.4	-2%	24%
Belgium	103.5	95.0	78.8	95.0	102.9	106.1	106.7	92.2	-14%	-3%
Austria	105.6	84.4	65.6	76.5	93.3	105.4	102.6	81.7	-20%	-3%
Sweden	120.8	99.3	80.9	75.9	89.8	87.1	75.6	67.3	-11%	-32%
Korea	65.6	72.5	53.0	48.2	57.8	87.2	75.6	67.0	-11%	-8%
Mexico	34.4	40.5	58.4	67.7	75.6	69.9	73.8	62.6	-15%	55%
Ireland	36.2	48.6	42.7	38.4	66.9	65.6	71.9	62.3	-13%	28%
New Zealand	54.3	38.0	35.6	35.2	154.1	119.1	56.3	53.8	-4%	41%
Denmark	60.7	45.8	37.8	48.9	62.9	57.4	54.4	52.2	-4%	14%
Czechia	27.8	62.3	55.6	63.9	45.6	37.5	40.2	43.2	8%	-31%
Norway	61.1	46.1	32.8	38.1	42.5	41.7	35.7	35.0	-2%	-24%
Finland	24.9	28.1	24.2	30.8	40.4	42.8	34.7	33.6	-3%	20%
Luxembourg	17.5	24.9	20.0	24.2	26.9	27.1	26.2	25.4	-3%	2%
Slovenia	12.2	35.9	22.9	30.0	33.2	31.3	26.2	24.8	-5%	-31%
Slovak Republic	9.3	26.8	17.1	26.8	24.3	24.3	20.9	22.9	10%	-15%
Israel	27.9	33.2	19.7	25.5	74.5	46.6	32.2	22.1	-31%	-33%
Lithuania	2.5	2.9	2.8	5.9	10.7	7.0	6.3	8.2	30%	183%
Estonia	5.5	10.4	9.1	11.8	14.2	12.5	8.9	7.5	-16%	-28%
All countries	**4 524.5**	**4 582.9**	**3 234.0**	**4 238.2**	**5 303.1**	**5 817.5**	**5 481.1**	**5 307.1**	**-3.2%**	**15.8%**
OECD Europe	**2 704.1**	**2 693.2**	**2 058.7**	**2 592.9**	**3 139.3**	**3 427.1**	**2 913.1**	**3 050.0**	**4.7%**	**13.2%**
National statistics (unstandardised)										
Poland	86.1	163.2	163.5	224.2	335.3	374.1	352.8	369.8	5%	127%
Chile	101.9	254.1	154.6	76.5	198.4	70.5	115.1	190.9	66%	-25%
Greece	34.0	95.4	63.4	28.7	63.4	70.5	80.2	63.6	-21%	-33%
Colombia	..	225.8	74.8	40.7	108.1	49.9	62.0	61.5	-1%	-73%
Hungary	25.8	55.3	43.8	49.1	55.5	61.3	49.3	47.2	-4%	-15%
Costa Rica	15.7	7.8	..	9.1	11.2	10.2	11.6	15.9	37%	104%
Iceland	5.6	10.7	8.9	10.0	17.0	16.6	14.8	14.1	-5%	32%
Latvia	4.5	6.6	4.6	5.9	7.3	4.0	3.5	4.4	26%	-33%
Total	**273.6**	**818.9**	**513.6**	**444.2**	**796.2**	**657.1**	**689.3**	**767.5**	**11.4%**	**-6.3%**
Total (standardised and national statistics)										
Total	**4 798.2**	**5 401.9**	**3 747.6**	**4 682.3**	**6 099.5**	**6 474.6**	**6 170.4**	**6 074.6**	**-1.6%**	**12.5%**

Note: Includes only foreign nationals. Data refer to the fiscal year ending in the year of reference for Australia (Jul-Jun) and Ireland (Apr-Mar). The inflows include status changes, namely persons in the country on a temporary status who obtained the right to stay on a longer-term basis, and migration within free-movement areas. Partial data and metadata for Türkiye can be found in the Statistical Annex.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/31n.

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
In 2025, OECD countries recorded an average of 8.5 new permanent migrants per 1 000 inhabitants, up from 8.1 per 1 000 in 2019 (Figure 1.2), with significant variation across countries.

Luxembourg and Iceland continued to record by far the highest rates of permanent migration relative to their populations, with 38 and 36 new permanent migrants per 1 000 inhabitants, respectively. Portugal also stood out in 2025, with a rate exceeding 30 per 1 000 inhabitants. In many OECD countries, permanent migration inflows ranged between 5 and 12 per 1 000 inhabitants.

At the lower end of the scale were Mexico, Colombia, Korea and Japan, each recording fewer than 2 new permanent migrants per 1 000 inhabitants. In several large OECD destination countries, permanent migration rates remained relatively modest despite sizeable inflows in absolute terms. In 2025, the United States recorded fewer than 4 new permanent migrants per 1 000 inhabitants, while the United Kingdom, Germany and France each recorded around 4 to 6 per 1 000 inhabitants.

Figure 1.2. Permanent migration to OECD countries relative to total population, 2025

Per thousand population



Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data. Data and metadata can be found in the note of Table 1.1.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/31n.


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Permanent migration by category of migration

This section presents permanent migration flows to OECD countries, broken down into five main categories of migration. The categories include work, family, humanitarian, other, and free movement within the EU-EFTA and the Trans-Tasman Area, which is addressed separately at the end of this section.

In 2025, family-related migration (including accompanying family) remained the largest category of permanent migration to the OECD accounting for 45% of all permanent inflows, a share broadly unchanged from 2024. Labour migration continued to grow (+13%). Its share of total permanent migration increased from 17% to 20%. By contrast, humanitarian migration declined by 26%, reducing its share from 13% to 10%. Migrants moving within free-movement areas accounted for 18% of permanent inflows in 2024 and 2025, compared with 29% in 2019 (Panel B of Figure 1.3) and decreased by 6% year on year.

Figure 1.3. Permanent migration to the OECD, by category of entry, 2014-2025



Note: Includes only countries for which data on standardised permanent-type migration are available (data and metadata can be found in Table 1.1).
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/31n.

StatLink https://stat.link/daowsk

The composition of migration however varies considerably across countries: family migration dominates in the United States, free movement remains a major channel across much of Europe, and labour migration represents a comparatively large share of inflows in Australia and Canada.

Family migration to the OECD remains at historically high levels in 2025

Family migration (including accompanying family) to OECD countries remained stable at historically high levels in 2025, with an estimated 2.4 million new permits. The United States remained by far the largest destination country for family migrants, receiving 952 000 family migrants in 2025, representing about 40% of all family migration to the OECD.

Family reunification migration increased by 5% in 2025, reaching almost 2 million migrants, whereas accompanying family migration declined by 21% to 438 000.

Among the largest OECD destination countries, family reunification (i.e. excluding accompanying family migration) increased notably in Italy (+62%), Spain (+45%) and Germany (+16%), and more moderately in France (+5%). In contrast, significant declines were recorded in the United Kingdom (-25%), Canada (- 9%) and Mexico (-40%).

The decline in accompanying family migration was concentrated in a few countries that had recorded exceptionally high labour migration in recent years. Accompanying family migration fell by 45% in the United Kingdom, 50% in New Zealand, 24% in Canada and 19% in the United States, generally reflecting lower inflows of labour migrants but also, in the United Kingdom, the effects of restrictions on dependants of care workers introduced in 2024.

Labour migration rebounded in 2025, driven by strong growth in a small number of countries

After declining in 2024, permanent labour migration to OECD countries rebounded in 2025, increasing by 13% to 1.1 million new permanent labour migrants. This level was more than 50% higher than in 2019.

Overall, labour migration trends diverged markedly across OECD countries in 2025 and OECD-wide growth was concentrated in a small number of countries. While labour migration increased strongly in Portugal (+299%), Italy (+83%), Spain (+67%), Germany (+40%) and to a lesser extent in Japan (+10%). Important growth rates based on smaller numbers are also observed in Mexico and Lithuania.

The increase to Southern Europe largely reflected measures aimed at expanding or regularising labour market access, including Portugal's clearance of pending residence applications, Italy's enlarged labour migration programme, and Spain's simplification of residence and regularisation procedures. In Germany and Japan, growth was supported by continued efforts to address labour shortages through more flexible or extended admission channels for skilled workers. In Mexico, growth was supported by a new human mobility strategy that expanded regular labour migration pathways and promoted migrant labour market integration, including through job-matching initiatives developed in partnership with employers.

In contrast, labour migration fell sharply in the United Kingdom (- 43%), Finland (- 36%), Ireland (- 26%), Belgium (- 26%), the United States (-19%) and Canada (-14%). In Finland, labour migration fell as slowing economic growth and higher unemployment reduced demand for foreign workers[2] while in Ireland the decline reflects moderating labour demand following several years of exceptionally strong job growth. In the United Kingdom, labour migration continued to adjust following policy changes introduced in 2024 that tightened access to the Health and Care Worker route and restricted the admission of accompanying dependants.

Humanitarian migration to the OECD declined sharply in 2025

After reaching one of its highest levels on record in 2024, humanitarian migration to OECD countries declined by 26% in 2025, to 538 000 individuals receiving recognised humanitarian status. Despite this decline, humanitarian migration remained above pre-pandemic levels.

The decrease was partly driven by lower numbers in major receiving countries: the United States (-53%), where major policy changes affected refugee admissions and other humanitarian pathways, and Germany (-35%). Humanitarian migration also fell substantially in many other important OECD receiving countries. Over the course of 2025, these admissions were reduced by around 50% in Austria, Norway and Belgium; by around 25% in Mexico, Switzerland, New Zealand, Sweden and Canada. While levels of humanitarian migrants' admissions have varied over the last 15 years in most of these countries and remained relatively high in 2025, these declines are part of a longer-term trend in Norway and Sweden.


Overall, the United States remained the largest destination country for humanitarian migrants, with 117 000 new admissions in 2025. A few OECD countries recorded increases. The most notable was France (+65%), where humanitarian migration rose to 72 000, making it the third largest humanitarian destination among OECD countries in 2025, after the United States and Germany. Other significant increases were observed in Italy (+41%), Finland (+33%), Spain (+15%) and Ireland (+10%).

The figures include both individuals granted international protection within OECD countries and refugees resettled after initially receiving protection in a non-OECD country. Ukrainians displaced by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine are only covered if they were granted a refugee status or subsidiary protection (see Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. Displacement from Ukraine four years into the crisis

Now entering its fifth year, the displacement crisis triggered by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 remains one of the largest and most prolonged humanitarian situations in Europe since the Second World War. The vast majority of movements took place during the first half of 2022 and the overall number of displaced Ukrainians in OECD countries stabilised at around 5 million displaced persons from Ukraine in 2025. The top receiving countries remain Germany (1.2 million) and Poland (972 000), despite slight declines in total numbers compared to 2024, followed by Czechia, the United States and Canada (Figure 1.4). Decreases may, to some extent, reflect transitions to other legal statuses and reduced visibility in official statistics, rather than necessarily indicating returns or onward movements.

Figure 1.4. Main OECD host countries for displaced Ukrainians, 2024-2025



Note: The totals for EU countries reflect the estimated number of individuals who have fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022, have been granted temporary protection, international protection, or other forms of stay linked to their protection needs or situation in their country of origin, and who are currently present in each respective host country.
Source: UNHCR data finder; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

StatLink https://stat.link/vpmc04


Box 1.3. Resettlement to the OECD decreased sharply in 2025

Resettlement programmes for refugees aim to serve as a durable solution and a responsibility-sharing mechanism among the international community. They are designed to transfer the most vulnerable refugees from a country of first asylum to another country that grants them long-term protection.

Since 1975, OECD countries resettled about 5.7 million refugees. A peak was reached in 1980, with 277 000 resettlement arrivals registered, 75% of them in the United States. In 2024, resettlement to OECD countries reached 189 000, the third-highest level ever recorded, then plummeted in 2025, falling back below pre-COVID levels, at 82 000. This 57% drop was mostly due to the collapse observed in the United States, and to a lesser extent to the decline in Canada.

Figure 1.5. Refugees admitted to OECD countries under resettlement programmes, 1975-2025

Thousands



Note: Some data presented may differ from statistics published previously due to retroactive changes or the inclusion of previously unavailable data. More information about UNHCR's resettlement programme can be found at https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/data-and-publications/unhcr-data.
Source: UNHCR, Eurostat.

StatLink https://stat.link/rc16fm

The United States, Canada and Australia have consistently been the main OECD countries for refugee resettlement. Together, they received more than 90% of the total number of refugees since 1975, with 65% for the United States alone, and 17% for Canada and 11% for Australia. The fourth main country over the period was Sweden with 2%.

With 39 000 arrivals, Canada was the main resettlement country in 2025, despite a 21% drop compared to 2024. Australia followed with 19 000 arrivals (+9%), and the United States ranked third after a 89% decrease to 12 000. Far behind was France (3 100, +38%) then New Zealand (1 500, -5%). All other countries received fewer than 1 000 resettled refugees.

In per capita terms, Canada and Australia were the top OECD destination countries in 2025. They received respectively 970 and 700 resettled refugees per million inhabitants, leading far ahead of New Zealand (280), Norway (120) and Finland (110). The ratio was under 100 in all other OECD countries and stood at 68 for the OECD area as a whole. If every OECD country resettled as many refugees per capita as Canada, the 2025 total would have stood at around 1.2 million refugees, more than 40% of the global resettlement needs estimated by the UNHCR at 2.9 million.

Free movement migration declined further in the EU-EFTA area

Long-term migration under free movement arrangements in the OECD continued to decline in 2025. In OECD EU-EFTA countries, free-movement migration fell by 6% to 962 000 migrants in 2025, following an 8% decline in 2024. Despite some variation across countries, flows remained below pre-pandemic levels.

Among the main destinations, free-movement migration decreased in Germany (- 10%), the Netherlands (-5%), Sweden (-14%), Ireland (-7%) and Belgium (-8%). In contrast, a small number of countries recorded increases, including Slovenia (+12%), the Slovak Republic (+9%), Czechia (+8%) and Switzerland (+1%).

Migration under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement remained more or less stable. Arrivals from New Zealand to Australia were broadly unchanged at 29 000, while migration from Australia to New Zealand increased by 14% to almost 3 700, although remaining below pre-pandemic levels.

Temporary labour migration

In total, approximately 2.2 million foreign workers were granted temporary authorisations or work permits in OECD countries (excluding Poland and Israel) in 2025. This represents a 4% decrease compared with the peak reached in 2023 and 2024. Nevertheless, the 2025 level remained 19% higher than in 2019 (1.87 million) (see Box 1.4 on methodology).

Box 1.4. OECD Temporary labour migration statistics

Temporary labour migration to OECD countries typically reflects short-term fluctuations in demand for labour and skills. Across the OECD, there is significant diversity in temporary migration channels and programmes, which target various types of workers and sectors, and offer differing durations of stay and entry conditions.


The statistics presented in this section aim to be as comprehensive as possible, within the limits of data availability. First, the section covers categories of temporary workers commonly found across OECD countries, including trainees, skilled workers (such as intra-company transferees), researchers, post-doctoral researchers, seasonal workers, and participants in youth exchange programmes (e.g. working holiday makers). Second, it examines the largest country-specific temporary foreign worker programmes. The specific case of posted workers within the EU/EFTA free movement area is discussed at the end of this section.

Data on temporary labour migration do not cover temporary authorisations delivered pending grant of a permanent permit, nor authorisations pending change of employment status (job seeker) or legal status (asylum seekers). Programmes for Ukrainians fleeing the war of Russia against Ukraine are also not included. Short-term mobility in free mobility areas other than posted workers in the EU/EFTA is also not included.

It is also important to note that comparable data are not available for Poland and Israel which are however important receiving countries of foreign temporary workers. The national statistics for Poland tend to overestimate migration flows by including a large number of work authorisations and permits that do not lead to actual arrivals, as well as new permits issued to workers who are already in Poland (Box 1.5).

Data on temporary labour migration to Israel now only cover bilateral agreements in specific sectors and are not necessarily comparable to previous years when most of temporary labour migration was linked to daily border crossings of foreign workers coming to Israel. Available data are described in Box 1.6.

Figure 1.6. Total flows of new temporary foreign workers to OECD countries, 2019-2025



Note: Excluding Poland and Israel.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2hv.

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In 2025, nearly three-quarters (73%) of temporary labour migrants to OECD countries went to the top four OECD destinations: the United States, Australia, Japan and Korea. The United States alone received more than one-third (37%) of all temporary labour migrants, while Australia, Japan and Korea accounted for 14%, 13% and 9%, respectively. Compared with 2024, Canada's share fell markedly, from 9% in 2024 to 6% in 2025, following a 37% drop in inflows. This decline coincided with significant adjustments to the *Temporary Foreign Worker Program* and the *International Mobility Program* in 2025 and 2026.

Compared with 2024, inflows also declined in the United States (-3%) while they increased by 9% in Japan. Flows were relatively stable in other major receiving countries (Australia, Korea, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). Despite these recent developments, temporary labour migration levels in 2025 remained above pre-pandemic levels in these destination countries, with the notable exception of Canada (-2% compared with 2019 levels) and New Zealand (-25%). Compared with 2019, inflows were 80% higher in Korea, 26% in the United Kingdom, 19% higher in Japan, 17% higher in the United States and in Australia.

EU/EFTA OECD countries welcomed around 16% of all new temporary foreign workers, excluding those moving freely within the EU/EFTA area. While this share remained virtually unchanged from 2024, aggregate figures masked increasingly divergent trends across countries.

In the EU/EFTA area, temporary labour migration decreased by 4% compared with 2024 but remained 39% above its 2019 level. This aggregate trend masks substantial divergence across countries. Italy recorded the strongest growth among major EU destinations, with inflows increasing by 23% from 2024 and more than fourfold (+306%) compared with 2019. Flows to Austria (+17%) and Germany (+8%) have been growing since 2021. By contrast, inflows to Spain fell by 17% from their exceptionally high 2024 level, although they remained almost four times higher than in 2019 (+272%). Flows to France remained stable relative to 2024 but stood 18% above their 2019 level. These contrasting developments suggest that the

recent expansion of temporary labour migration in the EU/EFTA area has become increasingly uneven across destination countries, partly reflecting differing labour market conditions and employer demand.

Temporary labour migration by selected category

Seasonal migration programmes are a major channel of temporary labour migration in OECD countries. In 2025, the number of seasonal workers continued to grow, with around 681 000 new permits issued (excluding Poland and Israel), a 3% increase compared to 2024 and 64% higher than in 2019.


The United States received two-thirds of all seasonal foreign workers in OECD countries, granting 315 000 new H-2A visas in agriculture in 2025 (compared with 314 000 in 2024) and 139 000 H-2B visas for non-agricultural seasonal and other temporary needs (such as one-time occurrence, peak-load or intermittent needs) against 136 000 the previous year. The next top destinations for seasonal work were Korea and the United Kingdom.

Seasonal migration increased in several OECD countries in 2025. While growth remained modest in the United States (+1%), it was much stronger in Korea (+49%). Korea's seasonal worker programme, introduced in 2021 to address labour shortages in agriculture and fisheries, continued to expand rapidly, reaching almost 70 000 visas in 2025, up from approximately 47 000 in 2024.

Developments across European OECD countries were uneven in 2025. Among the main destinations, seasonal migration increased further in Italy and Germany (+23%), Austria (+19%), Norway (+18%) and the United Kingdom (+10%). Italy recorded more than 20 000 seasonal permits, almost five times the 2019 level, reflecting the expansion of quotas under the 2023-2025 *Decreto Flussi programme,* although admissions remained below the quota ceiling. Conversely, arrivals declined markedly in Spain (-67%), France (-28%) and Canada (-24%). However, in Spain, the decline mainly reflects the introduction of multi-year seasonal permits under the 2025 GECCO Order, reducing the need for new permit issuances. In selected Northern and Central European countries, seasonal labour migration remained well below pre-pandemic levels, particularly in Sweden (-88% relative to 2019), Estonia (-82%), Finland (-68%) and Czechia (-59%).

Outside Europe, seasonal migration remained broadly stable in Australia at around 23 000 permits, while New Zealand recorded a decline (-8%) and Mexico a sharper decrease (-30% to 5 000) after a peak reached in 2024.

Figure 1.7. Inflows of temporary labour migrants to the OECD, main programmes and top receiving countries, 2019-2025



Note: Exclude renewals except in Australia and France (seasonal). Data for Korea include re-entries. EU include Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2hv.

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Working Holiday Maker (WHM) programmes are exchange programmes that allow young people to travel, work, and study in another country while experiencing its culture and lifestyle. In some OECD countries, especially Australia and New Zealand, WHMs play an important role in sectors like agriculture, hospitality, and retail.

In 2025, the number of WHMs arriving in OECD countries fell by 3% to 459 000. The decline was driven mainly by lower inflows to Canada (-15%), the United Kingdom (-13%), New Zealand (-8%) and the United States (-2%), while numbers remained broadly stable in Australia and continued to increase in Japan (+11%). Despite the decline in 2025, WHM inflows across the OECD remained slightly above their pre-pandemic level (+3% compared with 2019).

Australia continued to host by far the largest number of WHMs, accounting for 46% of the OECD total, with 211 000 arrivals in 2025. WHM arrivals in 2025 were above their 2019 levels in Australia, Japan and Korea (+25% each), Italy (+23%) and the United Kingdom (+5%). By contrast, participation remained below

pre-pandemic levels in New Zealand (-25%), Canada (-18%), Belgium (-15%), the United States (-4%) and France (-3%).

In the case of New Zealand, the decline in WHM flows in 2025 can be attributed to rising employment rates and a substantial tightening of labour market conditions. Recent policy changes imposing stricter requirements are expected to reinforce this trend and contribute to a further decline in 2026. In Canada, while broader restrictions on some temporary migration pathways were introduced in 2025, the impact on WHM flows appears to have been driven primarily by reduced International Experience Canada (IEC) quotas for several partner countries rather than by direct restrictions on the Working Holiday programme itself.

Trainee programmes aim to facilitate short-term skills transfers and promote familiarity with specific processes or equipment. Their main goal is not to fill regular job positions, but to enhance the knowledge and capabilities of trainees. In most OECD countries, these programmes operate on a relatively small scale. Notable exceptions include Japan, by far the leading destination for foreign trainees, as well as Korea and, more recently, Spain.

The total number of new foreign trainees across the OECD is stable since 2023 at around 291 000 new authorisations. Japan hosted nearly 60% of all foreign trainees, nearly all through its Technical Intern Trainee Programme.

Spain launched a new trainee programme in 2022. However, rather than recruiting trainees from abroad, it allows migrants in an irregular situation who have lived in the country for at least two years to regularise their status by enrolling in education or training. In 2025, 40 000 individuals regularised their stay through this programme, -22% compared to 2024.

Intra-company transferee (ICT) programmes allow multinational companies to transfer key employees between offices in different countries. These transfers are typically reserved for staff who have been with the company for at least one year. Depending on the country, the permitted duration of stay varies: from one to three years under the EU Directive, up to seven years with the L-1 visa in the United States, and with no fixed limit in Japan and Korea.

In 2025, the number of new intra-company transferees in OECD countries continued to decline for the third year in a row. A total of 122 000 ICTs were registered, 4% fewer than in 2024 and 17% fewer than in 2019. This decline was consistent across the main destination countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, with the notable exception of Japan (+4% each).

Other national temporary foreign worker programmes in OECD countries cover a wide range of skill levels and sectors. These include programmes for researchers, post-doctoral fellows, and au pairs, as well as initiatives targeting specific occupations or industries. While the structure and focus of these programmes vary by country, they all aim to meet particular labour market needs and support international mobility.

After strong growth in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of new migrants entering OECD countries through national temporary foreign worker programmes began to decline in 2024 after reaching a peak of 835 000 in 2023. A further decline of 12% was recorded in 2025, bringing the total to 680 000 entries. Despite this decrease, inflows remained slightly above their pre-pandemic level (+7% compared with 2019).

The overall decline in 2025 was driven primarily by sharp reductions in Canada (-45%), Korea (-24%) and the United States (-12%). In Canada, the decline to 81 000 admissions of other temporary foreign workers follows a series of policy measures introduced since 2024 to reduce the number of temporary residents, including tighter conditions under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program and new targets to lower the share of temporary residents in the population. In Korea, entries fell to 76 600, 24% below their 2024 level

and 27% below 2019 levels. The decline reflects reduced demand under the Employment Permit System, particularly under the E-9 visa for unskilled employment.

Australia and New Zealand, which had both experienced exceptionally strong post-pandemic growth, remained below their 2023 peaks. Australia admitted 76 000 other temporary foreign workers in 2025, broadly unchanged from 2024 and 7% below its 2019 level. In New Zealand, inflows increased by 12% to 40 600 after a steep decline in 2024, although they remained 37% below 2019 levels.

By contrast, other temporary labour migration continued to expand in several other OECD countries. Japan recorded the largest increase among major destination countries, with entries rising by 16% in 2025 to more than 85 000, nearly ten times the 2019 level. This growth was driven by the continued expansion of the Specified Skilled Worker System, introduced in 2019 to address labour shortages in designated sectors. The number of temporary foreign workers also increased substantially in Spain (+22%) and France (+19%). In those two countries, these increases extend a strong upward trend observed since 2021 and follow already marked growth recorded in 2024.

Among OECD countries with available data, Japan recorded the strongest growth relative to pre-pandemic levels (+88%), followed by Spain (+338%). France (+56%), Luxembourg (+61%) and Austria (+45%) also admitted considerably more temporary foreign workers than in 2019. Conversely, inflows remained well below pre-pandemic levels in Estonia (-86%), Ireland (-96%), Italy (-94%) and New Zealand.

Box 1.5. Trends in temporary labour migration to Poland 2019-2025

Channels for temporary labour migration in Poland

Third-country nationals are generally required to obtain a standard work permit in order to be legally employed in Poland. However, citizens of five countries (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) benefit from a simplified employment procedure ("declaration") to work temporarily in Poland. These declarations do not cover seasonal work, which requires a separate type of authorisation. Russian citizens became ineligible for this procedure in October 2022.

Furthermore, in response to the war of Russia against Ukraine, a new procedure, an "entrusting work notification", was introduced in March 2022 for Ukrainian nationals. It facilitates access to the Polish labour market for Ukrainians fleeing the conflict, as well as for those already residing in Poland. This has since become the main route for Ukrainians seeking employment in Poland.

Data limitations

The statistics presented in this box should be interpreted with caution due to several important limitations. First, work permit statistics include not only new permits but also renewals, which are excluded from OECD harmonised statistics. Second, a significant proportion of newly issued work permits (approximately 25% in 2023) are later repealed, mainly because the foreign worker does not take up the job within three months of the permit's start date. Third, each time a Ukrainian worker changes jobs, a new "entrusting work" notification is issued, leading to potential double counting. While 1.1 million such notifications had been registered in 2023, it was estimated that only 358 000 Ukrainians were actually newly employed in Poland under this procedure as of end of 2023. A more recent estimation of this share is not currently available.


Temporary labour migration to Poland decreased further in 2025

In 2025, temporary labour migration to Poland continued to decline across most admission channels. The number of declarations for employment exceeding 90 days fell by a further 23% to 324 000, following a 15% decrease in 2024. In contrast, notifications of entrusting work to Ukrainian nationals

under the March 2022 Special Law increased slightly by 3% to 1.03 million, remaining the largest channel for temporary labour migration. The number of work permits issued dropped sharply by 55% to 145 000, after having remained broadly stable in 2024. Seasonal work registrations partially recovered, rising by 25% to 10 200, but remained well below pre-pandemic levels. Compared with 2019, declarations for employment exceeding 90 days were less than one-third of their pre-pandemic volume, while seasonal employment also remained considerably lower (Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.8. New work authorisations granted in Poland, 2019-2025

Thousands



Note: Grants of work authorisations (including some renewals and work changes). Some of the workers have not yet entered Poland. The maximum duration of employment under a declaration was extended from 6 to 24 months in January 2022 which has contributed to a slowdown in the issuance of new declarations.
Source: Calculations from the OECD Secretariat based on national data.

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Box 1.6. Trends in temporary labour migration to Israel

Israel publishes extensive administrative statistics on foreign workers through the Population and Immigration Authority, covering stocks and flows of temporary migrant workers by sector, quotas, permits issued and renewed, entries and departures, legal and irregular status, and recruitment channels. Israel has also historically published the number of permits issued to Palestinians to work in Israel under daily-entry schemes. This provides a relatively detailed picture of the labour migration system, particularly in sectors that rely heavily on non-Israeli labour such as construction, agriculture, and caregiving, as well as other sectors where foreign workers are now being admitted such as manufacturing and hospitality.

Until October 2023, a substantial share of labour demand, especially in construction and agriculture, was met through Palestinian daily workers. Following the outbreak of the war in October 2023, access for these workers was largely suspended and employment levels collapsed. The policy response focussed on expanding quotas for foreign workers and accelerating their recruitment. Consequently,

labour shortages that had previously been filled through cross-border commuting increasingly became filled by foreign workers entering Israel with temporary work permits.

This replacement, as well as an increase in the total foreign workforce, is apparent in trends since late 2023. Palestinian daily workers, who numbered as many as 150 000 in 2022, are now largely absent, while temporary foreign workers have increased. The stock of temporary foreign workers increased from 129 183 at the end of 2022 to 227 583 at the end of 2025.

Posted workers within the European OECD area

In European OECD countries, *posted workers* are employees or self-employed workers who carry out their activity in another member country while staying affiliated with the social security system of their country of residence. When workers are posted to a single country, the posting cannot exceed 24 months (EC No 987/2009 Article 12), whereas there is no time limit for workers posted to two or more countries (EC No 987/2009 Article 13), mostly used in transportation. Flows of posted workers to and from the United Kingdom continue to be registered post-Brexit, in accordance with the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) signed by the EU and the United Kingdom at the end of 2020. This section covers postings of workers in European OECD countries.


After a sharp decline in single-country postings (under Article 12) during the COVID-19 period, flows to European OECD countries rebounded strongly, increasing by 32% in 2022 and a further 17% in 2023, bringing levels close to the 2019 peak. Growth continued in 2024, albeit at a more moderate pace, with postings increasing by around 5% to reach approximately 3.46 million, above the 2019 peak.

An additional 1.62 million postings, covering around 1.1 million workers, were issued to those active in two or more countries (under Article 13) in 2024, 2% more than in 2023. The majority of these Art. 13 postings concern transportation and storage, information and communication, and road freight transport. The main sending countries were Poland, Italy, Spain, followed by Germany and Lithuania, which together accounted for nearly 60% of postings. Trends diverged between 2023 and 2024 among these five top sending countries: postings increased by over 2.5% in the three leading countries, but declined in the two following ones, by 4.3% in Germany and by 1.1% in Lithuania.

In 2024, as in previous years, Germany remained the main receiving country for posted workers to a single country (508 200 postings), followed by France (472 000) and Austria (329 400). The composition of the next group of destination countries evolved compared with 2023, with the Netherlands (253 500) overtaking Belgium, while Switzerland (261 000) consolidated its position among the top five. While Germany continues to be the largest destination, inflows declined by around 7% compared to 2023. By contrast, France recorded a strong increase of about 26%, reaching its highest level to date and narrowing the gap with Germany.

Among the main destinations, Austria and Belgium registered slight declines (around -1% each), suggesting a stabilisation after strong post-pandemic rebounds. In contrast, several countries exhibited robust growth in 2024, notably Spain (+24%), Switzerland (+24%) and the Netherlands (+31%), pointing to continued dynamism and a gradual rebalancing of destination patterns across European OECD countries.

Figure 1.9. Posting of workers active in a single country under Article 12 in top receiving European OECD countries, 2010-2024



Source: European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet (2026[1]), "Posting of workers – Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2024", https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/4941289.

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In 2024, the average duration of postings decreased in the main receiving countries to reach 40 days on average across the 22 sending countries with available data (compared with 65 days in 2023). The average full-year equivalent (FYE) number of postings in European OECD countries decreased markedly in 2024 to around 415 600, compared to 610 100 in 2023 and 537 000 in 2022. This decline reflects the sharp increase in the number of short-duration postings, even as total posting volumes continued to rise.

Data on the average duration of postings are available by sending country and continue to show substantial heterogeneity, ranging from fewer than 40 days in Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg to more than 150 days in Czechia, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland and Norway in 2024.

When applying these durations by receiving country – assuming that postings from a given sending country have the same duration across all destinations – Germany remained by far the leading receiving country in 2024, with about 123 000 FYE postings. It was followed by France (52 300), while a second group of countries shows closer levels: the Netherlands (28 900) and Belgium (28 600), ahead of Austria (26 300) and Spain (23 100). Italy (21 800) and Switzerland (18 200) also account for significant volumes in FYE terms.

Table 1.2. Postings active in a single country under Article 12, by receiving countries, 2024

Full-year equivalent (FYE) numbers of postings and top 3 sending countries

Receiving country	Postings in 2024 (thousands)	FYE Postings in 2024 (thousands)	Top 3 sending countries in 2024
Austria	329.4	26.3	Germany, the Slovak Republic, Poland
Belgium	229.3	28.6	Poland, Portugal, Germany
Czechia	107.9	9.5	Germany, the Slovak Republic, Poland
Denmark	54.7	5.7	Germany, Poland, Spain
Estonia	6.5	1.0	Poland, Latvia, Germany
Finland	34.3	4.7	Germany, Poland, Estonia
France	471.9	52.3	Germany, Spain, Poland
Germany	508.2	123.0	Poland, Croatia, the Slovak Republic
Greece	34.3	3.2	Germany, Spain, Italy
Hungary	76.4	7.2	Germany, Poland, the Slovak Republic
Iceland	2.2	0.3	Poland, Germany, Lithuania
Ireland	22.3	2.2	Germany, Spain, Poland
Italy	225.2	21.8	Germany, Spain, Croatia
Latvia	8.1	1.0	Poland, Germany, Lithuania
Lithuania	9.8	1.3	Poland, Germany, Latvia
Luxembourg	53.4	4.2	Germany, Belgium, France
Netherlands	253.5	28.9	Poland, Germany, Belgium
Norway	18.4	3.3	Lithuania, Poland, Spain
Poland	115.5	8.3	Germany, Spain, Italy
Portugal	80.8	9.3	Spain, Germany, Poland
Slovak Republic	39.7	3.7	Germany, Poland, Czechia
Slovenia	22.2	4.1	Croatia, Germany, Austria
Spain	236.1	23.1	Germany, Portugal, Italy
Sweden	95	12.9	Poland, Germany, Lithuania
Switzerland	261.0	18.2	Germany, Italy, Austria
United Kingdom	139.2	11.7	Germany, Spain, Poland
Total OECD Europe	**3 435.4**	**415.6**	**Germany, Italy, Poland**
Bulgaria	15.8	1.2	Germany, Poland, Spain
Croatia	33.0	3.5	Germany, Slovenia, Poland
Romania	47.4	4.0	Germany, Spain, Poland

Note: Data on the duration of postings is collected by the sending country and is available for only 20 European OECD countries. For all other OECD countries lacking this information, an average posting duration of 65 days per year is applied. To estimate full-year equivalent (FYE) postings by receiving country, it is assumed that postings from a given sending country have the same average duration across all destination countries.

Source: Calculation from the Secretariat based on European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet (2026[1]), "Posting of workers – Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2024", https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/4941289.

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Germany remains the main sending country for most European OECD destinations, although Poland is the primary source of postings for several countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, as in previous years. Overall, the 2024 figures confirm that, despite record-high posting volumes, the effective labour input measured in FYE terms has declined, pointing to shorter or more fragmented postings.

In 2024, the increase in single-country postings was driven by services (+13%), while industry remained stable compared with 2023 and agriculture dropped by 14%. Industry accounted for 1.27 million postings

(49% of the total), including about 14% in construction (368 000 postings). Services represented a similar share, at 1.30 million postings (50%), while agriculture remained marginal at just over 0.5%.

Within services, the largest component remained financial, administrative and professional activities, accounting for roughly 18% of total postings, followed by education, health and social services (around 18%) and transport and information and communication (about 7%), a large part of which is road freight transport. Compared to 2023, growth in service postings was particularly driven by education, health and social activities (+18%) and transport-related postings expanded more strongly (+20%), reflecting continued demand in logistics. Financial and business services increased at a slower pace (+4%).

Sectoral specialisation across sending countries remains pronounced in 2024, but some shifts are visible. Construction continues to dominate postings from many Central and Eastern European OECD countries, often accounting for close to or more than 40% of industry postings. In Germany, services now slightly exceed industry overall. Service-oriented patterns persist in Belgium, France and Luxembourg, particularly in financial and professional activities. In 2024, Belgium also continues to stand out for temporary agency work, while both Belgium and France maintain sizeable postings in education and health services. Poland remains a key and highly diversified sending country, with large volumes spanning construction, transport (including road freight) and administrative services. Some smaller sending countries show more marked specialisation: for example, Lithuania remains strongly concentrated in accommodation and food services, while Slovenia and the Slovak Republic continue to be heavily oriented towards construction within industry.

A growing share of intra-EU/EFTA posted workers are third-country nationals (TCNs), that is, non-EU nationals who legally reside and work in an EU Member State before being temporarily posted to another Member State. Recent evidence suggests that the posting of TCNs is becoming a structural feature of EU labour mobility, particularly in sectors facing persistent labour shortages such as road freight transport, construction, agriculture, live-in care, and other labour-intensive activities.

Across the 17 Member States for which data are available, TCNs represented on average around 19% of intra-EU postings. Data from national declaration systems show that France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria are important destination countries for posted TCNs. In 2024, Belgium and France received more than 45 000 posted TCNs, followed by the Netherlands (around 26 000) and Austria (16 000). In all four countries, TCNs represented a substantial share of total incoming postings, accounting for between 15% and 26% of all posted workers.

The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Netherlands, where more than one-quarter of all incoming posted workers were TCNs in 2024 and where almost half of notified TCN postings in 2023 exceeded 90 days. TCNs posted to the Netherlands are predominantly Ukrainians and Belarusians sent by companies established in Poland and Lithuania, notably in road freight transport, logistics, agriculture and related sectors.

In Belgium, the number of posted TCNs more than quadrupled between 2016 and 2024. The largest nationality groups are Ukrainians, Brazilians and Belarusians, mainly posted from Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia and Portugal. In France, posted TCNs are predominantly sent from Spain and Portugal and include large numbers of Brazilians, Ukrainians, Moroccans and Senegalese. Moroccan and Senegalese workers are especially represented in agricultural postings from Spain to France.

The available evidence points to a strong concentration of posted TCNs within a limited number of sending countries. Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia play a particularly important role. In Poland, the number of A1 Portable Documents issued to TCNs increased almost fourfold between 2020 and 2024, reaching nearly 200 000, with most TCNs employed in road freight transport, construction and live-in care. Ukrainians account for the largest nationality group. In Lithuania, TCNs, mainly Belarusians and Ukrainians, dominate the road transport sector, representing around 86% of workers active in international transport with an A1


portable document issued under Article 13. In Slovenia, approximately six out of ten posted workers are TCNs, mainly citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina employed in construction.

In 2024, one-third of all posted drivers recorded in the EU Road Transport Posting Declaration Portal were TCNs. Among posted drivers from Poland, 46% were TCNs, primarily Ukrainians and Belarusians, while in Lithuania the share reached 84%, reflecting the sector's heavy reliance on migrant workers from neighbouring third countries.

International students

Recent data point to a shift in the geography of international student inflows across OECD countries. Following the strong post-pandemic recovery, inflows of international tertiary students peaked at 2.1 million in 2023 before declining to 1.9 million in 2024 and 1.6 million in 2025. Despite this moderation, inflows remained above pre-pandemic levels. The decline was concentrated in a number of traditional English-speaking destinations, notably the United States, Canada and Australia, while inflows to EU-EFTA countries continued to increase and reached their highest level in the series in 2025. While international student inflows to the United Kingdom remained broadly stable in 2025, declining inflows to the United States led the United Kingdom to become the largest OECD destination country for new international tertiary students (Figure 1.10).

Figure 1.10. International student flows to the OECD, 2015-2025



Note: EU-EFTA excludes the United Kingdom for the full period.
Source: OECD (2026), Standardised inflows of temporary migrants (dataset), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2hv.

StatLink https://stat.link/7a23us

Country-level data reveal substantial differences across destinations (Table 1.3). Between 2024 and 2025, inflows fell sharply in the United States (-33%), Canada (-57%) and Australia (-13%), while remaining broadly stable in the United Kingdom (+4%). The declines observed in several major destination countries occurred against a backdrop of recent policy changes intended to moderate international student inflows. At the same time, several European countries continued to attract growing numbers of international students, notably Italy (+76%), Germany (+45%) and Austria (+26%). France reached a record level of almost 110 000 new international students in 2025. Beyond Europe, inflows continued to rise in Japan (+5%) and Korea (+13%). Together, these developments point to an increasingly diversified landscape of international student mobility across the OECD, with growth spreading beyond the traditional major English-speaking destinations.

Table 1.3. Inflows of international tertiary-level students in OECD countries, 2015, 2017 and 2019-2025

Number of first residence permits issued in thousands

	2015	2017	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2025/24	2025/19
	Thousands									Change (%)	
Australia	115.3	144.2	155.6	73.5	59.2	189.0	234.6	181.9	157.7	-13	1
Austria	5.9	4.1	3.6	2.2	4.0	4.1	5.5	5.8	7.4	28	106
Belgium	5.8	6.2	8.0	5.5	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.8	10.5	7	31
Canada	84.1	134.6	171.2	50.7	214.8	275.1	350.9	212.6	90.8	-57	-47
Czechia	4.6	3.8	4.1	6.1	5.0	7.4	5.9	5.0	4.5	-10	10
Denmark	8.2	8.9	7.5	4.5	4.7	8.9	10.1	11.5	10.4	-10	39
Estonia	1.1	1.4	1.5	0.7	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	-67
Finland	5.9	5.2	5.2	3.2	5.8	8.4	12.8	12.2	10.5	-14	102
France	67.7	78.1	86.4	70.9	86.6	98.3	104.0	103.8	109.5	5	27
Germany	13.5	39.5	55.2	37.9	53.4	64.6	63.0	51.4	74.3	45	35
Greece	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0	0
Hungary	5.8	10.8	10.0	9.0	9.6	10.1	11.3	19.6	21.0	7	110
Iceland	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	..	..	..
Ireland	21.3	20.2	25.5	9.9	12.7	32.2	29.4	29.4	28.4	-3	11
Italy	21.4	17.1	20.3	8.5	17.5	25.1	27.4	20.1	35.3	76	74
Japan	99.6	123.2	121.6	49.7	11.7	167.1	139.6	167.1	176.1	5	45
Korea	23.4	28.2	35.3	28.3	38.6	57.2	47.7	55.6	63.0	13	78
Latvia	1.1	1.6	2.4	1.2	1.3	1.8	3.2	2.9	3.0	3	25
Lithuania	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.5	2.7	4.7	5.9	6.8	15	325
Luxembourg	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	25
Mexico	6.8	3.7	5.8	2.9	4.6	7.1	5.6	4.4	4.7	7	-19
Netherlands	15.3	17.2	20.2	11.6	19.6	21.9	22.9	21.9	21.1	-4	4
New Zealand	29.9	24.9	23.4	5.6	0.8	10.3	20.6	24.5	22.9	-7	-2
Norway	3.7	3.8	4.0	2.2	3.7	4.2	2.9	3.0	3.2	7	-20
Poland	29.8	21.6	6.1	16.3	27.1	23.8	21.3	15.8	13.7	-13	125
Portugal	2.7	4.1	13.3	12.3	10.9	9.7	23.8	16.6	11.4	-31	-14
Slovak Republic	1.3	1.8	2.9	2.3	2.7	3.4	4.2	2.8	6.0	114	107
Slovenia	1.1	1.7	2.6	2.0	1.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5	0	35
Spain	31.2	39.2	44.9	22.2	44.2	51.9	65.4	69.6	66.5	-4	48
Sweden	9.7	10.9	11.4	7.0	9.0	9.9	10.4	11.9	11.4	-4	0
Switzerland	6.1	5.8	6.0	5.4	6.1	6.3	6.7	6.3	6.1	-3	2
United Kingdom	245.3	305.8	376.1	221.9	367.5	476.1	446.7	383.6	398.3	4	6
United States	644.2	393.6	363.6	102.8	399.0	409.2	442.4	389.9	259.8	-33	-29
Total OECD	**1 513.5**	**1 463.8**	**1 596.6**	**778.8**	**1 435.7**	**1999.2**	**2 137.0**	**1 850.4**	**1 638.9**	**-11**	**3**
Total EU/EFTA	**264.9**	**305.5**	**343.9**	**243.2**	**339.4**	**408.1**	**448.9**	**430.9**	**465.6**	**8**	**35**

Source: OECD (2026), Standardised inflows of temporary migrants (dataset), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2hv.

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Although recent international student inflows have seen a declining trend in the past two years, the stock of international students enrolled in OECD countries continued to increase in 2024, reflecting the cumulative effect of strong inflows in previous years. The number of international students enrolled in OECD countries reached 5.5 million in 2024 (Table 1.4), up 8% from 2023. International students continued to be highly concentrated in a small number of destination countries. The United States remained the largest host country, with just over 1 million international students, followed by the United Kingdom (721 000), Australia (580 000), Canada (481 000) and Germany (438 000). Together, these five countries hosted almost 60% of all international tertiary students enrolled across the OECD. Australia and Canada recorded the strongest increases in enrolment numbers compared with 2023.

International students are disproportionately represented at higher levels of tertiary education. On average across OECD countries, they accounted for 11% of all tertiary enrolments, compared with 18% at the master's level and 25% at the doctoral level. In around two-thirds of OECD countries, international students accounted for at least one-fifth of doctoral enrolments, and in several countries for over 40%, highlighting the international nature of advanced education and research training. This concentration is particularly pronounced in countries such as Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, Austria and the United Kingdom.

Table 1.4. International tertiary-level students enrolled in OECD countries, 2024

	Thousands	International students (as percentage of all students)		
		Total tertiary education	Masters' level	Doctoral level
Australia	580	32	58	40
Austria	92	21	28	42
Belgium	49	9	12	16
Canada	481	25	25	39
Chile	22	2	4	21
Colombia	9	0	1	2
Costa Rica	m.	m.	m.	m.
Czechia	57	17	19	28
Denmark	29	10	21	39
Estonia	4	10	14	35
Finland	36	11	14	30
France	285	10	14	35
Germany	438	13	21	25
Greece	23	3	1	2
Hungary	43	14	22	29
Iceland	2	11	13	43
Ireland	35	14	33	42
Israel	13	3	5	14
Italy	123	5	7	15
Japan	184	5	10	25
Korea	144	5	14	21
Latvia	10	14	34	7
Lithuania	11	11	17	10
Luxembourg	4	51	78	89
Mexico	110	2	7	13
Netherlands	176	18	27	m.
New Zealand	44	18	46	46
Norway	13	4	6	26
Poland	95	7	6	3
Portugal	55	13	19	32
Slovak Republic	22	16	14	14
Slovenia	9	12	12	24
Spain	114	5	11	20
Sweden	36	7	13	37
Switzerland	68	20	33	59
Türkiye	336	5	9	10
United Kingdom	721	23	50	40
United States	1 006	5	11	40
OECD Europe total	**2 550**	**13**	**21**	**30**
OECD Total	**5 479**	**12**	**20**	**28**


Note: Data for Canada, Colombia, Hungary, Korea, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye and the United States refer to foreign students instead of. international students. Data for doctoral students not available for the Netherlands. Shares of all students (in percentage) are simple averages of individual country shares.

Source: OECD (2026[2]), *Education at a Glance 2026: OECD Indicators*, https://doi.org/10.1787/b4968bbc-en.

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China and India remained by far the largest countries of origin of international students enrolled in OECD countries in 2024 (Figure 1.11). China continued to rank first, with approximately 850 000 students, while India was approaching a similar level, with 829 000 students. The gap between the two countries narrowed considerably over the past decade, as the number of Indian students nearly quadrupled between 2015 and 2024, whereas growth among Chinese students was more moderate. India also recorded particularly strong growth (about 17%) compared with 2023. Beyond China and India, other Asian countries continued to gain prominence among the main origin countries. Notably, Nepal and Pakistan overtook France and Germany among the largest origin countries compared with 2023, underscoring the growing importance of Asian countries in international student mobility to OECD destinations.

Figure 1.11. Top 20 nationalities of international tertiary-level students enrolled in OECD countries, 2015 and 2024



Note: Statistics refer to stocks of international students and exclude Erasmus students in European countries.
Source: OECD (2026[2]), *Education at a Glance 2026: OECD Indicators*, https://doi.org/10.1787/b4968bbc-en.

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Asylum seekers

In 2025, the number of new asylum applications in the OECD (excluding the United States) declined to about 1.1 million (-22% compared to 2024), although they remained around 10% higher than in 2019, confirming that demand for international protection is still at historically elevated levels.

In European OECD countries, applications fell to around 790 000 in 2025 (-23% compared to 2024, 1 million), while remaining above pre-pandemic levels. In other OECD countries, applications fell by around 20% to 292 000.


United States statistics are based on official data from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for affirmative claims and from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for defensive claims. In 2025, data cover the full year for defensive claims but only January to September 2025 for affirmative claims, and the latter are reported by cases instead of individuals. In 2024, only the first

semester is covered by both EOIR and USCIS data. As a result, the 2025/24 trend cannot be presented for the United States and data is not aggregated to the rest of the OECD.

In 2024, for the first semester, 729 000 claims were reported. In 2025, excluding the affirmative claims for the last quarter, 912 000 claims were reported. Assuming the number of affirmative claims in Q4 2025 is the average of the first three-quarters, and assuming 1.5 individuals per case, we can anticipate that the number of asylum applications in the United States in 2025 is well above those observed prior to 2020 but is also significantly lower than in 2024.

Figure 1.12. New asylum applications since 1980 in the OECD

Thousands



Note: From 2021 on, Australian data are numbers of protection visa lodgements made onshore during the period (reported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs). Prior to 2021, Australian data are extracted from the UNHCR database.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs (from 2021 on).

StatLink https://stat.link/1sgf2r

Applications decreased in most OECD countries in 2025, with a few exceptions, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, Israel and Switzerland. After the United States, the top receiving countries, in absolute terms in 2025, were Spain (-15% to 141 100 in 2025), Italy (-16% to 126 600), France (-10% to 116 500) and Canada (-33% to 115 800) (Table 1.5 and Figure 1.13). Germany registered a sharp decline in new applications (-51% to 113 200), mainly driven by the drop in applications from Syria.

Outside the largest receivers, trends were mixed but generally negative. Several countries recorded very steep declines, including Austria (-44%), Greece (-20%), Türkiye (-28%), and Nordic countries such as Sweden (-27%) and Norway (-31%). Only 500 applications were registered in Chile, compared with 2 500 in 2024.

Table 1.5. New asylum applications by country where application is filed, 2019 and 2022-2025


	2019	2022	2023	2024	2025	% change: 2025 vs		Asylum seekers per million population (2025)	Top three origin countries of asylum seekers (2025)
						2019	2024		
Australia	27 407	13 400	22 900	24 756	22 970	-16	-7	868	IND, CHN, IDN
Austria	11 010	109 800	56 160	22 255	12 505	+14	-44	1 370	SYR, AFG, SOM
Belgium	23 140	32 140	29 305	32 710	27 540	+19	-16	2 351	PSE, ERI, AFG
Canada	58 339	94 374	146 729	173 931	115 838	+99	-33	2 948	HTI, IND, IRN
Chile	770	5 057	3 626	2 494	544	-29	-78	28	VEN, PSE, COL
Colombia	10 621	5 530	5 791	7 051	8 244	-22	+17	158	VEN, CUB, ECU
Costa Rica	59 180	129 482	34 643	28 277	29 559	-50	+5	5 790	NIC, CUB, VEN
Czechia	1 575	1 335	1 135	1 035	935	-41	-10	86	VNM, UKR, UZB
Denmark	2 645	4 505	2 380	2 210	1 865	-29	-16	314	ERI, AFG, SYR
Estonia	100	2 940	3 980	1 330	1 005	+905	-24	735	UKR, RUS, BLR
Finland	2 455	4 835	4 465	2 275	1 970	-20	-13	352	AFG,SOM, IRQ
France	138 290	137 605	145 160	129 910	116 475	-16	-10	1 753	UKR, COD, AFG
Germany	142 510	217 775	329 120	229 750	113 235	-21	-51	1 339	AFG, SYR, TUR
Greece	74 915	29 135	57 900	68 995	55 380	-26	-20	5 407	AFG, EGY, SDN
Hungary	470	45	30	25	110	-77	+340	11	SYR, RUS, IRN
Iceland	805	4 530	4 120	1 860	1 660	+106	-11	4 283	UKR, PSE, VEN
Ireland	4 740	13 645	13 220	18 435	12 975	+174	-30	2 497	SOM, NGA, PAK
Israel	9 446	3 916	6 813	6 080	9 632	+2	+58	1 041	LKA, IND, ERI
Italy	35 005	77 200	130 565	151 120	126 635	+262	-16	2 128	BGD, PER, EGY
Japan	10 375	3 772	13 823	13 646	11 607	+12	-15	93	THA, MMR, IND
Korea	15 429	11 538	18 826	18 327	14 572	-6	-20	282	RUS, IND, KAZ
Latvia	180	545	1 625	800	1 290	+617	+61	685	SOM, AFG, ETH
Lithuania	625	905	510	295	330	-47	+12	116	BLR, SOM, UKR
Luxembourg	2 200	2 405	2 615	2 125	1 770	-20	-17	2 661	ERI, SYR, VEN
Mexico	70 363	118 735	140 979	78 966	70 482	+0	-11	543	CUB, VEN, HTI
Netherlands	22 540	35 530	38 370	32 000	24 115	+7	-25	1 333	SYR, ERI, TUR
New Zealand	539	337	1 721	2 387	2 058	+282	-14	398	IND, CHN, LKA
Norway	2 205	4 650	5 135	4 800	3 320	+51	-31	602	UKR, SYR, ERI
Poland	2 765	7 700	7 720	14 445	11 155	+303	-23	288	UKR, BLR, RUS
Portugal	1 735	1 980	2 600	2 675	1 755	+1	-34	168	COL, CHN, AGO
Slovak Republic	215	505	375	140	130	-40	-7	24	UKR, AFG, BLR
Slovenia	3 615	6 645	7 185	5 465	3 965	+10	-27	1 872	MAR, EGY, DZA
Spain	115 190	116 150	160 470	165 465	141 055	+22	-15	2 944	VEN, MLI, COL
Sweden	20 805	13 210	8 960	6 780	4 940	-76	-27	468	AFG, SYR, ERI
Switzerland	12 600	23 130	26 895	22 750	23 415	+86	+3	2 640	AFG, ERI, TUR
Türkiye	56 417	33 246	19 017	9 009	6 459	-89	-28	74	AFG, IRQ, IRN
United Kingdom	44 465	89 393	84 416	108 136	100 620	+126	-7	1 465	PAK, ERI, IRN
United States	300 931	730 399	1 176 051	*729 105 (S1)*	*911 952 (partial)*	..	..	..	..
OECD total	**1 286 617**	**2 088 024**	**2 715 335**						VEN, MEX, HTI
OECD total (excl. United States)	**985 686**	**1 357 625**	**1 539 284**	**1 392 710**	**1 082 115**	**+10**	**-22**		
Selected non-OECD countries									
Argentina	3 172	914	2 012	1 694	1 172	-63	-31	26	RUS, CUB, VEN
Brazil	82 464	50 332	58 613	68 152	75 585	-8	+11	358	CUB, VEN, COL
Bulgaria	2 075	20 260	22 390	12 130	3 800	+83	-69	559	MAR, AFG, SYR

	2019	2022	2023	2024	2025	% change: 2025 vs		Asylum seekers per million population (2025)	Top three origin countries of asylum seekers (2025)
						2019	2024		
Croatia	1 270	2 660	1 635	1 000	845	-33	-16	217	TUR, RUS, SYR
Indonesia	1 002	18	25	87	0	..	..	..	..
Peru	259 834	1 428	10 453	32 854	18 697	-93	-43	552	VEN, COL, CUB
Romania	2 455	12 065	9 875	2 265	1 145	-53	-49	60	SYR, PSE, IRQ
Thailand	721	637	1 505	1 636	964	+34	-41	13	PAK, VNM, AFG

Note: United States statistics are based on official data from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for affirmative claims and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for defensive claims. In 2025, the latter covers the full year, while the former covers January to September 2025 only and is reported by cases instead of individuals. In 2024, only the first semester is covered by EOIR and USCIS data.
From 2021 on, Australian data are numbers of protection visa lodgements made onshore during the period (reported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs). Prior to 2021, Australian data are extracted from the UNHCR database.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs (from 2021 on).

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Figure 1.13. New asylum applications in top OECD receiving countries, 2019-2025



Note: Refer to the note for Figure 1.12. Receiving countries are ranked according to the number of applications registered in 2025.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs (from 2021 on).

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
Only in a few European OECD countries did the number of applications increase in 2025 compared to 2024. These were notably Latvia (+61%), Lithuania (+12%) and Hungary (with very small numbers), while all other European OECD countries recorded declines. In contrast, compared to 2019, some countries still show substantial increases, including Ireland (+174%) and Poland (+303%), despite the drop in 2025.

In Mexico, applications fell by 11% in 2025 compared with 2024, remaining nonetheless at levels similar to 2019. The number of asylum applications declined sharply in Chile (−78%), while it increased slightly in Costa Rica (+5%) and further in Colombia (+17%), continuing the rebound observed. Compared to 2019, applications remain much lower in Costa Rica (−50%) and Chile (−29%) and also lower in Colombia (−22%).

In Japan and Korea, the number of applications decreased in 2025 (−15% and −20%, respectively) following earlier increases in 2022-2023. Compared to 2019, applications are slightly higher in Japan (+12%) but slightly lower in Korea (−6%).

Across the OECD as a whole, around 1 400 new asylum requests per million inhabitants were recorded in 2025. In per capita terms (Figure 1.14), Costa Rica received the most asylum seekers relative to its population in 2025 (5 790 per million), followed by Greece (5 400) and Iceland (4 300). Other countries with high rates included Canada and Spain (around 3 000 each), as well as Luxembourg (2 700). By contrast, Hungary and the Slovak Republic received the lowest ratio of registered new applicants per inhabitant, followed by Chile and Türkiye.

Figure 1.14. New asylum applications per million inhabitants, top and bottom 10 OECD receiving countries, 2025



Note: Refer to the note for Figure 1.12. Receiving countries are ranked according to the number of applications in 2025 per million inhabitants. The United States is not presented on this graph because data on new applications in 2025 are currently incomplete and are therefore not comparable with those reported by other OECD countries.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs (from 2021 on).

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The top origin countries for asylum applicants within the OECD in 2025 were Venezuela, Mexico and Haiti, followed by Afghanistan, Cuba and Colombia. In 2025, Syria and Colombia became relatively less prominent among the largest origin groups. Other important origin countries in 2025 included India, Bangladesh, Honduras and Syria, broadly consistent with the diversified origin structure observed in recent years.


The United States remained by far the main destination country for many of the largest origin groups (although 2025 data are incomplete for this country). In 2025, this concentration remained particularly strong for applicants from Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the vast majority of applications from Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Ecuador, and a large share from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba and Colombia, lodged in the United States.

In Spain, applicants remained highly concentrated, with Venezuelans continuing to represent the largest group (60%), complemented by other Latin American origins (Colombian applicants accounting for an additional 10%). Similarly, in Costa Rica, Nicaraguans account for a very large majority of applicants. In Germany and Greece, applicants from Afghanistan and Syria continued to represent a large share of total applications, although their dominance appears somewhat less pronounced than in 2024. In France and

the United Kingdom, the distribution of origin countries remains more mixed, with no single nationality accounting for a majority, reflecting a broader range of origin countries (Figure 1.15).

Figure 1.15. Two main origin countries of asylum seekers by country of asylum, 2025

Top 10 receiving OECD countries of asylum



Note: Receiving countries are ranked according to the number of applications in 2025. Data for the United States are presumably underestimated (Refer to the note for Figure 1.12 for more details).
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR, Eurostat, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs (from 2021 on).

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Overall, in European OECD countries (excluding Spain), asylum seekers tend to originate more from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. In 2025, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Syria were the top three origin countries for asylum applicants in this region. This marks a significant change compared to 2024, when Syria was by far the leading origin country, ahead of Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Applications from Syria dropped from about 144 000 in 2024 to just over 41 000 in 2025. Afghanistan became the main origin country, despite a moderate decline (-11% compared to 2024), while Bangladesh remained at historically high levels, even though it also recorded a slight decrease after several years of rapid growth. Applications from several African countries continued to increase in European OECD countries. Sudan experienced one of the strongest rises (from around 14 000 to over 22 000), while Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt all reached high or increasing levels.


Irregular migration and returns

Irregular migration covers the situations where migrants enter irregularly in a country or stay longer than they were allowed to at entry. Monitoring irregular migration is important to try and address the difficulties it creates for both migrants and countries of residence. Irregular entries and overstays are closely monitored by all OECD countries (Box 1.7). Data are usually available by migration route and/or by nationality. They show significant variation over time linked to changes in countries of origin and transit. Return statistics are also widely available for forced and voluntary assisted returns. This section covers both EU countries and selected other OECD countries.

Irregular border crossings

Irregular border crossings have continued to decrease in 2025 across OECD countries with available data. The number of detected irregular border crossings into the European Union has been declining since 2023, according to data published by Frontex (Figure 1.16). From 381 000 in 2023, they dropped to 240 000 (-37%) in 2024 and 162 000 in 2025 (-32%). In the first quarter of 2026, only 21 000 detections were reported, the lowest figure since Q2 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 crisis.

Figure 1.16. Quarterly detections of illegal border crossings in the EU and in the United Kingdom, 2020-2026



Source: Frontex, the United Kingdom Home Office.

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In the first quarter of 2026, 5 300 arrivals via illegal routes to the United Kingdom were detected, the lowest figure since Q1 2021. On average, 11 600 arrivals per quarter were detected in 2025, 7% more than in 2024. The vast majority were arrivals on small boats (vessels used by individuals who cross the English Channel). In 2025, they accounted for 90% of the total (85% in 2024).

In the United States, a total of 128 000 encounters were registered by the United States Border Patrol (USBP) compared to more than 1 million in 2024. In the first six months of 2026, 60 500 encounters were registered.

In Mexico, a very sharp decline was observed in the number of events concerning persons in an irregular situation. In 2025, only 155 700 were registered during the whole year, compared to 1.2 million in 2024 and 779 000 in 2023.

In Chile, the number of reports of irregular entry peaked in 2021, at 56 900, then gradually declined to stand at 26 300 in 2025, of which 19 000 citizens of Venezuela. Between 2022 and 2025, the number of irregular migrants apprehended in Türkiye also dropped from 285 000 to 160 000.

Box 1.7. Data sources and key limitations regarding irregular migration

Data on irregular migration presented in this section cover irregular entries, overstayers and returns, and are compiled from a variety of administrative and operational sources. In the EU, Frontex provides harmonised and timely data on detections of irregular crossings at external borders, enabling comparisons between countries. However, these figures refer to detection events rather than to unique individuals, meaning that repeated crossing attempts may result in double counting, particularly along land routes such as the Western Balkans. Differences in how national authorities report incidents – for example, whether they record each individual separately or as part of a group – and the possibility of undetected crossings – on land, particularly – further affect data comparability and completeness. Other OECD countries also have monitoring systems in place, like the United States, the United Kingdom, Türkiye and Mexico which regularly publish information on apprehensions and control measures.

Data on overstaying migrants are derived from reports produced by national immigration authorities such as Japan's Immigration Services Agency, Korea's Ministry of Justice and Australia's Department of Home Affairs. Differences in data collection methods, reporting standards, and definitions of "overstayer" across countries can affect the comparability of the statistics.


Returns of irregular migrants include forced returns (removals), voluntary returns, whether assisted (typically facilitated and financially supported by the receiving country) or unassisted, and independent returns. Data is generally collected by national immigration or border authorities and may distinguish returns by type, nationality or method of enforcement.

However, comparability across countries remains limited due to differing legal frameworks, definitions, enforcement practices, and reporting methods. Some data sources focus on returns following official removal orders, while others also include informal or voluntary departures not systematically tracked.

Overstayers

An overstayer is a person who remains in a country after the end of the period authorised by their entry visa. Irregular migration in Japan, Korea, but also New Zealand and Australia, consists mainly of overstayers. In January 2026 the stock of estimated overstayers in Japan was estimated at 68 500, down from 75 000 in 2024 and 80 000 in 2023 (Figure 1.17). The stock of overstayers in Korea declined by 10% in 2025, to 357 000. By April 2026 it had gone down a further 3% to 347 000.

Figure 1.17. Overstayers in Japan and Korea



Source: Ministry of Justice of Japan and Ministry of Justice of Korea.

StatLink https://stat.link/2jfiv4

According to an estimate by Immigration New Zealand (INZ) there were around 21 000 overstayers in New Zealand as of 1 July 2025. This number includes 2 600 citizens of Tonga, 2 600 Chinese citizens and 2 200 US citizens.


In Australia, the Department of Home Affairs estimated that 77 700 unlawful non-citizens were living in the country as of 30 June 2025, excluding people already in held or community detention. The three main countries of origin were China (12 100 citizens), Malaysia (8 100) and the United States (5 500).

Returns

Returns refers here to the process by which a person who does not have a legal right to remain in a country is required or chooses to leave that country. Returns can be forced or voluntary; data included here do not include spontaneous independent returns. This section looks at returns from EU countries, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel and Australia.

In the EU, the number of third country nationals returned following an order to leave doubled between 2021 and 2025, to reach 139 000. Returns are roughly stable since Q3 2025, at around 35 000 per quarter (Figure 1.18).

Figure 1.18. Third-country nationals returned from an EU country following an order to leave, 2021-2026



Source: Eurostat Enforcement of immigration legislation statistics.

StatLink https://stat.link/1idapz

Germany drove a large part of the increase between 2021 and 2025, with 29 000 registered returns in 2025, more than three times the 2021 total and 57% more than in 2024. France was the second largest origin country in 2025 with 15 000 returns of third-country nationals (more than twice the 2021 figure and stable compared to 2024). Among countries with more than 1 000 returns, Ireland witnessed the highest increase from 2024 to 2025 (+92%), followed by Belgium and Hungary (+87% each).

In the EU, the share of forced returns represented 40% of the total in 2025 and in Q1 2026, compared to 43% in 2024 and 53% in 2023.

In the United Kingdom, the shares of voluntary and enforced returns were stable since the second half of 2024, according to Home Office immigration statistics. The number of returns from the United Kingdom rose in 2025. Voluntary returns reached 29 459, +10%, and almost 10 000 enforced returns were recorded, +21% compared to 2024.

Voluntary returns from Israel rose again in 2025 and reached 4 700 (+25%), while forced returns declined by 18% to 3 200.

Removals of unlawful non-citizens from Australia reached 3 500 in 2024-2025, up from 2 300 in 2022-2023 and 2 800 in 2023-2024. At the same time, returns (departures of people that were residing in the community) halved between 2022-2023 and 2024-2025, at 3 200, so that the overall number of departures decreased by about 20% in two years and stood at 6 600 in 2024-2025. India, China and Malaysia were the main nationalities concerned by these departures.

According to a statement by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on 10 December 2025, the United States enforcement operations had resulted in more than 600 000 removals since 20 January 2025, almost twice as many as in 2024, and well above the previous maximum of 430 000 reached in 2013.


Demographics of migration flows and stocks

India remains the top origin country of migration flows to the OECD despite a sharp decline

Overall migration flows to the OECD dropped in 2024, following a global upward trend since 2017 (except for the 2020 drop linked to COVID-19). Against this backdrop, India remained the top origin country in 2024 but declined more sharply than the rest of the world, by 19%, to under 500 000 new migrants (Figure 1.19). The main reason is that migration from India to the United Kingdom has halved in 2024, to only 66 000 people. Flows of Indian citizens to the other main destination countries, Australia, Canada and the United States, also dropped but only slightly.

Figure 1.19. Top 20 countries of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2023-2024

Thousands



Note: Migration flows to Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece and Ireland are not included. Migration flow series to Germany, Japan, Korea and Poland are adjusted to exclude short-term immigrants.
Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink https://stat.link/0jp5eb

Flows from China to OECD countries also fell in 2024 but only marginally, to 350 000 new migrants (-3% compared to 2023). The increase observed in the United States (+18 000) partially offset the declines in other major destination countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.

In 2024, Colombia was the third country of origin for migration flows to the OECD, with 252 000 new migrants, (+4%), with Spain by far the main destination country. Brazil was just behind (251 000, -2%), followed by Mexico (227 000, +4%) and Morocco (217 000, +7%). Flows from Cuba registered the largest absolute and relative increase in 2024. Indeed, 214 000 Cuban citizens emigrated to an OECD country (the United States, mostly), 94 000 more than in 2023, representing a 78% increase. After a 13% decline, the number of Romanians who emigrated to an OECD country in 2024 stood at only 213 000, the lowest level recorded since Romania's accession to the EU.

Among other origin countries with 100 000 or more new migrants in OECD countries, Pakistan, Venezuela and Peru are the only ones with a double-digit increase, while Syria, the Philippines, Türkiye, Russia, Poland and Nigeria registered drops by 10% or more (Annex Table 1.A.5).


In 2024, Cuba joined Albania at the top of the table concerning expatriation rate of nationals to OECD countries (both 20 per 1 000 inhabitants). They are followed by Romania and Eritrea (both 11), Bulgaria (10) and the Dominican Republic (7).

Fewer women than men among new migrants to most OECD countries in 2024

Men continue to dominate migration flows to OECD countries. In 2024, the average share of women among new migrants stood at 46%, as in 2023 (Figure 1.20). The only OECD countries which received significantly more women than men were the United States with 54.2% migrant women, Ireland (54%), Sweden (52.6%), Israel (52.2%), Chile (52.1%), Australia (51.9%) and New Zealand (51.7%).

The share of migrant women in total flows is stable over time but notable increases were recorded in New Zealand with +6 p.p. and in Sweden, +3 p.p. By contrast, it decreased in Estonia (-6 p.p.), the Slovak Republic (-4 p.p.) and in Italy and Spain (both -2 p.p.).

Figure 1.20. Share of women in migration flows to OECD countries, 2023 and 2024




Note: The OECD average is the simple average of countries presented in the figure.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/a5clne

By country of origin, migrant women tend to dominate in Latin American countries (Figure 1.21). This is the case most notably for Peru, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil. This is also observed for example for Ukraine and Russia.

Figure 1.21. Share of women in flows from top 20 countries of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2024



Note: Proportion of women among new immigrants to OECD countries for which gender-disaggregated data are available for 2024.

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
Immigrants make up 12% of OECD countries' population in 2025

In 2025, about 170 million persons in OECD countries were foreign-born, accounting for 12% of the total population (Figure 1.22). This is a 3 p.p. increase compared to 2015. The share of immigrant population is above 15% in more than half of OECD countries and above 20% in 10 of them.

Luxembourg was the country with the largest share of migrants (52%), followed by Australia and Switzerland (both 33%), New Zealand (29%), Ireland (24%) and Austria (23%). Despite increases in all countries except Israel and Latvia, there are still six OECD countries with less than 5% foreign-born in their population: Mexico, Poland, Japan, Türkiye, Korea and the Slovak Republic.

Iceland registered a sharp increase over the past 10 years (+10 p.p.). Luxembourg followed at +8 p.p., then Chile, Ireland and Spain (all +7 p.p.), and a large group of countries which saw the share of their immigrant population rise by about 6%: Austria, Colombia, Czechia, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Figure 1.22. Foreign-born population as a percentage of the total population in OECD countries, 2015 and 2025



Note: Data refer to 2015 or the closest available year, and to 2025 or the most recent available year. The OECD average is a simple average based on rates presented on the figure. For Japan and Korea, the data refer to the foreign population rather than the foreign-born population.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/320, Eurostat, UNDESA.


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Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries reached 3 million in 2025

The number of acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries had risen to almost 3 million in 2024 (Figure 1.23). This represented a 4% increase compared to 2023, led by very strong increases in Germany and in the United Kingdom. In 2024, 292 000 foreign citizens acquired German citizenship (+46%) and 270 000 became British citizens (+30%).

Partial data suggest acquisitions of nationality stood just above 3 million in 2025. The top country was the United States with 895 000 new citizens during the fiscal year 2025, up 9%. Germany followed with a record 309 000 grants of German citizenship, after a fifth consecutive annual increase (+6%). The number of people acquiring Spanish citizenship has risen for eight consecutive years and reached 300 000 in 2025 – also a record high. Canada ranked only fourth in 2025, due to a 22% drop, and registered 294 000 new citizens. The United Kingdom rounded out the top five with 235 000 new British citizens.

Figure 1.23. Acquisitions of citizenships in OECD countries, 2000-2025




Note: The estimation for 2025 is based on preliminary data for 27 OECD countries accounting for 96% of the 2024 total. Fiscal year for the United States.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en.

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Among the other notable evolutions, five more countries registered a record number of acquisitions of nationality in 2025: Belgium (69 000), Finland (14 000), Iceland (1 100), Ireland (26 000), New Zealand (52 000), and ten countries registered a decrease, with Canada (-22%), Denmark (-28%) and Chile (-63%) displaying the sharpest drops.

Figure 1.24. Acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of foreign population, 2024-2025



Note: The OECD average is the average of the countries featured in the figure above.
Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en.

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
In OECD countries for which data are available, the average share of foreigners who acquired the citizenship of their country of residence in 2025 was 2.5% (+0.1 p.p.). Since 2022, Canada has been the OECD country where the number of acquisitions of nationality relative to the stock of foreign population is the highest (Figure 1.24). In 2025, Canada still led the way with a ratio of 7.7%, despite a 2.6 p.p. decline compared to 2024, ahead of Norway with 5.5% (+1.2 p.p.) (Figure 1.24). With a ratio of 4.5%, down 3 p.p., Sweden dropped in the list, while Spain moved up at 4.3% (+0.5 p.p.). Apart from Canada and Sweden, four countries saw this ratio decline in 2025 (among those for which data are presented in the graph): Italy (-0.5 p.p. to 3.6%), France, (-0.2 p.p. to 1.5%), Denmark, (-0.3 p.p. to 0.7%), and Hungary (-0.1 p.p. to 0.6%). All other countries witnessed an increase.

Figure 1.25 shows the number of acquisitions of citizenship by country of former nationality over the three most recent 5-year periods. India emerges consistently as the largest origin country and shows a strong upward trend. Acquisitions of nationality by Indians increased from just above 650 000 in 2015-2019 to more than 900 000 in 2020-2024. This strong increase stems from the growth of Indian communities in many OECD countries, in particular in Canada, where 261 000 Indians became Canadian citizens over 2020-2024, +150% compared to five years before. The number of acquisitions was also high in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

However, the most striking evolution concerns Syria. Acquisitions of nationality by Syrian citizens rose from just 33 000 in 2010-2014 to nearly 600 000 in 2020-2024, representing by far the largest increase and the highest per cent change among the top 20 countries of origin. This is the consequence of the Syrian civil war in the mid-2010s and the refugee inflows that followed. Many Syrians who arrived during the peak refugee years have now completed the residence requirements necessary for naturalisation, especially knowing that Germany – by far the top destination for Syrian refugees – reduced the required years of residence for citizenship from eight to five in 2024. Over 2020-2024, 233 000 Syrians became German citizens, of which 83 000 in 2024 alone.

Figure 1.25. Acquisitions of citizenship by country of former nationality over 2010-2024

Top 20 countries of former nationality in 2024, ranked by the figure for 2024



Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/95zd3e

Other countries affected by political instability or conflict, leading to high emigration flows, displayed strong growth. About 170 000 Afghan citizens acquired the nationality of an OECD country over 2020-2024, more than double the number in the second part of the 2010s. Venezuelans also recorded a major increase, from 66 000 to 163 000, following the economic and political difficulties in Venezuela during the late 2010s.

Some longstanding immigrant groups also saw large increases in the recent years. Over the past five years, more than 500 000 citizens of the Philippines acquired the nationality of an OECD country, 70 000 more than over 2015-2019, of which a 27 000 increase in acquisitions of Canadian citizenship. Morocco is also one of the largest origin countries across all periods and increased sharply to 508 000 acquisitions in the first part of the 2020s, 80 000 more than in the second part of the 2010s.

By contrast, the number of acquisitions of citizenship by Chinese citizens fell from about 441 000 in 2010-2014 to 343 000 in 2020-2024, with a 23 000 decline in the United Kingdom between the first two periods and -49 000 in the United States over the last two. The number of acquisitions of citizenship by Mexican nationals stabilised at 600 000 over 2020-2024, 93% of them in the United States.

Recent trends in the labour market outcomes of immigrants

According to the latest edition of the *OECD Employment Outlook*, OECD labour markets have continued to show resilience over the past year, with employment and labour force participation remaining at historic highs. However, there have been new signs of weakening, with a slight rise in unemployment, a slowdown in the growth in employment and labour force participation, and a continued easing of labour market tightness. The OECD unemployment rate was 4.9% in May 2026, the average employment rate in the OECD reached 72.1% in Q1 2026, while the average labour force participation rate rose to 76.7%.

Recent changes in migrant labour market outcomes should be considered in this overall rather positive context. They nonetheless show mixed results in 2025. While unemployment and participation rates rose in most OECD countries, employment remained at historically high levels.

The average labour force participation rate of migrants in OECD countries was 77.1% in 2025, an increase of 0.6 p.p. from 2024 (Annex Table 1.A.6). Participation increased in 23 out of 34 OECD countries with available data; the largest increases were recorded in Colombia (+3.7 p.p.), the Slovak Republic (+3.2 p.p.), Greece (+2.4 p.p.) and Belgium (+2.1 p.p.). The highest participation rates among immigrants in 2025 were recorded in Sweden (84.2%), New Zealand (84.1%), and Estonia (84.0%), while the lowest were in Türkiye (48.4%), Mexico (58.2%), Belgium (70.5%), and Italy (70.8%).

As in previous years, the labour force participation rate of immigrants exceeded that of the native-born in the majority of OECD countries: in 24 out of 34 countries with available data in 2025, for an average advantage of +1.5 p.p. (Annex Table 1.A.6). The activity rates of immigrants were particularly high relative to the native-born in Chile (+13.7 p.p.), Luxembourg (+13.3 p.p.), Costa Rica (+6.7 p.p.), and Poland (+6.1 p.p.). Meanwhile, migrants had significantly lower activity rates compared to the native-born in Türkiye (-12.2 p.p.), the Netherlands (-11.0 p.p.), Germany (-7.1 p.p.), and Mexico (-7.0 p.p.). Compared with 2024, the migrant participation gap relative to the native-born widened in 22 of 34 OECD countries, most markedly in the Slovak Republic (+3.3 p.p.), Mexico (+2.4 p.p.), Greece (+2.1 p.p.), Luxembourg (+1.9 p.p.) and Lithuania (+1.8 p.p.); and narrowed most in Costa Rica (-2.9 p.p.), Finland (-1.8 p.p.) and Latvia (-1.4 p.p.).

The average migrant employment rate in OECD countries was 70.8% in 2025, an increase of 0.3 p.p. compared with 2024 (Table 1.6). At the EU level, the migrant employment rate stood at 68.2%. Among the 34 OECD countries with available data, migrant employment rates were highest in New Zealand (80.0%), Czechia (79.3%), Hungary (78.5%), Ireland (77.8%), and Australia (77.6%) and lowest in Türkiye (43.2%), Mexico (55.4%), Finland (61.7%), France (62.8%), and Belgium (63.3%).

From 2024 to 2025, migrant employment rates increased in 18 of the 34 OECD countries and declined in 15. The largest gains were recorded in Greece (+4.7 p.p.), the Slovak Republic (+4.3 p.p.), and Estonia (+2.3 p.p.). In contrast, the steepest declines were observed in Costa Rica (-2.7 p.p.), Finland (-2.3 p.p.), and Poland (-1.3 p.p.).

Migrants' employment rates reached or exceeded those of the native-born in 19 OECD countries in 2025. The average gap in employment rates between migrants and native-born individuals stood at -0.7 p.p. in 2025, narrowing from -0.9 p.p. in 2024. In the EU, this gap was more pronounced, at -3.3 p.p. The OECD countries with the largest negative employment gap for migrants in 2025 were the Netherlands (-12.9 p.p.), Türkiye (-12.2 p.p.), Finland (-11.8 p.p.), and Germany (-10.0 p.p.). Conversely, migrants' employment rates were substantially higher than those of the native-born in Chile (+13.6 p.p.), Luxembourg (+10.4 p.p.), and Costa Rica (+7.0 p.p.). Longer term patterns, over the past two decades, are presented in Annex Figure 1.A.1.

The average migrant unemployment rate across OECD countries was 8.3% in 2025, up 0.3 p.p. from 2024. At the EU level, the migrant unemployment rate stood at 9.7%. Migrant unemployment rates were highest in Finland (18.5%), Sweden (16.3%), and Spain (14.0%), and lowest in Hungary (3.7%), Czechia (4.1%), Australia (4.1%), the United States (4.2%) and Slovenia (4.3%).

Unemployment rates in the migrant population increased in 24 out of 34 OECD countries, representing more than two-thirds of the countries surveyed. Unemployment rose most sharply in Colombia (+4.0 p.p.) and Lithuania (+2.6 p.p.). By contrast, the largest reductions in migrant unemployment rates were recorded in Greece (-3.5 p.p.), Estonia (-2.8 p.p.), and Spain (-1.4 p.p.). In Estonia and Spain, declining migrant unemployment coincided with falling unemployment in the overall population, reflecting broad-based labour market improvements. Colombia, however, followed the opposite trajectory: despite a decline in overall unemployment, migrant unemployment increased substantially, suggesting a widening divergence between migrant and overall labour market outcomes.

With respect to unemployment, the average gap between migrants and native-born stood at +2.7 p.p. in 2025, with migrant unemployment rates exceeding those of the native-born in all but seven OECD countries. Finland and Sweden recorded the largest migrant unemployment disadvantage (each at +10.0 p.p.), followed by Austria (+6.0 p.p.) and Denmark (+5.9 p.p.). By contrast, migrants faced lower unemployment rates than the native-born in Chile (-1.4 p.p.), New Zealand (-1.1 p.p.), Costa Rica (-1.1 p.p.), and Hungary (-0.8 p.p.).

Looking jointly at employment and unemployment outcomes, the labour market situation of migrants deteriorated in 14 of the 34 OECD countries, with both lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates. This group included notably Finland, Costa Rica, Türkiye and Poland. At the same time, seven countries recorded improvements on both indicators, notably Estonia, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Italy and the United States.

Table 1.6. Labour market situation of immigrants in OECD countries, 2025

Country	2025		Change 2024-2025		Gap with the native-born in 2025	
	Percentages		p.p.		p.p.	
	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate
Australia	4.1	77.6	0.1	0.3	-0.2	0.3
Austria	10.1	69.8	1.0	0.0	6.0	-6.2
Belgium	10.2	63.3	0.4	1.6	5.0	-5.3
Canada	8.2	74.4	0.2	0.2	1.8	0.2
Chile	7.6	76.6	0.5	-0.5	-1.4	13.6
Colombia	9.2	67.5	4	0.6	-0.2	3.3
Costa Rica	5.9	67.4	0.4	-2.7	-1.1	7
Czechia	4.1	79.3	0.3	0.3	1.3	3.8
Denmark	11.6	73.6	1.2	-0.9	5.9	-3.9
Estonia	9.9	75.6	-2.8	2.3	2.6	0.3
Finland	18.5	61.7	1.8	-2.3	10	-11.8
France	11.9	62.8	0.9	-0.2	4.8	-7.7
Germany	7.1	69.6	0.9	-0.2	4.1	-10
Greece	11.9	66.9	-3.5	4.7	3.3	2.5
Hungary	3.7	78.5	0.6	-0.1	-0.8	3.5
Iceland[1]	6.0	84.7	..	..	..	..
Ireland	5.6	77.8	0	0.8	1.2	4.5
Israel[2]	4.6	77.9	..	..	..	..
Italy	8.1	65.1	-0.8	0.4	2.2	3
Japan[3]	5.0	77.3	..	..	..	..
Korea[4]	6.1	68.9	0.7	1	3.3	-1.6
Latvia	8.6	68.6	0.1	-0.4	1.4	-3.6
Lithuania	11	71.4	2.6	-0.3	4.1	-2.8
Luxembourg	7.6	74.1	0.5	0.5	2.8	10.4
Mexico	4.7	55.4	-0.3	1.8	2	-7.9
Netherlands	6.4	71.7	0.6	-0.1	3	-12.9
New Zealand	4.9	80	0.5	-0.6	-1.1	4.3
Norway	8	71	0.9	-0.2	4.4	-7.4
Poland	5	77.1	1.6	-1.3	1.8	4.5
Portugal	8.1	76.8	-1	0.8	2.3	3.4
Slovak Republic	..	74.8	..	4.3	..	2.5
Slovenia	4.3	73.4	-0.3	-0.5	0.6	0.6
Spain	14	66.6	-1.4	1	4.5	-0.5
Sweden	16.3	70.5	0.1	0.5	10	-8.2
Switzerland	7.6	76.4	0.7	-0.4	4.1	-5.6
Tûrkiye	10.8	43.2	0.4	-1.4	2.3	-12.2
United Kingdom	6.4	76.8	0.4	1.2	1.9	2.1
United States	4.2	73.1	-0.1	0.4	-0.3	3
EU27	**9.7**	**68.2**	**0.1**	**0.3**	**4.3**	**-3.3**
OECD average	**8.3**	**70.8**	**0.3**	**0.3**	**2.7**	**-1.0**

Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of the foreign-born and native-born populations. The OECD average is calculated as a simple average of all countries with available data for both years. ".." indicates missing data or unreported estimates due to low reliability. The OECD average of 2024 can be different from the previous edition's average due to the different country coverage and data updates.

1. The data for Iceland refer to 2024 instead of 2025 (excluded from OECD average).
2. The data for Israel refer to 2021 instead of 2025 (excluded from OECD average).
3. The data for Japan refers to foreign nationals, for the year 2020 instead of 2025 (excluded from OECD average).
4. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals.

Source: European countries and Türkiye: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Japan: Population Census; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Continua de Empleo (ECE); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: Current Population Survey (CPS).

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Employed migrants remain concentrated in specific sectors (Annex Table 1.A.8), notably in Other Services, which accounted for 20.5% of foreign-born workers in the EU, 25.5% in the United States and 32.1% in the United Kingdom in 2025, and in the Mining, manufacturing and energy sector, mainly in Central and Eastern European countries (Czechia 35.9%, the Slovak Republic 30.9%, Slovenia 30.4%, Poland 30.1%). Migrant workers are also often overrepresented in the health sector. This is true notably in the United Kingdom (18.2%), the United States (13.6%) and in several Nordic countries (Norway 14.7%, Denmark 14.6%, Sweden 14.1%). The Wholesale and trade industry accounted for 13.4% of foreign-born workers in the EU and 11.8% in the United States, while construction was an important employer of migrant workers in many OECD countries as well. Finally, the importance of the Hotels and Restaurants sector is also highlighted in some countries, employing 23.3% of foreign-born workers in Greece, 16.5% in Spain, 14.5% in Ireland, and 13.9% in Portugal.

Long-term unemployment continues to disproportionately affect immigrants

From 2024 to 2025, the incidence of long-term unemployment among unemployed migrants (the share in unemployment for more than 12 months) showed mixed trends across OECD countries with available data.

In 2025, an average of 25.2% of unemployed migrants across OECD countries with available data had been looking for a job for 12 months or more, compared with 23.1% for the native-born. The incidence of long-term unemployment among migrants was particularly high in Greece (59.1%), Lithuania (49.3%), and Italy (48.2%), and particularly low in Costa Rica (1.4%), Mexico (1.5%), and Colombia (5.0%) (Table 1.7).

Immigrants remained more at risk of long-term unemployment than their native-born counterparts in 17 out of 29 countries with available data in 2025. The gap between migrants and native-born was widest in Sweden (+15.5 p.p.), Lithuania (+14.7 p.p.), Belgium (+13.0 p.p.), Slovenia (+12.2 p.p.), and Norway (+10.3 p.p.). In contrast, migrants faced lower rates of long-term unemployment than the native-born in Ireland (-12.4 p.p.), Portugal (-8.5 p.p.), Chile (-7.3 p.p.), Colombia (-5.8 p.p.), Spain (-5.8 p.p.) and Italy (-5.8 p.p.).

Table 1.7. Long-term unemployment rates of immigrants and native-born in OECD countries, 2024 and 2025

Country	2024			2025		
	Foreign-born (%)	Native-born (%)	Gap FB-NB (p.p.)	Foreign-born (%)	Native-born (%)	Gap FB-NB (p.p.)
Austria	23.8	19.6	4.2	24.3	21.8	2.5
Belgium	43.3	32.8	10.5	40.1	27.2	13.0
Canada	9.5	9.8	-0.2	8.3	6.8	1.5
Chile	10.9	14.3	-3.3	9.0	16.3	-7.3
Colombia	2.8	7.8	-5.0	5.0	10.8	-5.8
Costa Rica	1.5	5.1	-3.6	1.4	2.9	-1.5
Czechia	38.1	28.1	10.0	29.7	30.4	-0.7
Denmark	14.1	10.4	3.7	15.1	11.8	3.3
Estonia	22.2	23.9	-1.7	28.5	22.1	6.4
Finland	27.3	19.2	8.1	31.6	23.4	8.2
France	29.3	21.3	8.0	27.5	21.3	6.2
Germany	27.8	27.5	0.3	27.1	28.3	-1.2
Greece	60.0	54.1	5.9	59.1	56.3	2.9
Hungary	..	34.8	..	..	33.4	..
Iceland	..	9.4	..	..	..	..
Ireland	17.2	23.4	-6.2	13.6	26.0	-12.4
Italy	47.8	53.4	-5.6	48.2	54.0	-5.8
Latvia	41.4	31.2	10.2	37.1	33.9	3.2
Lithuania	55.6	32.0	23.6	49.3	34.6	14.7
Luxembourg	26.8	..	..	32.5	..	..
Mexico	1.4	2.1	-0.6	1.5	2.2	-0.7
Netherlands	16.2	12.5	3.7	15.9	12.4	3.5
Norway	21.6	11.4	10.3	21.9	11.6	10.3
Poland	..	27.3	..	..	26.8	..
Portugal	28.1	38.5	-10.4	29.5	38.0	-8.5
Slovak Republic	..	64.6	..	..	63.9	..
Slovenia	36.0	30.5	5.6	39.6	27.4	12.2
Spain	29.8	35.0	-5.2	28.0	33.8	-5.8
Sweden	29.6	13.2	16.4	28.7	13.1	15.5
Switzerland	35.0	28.0	7.0	33.3	26.0	7.3
Türkiye	11.6	19.4	-7.9	15.0	18.0	-3.0
United Kingdom	17.5	23.9	-6.4	22.2	23.8	-1.6
United States	12.2	11.7	0.6	13.8	13.3	0.4
EU27	**31.5**	**32.8**	**-1.4**	**30.1**	**32.2**	**-2.1**
OECD average[1]	**25.4**	**22.8**	**2.6**	**25.2**	**23.1**	**2.0**

Note: Long-term unemployment rate = share of unemployed persons who have been out of work for 12 months or more (%). Gap = foreign-born rate minus native-born rate; positive values indicate a migrant disadvantage. ".." indicates missing data. FB = foreign-born; NB = native-born.
1. OECD average excludes Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland and the Slovak Republic, since there is no data for all years and origin. The OECD average of 2024 can be different from the previous edition's average due to the different country coverage and data updates.
Source: European countries and Türkiye: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat). Chile: Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socio-economica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Continua de Empleo (ECE). Canada, Labour Force Survey; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: Current Population Survey.

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Trends in labour market outcomes of immigrants by demographic and other background characteristics

Figure 1.26 illustrates the changes in employment rates by sex, age, level of education, and duration of stay in the EU, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Korea, New Zealand and Australia. All four panels show changes between 2024 and 2025 (in Panel B, 2025 data are not available for the prime-age group in Canada and New Zealand, nor for the older group in Korea).

Gaps between immigrant men and women persist as women's labour market outcomes continue to improve


As in previous years, immigrant women faced substantial gaps in labour market outcomes compared with immigrant men and, to a smaller extent, native-born women. The average employment rate of immigrant women across the OECD was 63.4% in 2025 – 15.1 p.p. below that of immigrant men (78.5%). Native-born women, by comparison, had an employment rate of 67.5%, and the employment gap between native-born men and women was considerably smaller, at 8.1 p.p.

Nevertheless, immigrant women's employment rates saw notable improvements in most countries in 2025. It increased in 22 of 35 OECD countries, while that of immigrant men declined in 16. As a result, the continued narrowing of the employment gap between men and women among immigrants was driven primarily by employment gains among migrant women. Overall, the employment gap between immigrant men and women narrowed in 24 of the 35 OECD countries with available data, declining on average by 0.5 p.p. (Annex Figure 1.A.2).

As shown in Panel A of Figure 1.26, immigrant women's employment rates rose across most of the selected countries in 2025, including in the United Kingdom (+0.9 p.p.), the United States (+0.8 p.p.), Australia (+0.8 p.p.) and the EU (+0.3 p.p.), with the largest gain among these countries recorded in Korea (+1.6 p.p.); they edged down only in New Zealand (-0.3 p.p.). Immigrant men's employment rates were more mixed, improving markedly in the United Kingdom (+1.5 p.p.), holding broadly stable in the EU (+0.2 p.p.), the United States (+0.3 p.p.), Canada (+0.2 p.p.) and Korea (+0.1 p.p.), and declining in New Zealand (-0.9 p.p.) and Australia (-0.3 p.p.). Across the OECD, employment rates grew most strongly for immigrant women in the Slovak Republic (+4.8 p.p.), Greece (+3.6 p.p.) and Mexico (+3.3 p.p.), and for immigrant men in the Slovak Republic (+3.1 p.p.), Greece (+2.9 p.p.) and Estonia (+1.7 p.p.), while significant falls for migrant women were recorded in Costa Rica (-5.4 p.p.) and Finland (-2.7 p.p.).

Figure 1.26. Changes in the employment rate by demographic group and country of birth in selected OECD countries, between 2024 and 2025

Percentage points



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (aged 15-64). Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15+ and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past 5 years, compared to nationals. "Low-educated" refers to individuals with less than upper secondary education, "Medium-educated" refers to those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, and "Highly educated" refers to individuals with tertiary education. Recent migrants correspond to migrants whose duration of stay is less than five years, whereas settled migrants are migrants who have been more than five years in the country of destination.

Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Survey.

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Persistent employment gaps for tertiary educated migrants

Employment rates vary markedly by education level. Lower-educated immigrants (less than upper secondary education) tend to have higher employment rates than their native-born counterparts, whereas medium and, especially, higher-educated immigrants tend to have relatively lower rates.

In the EU, in 2025, the employment rates of immigrants and the native-born were, respectively, 61.5% versus 56.1% among the lower-educated, 74.6% versus 79.2% among the medium-educated, and 80.3% versus 90.3% among the highly educated; the pattern was similar on average across the OECD (62.1% versus 54.7%; 74.3% versus 77.0%; and 81.4% versus 88.3%) (Annex Table 1.A.7).

Among the lower-educated, the largest gaps favoured immigrants in Poland (+31.5 p.p.) and the United States (+31.1 p.p.), and the native-born in Estonia (-16.8 p.p.) and the Netherlands (-9.7 p.p.). Among the highly educated, immigrants outperformed the native-born only in Chile (+4.7 p.p.), and Costa Rica (+1.8 p.p.), while facing the largest disadvantages in Türkiye (-19.7 p.p.) and Greece (-17.4 p.p.).

Among highly educated migrants, employment rates increased in 22 OECD countries, with the largest gains in the Slovak Republic (+3.3 p.p.) and Costa Rica (+3.1 p.p.), and the steepest declines in Slovenia (-3.3 p.p.) and Türkiye (-3.1 p.p.).

By contrast, employment rates among low-educated native-born individuals declined in 21 OECD countries, particularly in Germany (-5.6 p.p.) and Lithuania (-3.6 p.p.). Canada and New Zealand stand out as exceptions, recording increases of over 7.0 p.p. among low-educated native-born individuals: the largest gains observed among the native-born across all education groups and countries.

Employment rates tend to improve with length of stay

In 2025, migrants who arrived in the past five years had lower employment rates than settled migrants in most countries. In the EU, the employment rate of recent migrants stood at 59.3%, compared with 70.6% among settled migrants, a gap of 11.3 p.p. A similar pattern is observed elsewhere, albeit with varying magnitudes: the gap reached 8.1 p.p. in the United States (66.5% versus 74.6%), 5.7 p.p. in the United Kingdom (72.4% versus 78.1%), and 3.1 p.p. in Canada (72.3% versus 75.4%). Australia stands out as an exception, where recent migrants outperformed settled migrants by 5.2 p.p. (69.1% versus 63.9%).

Trends in the labour market situation of young migrants

In about half of OECD countries, the employment rates of young immigrants aged 15 to 24 were higher than those of their native-born peers in 2025. In the EU, the employment rate of immigrant youth was 37%, compared with 34.2% for native-born youth. Across the OECD, the average employment rate of young immigrants was 40.4%, marginally above that of native-born youth (40.2%). That being said, given the large share of youth still in education and training, an important indicator is the share of young people not in education, employment, or training (NEET rate). It provides a completely different picture.

In 2025, NEET rates of young immigrants (aged 15-24) exceeded those of native-born youth in all but six out of 28 OECD countries (the six exceptions where migrants have lower NEET rates are New Zealand, Lithuania, Australia, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Mexico).


Despite recent positive trends, the EU27 NEET rate of young immigrants stood at 16.2% in 2025 and was 6.4 p.p. higher than for native-born youth (Figure 1.27). In the United States, the immigrant NEET rate declined to 14.3% in 2025 (-2.5 p.p.), narrowing the gap with native-born youth (12.8%). In Canada, the

immigrant NEET rate edged up to 14.2% in 2025, remaining above the native-born rate of 13.0%. In the United Kingdom, the immigrant NEET rate was 11.4% in 2025, below the native-born rate of 12.8%.

The countries with the highest immigrant NEET rates in 2025 included Türkiye (30.1%), Costa Rica (28.7%), Colombia (27.6%), Spain (20.5%), and Austria (20.4%). Australia recorded one of the lowest immigrant NEET rates in the OECD at 6.1%, well below the native-born rate of 8.5%. New Zealand similarly showed a favourable pattern for immigrant youth, with a NEET rate of 9.2% compared to 12.2% for native-born youth.

Figure 1.27. Share of young people not in education, employment or training ("NEET"), by place of birth, in selected OECD countries, 2019-2025

Population aged 15-24



Note: Compulsory military service is excluded from the calculation. NEET rates of the native-born and foreign-born populations in the EU27 countries in 2019 and 2020 have been subject to adjustments for a break in series caused by a change in the methodology of the European Labour Force Survey in 2021. Calculations were made by the Secretariat taking into account the adjusted series for the whole population provided by Eurostat.
Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Canada and the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Survey.

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Disparities persist across regions of origin

Table 1.8 shows changes in employment, unemployment, and participation rates by immigrants' region of origin for selected OECD countries, comparing 2024 and 2025 data.

Within the EU, migrant employment rates in 2025 ranged from 74.8% for EU-born migrants to 56.0% for North African migrants. Migrants from Central and South America and the Caribbean (+1.1 p.p.) and North Africa (+1.7 p.p.) recorded the largest improvements in employment rates, while those from North America (-1.2 p.p.) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-0.5 p.p.) experienced slight declines. Migrants from the Middle East had relatively low employment rates (61.0%) but saw modest improvement (+0.3 p.p.). Unemployment remained highest among North African migrants (14.8%), though this represented an improvement of 1.1 p.p. relative to 2024.

In the United Kingdom, EU-born migrants continued to record among the highest employment rates (81.4%) in 2025, with a slight improvement (+0.8 p.p.). The highest employment rates were also observed for migrants from Oceania (82.0%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (80.3%, +1.5 p.p.). Migrants from North Africa (57.2%) and the Middle East and Central Asia (56.3%) had the lowest employment rates; the former saw an improvement of +2.9 p.p. but recorded the highest unemployment rate (16.0%). Asian migrants showed the largest employment rate increase (+3.0 p.p.).

In the United States, employment rates were broadly stable across most origin groups in 2025. Migrants from Canada recorded the strongest increase (+4.2 p.p.), reaching 75.2%. South American and Caribbean migrants improved modestly (+1.3 p.p.) to 75.5%, while European migrants experienced a slight decline (-0.9 p.p.) to 74.8%. Mexican migrants, who represent the largest foreign-born group in the United States, remained broadly unchanged at 71.4%. Unemployment rates showed little change across most groups.

In Australia, employment rates were relatively high and stable across all origin groups in 2025. European migrants saw the largest increase (+0.8 p.p.), reaching 80.9%, while migrants from North Africa and the Middle East experienced a decline (-2.3 p.p.), falling to 58.0%, the lowest employment rate in Australia across all origin groups and the only group with a rate below 62%. The highest employment rates were observed among migrants from the Americas (82.9%) and those from Sub-Saharan Africa (81.9%).

In conclusion, structural patterns by region of origin remain broadly consistent across OECD destinations in 2025. Migrants from the EU-EFTA, North America and the Americas generally maintain favourable labour market outcomes across most destinations. Migrants from North Africa and the Middle East continue to face the most significant employment disadvantages in European OECD destinations and Australia, though there has been some improvement. Sub-Saharan African migrants face divergent outcomes depending on destination, remaining at greater unemployment disadvantage in the EU, while maintaining strong employment rates in Australia and the United Kingdom. These differences reflect a range of factors, including national labour market conditions, integration policy frameworks, the length of established migration corridors, and the educational and occupational profiles of different migrant communities.

Table 1.8. Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of origin in selected OECD countries in 2024 and 2025, percentages

Destination	Region of birth	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate	
		2024	2025	2024	2025	2024	2025
EU countries	Asia	68.8	69.3	7.7	8.3	74.6	75.6
	Central and South America and Caribbean	70.2	71.3	12.5	11.6	80.2	80.6
	EU27 + EFTA	74.8	74.8	6.5	6.7	80	80.1
	Middle East	60.7	61	12.5	12.9	69.3	70.1
	North Africa	54.3	56	15.9	14.8	64.6	65.7
	North America	69.1	67.9	7.3	9	74.5	74.7
	Other European countries	66.4	66.8	8.4	8.7	72.5	73.1
	Other regions	71.3	70.9	6.6	6.7	76.3	76
	Sub-Saharan Africa	66.7	66.2	12.8	13.6	76.6	76.6
	Foreign-born (total)	67.9	68.2	9.6	9.7	75.1	75.6
	Native-born	71.3	71.6	5.4	5.4	75.4	75.7
Australia	Americas	83	82.9	3.8	3.6	86.3	86
	Asia	76.7	77	4.1	4.1	79.9	80.3
	Europe	80.1	80.9	3.1	3.6	82.7	83.9
	North Africa and the Middle East	60.3	58	7.3	6.9	65	62.3
	Other Oceania	79.2	79.9	4.2	4.2	82.6	83.3
	Sub-Saharan Africa	82.1	81.9	4.8	5.1	86.2	86.3
	Foreign-born (total)	77.3	77.6	4.1	4.1	80.6	80.9
	Native-born	77.2	77.3	4.1	4.4	80.5	80.8
United Kingdom	Asia	71.3	74.3	6.6	7.2	76.3	80.1
	Central and South America and Caribbean	77.5	74.9	6.1	7.5	82.6	81
	EU	80.6	81.4	4.3	4.8	84.2	85.4
	Middle East and Central Asia	58.4	56.3	11.1	12.3	65.6	64.2
	North Africa	54.3	57.2	13.6	16	62.8	68.1
	North America	80.6	77.6	3.3	5.7	83.4	82.3
	Oceania	81.5	82	3	5.5	84.1	86.8
	Other European countries	74.2	74.2	7.7	9.5	80.4	82
	Sub-Saharan Africa	78.8	80.3	6.8	5.4	84.6	84.9
	Foreign-born (total)	75.6	76.8	6	6.4	80.4	82.1
	Native-born	74.6	74.7	3.9	4.5	77.6	78.2
United States	Africa	72.8	72.2	4.9	5.7	76.6	76.6
	Asia and Middle East	72.8	73	3.4	3.6	75.4	75.7
	Canada	71	75.2	3	2.8	73.2	77.3
	Central America	71.6	72.6	5.5	5	75.8	76.4
	Europe	75.7	74.8	3.9	3.7	78.8	77.7
	Mexico	71.3	71.4	4.3	4.3	74.4	74.7
	Other regions	63.9	65.5	4.1	5.1	66.7	69
	South America and Caribbean	74.2	75.5	5.1	4.3	78.2	78.9
	Foreign-born (total)	72.7	73.1	4.3	4.2	76	76.3
	Native-born	70.3	70.2	4.1	4.5	73.3	73.5

Note: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded.

Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, and the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force, Japan: Population Census 2020; United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/d487be

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Annex 1.A. Supplementary tables and figures

Annex Table 1.A.1. Permanent migration flows to OECD countries by category, 2024 and 2025

Thousands and percentage change

	Work			Accompanying family			Family			Humanitarian			Free movement			Total		
	2024	2025	%	2024	2025	%	2024	2025	%	2024	2025	%	2024	2025	%	2024	2025	%
Australia	66.2	60.5	-9%	70.9	71.7	1%	52.7	52.5	0%	20.0	20.0	0%	29.3	29.2	0%	239.3	234.2	-2%
Austria	6.3	5.2	-17%	2.9	2.8	-3%	12.3	12.0	-2%	22.5	10.4	-54%	58.2	51.0	-12%	102.6	81.7	-20%
Belgium	7.0	5.3	-24%	0.0	0.0	..	21.1	20.4	-3%	16.4	9.1	-45%	62.2	57.5	-8%	106.7	92.2	-14%
Canada	146.5	126.1	-14%	135.2	102.2	-24%	106.0	96.2	-9%	76.7	59.2	-23%	0.0	0.0	..	483.7	393.8	-19%
Czechia	17.3	18.5	7%	0.0	0.0	..	10.0	11.1	11%	0.2	0.2	0%	12.2	13.1	7%	40.2	43.2	7%
Denmark	11.5	11.9	3%	5.9	5.8	-2%	5.4	4.5	-17%	0.9	0.9	0%	30.5	28.9	-5%	54.4	52.2	-4%
Estonia	2.6	2.2	-15%	0.0	0.0	..	1.8	1.6	-11%	1.4	0.8	-43%	3.1	2.9	-6%	8.9	7.5	-16%
Finland	7.8	5.0	-36%	0.0	0.0	..	18.9	20.7	10%	2.1	2.8	33%	5.5	4.7	-15%	34.7	33.6	-3%
France	62.6	54.0	-14%	5.5	4.6	-16%	97.1	102.0	5%	43.7	72.2	65%	67.6	68.8	2%	306.4	333.7	9%
Germany	63.0	88.1	40%	0.0	0.0	..	97.3	113.0	16%	142.4	93.1	-35%	267.6	240.0	-10%	574.7	538.3	-6%
Ireland	31.4	23.2	-26%	0.0	0.0	..	4.2	4.6	10%	3.9	4.3	10%	32.4	30.2	-7%	71.9	62.3	-13%
Israel	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	..	6.8	6.4	-6%	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	..	32.2	22.1	-31%
Italy	17.2	31.5	83%	0.0	0.0	..	103.5	167.4	62%	8.0	11.3	41%	41.3	37.5	-9%	170.8	248.8	46%
Japan	110.0	121.2	10%	42.7	52.3	22%	16.8	14.1	-16%	2.2	1.2	-45%	0.0	0.0	..	175.5	191.8	9%
Korea	11.3	9.6	-15%	1.9	1.4	-26%	15.5	15.6	1%	0.2	0.1	-50%	0.0	0.0	..	75.6	67.0	-11%
Lithuania	1.8	2.8	56%	0.0	0.0	..	2.9	4.0	38%	0.2	0.2	0%	1.2	1.2	0%	6.3	8.2	30%
Luxembourg	3.2	2.6	-19%	0.0	0.0	..	5.7	5.5	-4%	1.0	0.8	-20%	16.1	16.3	1%	26.2	25.4	-3%
Mexico	4.7	7.7	64%	0.0	0.0	..	33.9	20.5	-40%	25.9	18.0	-31%	0.0	0.0	..	73.8	62.6	-15%
Netherlands	23.4	20.7	-12%	0.0	0.0	..	42.2	43.0	2%	31.1	25.9	-17%	85.1	81.0	-5%	181.9	170.5	-6%
New Zealand	11.2	10.4	-7%	16.4	14.8	-10%	19.4	20.5	6%	6.1	4.4	-28%	3.2	3.7	16%	56.3	53.8	-4%
Norway	3.9	3.6	-8%	2.5	2.8	12%	9.1	11.7	29%	2.8	1.3	-54%	17.4	15.6	-10%	35.7	35.0	-2%
Portugal	60.3	240.4	299%	0.0	0.0	..	24.2	25.4	5%	0	0.5	..	26.7	27.2	2%	131.6	313.6	138%
Slovak Republic	16.0	17.9	12%	0.0	0.0	..	3.4	3.4	0%	0.1	0.0	..	0.9	1.0	11%	20.9	22.9	10%
Slovenia	15.9	14.2	-11%	0.0	0.0	..	6.1	5.8	-5%	0.2	0.1	-50%	4.1	4.6	12%	26.3	24.8	-6%
Spain	21.0	35.1	67%	15.5	13.7	-12%	128.9	187.3	45%	19.0	21.9	15%	116.7	112.2	-4%	368.0	460.5	25%
Sweden	12.1	10.4	-14%	10.0	8.4	-16%	23.2	22.8	-2%	3.5	2.6	-26%	26.7	23.1	-13%	75.6	67.3	-11%
Switzerland	2.2	2.2	0%	0.0	0.0	..	20.0	19.2	-4%	12.9	9.1	-29%	100.3	101.7	1%	135.6	132.4	-2%
United Kingdom	117.0	66.7	-43%	144.6	80.1	-45%	116.5	87.9	-25%	38.3	51.0	33%	0.0	0.0	..	433.9	295.8	-32%
United States	89.2	72.2	-19%	95.5	77.3	-19%	879.6	875.2	-1%	249.3	117.0	-53%	0.0	0.0	..	1 431.8	1 231.9	-14%

Source: OECD International migration database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/31n.

StatLink https://stat.link/ebal1v

Annex Table 1.A.2. Inflows of temporary labour migrants (selected categories), 2019-2025

Destination	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2025/24	2025/19
								change	
Seasonal workers									
Australia	14.5	4.5	14.6	24.3	20.2	23.1	23.2	0%	61%
Austria	9.4	8.7	10.4	14.1	14.9	15.8	18.8	19%	100%
Belgium	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-6%	..
Canada	3.8	2.1	2.0	3.9	4.2	2.8	2.2	-24%	-43%
Czechia	1.3	1.4	2.5	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5	-2%	-59%
Estonia	4.6	3.2	4.7	2.5	1.1	0.9	0.8	-11%	-82%
Finland	11.5	13.3	15.9	6.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	-2%	-68%
France	10.3	6.0	11.2	13.2	10.5	11.4	8.2	-28%	-20%
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.8	2.3	3.2	3.9	23%	..
Italy	4.2	1.8	2.0	3.2	8.2	16.7	20.5	23%	388%
Korea	0.0	0.0	0.5	8.2	25.5	46.9	70.0	49%	..
Mexico	10.0	3.7	3.7	4.4	6.6	7.2	5.0	-30%	-50%
New Zealand	13.9	15.3	19.4	20.5	19.5	19.9	18.3	-8%	32%
Norway	3.4	2.4	1.4	2.9	3.1	3.7	4.4	18%	30%
Slovak Republic	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.4	20%	21%
Slovenia	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	85%	141%
Spain	12.2	18.7	15.5	15.4	13.1	20.6	6.9	-67%	-43%
Sweden	6.2	3.5	5.5	6.5	5.2	1.4	0.7	-47%	-88%
United Kingdom	2.5	7.2	29.6	34.5	32.8	35.4	38.8	10%	1 457%
United States	307.6	275.8	421.8	421.8	446.1	449.7	453.6	1%	47%
Total	**416.6**	**368.7**	**562.7**	**586.1**	**619.1**	**664.6**	**681.3**	**3%**	**64%**
Working Holidaymakers (WHM)									
Australia	167.9	29.3	19.9	154.0	200.8	209.9	210.7	0%	25%
Belgium	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	12%	-15%
Canada	55.5	15.8	14.2	43.9	58.3	53.3	45.4	-15%	-18%
Denmark	3.7	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	19%	-75%
Finland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	-1%	..
France	5.2	2.0	0.6	4.5	4.8	4.8	5.0	5%	-3%
Italy	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	43%	23%
Japan	18.0	3.3	0.2	4.1	14.2	20.3	20.3	0%	13%
Korea	2.7	0.9	0.3	2.0	3.2	3.2	3.3	6%	25%
New Zealand	59.2	14.8	0.9	74.9	45.3	48.3	44.6	-8%	-25%
United Kingdom	20.1	8.0	8.3	16.9	22.7	24.4	21.2	-13%	5%
United States	108.5	5.0	40.8	93.3	103.9	107.2	104.6	-2%	-4%
Total	**444.4**	**82**	**86**	**395.1**	**454.3**	**472.7**	**458.8**	**-3%**	**3%**
Trainees									
Australia	2.2	0.5	0.5	1.5	2.1	1.9	2.0	8%	-9%
Austria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-20%	..
Belgium	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	1%	-34%
Denmark	2.4	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.6	6%	10%
Finland	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	10%	-58%
France	4.2	2.5	3.5	5.7	6.7	7.1	7.4	4%	75%
Germany	5.1	3.1	5.3	9.3	13.7	13.4	16.3	22%	218%

Destination	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2025/24	2025/19
								change	
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-17%	6%
Italy	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.2	36%	233%
Japan	207.5	87.5	23.6	185.2	198.8	164.9	174.1	6%	-16%
Korea	0.8	0.3	0.4	31.9	35.5	43.5	45.2	4%	5 467%
Lithuania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-100%	..
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-7%	71%
New Zealand	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.6	28%	-38%
Norway	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-6%	-77%
Slovak Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-75%	-67%
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	28.0	50.9	39.5	-22%	..
Switzerland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	7%	41%
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	-3%	..
United States	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.5	-30%	-45%
Total	**225.8**	**96.7**	**37**	**240.4**	**290.3**	**287.5**	**290.8**	**-1%**	**29%**
Intra-company transferees									
Australia	1.6	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.4	5%	45%
Austria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-25%	-25%
Canada	11.7	4.7	9.7	15.2	12.2	8.4	5.8	-31%	-51%
Czechia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	26%	183%
Estonia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%	-94%
Finland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	27%	238%
France	3.6	1.5	1.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.2	-23%	-39%
Germany	6.7	6.7	6.4	8.8	10.0	8.1	7.4	-9%	10%
Ireland	1.2	0.9	0.5	1.7	1.7	1.4	0.8	-43%	-34%
Italy	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	-7%	99%
Japan	10.0	3.2	0.5	7.8	8.4	8.8	9.1	4%	-8%
Korea	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	-8%	-25%
Lithuania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-23%	-63%
Luxembourg	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	59%	-17%
Netherlands	4.4	1.9	2.3	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.0	-21%	-55%
Norway	1.6	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.4	0%	-12%
Slovak Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42%	-62%
Slovenia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	100%	189%
Spain	1.4	0.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4	-11%	0%
United Kingdom	27.1	8.8	12.9	20.7	15.5	13.7	12.5	-9%	-54%
United States	77.0	18.6	39.4	80.7	71.1	75.2	75.5	0%	-2%
Total	**147.5**	**49.3**	**78.2**	**146.6**	**131.0**	**127.6**	**122.0**	**-4%**	**-17%**

Destination	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2025/24	2025/19
								change	
Other temporary workers									
Australia	82.0	29.3	23.9	70.2	95.3	75.6	76.1	1%	-7%
Austria	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	-5%	45%
Belgium	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.8	-5%	-20%
Canada	66.1	30.6	51.9	91.5	161.1	147.7	80.7	-45%	22%
Czechia	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.5	-16%	2%
Denmark	3.8	3.2	4.4	5.3	4.6	4.4	3.3	-25%	-15%
Estonia	23.3	15.9	23.7	17.9	5.1	3.7	3.4	-9%	-86%
Finland	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	-15%	3%
France	12.8	7.5	10.7	13.6	15.0	16.8	19.9	19%	56%
Germany	0.0	0.0	7.8	8.6	9.5	9.7	9.4	-4%	..
Ireland	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	-92%	-96%
Italy	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	76%	-94%
Japan	8.6	6.8	5.9	27.3	51.4	73.3	85.3	16%	888%
Korea	104.7	42.9	57.5	117.9	127.6	100.9	76.6	-24%	-27%
Lithuania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	81%	53%
Luxembourg	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	12%	61%
Mexico	14.5	10.3	19.0	19.8	22.7	19.6	19.3	-2%	33%
New Zealand	64.7	38.8	53.8	45.1	80.2	36.3	40.6	12%	-37%
Norway	1.8	1.3	0.9	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.1	-20%	-41%
Slovak Republic	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	4%	11%
Slovenia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	..	..
Spain	9.4	6.1	8.3	12.6	21.7	33.7	41.1	22%	338%
Sweden	1.2	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.5	3%	23%
Switzerland	3.3	2.5	3.4	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.1	-6%	-5%
United Kingdom	31.4	12.9	19.0	28.1	28.5	28.9	29.1	1%	-7%
United States	205.0	152.0	186.3	225.4	201.2	210.7	185.1	-12%	-10%
Total	**637.4**	**364.6**	**483**	**695.3**	**835.2**	**772.2**	**679.9**	**-12%**	**7%**

Source: OECD International Migration Database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/2hv.

StatLink https://stat.link/jthdm9

Annex Table 1.A.3. Permits considered in the statistics on temporary labour migration and their characteristics

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Australia (Temporary resident and seasonal worker programmes) Including renewals	**Seasonal workers:** Temporary resident (other employment); Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP); Pacific Labour Scheme; Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (PALM)		
	Working holidaymakers: subclasses 417 and 462	Up to 1 year	Subclass 417: uncapped Subclass 462: capped except for the United States
	Trainees: The Training visa (subclass 407) introduced in 2016.	Up to 2 years	
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary resident Skilled programme	Up to 4 years	
	Other workers: Temporary resident Skilled programme (except ICT); Temporary Resident (Other Employment) excluding "Australian Government Endorsed Events", "Invited for Other Social and Cultural Activity"; Entertainment; Family (Temporary); Religious Work		
Austria	**Seasonal workers:** Number of work permits issued (quota and out of quota workers)	Up to 9 months	
	Trainees: Temporary residence permits (Aufenhaltsbewilligungen [AB]) issued for ICT trainees	Up to 12 months	Uncapped
	Intra-company transferees: AB permits issued to ICT Managers and Specialists	Up to 12 months (renewable)	Uncapped
	Other workers: AB permit for Self-employed. NB permit for Specific cases of gainful employment – special managers Job rotation Researchers: Settlement permits (Niederlassungsbewilligung [NB]) for Researchers (and AB permits for Researchers, if any) Au pair: AB permits for Special cases of dependent gainful occupation – Au Pair Excludes: Posted workers, Artists, Volunteers/social service workers	Up to 12 months (renewable)	Uncapped
Belgium (positive decisions for visa D)	**Working holidaymakers:** Programme vacances travail		
	Trainees: training/stage visa		
	Seasonal workers: seasonal visa		
	Other workers: Visa D for Au pair; Researchers, Volunteers		
Canada (TFWP and IMP programmes – initial permits)	**Seasonal workers:** Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (TFWP): effective entries	Not renewable	
	Working holidaymakers: International Experience Canada Working Holiday and International Youth Program (IMP)	Not renewable	Uncapped
	Intra-company transferees: International Mobility Program (IMP) Work Permit Holders by year in which Initial Permit became effective (Trade – ICT; NAFTA – ICT; GATS professionals; significant benefits ICT)	Varies	
	Other workers: other Temporary Foreign Workers with LMIA; Other International Mobility Program Participants (excl. Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel; Spouses of skilled workers; Spouses of students; PR Applicants in Canada; Humanitarian reason; Haiti special measures)	IMP: varies Live-in caregivers: unlimited other TFWP: not renewable	Uncapped

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Czechia	**Seasonal workers:** Long-term visa for Seasonal employment	Up to 9 months, renewable	
	Intra-company transferees		
	Researchers		
	Other workers: Special work visa (for citizens of Ukraine and other selected nationalities) working in agriculture, food industry, forestry	Up to 1 year, not renewable	
Denmark	**Working holidaymakers:** Residence permits in the area of education – Working Holiday	Up to 12 months	
	Trainees: Residence permits in the area of education – Interns	Up to 18 months	
	Other workers: Work permits – Agriculture, Wage work in Greenland or Faroe Islands. Researchers: Work permits – Researchers and teachers Au pair: Residence permits in the area of education – Au pair	Up to 2 years (4 years for researchers) (renewable)	
Estonia	**Seasonal workers:** Registration of short-term employment as a seasonal worker	Up to 270 days in a 365-day period	Uncapped
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary residence permit – ICT (includes trainees, managers, specialists)	Up to 3 years (1 year for ICT trainees)	
	Other workers: Other registration of short-term employment (Under general conditions, Equipment installer/craftsman, Other)	Up to 365 days in a 455-day period	Uncapped
	Researchers: Temporary residence permit – Researcher	Up to 5 years	
Finland (Decisions on first residence permits)	**Seasonal workers:** Seasonal work visas; Seasonal work requiring a LM test	Up to 9 months	
	Trainees: Internship		
	Intra-company transferees: ICT; ICT (mobile)		
	Other workers: Volunteering; National researcher; Scientific research	Up to 12 months	
France (first residence permits issued – work contract or permits shorter than 1 year)	**Seasonal workers:** number of medical check-up (source: OFII)	Up to 9 months per year (3-year authorisation)	
	Working holidaymakers: *Programme vacances Travail*	Up to 12 months.	
	Trainees: *Stagiaires*	Up to 1 year initially (extension up to 3 years in total)	
	Intra-company transferees: Residence permits – *Salarié en mission / Salarié détaché ICT*	Up to 3 years.	
	Other workers: Researchers, au-pair, other residence permits	Up to 12 months (renewable)	
Germany (grants of first residence permits)	**Seasonal workers:** § 15a Abs.1 Nr. 1 BeschV (Saisonbeschäftigung – Arbeitserlaubnis bis 90 Tage)		
	Trainees: Berufsausbildung (§ 16a AufenthG)		
	Intra-company transferees: § 8 BeschV (Praktische Tätigkeiten als Voraussetzung für die Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsqualifikationen), § 10 BeschV (Internationaler Personalaustausch, Auslandsprojekte), § 10a BeschV (ICT-Karte / Mobiler-ICT-Karte)		
	Other workers: "Au pair (§19c Abs. 1 AufenthG in conjunction with § 12 BeschV)"; European Voluntary Service (§ 19e AufenthG)		
Ireland	**Trainees:** Internship employment permit		
	Intra-company transferees: ICT Employment permit		
	Other workers: Contract for Services Employment permit; Exchange Agreement		
	Specialists and skilled (experts working visa)	Unlimited	Uncapped
Italy	**Seasonal workers:** estimates from the Ministry of Interior	Up to 9 months	Capped

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
(entry visa data)	**Trainees:** visa for study/training reasons – traineeship		Uncapped
	Working holidaymakers: "Vacanze lavoro" programme	12 months	Uncapped
	Intra-company transferees: estimates from the Ministry of Interior	Up to 3 years (1 year for ICT trainees)	Uncapped
	Other workers: estimates from the Ministry of Interior		Uncapped
Japan (New visas, excl. re-entry)	**Working holidaymakers:** Working holidaymaker visas		Capped for some nationalities
	Trainees: Trainees and Technical intern training		
	Intra company transferees		
	Other workers: Professor; Researcher; Instructor; Specified Skilled Worker; Designated activities – Researcher and IT engineer; Designated activities – Housekeeper; Designated activities – EPA candidates	1 to 5 years, renewable	Uncapped
Korea (Visas issued, incl. some re-entries)	**Industrial trainees:** Industrial trainees (D-3); general trainees (D-4)		
	Working holidaymakers: H-1		
	Intra-company transferees: D-7		
	Other workers: Speciality Occupations (E-5); Unskilled Employment (E-9); Visiting & Employment (H-2); Foreign Language Instructor (E-2); Research – (E-3); Professors (E-1)		
Lithuania (First issuances of temporary residence permits)	**Trainees:** Intern at a scientific study institution		
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary residence permits – ICT		
	Other workers: Researchers Excluding "Workers in shortage occupations/whose work meets the needs of the labour market" (undetermined share of posted workers among this category)		
Luxembourg (first residence permit issuances)	**Trainees:** "Stagiaires"		
	Intra-company transferees: Transfert intragroupe – expert/cadre; employé-stagiaire; mobile expert cadre; Travailleur transféré; Mobilité à long terme du travailleur transféré – expert/cadre		
	Other workers: Posted workers; Researcher; Prestataire de service Communautaire; Volunteer; Au pair	Up to 12 months	

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Mexico	**Seasonal workers:** Cards of visiting border-worker *(Tarjetas de Visitante Trabajador Fronterizo)*	Up to 5 years	
	Other workers: Temporary residence permit *(Tarjetas de Residente Temporal)* for work		
Netherlands	**Intra-company transferees:** Single permit – Work/residence permit for ICT	Up to 3 years (up to 1 year for ICT trainees)	
New Zealand (excludes Australian citizens)	**Seasonal workers:** Recognised Seasonal Employer Limited Visa; Supplementary Seasonal Employment (extensions)	Up to 7 months (or 9 months for citizen-residents of Tuvalu and Kiribati); extensions possible up to 6 months	Capped
	Working holidaymakers: Working Holiday Scheme	Up to 12 months (or 23 months for citizens of the United Kingdom or Canada)	Capped for some countries
	Trainees: Work experience for student; Medical & dental trainee; NZ racing conference apprentice; Excluding religious trainees	Practical training for students not enrolled in New Zealand (or enrolled for 3 months maximum): up to 6 months; Apprentice jockeys: up to 4 years	Uncapped
	Other workers: *Skilled Migrant Programme;* *Skilled Work programme:* selected categories (ASEAN Special Work; Chef from Thailand; China Skilled Workers; China Special Work; Essential Skills; Essential Skills – Skill Level 1; Essential Skills – current employment; AEWV transitional; Accredited Employer); *Work to Residence Programme:* selected categories (Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation; Talent (Accredited Employer)) *Exchange Work*		
Norway (Education and work permits)	**Seasonal workers:** Work permits – seasonal	Up to 6 months in a 12-month period. Not renewable	
	Working holidaymakers (from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan or Argentina)	Up to 1 year. Renewable for some nationalities for up to 2 years	Some capped
	Trainees: Education permit – Interns or guestworkers (Praktikant eller gjestearbeider)	Up to 6 or 12 months. Not renewable	
	Post doc: Education permit – Post-doc		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Other granted work permits for third-country nationals		
Slovak Republic	**Seasonal workers:** Foreign workers – Agriculture (Residence permit for the purpose of seasonal employment)	180 days within 12 months, renewable once	

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
	Trainees: Temporary residence – ICT – intern; Special activity – Internship as part of studies outside the Slovak Republic		
	Intra-company transferees: ICT Specialists and Managers		
	Researchers: Temporary residence – Research & Development		
	Other temporary workers: Temporary residence – Special activity – Teaching activity		
Slovenia	**Seasonal workers**: first permits issued (Eurostat)	Up to 6 or 7 months in a calendar year	
	Trainees: Ministry of Interior		
	Intra-company transferees: Temporary residence permits – ICT	Up to 1 year, Renewable	
	Other temporary workers: Temporary residence permits – Research work	Up to 1 year, Renewable	
Spain (first residence permits)	**Seasonal workers:** Residence of limited duration: salaried and self-employed; agriculture and selected other sectors; GECCO programme		
	Trainees: Residence of limited duration – Work-linked Training		
	Intra-company transferees: EU and national programmes		
	Other workers: Digital nomad; *Fixed-term residence:* Employment for others. Civil servants or military officials of foreign state administrations who come to Spain to carry out activities by virtue of co-operation agreements with the Spanish Administration; *Researchers* EU / national: agreement with research organisations (EU and national): Research staff; scientific and technical staff; Professor; *Temporary residence:* Employed, Self-employed, Exception to the work authorisation.		
Sweden (Temporary permits)	**Seasonal workers:** Berry pickers		
	Working holidaymakers: Working holiday visas (for citizens of Australia, Hong Kong (China), Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Korea)	Not renewable	
	Other workers: Researchers **Excluding:** Student looking for work; International exchange (Artist, Aupair, Intern, Youth exchange); Professional athlete/coach; Looking for work or starting a business		
Switzerland	**Trainees**: L permits (all durations)	Up to 18 months	Capped
	Other workers: Holders of L permit for Work (Third-country nationals) Researchers: Academic guests and sabbaticals – B and L permits (Third-country nationals) Postdoc: Doctorants et postdoctorants – B permits (estimated share of postdocs) (Third-country nationals)	Up to 12 months, renewable	Capped

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
United Kingdom (Entry clearance visas granted)	**Seasonal** Seasonal worker (previously Tier 5)	Up to 6 months	Capped
	Trainees: Study – Trainee doctors and dentists; Work – Graduate Trainee (Global Business Mobility)	Up to 12 months	
	Working holidaymakers: Youth Mobility Scheme (previously Tier 5)	Up to 24 months (multi-entry visa)	
	Intra-company transferees:		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Short Term (closed on 6 April 2017)		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Long Term	Maximum 5 years (9 years if salary > GBP 120 000 per year)	
	Senior or Specialist Worker (Global Business Mobility)	Up to 5 years	
	Other workers: ECAA Businessperson; International Graduates Scheme; Overseas Domestic Worker; Private Servants in Diplomatic Households; Government Authorised Exchange (previously Tier 5); International Agreement (previously Tier 5); Secondment Worker (Global Business Mobility); Service Supplier (Global Business Mobility); UK Expansion Worker (Global Business Mobility)		
United States (non-immigrant visa statistics)	**Seasonal workers:** H-2A – Temporary worker performing agricultural services; H-2B – Temporary worker performing non-agricultural services	Up to 3 years	Capped as to H-2B
	Working holidaymakers: J-1 – Exchange visitorsummer Work Travel Programme	Up to 4 months	Capped
	Trainees: H-3	Up to 2 years	
	Intra-company transferees: L-1 – Intra-company transferee (executive, managerial, and specialised personnel continuing employment with international firm or corporation)	Maximum initial stay of one year (3 years for L-1A employees). Extended until reaching the maximum limit of seven years (5 years for L-1B)	
	Other workers:		
	H-1B – Temporary worker of distinguished merit and ability performing services other than as a registered nurse (approvals)	Up to 3 years initially. Maximum limit of six years in total (with some exceptions)	Capped
	H-1B1 – Free Trade Agreement worker (Chile/Singapore)		
	O-1 – Person with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year)	
	O-2 – Person accompanying and assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by O-1	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year)	
	TN – NAFTA professional	Up to 3 years	

Annex Table 1.A.4. Postings of workers active under Article 12 in selected European OECD countries, by destination country, 2010-2024

Destination	2010-14 annual average	2015-19 annual average	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024/23	2024/10
	Thousands							Change in percentage	
European OECD countries									
Germany	337	444	411	430	489	548	508	-7.2	103.3
France	170	267	308	308	337	375	472	25.8	194.0
Austria	80	162	232	221	305	333	329	-1.1	452.3
Switzerland	69	134	177	153	166	210	261	24.5	402.2
Netherlands	97	127	390	153	173	193	254	31.4	176.9
Spain	50	82	82	88	150	190	236	24.3	272.9
Belgium	127	175	169	174	215	231	229	-0.8	153.3
Italy	55	87	91	108	133	169	225	33.4	272.5
United Kingdom	41	73	62	38	111	100	139	39.8	305.5
Poland	15	35	59	58	92	105	116	9.9	797.1
Czechia	17	40	60	54	73	79	108	36.6	579.0
Sweden	26	52	61	58	71	78	95	22.1	388.3
Portugal	12	27	29	36	57	73	81	10.2	563.1
Hungary	9	21	29	38	42	54	76	42.1	803.7
Denmark	11	22	35	31	43	63	55	-12.6	469.5
Luxembourg	23	34	47	44	48	52	53	2.3	92.8
Slovak Republic	7	16	18	14	60	34	40	16.5	357.0
Finland	20	23	25	24	31	39	34	-11.7	70.0
Greece	7	10	11	13	22	29	34	19.6	221.5
Ireland	5	8	8	6	45	62	22	-64.2	344.4
Slovenia	4	9	11	13	27	35	22	-36.6	554.4
Norway	21	27	25	21	44	69	18	-73.2	-2.0
Lithuania	2	4	5	4	6	9	10	9.5	431.9
Latvia	2	2	3	2	3	5	8	52.9	337.3
Estonia	2	3	3	3	0	9	6	-28.4	423.9
Iceland	0	1	1	1	19	81	2	-97.3	308.8
Total	**1 245**	**1 938**	**2 390**	**2 105**	**2 759**	**3 237**	**3 450**	**6.6**	**230.0**
Selected non-OECD countries									
Romania	10	17	18	18	33	47	47	1.3	401.8
Croatia	3	12	12	13	16	69	33	-51.9	..
Bulgaria	4	6	6	6	10	15	16	7.9	253.3

Source: De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet (2026[1]), "Posting of workers – Report on A1 Portable Documents issued in 2024", https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/4941289.

StatLink https://stat.link/vk5zq1

Annex Table 1.A.5. Top 50 countries of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2023-2024

	Thousands		Share in	2024/23 absolute	2024/23 change	Difference with	Expatriation rate
	2023	2024	2024 (%)	change (thousands)	(%)	2023 rank	(per '000 population) in 2024
India	607	494	6.2	-113	-19	0	0.3
China	362	351	4.4	-11	-3	0	0.2
Colombia	243	252	3.2	10	4	2	4.8
Brazil	256	251	3.2	-5	-2	-1	1.2
Mexico	218	227	2.9	9	4	1	1.7
Morocco	204	217	2.7	13	7	1	5.7
Cuba	120	214	2.7	94	78	13	19.5
Romania	244	213	2.7	-31	-13	-4	11.2
Pakistan	169	186	2.3	16	10	3	0.7
Venezuela	150	174	2.2	24	16	5	6.1
Syria	194	173	2.2	-21	-11	-3	7.1
Afghanistan	173	167	2.1	-6	-3	-1	4.0
Philippines	192	163	2.1	-29	-15	-4	1.4
Italy	154	146	1.8	-8	-5	0	2.5
Germany	145	139	1.8	-6	-4	2	1.6
Viet Nam	122	123	1.5	1	1	3	1.2
Türkiye	159	122	1.5	-36	-23	-4	1.4
Russian Federation	182	121	1.5	-61	-34	-8	0.8
Peru	108	120	1.5	12	11	3	3.5
Poland	136	111	1.4	-25	-18	-2	2.9
France	105	108	1.4	3	3	3	1.6
Bangladesh	113	108	1.4	-5	-4	-1	0.6
United States	106	106	1.3	-1	-1	0	0.3
Nigeria	145	91	1.2	-54	-37	-8	0.4
Iran	94	91	1.1	-4	-4	0	1.0
Dominican Republic	86	84	1.1	-2	-2	0	7.4
United Kingdom	85	83	1.0	-2	-2	0	1.2
Spain	83	79	1.0	-4	-5	0	1.6
Nepal	60	70	0.9	10	17	6	2.4
Argentina	72	69	0.9	-3	-4	0	1.5
Honduras	62	67	0.8	5	8	2	6.3
Algeria	57	66	0.8	9	16	6	1.4
Bulgaria	80	65	0.8	-15	-19	-4	9.6
Portugal	62	61	0.8	-2	-2	-2	5.8
Albania	63	57	0.7	-6	-10	-4	20.3
Egypt	57	56	0.7	-1	-2	1	0.5
Sri Lanka	54	54	0.7	-1	-1	2	2.3
Bolivia	26	53	0.7	27	106	28	4.3
Tunisia	46	53	0.7	7	15	3	4.3
Ecuador	42	50	0.6	8	19	4	2.8
Cameroon	37	46	0.6	9	23	9	1.6
Netherlands	43	45	0.6	2	5	1	2.5
Hungary	51	44	0.6	-7	-14	-2	4.5
El Salvador	38	42	0.5	5	12	5	6.7
Korea	42	41	0.5	-2	-4	0	0.8
Canada	39	40	0.5	0	1	1	1.0
Senegal	27	38	0.5	11	40	16	2.1
Belarus	60	38	0.5	-22	-37	-14	4.2
Eritrea	33	38	0.5	5	15	4	10.8
Uzbekistan	33	38	0.5	5	15	2	1.0


Note: Migration flows to Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece and Ireland are not included. Migration flow series to Germany, Japan, Korea and Poland are adjusted to exclude short-term immigrants.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en.

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Annex Figure 1.A.1. Employment rates by place of birth, 2004-2025

Percentage (%)




Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/2g7rvf

Annex Figure 1.A.2. Evolution of the gap in employment rates between men and women, by place of birth, 2004-2025


Percentage points



Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/ejdgv5

Annex Figure 1.A.3. Change in the labour force participation rate between 2024 and 2025, by place of birth, men and women, population aged 15 to 64



Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of the foreign-born and native-born populations. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15-59 and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals.

Source: European countries: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/zin5kx

Annex Table 1.A.6. Labour force participation in OECD countries, 2024-2025

	2024			2025		
	Foreign-born (%)	Native-born (%)	Gap with the native-born (p.p.)	Foreign-born (%)	Native-born (%)	Gap with the native-born (p.p.)
Australia	80.6	80.5	0.0	80.9	80.8	0.1
Austria	76.9	78.6	-1.8	77.7	79.3	-1.6
Belgium	68.4	71.6	-3.2	70.5	72.3	-1.8
Canada	80.6	79.4	1.2	81.0	79.1	1.8
Chile	83.0	68.9	14.1	82.9	69.2	13.7
Colombia	70.6	66.6	4.0	74.3	70.9	3.5
Costa Rica	74.1	64.5	9.6	71.6	65	6.7
Czechia	82.1	77.2	4.9	82.7	77.6	5.1
Denmark	83.1	82.3	0.8	83.2	82.2	1.1
Estonia	84.0	81.9	2.1	84.0	81.3	2.7
Finland	76.9	79.7	-2.8	75.8	80.4	-4.6
France	70.9	75.2	-4.3	71.3	75.9	-4.6
Germany	74.4	82.0	-7.6	74.9	82.1	-7.1
Greece	73.6	70.2	3.3	75.9	70.5	5.4
Hungary	81.1	78.6	2.6	81.5	78.5	3.0
Iceland[1]	90.1	88.3	1.9	..	..	..
Ireland	81.6	76.4	5.2	82.4	76.7	5.7
Italy	71.1	65.8	5.2	70.8	66	4.8
Japan[2]	81.4	79.8	1.6	..	..	..
Korea[3]	71.8	72.3	-0.5	73.4	72.5	0.8
Latvia	75.4	76.9	-1.4	75.1	77.8	-2.8
Lithuania	78.4	79.5	-1.2	80.3	79.7	0.6
Luxembourg	79.2	67.8	11.4	80.2	66.9	13.3
Mexico	56.4	65.8	-9.4	58.2	65.1	-7.0
Netherlands	76.3	87.5	-11.2	76.7	87.6	-11.0
New Zealand	84.3	81.8	2.5	84.1	80.5	3.6
Norway	76.6	81.6	-5.0	77.2	81.3	-4.2
Poland	81.1	74.6	6.5	81.1	75.0	6.1
Portugal	83.6	77.0	6.6	83.5	77.9	5.6
Slovak Republic	75.5	76.6	-1.1	78.7	76.5	2.2
Slovenia	77.4	75.7	1.8	76.7	75.6	1.1
Spain	77.6	73.7	3.8	77.5	74.1	3.3
Sweden	83.5	84.0	-0.5	84.2	83.9	0.3
Switzerland	82.5	85.0	-2.5	82.7	85.0	-2.3
Türkiye	49.7	60.9	-11.2	48.4	60.5	-12.2
United Kingdom	80.4	77.6	2.8	82.1	78.2	3.9
United States	76.0	73.3	2.6	76.3	73.5	2.9
EU27	**75.1**	**75.4**	**-0.3**	**75.6**	**75.7**	**-0.1**
OECD average	**76.5**	**75.7**	**0.8**	**77.1**	**76.0**	**1.1**

Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of the foreign-born and native-born populations. The OECD average is calculated as a simple average of all countries with available data for both years. ".." indicates missing data or unreported estimates due to low reliability. The OECD average of 2024 can be different from the previous edition's average due to the different country coverage and data updates.

1. The data for Iceland refer to 2024 instead of 2025 (excluded from OECD average).
2. The data for Japan refers to foreign nationals, for the year 2020 instead of 2024 (excluded from OECD average).
3. Rates for Korea are estimated for the population aged 15+ and refer to foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past five years, compared to nationals.

Source: European countries and Türkiye: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Japan: Population Census; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/95syek

Annex Table 1.A.7. Employment rates of persons aged 15-64 by place of birth and education level, OECD countries, 2025

	Foreign-born			Native-born		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Australia	49.4	75.2	85.6	54.2	80.6	88.5
Austria	57.6	75.1	80.4	53.2	79.1	90.6
Belgium	48.0	67.4	83.5	47.1	75.9	90.4
Canada	53.0	70.3	82.3	51.9	71.4	84.2
Chile	76.9	84.8	87.3	64.6	75.0	82.6
Colombia	67.6	74.3	81.2	64.4	69.0	80.2
Costa Rica	68.9	68.3	85.4	60.3	66.6	83.6
Czechia	72.0	85.6	86.3	58.0	87.2	90.0
Denmark	57.6	75.7	83.7	59.5	83.3	89.2
Estonia	44.7	82.8	79.7	61.4	82.0	91.3
Finland	53.0	68.7	80.4	47.8	78.7	90.1
France	52.1	67.0	77.2	52.5	75.2	89.3
Germany	62.0	78.8	78.1	59.4	84.8	92.0
Greece	71.6	67.6	66.2	55.8	72.5	83.6
Hungary	76.8	85.9	88.7	58.2	84.7	92.5
Iceland[1]	76.1	84.0	91.6	73.5	86.7	92.5
Ireland	67.3	76.8	87.5	53.6	77.8	89.8
Italy	63.9	71.0	73.7	53.3	75.8	90.1
Korea	55.1	66.8	66.0	33.7	55.9	76.9
Latvia	..	69.4	76.7	58.3	76.8	90.1
Lithuania	..	65.5	85.7	43.9	74.7	91.3
Luxembourg	61.1	71.0	86.7	49.1	73.9	89.9
Mexico	60.8	67.4	76.5	64.4	71.9	81.1
Netherlands	61.5	75.5	84.7	71.3	85.7	92.0
New Zealand	68.8	83.0	88.4	65.5	82.1	91.1
Norway	58.1	73.6	83.9	59.6	82.2	91.4
Poland	76.3	83.7	86.9	44.8	76.0	92.1
Portugal	77.6	82.3	87.3	71.2	86.1	92.5
Slovak Republic	..	77.0	90.6	32.5	81.4	92.6
Slovenia	61.0	83.9	77.7	50.8	77.9	92.5
Spain	64.5	72.5	79.4	61.9	75.3	86.4
Sweden	62.5	79.7	86.8	66.5	87.0	94.1
Switzerland	68.6	79.0	84.2	58.0	84.2	92.5
Tûrkiye	42.2	46.5	54.6	48.4	60.1	74.3
United Kingdom	67.8	76.7	86.6	50.0	76.1	87.4
United States	60.5	71.7	80.0	29.4	68.4	83.1
EU27	**61.5**	**74.6**	**80.3**	**56.1**	**79.2**	**90.3**
OECD average	**62.1**	**74.3**	**81.4**	**54.7**	**77**	**88.3**

1. The data for Iceland refer to 2024 instead of 2025 (excluded from OECD average).

Source: European countries and Türkiye: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: Current Population Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/kawcy5

Annex Table 1.A.8. Employment of foreign-born persons by industry, 2025

	Agriculture and fishing	Mining, manufacturing and energy	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Education	Health	Activities of households	Admin. And ETO	Other services	Total	Total FB employed (thousands)	Total percentage of FB employed
Austria	0.9	16.8	9.9	14.9	12.2	6.5	5.1	..	11.3	22.2	100	1029	69.8
Belgium	0.4	13.4	7.7	11.5	7.6	6.2	8.6	..	22.6	21.8	100	960	63.3
Costa Rica	15.6	6.4	15.3	15.4	10.6	2.1	2.1	12.3	5.9	13.9	100	225	67.4
Czechia	1.5	35.9	13.5	10.7	7.2	6.2	1.6	..	6.5	16.5	100	305	79.3
Denmark	0.9	13.4	5.1	16.3	9.9	9.5	14.6	..	10.1	20.2	100	251	73.6
Estonia	..	25.9	9.4	12.3	6.6	8.5	3	..	7.2	27	100	79	75.6
Finland	1.2	14	7.5	9.1	11.2	7.8	13.4	..	14.4	20.9	100	266	61.7
France	1.1	10.8	11.3	12.3	10.5	7.8	8.8	2.4	13.4	21.5	100	3 252	62.8
Germany	0.5	22.5	8.2	14.5	9.2	5.1	7.9	0.5	11.3	20.3	100	7 945	69.6
Greece	7.4	14.3	15.3	13.2	23.3	2.5	1.1	3.9	7.1	11.9	100	351	66.9
Hungary	5.1	23.4	8.9	15	5	10.2	3	..	8.8	20.6	100	137	78.5
Ireland	..	13.6	8.8	17.8	14.5	8	12	..	6.5	18.8	100	512	77.8
Italy	6.1	21.1	11.3	10.8	11.4	2.2	2.7	10.2	7.7	16.5	100	3 608	65.1
Latvia	..	19.5	9.4	14.4	6.7	7.6	3.9	..	8.2	27.5	100	59	68.6
Lithuania	5.7	23.6	8.7	10	5	8.1	2.3	..	7.8	28.7	100	62	71.4
Luxembourg	..	4.2	6.1	11.5	3.8	5	4.2	..	20.7	42	100	168	74.1
Mexico	3.7	10.9	6.1	17.6	9.9	..	8.9	..	1.1	27.7	86	349	55.4
Netherlands	1	13.6	5.1	16.2	7.2	7	9.5	0.3	14.7	25.4	100	1 285	71.7
Norway	1.4	10.8	10.2	11.7	9.3	7.1	14.7	..	12.3	22.3	100	547	71
Poland	..	30.1	12.3	12.6	5.9	4.8	..	..	6.3	25.8	100	473	77.1
Portugal	1.1	8.8	11.3	18.3	13.9	8.5	5	3.6	11.4	18	100	600	76.8
Slovak Republic	5.3	30.9	9.4	13.4	8.7	6.8	1.2	..	4.5	19.7	100	30	74.8
Slovenia	..	30.4	19.1	11.7	6.3	4.4	2.5	..	9.8	15.5	100	141	73.4
Spain	5	11.4	10.7	14.6	16.5	3	4	8	8.8	18	100	4 823	66.6
Sweden	0.4	11.7	5.9	9.5	6.3	12.4	14.1	..	13.2	26.3	100	1084	70.5
Switzerland	0.7	17	8.7	12.9	7.9	6.3	7	1.9	9.3	28.4	100	1 367	76.4
Türkiye	4.4	28.9	8.8	18.1	6.5	5.4	1.2	2.8	7.8	16.2	100	729	43.2
United Kingdom	0.3	8.6	4.4	9.8	6.9	8.6	18.2	0.2	10.8	32.1	100	7 044	76.8
United States	1.8	11.3	11.9	11.8	8.3	6.1	13.6	0.8	9	25.5	100	28 674	73.1
EU27	2.3	17.2	9.5	13.4	10.9	5.3	6.5	3.4	11	20.5	100	28 233	68.2

	Agriculture and fishing	Mining and manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale, retail, accommodation and food	Electricity, Transportation, Telecommunications, Finance	Business, Personal, Public Services	Health	Activities of households	Admin. And ETO	Other services	Total	Total FB employed (thousands)	Total percentage of FB employed
Korea	8.8	44.6	9.5	20.7	2.8	13.5	..	..	..	..	100	1 144	68.9

Note: ".." indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations. The population refers to the employed foreign-born population aged 15 to 64. Comparable industry data for 2025 are not available for Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
Source: European countries and Türkiye: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); Canada, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Survey; Korea: Economically Active Population Survey and Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force.

StatLink https://stat.link/acl0r4

Notes

[1] Eurostat data on first residence permits are used to estimate the number of permits issued for employment, family and other reasons. Note that the national flow series published by AIMA in September 2026 differs in coverage from the Eurostat series, resulting in different levels and trends. The difference partly reflects the treatment of Community of Portuguese Language Countries – CPLP – residence authorisations, which are not fully captured in the Eurostat series, as well as AIMA's inclusion of residence documents issued to EU citizens and their family members as a separate category. On this basis, AIMA reported 337 880 new residence titles in 2025, compared with 218 332 in 2024 (+55%) and around 329 000 in 2023 (+2.7% between 2023 and 2025).

[2] https://migri.fi/en/-/immigration-statistics-2025-immigration-to-finland-decreasing.

2 Recent developments in migration policy

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in the immigration policies of OECD countries during the period 2025-2026, with a particular focus on policy changes linked to return migration and international researcher mobility.

In Brief

Key findings

- Migration policy developments in 2025 and 2026 largely extended trends observed in recent years. Governments continued to balance political pressure to strengthen migration control with the need to address labour shortages, attract talent and maintain international protection systems.
- In the European Union, the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum advanced significantly in 2025 and 2026, alongside broader efforts to strengthen EU-level migration governance. The implementation process was accompanied by the adoption of the EU's first Visa Strategy, a new European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, and negotiations on the Return Regulation establishing a Common European System for Returns.
- Many OECD countries introduced measures aimed at reducing irregular migration, reflecting growing political pressure to strengthen control over migration flows following several years of high migration levels. Reforms included stronger border controls, enhanced enforcement measures, expanded efforts to combat migrant smuggling and increased emphasis on returns and deterrence.
- Several countries tightened asylum and international protection systems, reflecting both broader efforts to strengthen migration management and preparations for the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Reforms included stricter eligibility rules, accelerated procedures and greater emphasis on the temporary nature of protection status and the prospect of return.
- Labour migration systems became increasingly selective and targeted, with tighter admission conditions for some categories of workers alongside continued recruitment in shortage occupations and sectors.
- Competition for highly skilled workers intensified, with many countries expanding fast-track pathways, talent visas and other measures aimed at attracting workers in strategic sectors, including technology, healthcare and research.
- Return policies remained a major area of reform, with governments seeking to accelerate return procedures, increase enforcement and strengthen co-operation with countries of origin and transit.
- Countries increasingly viewed international researcher mobility as a strategic policy issue linked to innovation, competitiveness and technological leadership. Against a backdrop of intensifying global competition for scientific talent, several OECD countries expanded immigration pathways, launched dedicated recruitment initiatives and strengthened measures to attract and retain international researchers.

Major policy trends in 2025-2026

Migration policy developments in 2025 and 2026 continued trends observed across OECD countries in recent years. Governments sought to balance political pressure to strengthen control over migration flows with the need to address labour and skills shortages, attract talent and maintain international protection systems. Across many OECD countries, migration policies became increasingly differentiated, with tighter

controls on irregular and lower-skilled migration coexisting alongside efforts to attract workers and talent considered strategically important. The resulting reforms combined tighter controls on irregular migration, asylum and return policies with more selective approaches to labour migration and talent attraction.

Major developments in migration governance frameworks

The most significant development occurred within the European Union with the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began to apply in June 2026. Alongside implementation of the Pact, the European Commission launched the EU's first Visa Strategy, presented a new European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy and adopted additional initiatives to strengthen legal migration and talent attraction. Negotiations also progressed on the Return Regulation establishing a Common European System for Returns, which seeks to further harmonise return procedures and strengthen co-operation on return and readmission across Member States. Together, these measures reflect an increasingly comprehensive approach to migration governance that seeks to combine asylum management, border security, labour migration, return policy, talent attraction and co-operation with third countries within a common policy framework. The Pact itself was the result of several years of negotiations aimed at balancing effective management of external borders with solidarity among Member States. While implementation has progressed significantly, discussions regarding responsibility-sharing and the operationalisation of the new solidarity mechanism have illustrated the continuing complexity of translating a common framework into practice across Member States. The European Commission's assessment of progress in May 2026 noted substantial advances in implementation preparations but also identified continuing challenges related to legislative adaptation, administrative capacity, staffing, infrastructure, digital systems and uneven levels of preparedness across Member States (European Commission, 2025[1]).

Meanwhile, migration governance in the Americas underwent a significant reorientation following the return of the Trump administration in January 2025. Changes to US asylum, humanitarian and border policies, combined with a stronger focus on enforcement, removals and migration deterrence, altered migration dynamics throughout the region. Migration co-operation increasingly centred on border control, deportations, readmission arrangements and the management of irregular migration flows, often through bilateral agreements between the United States and countries of origin and transit. These shifts also marked a broader reorientation of migration governance in the region. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, adopted in 2022, sought to establish a regional framework based on shared responsibility, expanded legal pathways, international protection and migrant integration. While the Declaration remains formally in place, the political momentum behind the Declaration has weakened considerably, with migration governance increasingly shaped by national policy responses and bilateral arrangements.

Stronger controls on irregular migration and border management

In the United States, the Trump administration made border enforcement a central policy priority, introducing a range of measures intended to deter irregular arrivals, strengthen enforcement and increase removals. European countries similarly reinforced border controls in response to concerns about irregular migration and secondary movements. Following the formation of a new coalition government in 2025, Germany extended and reinforced border controls at several land borders as part of a broader effort to reduce irregular migration. Poland introduced temporary border controls at its borders with Germany and Lithuania in July 2025, citing sustained migratory pressure, while Italy extended controls at its border with Slovenia until December 2026 because of concerns relating to irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks.

In 2025, France and the United Kingdom reached a new agreement intended to reduce irregular crossings of the English Channel and weaken the business model of migrant smuggling networks. The agreement facilitates the return of certain irregular entrants while creating additional legal pathways for others.

Spain, by contrast, pursued an alternative approach to addressing irregular migration through a regularisation programme implemented in 2026, which targeted certain foreign nationals already residing in the country. The measure grants eligible applicants a residence permit with work rights and was presented as a response to existing irregular residence, labour market needs and social cohesion objectives.

Tightening asylum and international protection systems

Several OECD countries introduced reforms affecting asylum seekers, refugees and beneficiaries of international protection. These measures sought to tighten access to protection systems, accelerate procedures, strengthen enforcement and increase governments' capacity to manage asylum caseloads. In the European Union, the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum increasingly translated into national reforms of asylum procedures and protection systems. In parallel, several countries introduced additional measures aimed at accelerating procedures, managing asylum caseloads more effectively and strengthening the link between protection status and evolving protection needs.

The United States adopted and proposed a series of restrictive measures affecting refugees and asylum seekers. These measures included the suspension of the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), a substantial reduction in refugee admissions, the expansion of travel restrictions affecting several major refugee-origin countries, enhanced review of refugee and immigration status determinations, restrictions on access to resettlement and integration services, reduced access to certain public benefits for refugees, and proposed restrictions on employment authorisation for asylum applicants.

Several other OECD countries similarly tightened asylum procedures. Canada adopted the *Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act* in 2026, introducing new eligibility restrictions for certain asylum claims, including claims submitted more than one year after entry and some claims lodged following irregular entry from the United States. Ireland announced plans to introduce a mandatory accommodation contribution for employed applicants for international protection residing in state-provided accommodation. Greece adopted legislation strengthening sanctions for rejected asylum seekers and reinforcing a deterrence-oriented approach to migration management. The United Kingdom also announced a package of asylum reforms aimed at tightening the system and strengthening incentives for return where protection needs are no longer present.

Closely linked to these debates has been a growing emphasis on protection statuses that are temporary, conditional and subject to periodic review. Finland amended its Aliens Act in 2025 to shorten the duration of residence permits granted on the basis of refugee status and subsidiary protection and increase the frequency of reassessments of protection needs. The United Kingdom announced that newly recognised refugees would generally receive 30-month protection permits instead of the five-year period previously granted as standard, with protection needs reassessed at each renewal and greater emphasis placed on return where conditions in countries of origin are considered to have improved. Sweden continued its shift away from permanent settlement as the default outcome of asylum through reforms in 2026 limiting access to permanent residence for beneficiaries of protection, while the Netherlands moved away from permanent asylum residence permits and reinforced a system based on renewable protection statuses.

The tightening of asylum and protection systems also gave rise to renewed debate regarding the scope of international legal protections. Several European Governments called for a reassessment of the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly with regard to its implications for removals of rejected asylum seekers and foreign nationals convicted of crimes. Critics

argue that current interpretations constrain governments' ability to remove rejected asylum seekers and foreign nationals convicted of crimes.

Despite the overall trend towards more restrictive asylum policies, several countries also expanded pathways for refugees and displaced persons. Costa Rica created a special humanitarian permit for certain Latin American nationalities, and Italy expanded labour mobility pathways for refugees through dedicated admission quotas linked to training and employment opportunities.

The trend towards more selective and targeted labour migration continues

While many governments sought to reduce overall migration levels and strengthen labour market protections for domestic workers, persistent labour and skills shortages continued to generate demand for foreign workers in a range of sectors. As a result, labour migration systems became increasingly selective and targeted, with tighter conditions for some categories of migrants alongside expanded pathways for workers in shortage occupations and highly skilled professionals, continuing trends observed in recent years (OECD, 2024[2]; OECD, 2025[3]).

In several OECD countries, labour migration reforms were explicitly linked to efforts to reduce migration levels and strengthen protections for domestic workers. The United Kingdom's 2025 Immigration White Paper set out a strategy centred on reducing net migration, raising skill requirements and strengthening domestic workforce development. Subsequent reforms increased the skill threshold for the Skilled Worker route from RQF Level 3 to level 6, removed more than 100 medium-skilled occupations from eligibility for overseas recruitment and substantially increased salary thresholds. Additional restrictions were introduced across several migration categories, alongside tighter scrutiny of selected visa applications.

Canada similarly tightened elements of its Temporary Foreign Worker Program and International Mobility Program through higher wage thresholds, more restrictive eligibility conditions linked to regional labour market circumstances and stronger employer compliance requirements. At the same time, Canada continued to expand pathways from temporary to permanent residence for selected workers already established in the country. Quebec also narrowed the list of occupations eligible for simplified labour market impact assessments. Mexico strengthened documentation and compliance requirements for employment-related residence permits, while Japan introduced stricter documentation and language requirements for certain work visa categories.

The United States announced a broad package of proposed reforms aimed at tightening employment-based migration programmes and strengthening labour market protections. These included higher prevailing wage requirements for H-1B and permanent labour migration pathways, stricter labour market testing, additional employer compliance obligations and reforms to H-1B eligibility criteria. The administration also introduced a USD 100 000 fee for certain H-1B petitions involving workers recruited from abroad, substantially increasing sponsorship costs for some employers.

Despite these tightening measures, labour shortages remained a significant concern in many OECD countries, prompting governments to maintain or expand selected labour migration channels.

Italy adopted a new three-year Decreto Flussi for 2026-2028 authorising almost 500 000 entries of non-EU workers, with allocations focussed on sectors experiencing persistent shortages, including agriculture, tourism, construction, transport and manufacturing. Ireland revised its occupation lists and expanded quotas in selected sectors, notably care work. New Zealand also expanded eligibility under its occupational shortage framework.

More broadly, many European countries continued to adjust labour migration programmes to address specific labour market needs. Austria expanded seasonal worker quotas, Germany doubled admissions under its Western Balkans labour migration scheme, Greece increased the number of positions available to third-country nationals and Ireland expanded opportunities in shortage occupations. At the same time,

some countries moved in the opposite direction. Lithuania reduced admission quotas, while Hungary ended its guest worker programme in 2026.

Several countries also introduced targeted flexibility measures to address localised labour shortages. Canada temporarily increased the cap on low-wage temporary foreign workers for rural employers, while Quebec introduced transitional arrangements allowing certain workers awaiting permanent selection decisions to remain employed. Finland eased restrictions for workers changing jobs within labour shortage occupations, and Estonia introduced reforms increasing employment flexibility for foreign workers and employers.

Competition for highly skilled workers and strategic talent intensified

Alongside tighter controls on lower- and medium-skilled migration, many OECD countries continued to strengthen pathways for highly skilled migrants and workers in strategic sectors considered important for economic growth, innovation and competitiveness.

Canada further expanded its category-based Express Entry selection system, including targeted invitations for STEM occupations and new pathways for foreign doctors. The country's broader Tech Talent Strategy continued to prioritise highly skilled workers through accelerated processing and targeted recruitment initiatives. Japan expanded its focus on highly skilled migration through the Japan System for Special Highly Skilled Professionals (J-SKIP) and the Japan System for Future Creation Individual Visa (J-FIND) programmes, designed respectively for highly qualified professionals and graduates of leading universities.

Greece adopted reforms centred on attracting technology and innovation talent, including a new Tech and Talent Visa and more flexible EU Blue Card arrangements. Sweden extended the validity of EU Blue Cards, while France expanded talent pathways for medical and pharmacy professionals. Portugal reoriented parts of its immigration system towards highly qualified workers, and Germany continued implementation of its Skilled Immigration Act while also advancing plans for a new Work-and-Stay Agency. The agency is intended to act as a one-stop platform for skilled immigration, improving co-ordination between visa authorities, labour market institutions and migration administrations and simplifying recruitment procedures for employers seeking to hire skilled workers from outside the European Union.

At EU level, efforts to attract skilled talent increasingly complemented national reforms. In December 2025, the European Commission announced the launch of the first European Legal Gateway Office pilot project in India, aimed at facilitating recruitment in the ICT sector and supporting legal pathways for skilled workers. Similar initiatives, together with ongoing reforms to the EU Blue Card framework, reflect a growing emphasis on international competition for talent.

Return systems under reform across OECD countries

Return policies have become an increasingly prominent component of migration management across OECD countries in recent years. Recent policy developments have focussed on accelerating return procedures, strengthening enforcement, expanding co-operation with countries of origin and transit, and increasing the implementation of both voluntary and forced returns.

Focus on accelerated voluntary and forced return in many OECD countries

Recent years have seen a renewed policy focus on increasing return rates and improving the implementation of return decisions across OECD countries, with the most significant reforms taking place in Europe and the United States. In the European Union, the adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024 marked a major overhaul of the EU migration framework, including in the area of return migration. While the Pact covers a broad range of issues related to asylum, border management and responsibility-

sharing, it also places greater emphasis on returns by strengthening the link between asylum and return procedures. In particular, it introduces a border return procedure for certain categories of rejected asylum applicants and seeks to ensure that negative asylum decisions are followed more systematically by return procedures.

The return dimension of the Pact has subsequently been reinforced through the European Commission's proposal for a Common European System for Returns (CESR) in March 2025, implemented through a proposed Return Regulation. The reform seeks to establish a more integrated EU-wide return framework through common procedures, a European Return Order, stronger obligations on returnees to co-operate with return procedures, mutual recognition of return decisions across Member States, and enhanced provisions on readmission and co-operation with third countries (see Box 2.1). The Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement on the Regulation in June 2026, which was subsequently approved by the European Parliament and was awaiting final Council approval as of July 2026.

Alongside the reforms introduced through the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Return Regulation, several Member States have strengthened their national return frameworks through a combination of enhanced enforcement measures, greater detention capacity, expanded return support and efforts to improve the implementation of return decisions.

Germany adopted the Act to Improve the Return of Foreigners (*Rückführungsverbesserungsgesetz*) in 2024, introducing measures to facilitate the implementation of return decisions and removals through extending detention periods prior to removal, expanding powers to identify and locate persons subject to removal, and facilitating the deportation of criminals and other removable migrants. France implemented several provisions of its 2024 immigration law aimed at accelerating removal procedures following negative asylum decisions and strengthening the enforcement of obligations to leave the territory. Sweden has undertaken a broader overhaul of its migration system and implemented measures to strengthen both voluntary and forced returns. Recent reforms have combined expanded financial incentives for voluntary return with increased detention capacity, reforms intended to facilitate the implementation of removal orders, and stronger co-operation between migration and law-enforcement authorities to increase the implementation of removal orders. Belgium, meanwhile, adopted a new Proactive Return Policy Law and expanded dedicated return structures for rejected asylum applicants as part of broader efforts to increase effective returns.

Denmark has strengthened its return framework with the establishment of the Danish Return Agency, operational since 2021, which centralised responsibility for return-related activities previously spread across several authorities. The agency oversees return counselling, voluntary return programmes, reintegration assistance, accommodation for persons awaiting return and co-operation with countries of origin. Recent reforms have placed greater emphasis on sustainable reintegration through pre-departure counselling, financial assistance and post-return support, complemented by the Danish Migration Management and Return, Readmission and Reintegration Programme (2024-2029), which seeks to strengthen return and reintegration capacities both in Denmark and in partner countries.

Box 2.1. The EU Return Regulation: Towards a common European system for returns

In June 2026, the European Parliament approved the Return Regulation, a major reform of the EU return framework that replaces the Return Directive that had governed EU return policy since 2008. The Regulation forms the core of the proposed Common European System for Returns and reflects a stronger emphasis on accelerating returns, harmonising procedures across Member States, and strengthening migration-control instruments. It was approved by the European Parliament on 17 June 2026 following a political agreement reached between the Council and Parliament on 1 June 2026.

Among its most significant tools, the Regulation broadens the range of countries to which third-country nationals may be returned and establishes a legal framework for the creation of return hubs in third countries. It also introduces a system for the mutual recognition and enforcement of return decisions across Member States through a new European Return Order. At the same time, the Regulation expands obligations on individuals subject to return procedures, strengthens the use of entry bans, increases powers to locate persons subject to return, and extends the maximum detention period from 18 to 30 months.

In addition, the Regulation expands the operational role of Frontex in return procedures, information exchange and implementation of the new return architecture. Once formally approved by the Council, several provisions, including those relating to return hubs, readmission co-operation and Frontex support, will apply immediately, while most other provisions will enter into force after a 12-month transition period.

Source: https://ecre.org/european-parliament-approval-of-the-return-regulation/; https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-welcomes-political-agreement-return-regulation-2026-06-02_en.

In the United States, return and removal policy has similarly moved to the forefront of the migration agenda. Since 2025, the Trump administration has pursued a goal of substantially increasing the scale of removals, including a stated objective of reaching 1 million deportations annually. This effort has involved expanding detention capacity and increasing interior enforcement operations and terminating or allowing the expiry of several temporary protection programmes. The administration has also placed emphasis on encouraging voluntary departure. A federal incentive programme provides travel assistance and financial incentives, recently raised to USD 2 600, for migrants who agree to leave voluntarily and register their departure through the "CBP Home" Mobile application. These measures seek to increase departures beyond those achieved through formal removals. More generally, tighter immigration enforcement and changing conditions for undocumented migrants have further contributed to pressures toward "self-deportation", particularly in locations experiencing intensified enforcement activity.

The increase in return and deportation flows from the United States has had repercussions across the region, particularly in Mexico. In January 2025, the Mexican Government launched the national repatriation strategy *México te Abraza* ("Mexico Embraces You") and established a network of reception centres in northern border states to receive returning Mexican nationals deported from the United States. Co-ordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and involving 34 federal agencies, the programme provides returning migrants with temporary accommodation, food, medical and psychological assistance, identity documents, transport to their communities of origin, access to social programmes and labour market services. Repatriated individuals also receive a repatriation certificate granting access to programme benefits and temporary access to public health insurance. Although the programme was primarily designed for returning Mexican nationals, Mexico has also received increasing numbers of third-country nationals deported from the United States. Mexican authorities have indicated that such migrants may receive humanitarian assistance and support for onward voluntary return to their countries of origin.

Outside Europe and North America, Japan has tightened its return framework following revisions to its Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act that entered into force in 2024-2025. The reforms were intended to address repeated asylum applications used to delay removal and allow deportation of certain repeat asylum applicants whose claims have already been rejected. The reforms have been accompanied by a stronger focus on enforcement, including the Immigration Services Agency's 2025 "Zero Illegal Foreign Residents Plan", which aims to increase removals of persons subject to final deportation orders.

In Korea, recent policy developments have centred on recurring voluntary departure programmes for irregular migrants. Since 2022, the Ministry of Justice has periodically introduced temporary departure programmes under which irregular migrants who leave voluntarily receive exemptions from administrative fines and temporary suspension of entry restrictions. These programmes primarily target migrants who have overstayed their visas or otherwise fallen into irregular status after lawful entry. Authorities have simultaneously maintained immigration enforcement measures against migrants who do not participate in the voluntary return programme.

Externalisation of return and removal arrangements

Another important development has been the growing interest in the externalisation of return procedures. Rather than relying exclusively on direct returns to countries of origin, several countries have explored mechanisms involving third countries as destinations for deportees, hosts of return facilities or partners in broader return management arrangements. The objective is generally to address cases in which direct return is difficult or impracticable and to increase the effectiveness of return systems.

Within the European Union, discussions on return hubs advanced rapidly between 2025 and 2026. Following a joint letter from 19 Member States calling for the development of "innovative solutions" for migration management, the proposed Common European System for Returns incorporated a legal basis for return hubs in third countries. Return hubs are facilities located in third countries where persons subject to a return decision in an EU Member State could be transferred while awaiting return to their country of origin, or, under certain arrangements, be returned directly to the third country hosting the hub. The concept subsequently received support from the Council in its December 2025 negotiating position and was retained in the provisional political agreement on the Return Regulation approved in June 2026 (see Box 2.1). The agreed text allows Member States to establish return hubs in third countries through agreements or arrangements that comply with international human rights standards and the principle of non-refoulement. While no operational EU return hubs had been established as of mid-2026, the concept had moved from political debate into the emerging EU legislative framework on return.

When it comes to national initiatives, Italy and the Netherlands have been at the forefront of efforts to externalise migration management. Italy signed an agreement with Albania to provide facilities that initially were designed to process certain asylum claims outside Italian territory but were repurposed in 2025 through Decree Law No. 37/2025 to also accommodate migrants already subject to removal orders in Italy. The reform transformed the facilities into a potential component of Italy's return infrastructure and represented one of the first attempts by a European country to establish offshore facilities directly linked to return procedures.

In September 2025, the Netherlands and Uganda signed a Letter of Intent on a pilot transit hub. The initiative was not operationalised and Dutch efforts subsequently shifted towards a broader coalition with Denmark, Germany, Austria and Greece seeking shared return hubs outside the EU. Following the political agreement on the EU Return Regulation, participating countries began discussions with potential host countries and explored wider migration and development partnerships linked to the operation of such hubs. As of mid-2026, no specific countries of co-operation had yet been announced.

Since 2025, the Trump administration has made increasing recourse to third-country removal arrangements, under which migrants may be transferred to countries other than their country of nationality.

Initial agreements focussed on transit countries in Central America, notably Panama and Costa Rica, which agreed to receive non-national deportees pending onward return. Subsequently, the United States expanded co-operation with a broader group of partner countries, including countries outside the Americas, as part of a strategy to increase removal capacity when direct returns to countries of origin are difficult to implement.

Reassessment of protection needs and renewed returns to Syria and Afghanistan

Another notable development has been the reassessment of protection conditions in major countries of origin and the resulting expansion of return possibilities. For much of the past decade, large-scale returns to countries such as Syria and Afghanistan were largely suspended across many OECD countries due to security concerns and humanitarian protection considerations. Since 2024, however, governments have increasingly revisited these assumptions, reflecting changing political conditions in origin countries, domestic pressures to increase return rates, and broader efforts to reduce asylum backlogs.

In Europe, this shift has been particularly visible in relation to Syria and Afghanistan. Germany resumed deportations of Afghan nationals in 2024, initially focussing on individuals convicted of serious crimes and persons considered security risks. Similar discussions subsequently emerged in several other European countries. Following political developments in Syria in late 2024, a number of European Governments reassessed the situation in the country. Austria became the first EU Member State since 2011 to carry out deportations to Syria in 2025, while several other countries announced plans to explore similar measures. At the same time, several European countries temporarily suspended the processing of Syrian asylum applications pending new assessments of country conditions and protection needs. These measures initially concerned relatively small and selected groups, but they signalled an important shift in return policy and in the interpretation of protection obligations.

Türkiye, the world's largest host of Syrian refugees, introduced a "go-and-see" policy in the first half of 2025 allowing Syrians under temporary protection to visit Syria and subsequently return to Türkiye without losing their status, enabling them to assess conditions before deciding whether to return permanently.

EU-level discussions have also evolved. As implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum progresses, debates have intensified around the designation of safe countries of origin and the reassessment of country conditions in major refugee-origin countries. New evaluations of the security situation in Syria and other countries could provide additional momentum for expanding return programmes beyond the limited categories currently targeted. While large-scale returns to Syria and Afghanistan remain politically and operationally challenging, the direction of policy has clearly shifted towards increasing the scope for returns where governments consider conditions to have improved sufficiently.

The United States has also tightened its approach to temporary protection as part of a broader effort to increase returns and reduce the use of humanitarian migration pathways. In 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terminated Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals, arguing that conditions in Afghanistan no longer justified continued protection. The termination took effect in July 2025. DHS subsequently announced the termination of TPS designations for several other nationalities, including Syrians and Haitians, on the grounds that country conditions no longer met the statutory requirements for TPS. While the Syrian designation initially remained in place following court orders suspending the termination, the US Supreme Court ruled in June 2026 that federal courts could not review TPS determinations on non-constitutional grounds, thereby allowing the administration to proceed with the termination of TPS for both Syria and Haiti.

Return and readmission increasingly embedded in migration partnerships and international development co-operation in the EU

While recent EU reforms have focussed heavily on increasing return rates and improving the enforcement of return decisions, EU institutions and several Member States have also sought to strengthen co-operation with countries of origin and support the longer-term reintegration of returnees. As a result, return, readmission and reintegration have become increasingly embedded in broader migration partnerships and external co-operation frameworks. Recent examples include the EU – Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (2023), the EU – Egypt Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership (2024) and the EU – Mauritania Partnership (2024), which combine migration-management and border-control objectives with co-operation on readmission, return and reintegration. In parallel with the proposed Return Regulation, the European Commission and Member States have increasingly sought to strengthen co-operation with third countries on return and readmission through a broader migration-diplomacy approach that includes the use of financing instruments, visa policy and trade relations as incentives for co-operation (European Commission, 2026[4]).

Several OECD-EU countries have also taken steps to strengthen the alignment between return and reintegration and development co-operation (OECD, 2025[5]). This trend is illustrated by recently adopted strategies for return and reintegration among Nordic countries. Sweden's 2024-2028 Strategy for Global Development Co-operation on Migration, Returns and Voluntary Repatriation explicitly aims to create synergies between migration policy and development assistance. The strategy supports reintegration programmes, migration-management capacity building and local development in countries of origin. Denmark has adopted a similarly integrated approach through its Danish Migration Management Programme (2024-2029). The programme seeks to strengthen migration-management capacities in partner countries while improving structures for return, readmission and sustainable reintegration. It explicitly positions development assistance as a tool for supporting longer-term migration management objectives and strengthening co-operation with countries of origin. While Norway has had multi-year return strategies in place since 2011, the 2025-2030 Return Strategy is the first strategy published jointly by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Researcher mobility and global competition for scientific talent

Growing geopolitical tensions, concerns about research funding environments and intensifying international competition for highly skilled workers have increased the strategic importance of international researcher mobility across OECD countries. Governments are increasingly seeking not only to facilitate the admission of researchers and scientists but also to actively attract, recruit and retain global scientific talent as a means of strengthening research excellence, innovation, technological development and economic competitiveness. These efforts accelerated markedly in 2025, when concerns regarding research funding cuts, constraints affecting academic institutions and tighter immigration policies in the United States prompted a number of OECD countries to position themselves as alternative destinations for internationally mobile researchers.

Expansion of dedicated pathways for researchers and scientific talent

A first major trend has been the expansion of immigration pathways specifically designed to attract researchers and scientists. Across OECD countries, governments have sought to facilitate international mobility by accelerating admission procedures, broadening eligibility criteria and reducing administrative barriers for researchers and their families.

Within the European Union, national reforms have developed alongside common EU frameworks governing the admission and mobility of third-country researchers. The Students and Researchers

Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/801) establishes common rules for the admission of researchers and facilitates short- and long-term mobility across Member States. In parallel, the revised EU Blue Card Directive (Directive (EU) 2021/1883), which Member States were required to transpose by November 2023, has sought to strengthen the EU's attractiveness to highly qualified talent through lower salary thresholds, shorter minimum contract requirements, expanded recognition of professional experience, enhanced intra-EU mobility and easier access to long-term residence. Together, these instruments provide an important framework underpinning researcher and highly skilled mobility across the European Union.

Several major European destinations for international researchers continue to rely on immigration pathways introduced in earlier years. France's *Passeport Talent – Chercheur*, introduced in 2016, remains the principal admission channel for non-EU researchers, providing multi-year residence permits, simplified admission procedures and facilitated family reunification for researchers hosted by recognised institutions. The United Kingdom similarly continues to rely on its Global Talent Visa, introduced in 2020, which offers a flexible route for leading and emerging researchers, scientists and innovators and provides pathways to long-term settlement. Germany, by contrast, does not operate a dedicated researcher visa of comparable prominence. Instead, researcher mobility is supported through a combination of residence permits for researchers, the EU Blue Card and broader skilled migration channels. Recent reforms implementing the revised EU Blue Card Directive, together with wider changes to Germany's skilled migration framework, have expanded eligibility, lowered salary thresholds and facilitated admission for highly qualified workers, indirectly improving mobility opportunities for researchers and other STEM professionals.

Sweden has recently adopted reforms aimed at improving the attractiveness of the country for international researchers and doctoral candidates. The reforms allow doctoral candidates with hosting agreements to obtain residence permits for research, facilitate changes between permit categories within Sweden and extend post-study residence rights for researchers and doctoral graduates. These measures form part of a broader effort to strengthen Sweden's competitiveness in the global competition for talent.

Outside Europe, Japan introduced the Japan System for Special Highly Skilled Professionals (J-SKIP) and the Japan System for Future Creation Individual Visa (J-FIND). J-SKIP provides an accelerated route for highly qualified researchers and professionals, while J-FIND allows graduates from leading universities worldwide to enter Japan for job seeking, entrepreneurial activities or research-related opportunities. Together, these programmes represent a significant effort to strengthen Japan's attractiveness as a destination for global scientific talent. Korea has similarly strengthened dedicated pathways for scientific talent through the introduction of the K-STAR Visa Track in 2025. The programme expands fast-track residence opportunities for outstanding international graduates and researchers in science and technology, provides access to an F-2 residence visa without employment requirements for selected candidates, and shortens the path to permanent residence from six years to three years.

Canada has expanded immigration pathways targeting researchers, technology professionals and STEM workers through initiatives associated with its Tech Talent Strategy, while Australia introduced the National Innovation Visa in December 2024, a permanent migration pathway targeting exceptionally talented individuals, including researchers, academics and innovators capable of contributing to strategically important sectors of the economy.

Researcher recruitment increasingly embedded in national innovation and competitiveness strategies

Recent reforms also indicate a broader shift away from isolated researcher visa programmes towards comprehensive talent-attraction strategies that integrate immigration policy with innovation, industrial and economic objectives. The most prominent recent example is the European Commission's *Choose Europe for Science* initiative, launched in 2025. The initiative seeks to position Europe as a preferred destination for internationally mobile researchers by mobilising research funding, strengthening research careers and

supporting recruitment efforts across the European Research Area. Building on existing instruments such as Horizon Europe, the European Research Council (ERC) and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, the initiative reflects a shift from simply enabling mobility towards actively attracting leading researchers and research teams. It also illustrates the growing tendency to view researcher attraction as an issue of strategic competitiveness, innovation and technological sovereignty rather than solely one of migration policy.

The European initiative has been accompanied by a proliferation of national programmes. France launched *Choose France for Science*, designed to attract international researchers and research teams through dedicated funding opportunities and institutional support. Germany has expanded recruitment efforts through initiatives such as *Global Minds*, while Denmark has strengthened international recruitment efforts through *Science Hub Denmark*, a national initiative launched in 2024 to increase the international visibility of Danish research and attract leading researchers in strategic scientific fields.

Norway has adopted one of the most ambitious recent recruitment initiatives. In 2025, it launched a dedicated international researcher recruitment scheme with a budget of NOK 300 million for 2025-2028 (about EUR 27 million), aimed at helping Norwegian institutions recruit and retain highly qualified researchers from abroad. The programme was explicitly presented as a response to growing global competition for research talent and concerns about academic freedom in other parts of the world. Norway has further sought to reduce barriers affecting the recruitment and retention of international researchers. In 2025, the government announced that it would reverse a recently adopted requirement obliging foreign doctoral candidates and postdoctoral researchers to undertake mandatory Norwegian-language training, following concerns that the measure could hinder international recruitment and weaken Norway's attractiveness as a research destination. The reform formed part of a broader effort to strengthen the country's international research competitiveness and improve conditions for globally mobile scientists.

Italy has taken a particularly targeted approach. In 2025, it launched a EUR 50 million programme encouraging highly qualified researchers currently based abroad to relocate to Italy. The programme specifically targets recipients of ERC Starting and Consolidator Grants and provides funding of up to EUR 1 million per project to support relocation and research activities. Estonia has adopted a similar strategy on a smaller scale, introducing schemes aimed at attracting internationally mobile researchers, including dedicated opportunities for holders of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Seal of Excellence and mobility grants supporting relocation to Estonian research institutions. The Austrian Academy of Science APART-USA funding programme is supporting outstanding postdoctoral researchers working at a US university or non-university research institution who wish to relocate their research activities to excellent research locations in Austria. Together, these initiatives illustrate the growing use of targeted research funding as a tool for attracting internationally mobile scientific talent.

Outside Europe, Canada has significantly expanded efforts to attract global scientific talent through its *Canada Global Impact+ Research Talent Initiative*, launched at the end of 2025. Backed by CAD 1.7 billion (approximately EUR 1.1 billion) over 12 years, the initiative aims to recruit more than 1 000 leading international researchers, early-career academics, doctoral students and postdoctoral researchers to Canada. It combines support for world-leading research chairs, recruitment of emerging research leaders, research infrastructure investments and dedicated funding for doctoral and postdoctoral researchers, reflecting a highly strategic approach to strengthening national research capacity and innovation performance. The initiative was announced in the context of intensifying international competition for scientific talent and was explicitly presented as a means of strengthening Canada's position as a global destination for research excellence. Australia has similarly sought to capitalise on growing international mobility among researchers through the Australian Academy of Science's *Global Talent Attraction Program*, which aims to recruit world-leading researchers and technologists, particularly from the United States, and support their relocation to Australian universities, research institutes and industry.

Beyond national initiatives, regional governments and individual research institutions have also launched targeted programmes to attract internationally mobile researchers. In Spain, the Catalan Government's *Catalunya Talent Bridge* programme aims to attract internationally mobile researchers through dedicated research positions and funding support. In France, Aix-Marseille Université launched the *Safe Place for Science* programme in 2025, a programme specifically designed to host researchers who felt that their work could be constrained by changing conditions in the United States. It initially planned to mobilise around EUR 10-15 million over three years and host approximately 15-20 researchers. In Australia, the state of South Australia launched the Global Researcher Attraction Program, providing dedicated fellowships to recruit internationally recognised researchers in STEM fields aligned with strategic state priorities, including critical technologies, artificial intelligence, defence and cybersecurity.

Several national and regional/institutional initiatives highlighted reductions in research funding, constraints on academic freedom and a less favourable environment for international researchers in the United States as opportunities to attract globally mobile scientific talent. Norway's international researcher recruitment programme, Austria's APART-USA fellowships and Catalonia's *Talent Bridge* programme all emerged within this broader context.

Greater attention to retention and long-term careers

A related development has been the growing recognition that attracting international researchers is insufficient unless countries can also provide conditions that encourage them to remain and build long-term careers. As global competition for scientific talent intensifies, policymakers are increasingly paying attention not only to recruitment and admission but also to settlement, career development and family support.

Japan provides one of the clearest examples through the J-SKIP programme, which combines facilitated admission with exceptionally rapid access to permanent residence, extensive rights for accompanying family members and flexible conditions for spouses. The programme is explicitly designed to attract and retain internationally mobile talent. Korea has also introduced stronger retention incentives for highly qualified scientific talent under the K-STAR Visa Track, which enables outstanding international researchers and science and technology graduates to obtain long-term resident status more easily and reduces the period required to qualify for permanent residence from six years to three years.

Sweden has strengthened retention pathways for international researchers and doctoral candidates. Reforms adopted in 2026 facilitate access to permanent residence, reduce the qualifying period for researchers and doctoral candidates, extend opportunities to remain after completing research or studies, and allow doctoral candidates to obtain residence permits specifically for research rather than study purposes. Germany has similarly strengthened pathways from study and research to employment and long-term settlement, while France's Passeport Talent – Chercheur framework combines facilitated admission with multi-year residence permits and favourable provisions for accompanying family members.

Overall, recent reforms suggest a significant evolution in researcher mobility policy. While earlier initiatives focussed largely on facilitating entry, current approaches increasingly span the full mobility cycle from recruitment and admission to integration, settlement and long-term retention. As global competition for scientific talent intensifies, the ability to retain internationally mobile researchers is becoming as important as the ability to attract them in the first place.

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3 Recent developments in migrant integration policy

In a context of persisting fiscal pressure in the field of integration and the widespread policy goal of maximising the productive potential of migrants, this chapter offers an overview of the notable trends in integration policy in OECD countries over the past year. It focusses in particular on citizenship access and naturalisation, access to benefits and material support and on decentralisation and the role of subnational levels in integration.

In Brief

Key findings

- Integration policy across OECD countries has entered a more constrained phase, reflecting tighter public finances, growing pressure on housing and public services, and weaker political support for broad-based integration spending.
- Overall, integration policies in 2025-2026 reflect a continued shift towards activation, conditionality and individual responsibility. While these reforms may improve policy targeting and fiscal sustainability, they also increase the risk of slower integration for migrants facing persistent structural barriers, including limited language skills, caring responsibilities and weaker labour market attachment.
- The policy focus continues to shift from universal integration programmes towards more targeted, conditional and employment-oriented measures, often delivered through digital tools and local implementation arrangements.
- Countries are introducing integration measures earlier, differentiating pathways by migrant category and strengthening links between integration participation and labour market outcomes.
- Labour market integration remains the principal policy objective. Reforms increasingly promote rapid labour market entry while strengthening measures to improve job matching and protect migrant workers from exploitation.
- Civic integration requirements are becoming more prominent, with greater emphasis on language acquisition, civic knowledge and shared values as part of integration.
- Support for displaced Ukrainians is evolving from emergency assistance towards longer-term inclusion. At the same time, several countries are making support more targeted, conditional or time-limited as policies increasingly prioritise self-sufficiency.
- OECD countries are placing greater emphasis on social cohesion, anti-discrimination, civic participation and addressing negative social control, reflecting a broader understanding of integration that extends beyond labour market outcomes.
- Citizenship policy is becoming a more explicit instrument for shaping integration expectations. Across many OECD countries, reforms strengthen requirements related to language proficiency, residence duration, civic knowledge and economic self-sufficiency, although some countries continue to facilitate access for specific groups.
- Access to benefits and material support is increasingly linked to residence history, labour market participation and engagement in integration measures. While protection for vulnerable groups is generally maintained, eligibility conditions are becoming more restrictive for working-age migrants with weaker labour market attachment.
- Local and regional authorities continue to play a growing role in integration governance. Municipal implementation, place-based approaches and strengthened monitoring frameworks are increasingly used to address integration challenges and tailor support to local needs.

Major changes over the past year

Integration policy has entered a more constrained and politically contested phase. Tight public budgets, pressure on housing and public services and weaker political appetite for broad-based integration investments have slowed reform and changed its character. Large universal integration programmes are giving way to measures that are targeted, conditional, employment-oriented, digitally delivered, or locally implemented.

The trend towards structured early integration pathways has continued but **countries are now extending integration earlier in the migration trajectory, differentiating provision by migrant category, and linking participation more explicitly to labour market participation.**

In the region of Flanders in Belgium, pre-arrival integration trajectories are being developed in fully digital form for people still abroad, with separate modules for labour migrants and family migrants, remote coaching and continuity into post-arrival integration. From 2027, many third-country workers will face a mandatory tailored integration trajectory, and language requirements are being raised from A2 to B1 for some groups.

Estonia revised its Early Integration Programme, introducing a new B1 language course, adjusting the duration of A1-A2 courses to improve accessibility and flexibility, and adding a short orientation module for beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine. From 2026, applicants for permanent settlement also need to complete the programme and pass an A2 language examination. As part of transposing the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, Estonia is also preparing to make participation mandatory during the asylum application stage.

In Finland, the 2026 budget provides for the national core curriculum for integration programme to be reviewed, with the aim of allowing training to be combined more flexibly with work or entrepreneurship. Lithuania is preparing new language examinations ahead of requirements entering into force from January 2026, when immigrants working in the service sector will need at least A1 proficiency.

A number of new programmes are also targeted at migrant entrepreneurs. For example, Hungary's SMART UA programme, launched in 2025, offers a six-week entrepreneurship course for displaced Ukrainians with business ideas or early-stage ventures.

The emphasis on civic and social integration has also grown. France introduced a civic exam for first applications for multi-year residence permits in 2025 and launched a dedicated training website for applicants. Lithuania trained its first instructors for a standardised sociocultural introduction course, with 19 instructors from 14 municipalities completing a 20-hour programme to support people granted asylum, beneficiaries of temporary protection and other newcomers.

Austria expanded mandatory Values and Orientation Courses from three to five days on a pilot basis in 2024, with nationwide implementation in place since 2026. A new law on "integration obligations" is currently under discussion which will, among other measures, render the signature of a new "value charter" obligatory.

To combat negative social control and honour-related issues, Norway has implemented a range of measures. In May 2025, the government launched the new action plan "In charge of your Own Life – Strengthened Efforts Against Negative Social Control and Honour-Related Violence" (2025-2028). The action plan contains 29 measures within the following priority areas: legal protection, prevention, capacity-building within public services, and involuntary stays abroad. Norway also has special envoys for integration. These work to provide support and aid to Norwegian citizens and people with legal status in Norway who are victims of negative social control and honour-based violence abroad.

Likewise, Denmark launched a four-year plan to address negative social control and honour-related conflict, including a 50% increase in security consultants advising municipalities, rights advisers placed in

youth education institutions, and new crisis centre places for families with children. Sweden appointed public inquiry to examine parallel social structures and their consequences for integration and exclusion. Both initiatives reflect a broadening of integration policy to address behaviour and social structures within settled communities.

Sweden commissioned Statistics Sweden (SCB) to assess the feasibility of creating an Integration Barometer – a proposed survey instrument to monitor aspects of integration that cannot be captured through administrative registers alone, including trust in institutions, democratic participation, social networks, language use, belonging and perceptions of discrimination. The initiative is part of a broader effort to strengthen integration monitoring, including plans for regular monitoring of geographically concentrated disadvantage.

The link between integration support and labour market entry has strengthened. This is partly driven by labour shortages, but also by the political need to demonstrate that integration spending supports self-sufficiency. In Greece, for example, the 2025 draft legal migration framework explicitly links access to some integration support to active job search by beneficiaries of international protection. In Sweden, reforms in 2025-2026 retain an individualised introduction model but place greater emphasis on work incentives, particularly for women with children and weak labour market attachment. Alongside this push to incentivise work, the growing contribution of migrant workers to municipal and regional welfare services, including elderly care, has been highlighted by Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions.

In Finland, legislative amendments entering into force in June 2025 gave third-country nationals holding work-based residence permits three months – or six months for specialists and entrepreneurs – to find new employment before their residence status is affected, while also broadening their right to seek work across any designated labour shortage sector rather than only their original field.

The employment-first approach is increasingly accompanied by stronger safeguards against exploitation. In Korea, an amendment to the Immigration Act entering into force in November 2025 exempts foreign victims of unpaid wages from notification obligations and allows labour inspectors to assist them without reporting their immigration status. Earlier reforms in Finland clarifying employer responsibilities to migrant workers, introducing consequences for employers suspected of offences, and creating residence-permit options for victims of exploitation continued to be debated and refined in 2025-2026.

In Switzerland, the government has extended the pilot programme “PERSPECTA” which aims at a better labour market integration of family migrants.

Early intervention is also becoming more prominent. In the new Dutch coalition agreement, it is foreseen that asylum seekers with a good prospect of obtaining a residence permit will obtain language training at the very start of the asylum procedure. Likewise, “Participation Resource Centres” are planned to be set up at large reception locations. These Centres aim at supporting asylum seekers in arranging language training, volunteer activities or paid work.

In a similar vein, the new law on “integration obligations” in Austria, which is currently under discussion, foresees early obligatory integration measures including for asylum seekers from countries with high recognition rates.

In Canada, labour migrants and their families have traditionally had access to settlement services until obtaining citizenship. Since April 2026, access has been reduced to up to six years after obtaining permanent residence, and a further reduction to five years is foreseen for April 2027.

Fiscal pressure has led a number of countries to target support to groups that are particularly vulnerable or have poor labour market outcomes. Support for migrant children is expanding, mainly through targeted measures. Poland’s “Friendly School” programme running from 2025 to 2027, with a EUR 118 million budget, funds intercultural assistants, psychological support, career counselling and training for teachers working with migrant pupils. Czechia expanded language-support eligibility for newly

arrived foreign pupils, from 12 to 24 months and up to 400 hours of instruction. The Austrian School Organisation Act was amended in February 2026 and gives schools more autonomy in German language support and requires students to attend summer school to improve their German language.

Italy issued new school guidelines in 2025, strengthening Italian as a second language, promoting linguistic and cultural mediation, and introducing migration history into curriculum objectives. Sweden announced a three-year reinforcement of SEK 40 million per year from 2026 for language-strengthening initiatives through folk high schools, targeted at adults with weak language skills who have vocational education but are unemployed or weakly attached to the labour market. Regarding children, in 2026, the Swedish Government has been examining the introduction of compulsory language screening for young children in order to strengthen their language development. To this end, an internal government inquiry has been tasked with analysing how such a system could be designed and implemented.

Overall, all OECD countries, extended temporary protection provision for internationally displaced Ukrainians in 2026, but **policy for Ukrainians is moving from emergency reception towards longer-term inclusion**, though, in some countries support is also becoming more conditional and time-limited. Romania's support shifted in 2025-2026 towards structured inclusion with Ukrainian children given provisional school enrolment pending recognition of prior studies, alongside Romanian-language courses for children and adults, psycho-pedagogical counselling and cross-ministerial co-ordination. Greece expanded the HELIOS integration programme, which provides housing support and counselling. In Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia simultaneously reduced reception capacity, signalling a shift from emergency hosting towards self-sufficiency. Poland began phasing out emergency measures introduced in 2022. From March 2026, beneficiaries of temporary protection face reduced access to some family benefits, healthcare and accommodation, while retaining full labour market access.

In a number of OECD countries, integration policy in 2025-2026 is increasingly linked to social cohesion and anti-discrimination. In the EU, many countries adopted new national action plans to fight against racism and discrimination, following up on the new EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030. In Spain, for example, the hate-crime action plan for 2025-2028 reinforces prevention, reporting and support for victims, expands co-operation with migrant associations and civil society organisations, and promotes intercultural awareness among public officials and law enforcement. Luxembourg presented its first national action plan against racism in 2025, with 23 objectives and 128 measures to strengthen equality, prevent discrimination and improve victim support, including an anti-racism label.

Citizenship access and naturalisation

Citizenship requirements have become a more explicit instrument for defining integration expectations. The direction is not uniform, but the centre of gravity is shifting towards more demanding conditions for access, particularly where political debates have become more restrictive.

Germany's Act to Modernise Nationality Law entered into force on 27 June 2024, introducing dual nationality and reducing the general residence requirement for naturalisation from eight to five years. In 2025, however, the federal government removed the accelerated route that had allowed applicants with strong integration outcomes to naturalise after three years of residence. Applicants must now have resided in Germany for at least five years and meet other requirements, including sufficient German-language skills and financial independence.

In Sweden, amendments to the Citizenship Act entered into force in June 2026, making the requirements for obtaining Swedish citizenship more stringent. The new rules include requirements for knowledge of the Swedish language and Swedish society, a longer period of residence (generally increased from five to eight years), a self-support requirement, and stricter assessment of whether the applicant has led, and can be expected to lead, an orderly and law-abiding life.

In addition, a government-appointed public inquiry has proposed legislative amendments that would allow Swedish citizenship to be revoked from dual nationals who acquired citizenship on false grounds or who have committed certain particularly serious crimes, including offences related to national security. While proposals in this area have been advanced and a constitutional amendment has been approved in principle, the revocation regime has not yet fully entered into force and remains subject to completion of Sweden's constitutional amendment process.

Poland announced a tightening of access to citizenship in 2025. The required period of stay for a permanent residence permit is to be extended from three to five years, during which time applicants must maintain tax residency in Poland. Applicants will sign a loyalty declaration and a naturalisation test will be introduced, covering Polish history, language and recent political, economic and social developments, as well as basic values and norms of Polish social life. The required language level will rise from B1 to B2. Application fees also increased. Presidential approval of citizenship now carries a fee of PLN 1 669 (EUR 393), with administrative recognition carrying a fee of PLN 1 000 (EUR 240).

Belgium raised the fee for acquiring Belgian nationality from EUR 150 to EUR 1 000 in 2025, with annual indexing. This change is part of broader government measures placing greater emphasis on individual responsibility in citizenship applications. Illiterate persons continue to be exempt from the written language test component of the citizenship test, following the 2024 amendment to Belgium's Citizenship Code.

Language requirements are also being strengthened for permanent residence. As part of its ongoing earned settlement reforms, the United Kingdom will raise English language requirements for settlement (Indefinite Leave to Remain). Under the new rules, most applicants will need to demonstrate B2 level English (A-level standard), replacing the current B1 level (GCSE standard). The change was formally announced on 5 March 2026 and is scheduled to take effect from March 2027, giving applicants time to prepare.

Ireland improved the efficiency of citizenship administration in 2025, building on reforms already visible in 2024. Citizenship applications can now be made online, with electronic payments and vetting. Processing times fell from 15 months in 2023 to 8 months in 2024. In December 2025, however, the government extended the residence requirement for people granted international protection seeking naturalisation from three to five years.

Finland extended the residence requirement for naturalisation from five to eight years in October 2024, with further tightening planned in subsequent phases, including a self-support requirement, an integrity condition, and a citizenship test.

In the Netherlands, the 2026 coalition agreement foresees tightening of access to Dutch nationality. This concerns both the required language proficiency (from A2 currently to B1) and the minimum residence duration (from five to six years).

The exception to the trend towards more stringent requirements is Romania, where reform of the Citizenship Act reduced the mandatory residence period for people with refugee status who can demonstrate active integration, and introduced exemptions from minimum residence requirements for stateless persons and third-country nationals with significant contributions to the economy, arts, culture, sport, or volunteering. Romania also introduced a requirement to show Romanian-language proficiency at B1 level for applicants seeking acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship.

Overall, citizenship reforms in 2025-2026 point to more stringent conditions for access, with language proficiency, civic knowledge, fiscal contribution, residence duration and economic self-sufficiency becoming more prominent across OECD countries. The cumulative effect of higher fees, longer residence requirements and more demanding conditions risks excluding migrants who are functionally integrated but lack the resources or formal credentials these measures require.

Access to benefits and material support

Reforms to social benefits and material support are among the clearest signs of the tighter fiscal and political environment in 2025-2026. Support is being narrowed, made more conditional or linked more explicitly to labour market participation. Vulnerable groups are often protected, but working-age adults, especially recent arrivals and those without stable employment histories, increasingly face stricter activation requirements, residence-duration rules, income tests or reduced support.

Denmark's 2025 social-assistance reform is one such example. The reform simplifies benefits into three main rates – minimum, basic and increased. The central integration effect of the reform lies in differentiated eligibility based on residence and employment history. Access to higher benefit levels depends on long residence, typically nine out of the previous ten years, and an employment record of around two and a half years. Those who do not meet these criteria are placed at the lower minimum rate. Although formally nationality-neutral, this primarily affects newcomers and third country national (TCN) migrants, who are less likely to meet these thresholds. The reform also expands the work obligation to around 22 000 recipients, with participation of up to 37 hours per week in activation activities such as internships, training or community work. The work obligation is formally general, but in practice has a substantial impact on refugees and third-country national women with weak labour market attachment. Denmark has also asked municipalities to review 5 000 disability pension cases involving third-country nationals. The review applies to cases approved after 2003 in 74 designated housing areas and includes interviews and reassessment of medical and work-ability documentation. This fits a broader trend in which access to support is increasingly scrutinised through the lens of work capacity, self-sufficiency and residence history.

In early 2026, the Swedish Government proposed to limit access to welfare benefits for newly arrived migrants by introducing new eligibility requirements. If implemented, as of 1 January 2027, certain welfare benefits, such as child and housing allowances, will only be available to migrants who have resided in Sweden for a period of five years within a 15-year period or who pass certain employment income requirements.

In Austria, the planned new law on "integration obligations" foresees benefit cuts for non-participation or drop-out of integration activities. Cuts in social benefits for recent arrivals are also under discussion.

In Finland, healthcare reforms in 2025-2026 restricted access to non-urgent medical services for undocumented migrants while preserving emergency care. Comprehensive healthcare remains available for pregnant women and children. In France, from July 2026, foreign students from non-EU countries who are not eligible for need-based grants will be excluded from housing assistance. Students in precarious situations or with low incomes will retain access. In Sweden, a government-appointed inquiry presented proposals in March 2026 to introduce mandatory fees for publicly funded interpretation services.

A number of OECD countries are also withdrawing support initially extended to people displaced from Ukraine. In Poland, legislation from 2025 begins to phase out measures introduced in 2022. From 5 March 2026, following a transitional period, beneficiaries of temporary protection face reduced access to some family benefits, healthcare and accommodation, mainly affecting non-working adults outside vulnerable groups. They retain full access to the labour market upon registration, but lose the right to start businesses on the same terms as Polish citizens, and lose special provisions for medical employment and education. The Netherlands has adjusted support for displaced Ukrainians such that adults no longer receive a living allowance if they have a job or other income. Ukrainians with income living in municipal shelter must also contribute to utility costs.

Countering this tendency to remove and restrict support, the Czechia 2025 Housing Support Act, which takes effect gradually between January and June 2026, offers foreign nationals with permanent residence, asylum or subsidiary protection housing rights on the same terms as Czech citizens. It establishes

municipal Housing Contact Points, guarantees and compensation for landlords and municipalities, and provides for direct housing assistance.

The overall direction in 2025-2026 is not the withdrawal of support, but its reconfiguration. Support is increasingly targeted at vulnerability, conditioned on activation, or linked to residence and employment history. This reflects budgetary pressure and weak political will for expansive integration spending, but it also increases the risk that low-income migrants, women with care responsibilities and people with limited language skills face slower or more precarious integration.

Decentralisation and the subnational level

Local and regional authorities are becoming more central to integration policy in 2025-2026. This is partly pragmatic: many difficult integration bottlenecks including housing, school placement, language access, childcare, transport, and public employment services are experienced locally. It also reflects national fiscal and political constraints. Where central governments are reluctant to expand large universal programmes, local systems, civil society organisations and EU-funded projects are increasingly called upon to deliver targeted support. A parallel trend towards place-based integration governance reflects a move away from migrant-specific investments at the national level, towards identifying neighbourhoods where integration challenges coincide with broader socio-economic disadvantages. Such approaches can help target employment, education and community-support measures more effectively, but they require careful communication to avoid reinforcing territorial stigma or conflating migration-related challenges with wider patterns of social exclusion.

Belgium provides a clear example of expanding local responsibility. In Wallonia, a 2024 decree implemented in 2025 formally makes socio-professional integration a core mission of the Regional Integration Centres, consolidating their role in supporting migrants' access to employment through tailored programmes, partnerships with public employment services and local actors, and stronger engagement with employers.

The Netherlands remains one of the most developed examples of decentralised civic integration. Since the entry into force of the 2021 civic integration system, municipalities have been responsible for providing civic integration courses, monitoring quality and preparing a personal integration plan for each newcomer. They are also expected to encourage employers to create job opportunities for recognised refugees. In 2025-2026, this municipal model remains central to Dutch integration policy, especially as national policy seeks to reduce pressure on reception and housing systems.

In Sweden, the government submitted a proposal for a new law on the settlement of newly arrived refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, which is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2027. The aim of the proposal is to increase the influence of municipalities over the reception of new arrivals and strengthen incentives for newly arrived migrants to actively contribute to their integration, while at the same time ensuring more equal housing support across the country by obliging municipalities to provide housing for three years. The allocation of new arrivals would be based on the conditions for integration in each municipality.

In 2025, Czechia launched a new funding system for municipal projects supporting the integration of temporary protection holders. Municipalities, voluntary associations of municipalities, cities and urban districts can apply for additional funds for counselling, co-ordination of integration activities and direct personal work with clients. Funding is available with a 10% co-financing requirement and must be spent by the end of 2026.

Italy has also expanded its focus on local capacity-building. The Charter for the Integration of Refugees, launched in 2022 by six major cities and later joined by ten others, was followed in 2025 by the Interior Ministry's LGNetForma programme, run with ANCI, Cittalia and 22 partner municipalities. The programme

targets 2 300 municipalities with more than 5 000 inhabitants, using webinars to strengthen municipal capacity on reception and inclusion.

Monitoring is also becoming more place-sensitive. Germany's national Integration Dashboard, launched through the Federal Statistical Office in April 2025, is a notable example. In Belgium, the Walloon Observatory for Foreigners' Integration, established as part of the 2025 reforms, gives Wallonia a more permanent monitoring and co-ordination body. Canada has expanded common performance frameworks across federally funded settlement programmes, requiring providers to report against harmonised indicators covering economic integration, language acquisition, social participation and civic engagement, strengthening comparability across provinces and the evidence base for funding decisions. Spain's 2025 monitoring framework strengthens national tracking of migrant inclusion and anti-racism outcomes; while many indicators can be disaggregated geographically, the framework is primarily a national instrument rather than a subnational dashboard.

EU funding is reinforcing this local turn. The 2025 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund explicitly encourages local and regional authorities and migrant organisations to apply, focussing on practical integration bottlenecks including healthcare access, migrant women's labour market integration, digital literacy, refugee education pathways and protection of migrant children.

4 International recruitment and retention of migrant long-term care workers

This chapter provides new insights on the contribution of labour migration to addressing labour shortages in long-term care. The chapter starts by comparing countries' approaches to admitting labour migrants, including the use of dedicated channels, shortage lists, bilateral labour agreements and quotas. It then compares the regulation of care occupations across countries, what skills, training and qualifications are required and how they are assessed. Finally, it looks at available data and evidence on retention of migrant workers in long-term care and what trade-offs need to be considered when designing or assessing labour migration channels for this sector.

In Brief

Key Findings

- Ageing populations are increasing long-term care (LTC) demand, while shrinking working age cohorts reduce the availability of resident care workers, creating looming increasing labour shortages in most OECD countries.
- Migrant labour is one way to address labour shortages, alongside bolstering domestic workforces, improvements to technology and productivity, skills development and education. It is for countries to decide how much emphasis to put on each of these factors, understanding that short term responses may affect longer-term equilibrium.
- Migrant workers already make up a substantial share of the LTC workforce in Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland. Many entered via non-labour migration channels such as humanitarian or family.
- OECD countries vary widely in their labour migration pathways for care workers, with only a handful operating dedicated care worker visas. Most countries rely on general work permits, with some using shortage occupation lists, quotas or bilateral labour agreements to facilitate the admission of care workers.
- Skill, qualification, and regulation requirements for care roles vary based on occupation and country, ranging from no formal requirements (e.g. Israel, Italy, for personal care workers) to high standards for qualification recognition and language proficiency (e.g. Germany, for registered nurses). This variation and inconsistency in requirements complicates cross country mobility and recognition, notably within free mobility areas such as the European Union (EU).
- Retention is a key policy priority for countries, however, evidence specifically on migrant retention is limited, as few countries track whether migrants admitted for care roles remain in the sector over time. Limited data available points to high turnover rates and challenges retaining staff in the sector, including migrant workers.
- Although improving job quality and training will make the biggest impact to retention, migration levers, such as employer/sector mobility restrictions, family reunification rules, and pathways to permanent residence can impact migrant retention, although not always in the sector. Soft measures, such as thorough onboarding, mentoring, and ongoing language and cultural support for migrants also play a role.
- Designing successful migration channels is complex and requires consideration of factors such as eligibility, mobility between employers within the sector, path to permanent residence. There is no one-fits-all model and trade-offs need to be made, such as balancing faster access to permanent residence to support recruitment with potential exits from the sector once full labour market mobility is gained. Similarly, facilitating international recruitment may, if badly designed, weaken efforts to train, activate and retain resident workers in the sector.

Introduction

Population ageing presents the challenge of an increasing proportion of older people in the population, some of whom require assistance with daily living activities over an extended period of time due to physical or mental frailty or disability (referred to as long-term care or LTC), coupled with a shrinking working age population. Although the LTC workforce has been increasing, it is not keeping pace with increased demand for LTC. Labour shortages in the LTC sector are becoming a growing structural challenge in a number of OECD countries. This, combined with difficulty attracting and retaining local or domestic workers has led to an increasing role for migrant workers in the LTC workforce – sometimes this is the result of a national workforce strategy while in other cases it is a market-led phenomenon.

Foreign-born workers[1] already account for a significant share of the LTC workforce in some countries (OECD, 2025[1]). Most of these migrants were not admitted through labour migration channels, but rather through free mobility provisions in the European Union (EU) and in Australia/New Zealand (to some degree), or through other migration pathways – as dependents, students or humanitarian migrants.

When addressing skills shortages there are four pillars: technology and productivity; mobilising domestic labour supply through improved working conditions and career prospects; skills development and training; as well as international recruitment. It is a decision for countries themselves how much emphasis to put on each pillar, including the role of migration in their workforce strategies. As shortages become more acute, however, it is valuable to examine the role of migrant workers and migration channels in the LTC sector within the context of wider reforms to address labour shortages. This is the main objective of this chapter.

Several countries have opened labour migration programmes for care workers, such as Canada and Japan. Other OECD countries have tailored their existing labour migration pathways to better support the admission of migrant care workers, whether through quotas and shortage lists within general work permits/visas or Bilateral Labour Migration Agreements (BLAs).

Another challenge in addressing the LTC workforce needs is retention over time to not only ensure continuity and quality of care for care recipients but also to reduce the costs and disruptions associated with frequent turnover of staff. Previous work by the OCED finds that improvements in job quality and training are most important for improving retention of all care workers (OECD, 2023[2]). However, when it comes to migrant care workers, most OECD countries have limited data on whether they stay in the sector over time due to the difficulty in tracking them and lack of evidence on how to best retain them in the sector.

This chapter examines labour migration channels for care workers within this policy context. Building on previous work by the OECD Health Division (OECD, 2023[2]; OECD, 2020[3]; Llena-Nozal, Barszczewski and Rauet-Tejeda, 2025[4]; Llena-Nozal, Araki and Killmeier, 2025[5]), and the chapter on migrant doctors and nurses in the International Migration Outlook 2025 (OECD, 2025[6]), it focusses on how countries structure their labour migration channels to contribute to addressing skill shortages. It reviews: current labour migration channels for care work across the OECD and their characteristics (e.g. ability to get permanent residence, bring dependents, work for a different employer, skill/salary thresholds, as well as magnitude and trend); the level of training, qualifications and occupational regulation for care sector roles; and assesses available retention data, and policy levers for improving retention in the sector, with a focus on what governments, the sector and employers can do to improve the retention of migrant care workers in the LTC sector.

What is long-term care, who provides it and where is it delivered

LTC refers to the provision of a range of services to enable people to live as independently and safely as possible and support activities of daily living (ADLs), such as dressing, bathing, eating and maintaining mobility and instrumental ADLs, such as managing finances and doing the laundry. In countries where

LTC occupations are largely unregulated,[2] in most cases it does not include medical treatment or services which are predominantly provided by doctors and nurses. In countries where LTC occupations are regulated, the range of tasks involved is quite different and may include provision of medical services. This is the case, for example, in Germany, where registered nurses play an important role in LTC.

The purpose of LTC is to maintain functional ability, autonomy and dignity rather than cure disease or illness. It is provided in two main settings: institutional (such as hospitals, a nursing home or residential facilities) or home and community-based care (including day care for older people). The balance between these settings varies across OECD countries, reflecting differences in policy design, funding and cultural preferences (Llena-Nozal, Barszczewski and Rauet-Tejeda, 2025[4]). The proportion of LTC recipients who received care at home across 23 OECD countries[3] increased slightly from 2013 to 2023, from 66% to 70% (OECD, 2025[1]). This reflects the desire of many care recipients to remain in their homes for as long as possible ("aging in place"), and the development of services to support home-based care by OECD countries.

Most care recipients are older people experiencing loss of functional capacity and require assistance with daily activities. They face multiple chronic conditions that can make their care complex and require support from qualified personnel. One in four older people (i.e. aged 65 and over) require LTC, underlining the scale of care needs associated with population ageing across OECD countries (OECD, 2024[7]). The share of older people receiving formal LTC rises steeply with age – among people aged 80 and over, up to 30% receive some form of formal care, depending on the country and the availability of family or informal support (OECD, 2020[3]).

The LTC workforce is predominantly female, and characterised by persistent poor pay and conditions. In most countries, it comprises three key occupations: personal care workers (the bulk of the workforce), assistant/practical nurses and registered nurses. The tasks performed by workers are often physically and emotionally demanding, involving support with mobility, monitoring health conditions and maintaining communication with family and health professionals.

Care work can be formal (i.e. workers are paid) or informal (e.g. family caregivers). Workers in informal settings, such as their employer's home, are particularly vulnerable as they often find themselves in a "grey" area in terms of regulation and worker rights – particularly when performing "live-in" or "24 hour" care. The adoption of ILO Convention No. 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers in 2011 marked an important milestone in the recognition of domestic work as a form of employment entitled to the same fundamental labour rights and protections as other occupations. The Convention established a framework for ensuring decent working conditions for domestic workers, including clear terms of employment, limits on working time, weekly rest, minimum wage coverage where applicable, occupational safety and health protections, and access to social protection. It also contains specific provisions addressing the vulnerabilities of migrant domestic workers and workers in live-in arrangements. By promoting the formalisation and regulation of domestic employment, Convention No. 189 has served as an important international reference point for labour market reforms affecting household-based care and domestic work.

While informal care continues to play an important role in many countries, this analysis focusses on migrants that are employed to work in the formal LTC sector, for which there is more reliable data.

Demographic change is leading to increased demand for care workers

Population ageing affects all OECD countries to varying degrees, driven by declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy. In 2023, 18.5% of the population across OECD countries were aged over 65, including 4.9% who were aged over 80. By 2050, the share of older people is projected to increase to 26.4%, with those aged 80 and over doubling to almost one in ten people (OECD, 2025[1]).

As people age the prevalence of disability, frailty and sickness increases, particularly among those aged 80 and over. As a result, some individuals require assistance with everyday activities. While much of this support is provided by informal carers, such as family or friends, a proportion of older people will need formal LTC services. This reflects both the severity of their needs – typically classified as low, moderate or severe limitations in daily activities[4] – and the absence or limited availability of informal caregivers.

Understanding the extent and severity of needs is central to anticipating future LTC demand. On average across OECD countries, approximately a quarter of older people have LTC needs, half of which are low (12% or 31 million), followed by moderate (8% or 20.6 million) and severe needs (4% or 10.3 million) (OECD, 2024[7]).[5] Cross-country variation is substantial, however, reflecting differences in population age structures and the number of years older people spend in good health. For example, Japan has a relatively high share of older people with severe needs, while in Hungary, this proportion is close to zero, partly because a large share of its older people are aged 65-74 so are more likely to have low or moderate needs (OECD, 2024[7]). Unmet need for LTC, nevertheless, remains substantial, reflecting gaps in coverage, affordability and service capacity. Across OECD countries, just over a quarter (27%) of people with care needs receive any formal care (OECD, 2024[7]).

Rising demand for LTC is further compounded by a shrinking available working age population, reduced availability of informal carers due to changes in familial structures and increased female participation in the labour market, and the ageing of the health workforce itself. In 2023, for example, a quarter of nurses were due to retire within the next ten years (OECD, 2024[8]). Informal care is also falling; for example, in France, the number of informal carers fell by 6% between 2008 and 2022, while the number of informal carers providing more than 35 hours a week rose from 8% to 13% (Verhagen, 2026[9]).

The LTC workforce is not growing at the pace of demand

The growth in the LTC workforce is not keeping pace with the needs of older people. Across OECD countries, the number of LTC workers increased by around 20% between 2011 and 2021, yet the population aged 80 and over – the group most likely to require intensive care – grew faster over the same period. As a result, workforce expansion has not been sufficient to meet rising care needs.

In 2021, LTC workers made up 1.9% of total employment in OECD countries, ranging from less than 0.3% of total employment in Greece, Lithuania and Poland to more than 4.0% in Norway and Sweden (OECD, 2023[2]). This illustrates substantial cross-country differences in LTC workforce supply. On average across OECD countries, there are five care workers for every hundred people aged 65 and over, ranging from 0.2 workers in Greece to 13 workers in Norway (OECD, 2024[7]). Countries with lower workforce density tend to rely more heavily on informal care and experience higher levels of unmet need for formal LTC services, particularly among people with moderate care needs. Without significant improvements in recruitment, retention and productivity, workforce shortages are likely to intensify as population ageing advances.

To meet the projected increase in demand for care, the share of LTC workers in total employment would need to increase by 0.6 percentage points (p.p.) annually between 2023 and 2033 (without gains in productivity or change in needs by age group). Even with an increase in labour-productivity the percentage of total workforce in LTC would need to increase by 0.5 p.p., amounting to millions of additional workers (OECD, 2023[2]). The European Commission has estimated that an additional 1.6 million care workers will be needed by 2050 in the EU to maintain current levels of coverage (European Commission, 2025[10]). There is some uncertainty around the estimates of increased demand for LTC workers as they do not consider future policy changes, technological shifts or the increasing reliance on formal care due to fewer informal carers.[6]

Care work vacancies are among the hardest to fill in many OECD countries

The reason why the LTC workforce is not increasing at the pace of demand is partly due to recruitment and retention challenges; this section focusses on the former. Depending on the skill level of the workforce and national circumstances, the difficulty in filling care worker vacancies reflects a combination of rapidly rising demand and persistent job-quality challenges. Recent OECD analysis shows that many countries report chronic recruitment difficulties in LTC and related care occupations, with shortages already evident and projected to worsen as population ageing accelerates (OECD, 2023[2]). Employer surveys and administrative data indicate that personal care workers and nurses in LTC face higher vacancy and turnover rates than comparable occupations, contributing to longer vacancy durations and unmet care needs in several OECD Members (OECD, 2023[2]).

These recruitment bottlenecks are closely linked to structural factors. When LTC occupations are regulated, training capacity and difficulties for migrant workers to get their qualifications recognised may be the most significant bottlenecks (OECD, 2017[11]).

Complementary evidence from vacancy and job-posting analyses shows that health and care roles typically take longer to fill than other jobs across most countries, underscoring that labour shortages in care are not cyclical but reflect long-standing mismatches between working conditions and growing care needs in ageing societies. While international recruitment can assist in filling vacancies, high and persistent vacancy rates in many countries indicate structural shortages that may not be addressed fully by international recruitment.

Recent data from OECD countries regarding recruitment challenges

The Australian Government's 2023 Aged Care Provider Workforce Survey asked about the main challenges in recruitment across home-care providers, and asked providers about the number of vacancies for personal care workers and nurses. The findings highlighted the difficulty of recruiting sufficient staff, competition for staff with other providers or industries, remuneration and applicants not having the right skills and qualifications (Welfare, 2023[12]). Aged and Disabled Carers are an occupation group under continued workforce pressure, with high vacancy rates persisting despite overall labour-market cooling (Jobs and Skills Australia, 2025[13]). Similarly, New Zealand's Aged Care Association reports ongoing recruitment challenges and staff shortages as factors limiting providers' ability to maintain services and plan for future capacity. The occupation of caregiver and registered nurse were highlighted as having particularly high vacancy rates, driven by high turnover in the case of caregivers (31% annual turnover rate) (New Zealand Aged Care Association, 2024[14]).

In Canada, official data and provider evidence show that LTC vacancies are persistent and difficult to fill. The Canadian Institute for Health Information reports that LTC homes continue to experience staffing shortages that translate into high vacancy levels and reliance on overtime, with overtime accounting for 8% of total direct care hours in LTC in 2023-2024 (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2025[15]). Provider-side evidence reinforces this picture: the Canadian Association for Long Term Care reports that there were over 38 000 vacant positions in long-term care homes as of late 2022, more than double pre-pandemic levels, and describes recruitment and retention challenges as an acute and ongoing sector-wide staffing crisis affecting nurses, personal support workers, and support staff (Canadian Association for Long Term Care, 2023[16]). Labour-market statistics further confirm that these vacancies are difficult to fill: Statistics Canada finds that job vacancies in health-related occupations, including nurses and personal support workers central to LTC, more than doubled between 2019 and 2023, with vacancies increasingly long-duration in several regions – evidence of sustained unmet demand rather than short-term turnover.

Both Japan and the Republic of Korea face persistent difficulties filling vacancies in LTC, reflecting structural labour shortages rather than short-term mismatches. In Japan, nursing and LTC are among the

occupations with the most severe shortages, with public employment service data showing very high job openings to applicants ratios, which may signal vacancies are hard to fill. It is estimated that approximately 570 000 additional care workers will be required by 2040, implying that a large share of anticipated positions will remain unfilled under current recruitment and retention patterns (The Straits Times, 2024[17]). In Korea, where demand for LTC has expanded rapidly since the introduction of public LTC insurance in 2008, government and government-funded research indicate that workforce supply is already insufficient: official projections suggest a gap of around 110 000 care workers by 2028, with shortages driven in part by an ageing workforce, as around two-thirds of current carers are aged 60 or over (Korea Immigration Service Foundation, 2026[18]). Longer-term government forecasts point to much larger unmet staffing needs over the next two decades if current trends persist, reinforcing concerns that vacancies in LTC will become increasingly difficult to fill without significant policy action.

The EU is experiencing severe recruitment challenges in both the public and private care sectors, especially for highly skilled care professionals. Several countries (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France) place care workers on shortage occupation lists to accelerate or facilitate the recruitment of foreign workers. Shortages are reflected in vacancy rates, which peaked between 2019 and 2021 when approximately 421 000 residential care workers across the EU left the sector. The replacement of the workforce is seen as a key challenge as job openings predominantly reflect the replacement of health and care workers that are retiring rather than growth in employment (CEDEFOP, 2023[19]).

Retention issues exacerbate pressures

Persistent difficulties in recruiting and retaining workers further exacerbate these pressures. Improving job quality, training and wages are key to attracting and retaining care workers in LTC over the medium and long term, which will help address labour shortages in the sector. *Beyond Applause? Improving Working Conditions in Long-Term Care* (OECD, 2023[2]) emphasises that these persistent structural weaknesses contribute to high turnover and difficulties in retaining experienced staff (see Box 4.1). The publication highlights the need for sustainable workforce strategies that go beyond symbolic recognition and focus on better staffing levels, clearer career pathways, stronger access to continuous training, and improved working environments. Strengthening job quality is essential not only for retention, but also for ensuring quality and resilience in long-term care systems.

Available data on retention show that the LTC sector is characterised by high turnover rates and short job tenure, with many workers leaving the sector within a few years. Average job tenure in LTC is two years less than in the general health workforce (OECD, 2023[2]). This is partly due to a higher share of part-time and temporary contracts, and poorer working conditions compared with hospital and acute settings.

Box 4.1. Key recommendations to improve retention for all care workers

To improve retention in the LTC workforce, the OECD publication *Beyond Applause? Improving Working Conditions in Long Term Care*, recommends:

- Raising wages and improving financial recognition to better reflect skills, responsibilities and working conditions, supported by adequate public funding.
- Reducing workload pressures through improved staffing ratios, limits on excessive overtime, and more predictable schedules.
- Strengthening occupational health and mental health protections, including prevention of work-related injuries, stress and burnout.

- Expanding training and career pathways to enhance professional recognition, skills development and progression opportunities.
- Promoting job security and stable contracts by reducing reliance on casual and insecure employment arrangements.
- Reinforcing social dialogue and collective bargaining to improve working conditions and workforce voice.
- Linking funding reforms to workforce outcomes, ensuring that increased investment translates into better jobs and lower turnover.

Source: OECD (2023[2]), *Beyond Applause? Improving Working Conditions in Long-Term Care*, https://doi.org/10.1787/27d33ab3-en.

Official strategies and plans can play a role in supporting retention. Several actions are in place to support these policy goals at the EU level: the European Care Strategy and the Council Recommendation on access to high-quality long-term care provide a comprehensive framework for reforms and investments at EU and national levels to improve provision of care services, and urge Member States to support quality employment, ensure fair working conditions, improve the professionalisation of care, and address skills needs.

Aligning with this, several OECD countries (including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and Norway) have official strategies or plans that cover the retention of care workers or healthcare workers in general, indicating that retention is a priority. Strategies generally contain the following elements: improving wages, stable contracts, access to training, and professional development.

While official strategies and plans can play a role in directing the efforts of government and the sector to support retention, implementation is key if outcomes are to be achieved. For example, New Zealand's 2017 Care and Support Workers (Pay Equity) Settlement was intended to permanently raise wages but ultimately failed to deliver long-term improvements as continued funding was not provided after the expiry of the Settlement in June 2022, leaving many workers effectively back at minimum wage (Health New Zealand, 2024[20]). Retention of migrant LTC workers adds other considerations and is discussed at the end of this chapter.

Taxonomy of OECD countries approach to care worker migration

To introduce the discussion of migrant workers in LTC, first it is important to identify the major structural factors that influence the approaches OECD countries take: the funding model, predominant care setting (institutional or home care) and regulation of care worker occupations.[7] The following taxonomy (Figure 4.1) provides a framework for understanding the variety of approaches OECD countries take to care worker labour migration. It builds on a typology of LTC systems done by the OECD health division (Llena-Nozal, Barszczewski and Rauet-Tejeda, 2025[4]). Four clusters were identified, with some countries partially belonging to a cluster.


- **Cluster 1: Long-term care insurance model** is represented by Japan, Germany and Korea. Entitlements guaranteed by mandatory LTC insurance expand demand for both home and institutional services; providers and occupations are regulated/accredited. These countries have mixed home/institutional settings and care work occupations are subject to certification regulations in Japan and Germany (but only semi-regulated in the case of Korea). Labour migration channels are an important complement to domestic training capacity. Structured, labour migration channels are available aligned to certification (language and skills), often via bespoke categories or bilateral

agreement routes (e.g. Japan's EPA – *Economic Partnership Agreement* – and "Specified Skilled Worker" visas).

- **Cluster 2: Universal tax-funded systems** with broad access to formal LTC are present in Denmark and Finland. These systems are highly regulated with emphasis on care provided at home. There are limited labour migration channels for personal care workers as the domestic workforce and existing pools of migrants fill most workforce gaps. As the population ages, selective international recruitment is likely if domestic supply lags.
- **Cluster 3:Limited public funding, selective access** to formal LTC, mixed home/institutional care and semi-regulated/unregulated workforce is seen in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Persistent staff vacancies/shortages make migration an attractive lever, with exceptions made to existing labour migration channels usually made to facilitate recruitment of personal care workers.
- **Cluster 4: Limited formal LTC and regulation, emphasis on home care combined with cash/ in-kind benefits**, seen in Italy, Greece and Spain (and in France and Israel to some extent), is generally correlated with a lack of accessible labour migration channels and reliance on either migrants already present or informal carers. The exception is Israel, which combines cash/in-kind benefits, home care and a labour migration channel.

Figure 4.1. Taxonomy of long-term care systems and role migrants play

A framework for understanding variety of approaches to care worker migration



Capturing data on care workers, including foreign-born, is a challenge

Understanding how many people work in LTC, and how many of them are foreign-born, is important but not simple. The definitions of LTC workers (provided above) do not map easily to categories used to identify workers in administrative or survey data. Even when consensus is reached on the definition of LTC workers, these do not always map clearly to classifications. For example, in the EU, the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on access to affordable high-quality long-term care (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2022.476.01.0001.01.ENG) contains several definitions relevant for LTC workforce, separating "formal" long-term care, "informal" care, domestic long-term care worker, who may be a live-in care worker. "Formal" in this Recommendation is based on professional status, rather than contractual status.

Labour Force Surveys (LFS) can be used to gain an understanding of employment in the LTC sector but have serious limitations due to the occupation and industry classifications. Sector and occupation classifications often do not correspond exactly to long-term care activities. Within the health sector, for example, there are sector classifications that cover residential nursing care activities, but these might not capture care work provided in the home or hospital setting or provided through visiting care workers. Using broad occupation codes can miss LTC workers who are only one part of wider categories, such as "health professionals, personal care workers and social work". Persons identified as nurses or nursing assistants may be working in care if employed in hospitals or through agencies, but this is not necessarily captured by occupation or sector definition. For workers providing care in the home, it can be difficult to separate LTC work from childcare or private household duties. As a result, home-based carers, live-in carers and mixed-task workers (which is where migrant LTC workers are overrepresented) can be misclassified or invisible, even though they are a significant proportion of the workforce as 70% of recipients of LTC receive care in the home on average in the OECD. See Annex 4.A, for an overview of occupation codes used in LTC in different countries.

Box 4.2. LTC workers captured in the EU Labour Force Survey

When labour force surveys are referenced, LTC workers are defined under the scope of the International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08) and the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE, rev. 2) as follows:

- ISCO-08: Nursing professionals (221), Nursing associate professionals (3 221), Healthcare assistants (5 321), Home-based personal care workers (5 322);
- NACE rev.2: Residential care activities (87), Social work activities without accommodation (88).

It does not include activities of households as employers of domestic personnel, including live-in care workers, which may be relevant for countries where LTC workers are employed as domestic workers.

Source: OECD (2023[2]), *Beyond Applause? Improving Working Conditions in Long-Term Care*, https://doi.org/10.1787/27d33ab3-en.

The other challenge to using LFS to estimate the size of the care workforce and the share of foreign-born is related to the sampling method. Most surveys use a household sampling method. This may miss live-in carers employed by the household due to the grey nature of their work as well as cross-border workers who are not usually resident (particularly important in countries like Luxembourg or Switzerland). Identifying the LTC workforce as an aggregate of smaller categories may have specific challenges when the sample size is too small or the target group tiny. Recent immigrants are less frequently captured in survey samples than long-standing immigrants. Further, labour force surveys do not usually capture the

visa or permit status and therefore cannot generally be used to identify international recruitment from abroad.

Using LFS data to compare countries overall is far from perfect, however, since the extent to which the care workforce is captured depends in part on the share of care workers who work in sectors and occupations which are well-covered by the LFS, such as institutional nursing homes (sector) or home health and personal care aides (occupation). For smaller countries, such as Australia, the sample size is not sufficiently large to enable accurate analysis of the contribution of migrant care workers to the sector.

LFS, with the above caveats, nonetheless provide an indication of the proportion of migrants in a certain occupation or sector across OECD countries, and the trend (i.e. whether the proportion is increasing or decreasing).

Other surveys are conducted which may capture care workers, although they may also face the same issues of definition and sample design.[8] Administrative data provides a unique alternative source. Social security contributions provide a picture of employed workers, often by sector and occupation, although subject to the same classification challenges as survey data. In some OECD countries, specific pension funds for domestic workers may allow identification of migrant workers. In Italy, for example, a separate pension fund allows identification of workers (Box 4.3). This covers only workers who are declaring their employment, however. The number of workers paying social contributions for home-based care work may be well below the total, due to undeclared work, which is particularly rife in the home care sector. For example, in Poland, the total number of foreign individuals paying social contributions in the entire health and social sector is below most estimates of the number of just Ukrainians working in care (Box 4.4).

Box 4.3. Drawing on administrative data to capture migrant care workers in Italy

In Italy, mandatory pension contributions by domestic workers allow the pension institute INPS to identify and monitor home-based care workers, separating “badanti” (caregivers) from other domestic workers. An Observatory publishes data on workers by sex, age, nationality, hours worked, and reported wages, for all workers who have made at least one pension contribution payment. In 2025, “badanti” represented 51.3% of all domestic workers, confirming the predominance of this occupation. The care workforce is dominated by foreigners, even if the share of foreigners has fallen from 80% to about 72% in the past decade (Table 4.1), although this may reflect, to some extent, naturalisations. In 2024, in terms of origin, 43% of all care workers recorded were nationals of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and 9% of countries in South America.

Table 4.1. Home care workers in Italy are dominated by foreign workers

Individuals paying at least one pension contribution as domestic care workers, by nationality, 2015-2024

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Foreigners	309 275	307 194	306 481	305 560	305 138	327 138	332 890	314 488	302 508	298 445
Italians	77 565	81 209	95 174	104 706	110 495	123 152	124 820	119 654	114 219	114 716
Share of foreigners	79.9%	79.1%	76.3%	74.5%	73.4%	72.7%	72.7%	72.4%	72.6%	72.2%

Note: The number of workers paying social contributions for home-based care work may be well below the total, due to undeclared work.
Source: INPS Osservatorio sui lavoratori domestici.

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
In addition to LSF data and administrative data on the care workforce, there are limitations in capturing the flows and stocks of migrant care workers in migration data sets. For those countries where there is a specific permit or visa channel for care workers, it is possible to refer to programme data, which is presented below for Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. For countries where occupation codes are reported for labour migration channels, it is possible to identify the number of migrants admitted for employment in care occupations. This is possible, for example, for Australia for the temporary skilled visa programmes. Countries which conduct labour market testing may also have data on care work occupations which are approved through the labour market test, although positive decisions on labour market tests may not lead to actual admission.

The overall contribution of migrants in the care sector workforce

EU LFS data on migrant care workers provide a partial picture

The portrait emerging from the EU LFS is that foreign-born working in LTC – excluding domestic workers who may do LTC tasks – make a substantial share of the LTC workforce in several of the countries covered. Across 26 European OECD countries, the share of foreign-born workers increased by 7 p.p. over ten years – from 14% in 2014 to 21% in 2024. However, this varies between countries. In Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland this trend was particularly strong with four out of every ten long-term care workers being foreign-born but in Türkiye, Lithuania and Poland foreign-born workers represented less than 2% of the workforce (OECD, 2025[1]). Note, that this figure is likely underreported for Luxembourg as the LFS may not capture non-resident cross-border workers, a significant component of the workforce. See Figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2. Share of foreign-born and overall workers in LTC occupations as identified by the EU LFS



Note: EU 26 is an unweighted average. "All workers" refers to share of migrants in total employed population.
Source: OECD (2025[1]), *Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators*, https://doi.org/10.1787/8f9e3f98-en (originally from EU Labour Force Survey).

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Within the category of foreign-born, the proportion of non-EU nationals working in LTC across the 26 EU countries has increased more than for EU nationals – going from 8% in 2014 to 19% in 2024 (an increase of 11 p.p.), while that for EU national increased from 3% to 6% over the same period. For a breakdown of the country by country change please see Annex Table 4.A.1.

The United States and the United Kingdom also have a high presence of foreign-born care workers

In the United States, immigrants constituted 30% of the overall direct care workforce in 2024 (defined as individuals 18 and older who earned at least USD 1 000 during the year and indicated that their job was in both the long-term care industry and their occupation fell under the category of either aide or nurse) (Chidambaram, 2026[21]). This includes 18% who were naturalised citizens and 12% who were non-citizen migrants. The proportion of foreign-born varies by setting – in home care settings they made up a third of all workers and in residential care a quarter. Immigrants play a large and growing role in long-term care – increasing from 24% of direct care workers in 2018 (Pillai, 2025[22]).

In England (United Kingdom), of the 1.6 million posts in care in 2025/26, an estimated 33% were filled by non-British workers (Skills for Care, 2026[23]). The number of EU nationals has been declining, in both absolute terms and as a share of workers in care posts, falling from 100 000 to 90 000 and from 7.1% to 5.5% of workers between 2020/21 and 2025/26. The number of non-EU workers has risen from 8.4% to 27% over the same period, reflecting the expansion in international recruitment, even as the number of British workers fell.

In Korea, migrant workers comprised only 0.9% of the employed nursing assistants in care work in 2023 (Kwon, 2026[24]), while migrant workers – overseas Koreans of Chinese origin, of whom more than half are over age 60 – comprised 90% of the "caregiver" workforce.

Countries rely on different pools of migrants to meet labour shortages

The extent and type of migrant employment in the care sector varies across OECD countries depending on factors, including the LTC sector, the labour market regulations, the culture of care (including informal versus formal care), and the migration system itself (Desiderio, 2021[25]). LTC systems also differ widely among OECD countries, with a general evolution from a reliance on informal care provided by family and friends to more formal long-term care systems, which increase the scope for formal employment, over time.

All countries predominantly rely on women for work in the care sector, a factor which contributes to low pay, irregular working hours, poor working conditions and workplace harassment and abuse. Where workers are female and migrant, they are likely to face additional disadvantages.

Temporary migrants and labour migrants

Like many Asian non-OECD countries, Israel relies almost exclusively on temporary labour migrants for the provision of LTC, mainly in the care recipient's home (known as live-in care). More information on Israel's migration channel is in the next section. The migrant care workforce in New Zealand and Australia comprises a mix of temporary visa holders on work, student, partner and working holiday visas. In Australia, students appear to be an important group: a Department of Health survey in 2024 found that 43% of aged care workers were foreign-born, and the non-citizen foreign-born holding temporary visas (about 10% of all aged care workers) most were either student (45%) or graduate (20%) visa holders (Australian Government, Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, 2024[26]). In New Zealand, by contrast, temporary work visas appear more important; a 2023 industry survey of residential aged care facilities

found that 45% of the workforce was on visas, of which 32% were accredited employer visas or other temporary work visas, with most of the others holding permanent residence (Aged care Association New Zealand, 2024[27]).

Free movement provisions

In free mobility areas, regional mobility usually contributes significantly to meeting countries' LTC needs, sometimes exacerbating unmet needs in countries of origin. In Europe, countries such as Italy, Germany and Austria have largely depended on free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe, attracted by higher wages and job opportunities. For example, following EU accession, there were high numbers of Polish and other central and eastern European workers working in care in the United Kingdom. However, following the United Kingdom's exit from the EU and the end of free movement, EU migration to the United Kingdom declined, while rising EU inflows were seen in Germany (Turnpenny and Hussein, 2021[28]; OECD/European Commission, 2024[29]). Free movement of healthcare workers also occurs between New Zealand and Australia, with a large proportion of Australia's foreign born healthcare workforce coming from New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition arrangement (Australian Government, Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, 2025[30]). Cross border movements are common, notably in Luxembourg and Switzerland.

Regularisation programmes

When legal migration channels are not available or difficult to access, undocumented migrants may play a role in meeting unmet LTC needs. In such situations, notably when continuous regularisation schemes are not available, large-scale regularisation may be needed. Spain and Italy, for example, have undertaken large regularisation programmes targeted at the LTC sector. Italy has conducted several regularisation programmes over the last four decades. In 2002, it regularised approximately 350 000 people for the mixed category "domestic work/LTC in home" and in 2009, approximately 100 000 of the 295 000 applicants were "badanti" (live-in domestic care workers that provide daily assistance in private households) or care workers. In 2012, a further regularisation saw 116 000 applications in "domestic work", which again included care work (OECD, 2025[6]). In 2020, a further regularisation programme was introduced targeted at essential sectors – namely domestic, care, agricultural and fishing work. In Spain, the 2005 regularisation included applications for "domestic work" (almost a third of all applications), which includes LTC but also other roles. Currently, Spain has five categories for continuous regularisation through "arraigo" (rootedness) permits, including on the basis of providing live-in care to a Spanish national. These permits have recently been simplified, with reduced residence requirements for applying. France has a mechanism for regularisation for persons employed in sectors where recruitment is difficult; this may include care work, allowing care workers, under certain conditions, to acquire regular status as workers.

Family and humanitarian migrants

In most of Latin America, the LTC workforce is largely informal, and care is provided by family members rather than migrant workers (Stampini et al., 2025[31]). In the United States, many foreign-born employed in care have entered through family channels (due to foreign care workers not meeting salary and skills thresholds on labour migration channels). In many OECD countries, including France, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Poland, migrants who entered through family reunification and humanitarian channels have increasingly contributed to employment in the long-term care sector, thereby helping to ease shortages. Box 4.4 below illustrates this with the example of Ukrainian workers and beneficiaries of temporary protection in the Polish domestic sector.

Box 4.4. Ukrainian care workers in Poland

Two waves of migration brought different types of migrants

Poland experienced two distinct waves of Ukrainian migration: one from 2014 and one following full-scale war with Russia from 2022, which triggered the largest displacement in Europe since World War II, primarily to neighbouring countries. The two groups show different characteristics: the first group were primarily labour migrants, consisting of working-age men engaged in circular migration; while the second group were mainly women and children who were forced to migrate/flee (i.e. beneficiaries of temporary protection). Skill levels varied between the groups, with the former tending to be medium-skilled and the post-2022 group having higher education on average compared with the Ukrainian population.

Estimates of Ukrainian migrants in the care sector

The provisions of the Temporary Protection Directorate, launched in March 2022, provided beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine with a right of residence and access to the labour market in Poland, as in other EU Member States. OECD analysis, drawing on Eurostat and national sources, indicates that Poland hosted approximately 1 million Ukrainian citizens under temporary protection in 2023-2024. Just over half were of working age, corresponding to roughly half a million potential workers. The labour market inclusion of Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection has been relatively fast but as much of the employment is concentrated in low skilled jobs, this may suggest a skills mismatch as well as beneficiaries of temporary protection prioritising quick entry into the labour market.

The care and service work sector is one sector where Ukrainian migrants are concentrated, partially because it is only semi-regulated in Poland with few barriers to entry (this sector includes LTC but also occupations such as child carers and cleaners). Care International estimates that approximately 100 000 Ukrainian women work as domestic workers in Polish homes. Poland depends on these workers due to a rapidly ageing population and to compensate for emigration of Polish care workers, who often move abroad for work.

Labour migration has lost importance since 2022, probably largely replaced by the employment of beneficiaries of temporary protection (see Table 4.2). The two channels to enter Poland for employment – the declaration system and the standard work permit route – indicate relatively low numbers of workers using these channels. Prior to the arrival of beneficiaries of temporary protection, employers filed 5 900 declarations to home personal care workers, of which 94% were for Ukrainians. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years. Work permits granted for “Personal care workers in healthcare and related occupations”, which includes care workers, also fell sharply since 2022, responding to the sudden availability of Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection (who did not require work permits).

Table 4.2. Declarations to hire by occupational groups, number of work permits granted, and number of insured, health-related occupations and sector, by nationality, Poland, 2021-2025

Occupation	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Healthcare aides	243	298	102	81	96
of which, Ukrainians	*64.6%*	*47.7%*	*36.3%*	*29.6%*	*35.4%*
Home personal care workers	5 905	3 373	2 093	1 251	1 474
of which, Ukrainians	*94.2%*	*84.9%*	*81.6%*	*53.6%*	*47.1%*
Personal care workers in healthcare and related workers not elsewhere classified	275	352	156	95	92
of which, Ukrainians	*84.4%*	*57.4%*	*23.7%*	*12.6%*	*17.4%*
Total work permits granted for "Personal care workers in healthcare and related occupations´	799	283	6	8	7
Total number of insured foreigners in "health care and social welfare"	17 513	27 613	32 264	35 933	41 194
of which, Ukrainians	*64.4%*	*72.9%*	*73.0%*	*72.3%*	*87.4%*

Note: Occupational groups 5 321, 5 322, 5 329 included in declaration statistics until June 2025. 2025 data are estimates based on the first six months. For full year 2025, only "health and social care" was reported, of which Ukrainians comprised 62% of the 5 200 declarations.
Source: Polish Public Employment Service (declarations and work permits) and Social Insurance Institution (number of insured foreigners). Klakla (2023[32]), *In the shadows: Ukrainian Domestic Workers in Poland*, Care International Poland; Polish Development Bank (2025[33]), *The impact of Ukrainian migrant inflow on the Polish economy: a contemporary analysis*, https://www.bgk.pl/files/public/user_upload/The_Impact_of_Ukrainian_Migrant_Inflow_on_the_Polish_Economy.pdf; OECD (2023[34]), "What we know about the skills and early labour market outcomes of refugees from Ukraine", OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1787/c7e694aa-en; OECD (2023[35]), *International Migration Outlook 2023*, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en; Eurostat (2025[36]), Temporary protection statistics (Ukrainian beneficiaries by country and age group).

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Using existing pools of migrant workers, including strengthening pathways into the care sector, can be effective for addressing workforce shortages. Measures such as accelerated skills recognition, targeted language training, bridging programmes and facilitated labour market access for family and humanitarian migrants can expand the available workforce while reducing reliance on overseas recruitment, as part of a multi-modal approach.

Using labour migration pathways is a key component in meeting labour shortages

The gap between LTC demand and supply has led some governments to consider international recruitment as a key component of their workforce strategies. In some countries, migrants are playing an increasing role even without dedicated migration channels through market-led phenomena. Countries differ significantly in the magnitude of the contribution expected from migrant care workers (both those in the country and those who are recruited from outside), and how they organise their labour migration channels for employment in the care sector.

This section outlines the approach taken by countries that have specific migration channels for care workers, followed by countries that facilitate migrant care workers to enter through general work permits, supplemented by shortage lists, quotas or bilateral labour agreements.

Comparing pathways for care workers is not simple, since the occupation comprises different occupations, and multiple migration channels may be possible. In comparing channels, key design features include

occupational mobility (whether migrants can change employer within the sector, or leave the sector), ancillary conditions (e.g. whether family reunification is allowed), and long-term prospects (i.e. whether a pathway to permanent residence exists and how long it takes). While permit cost and processing times also influence accessibility of the pathway we have not included this in the analysis. Table 4.3 below provides an overview of how countries that have specific migration channels compare on these considerations. Countries where care workers enter through general labour migration channels are covered in Annex Table 4.A.2.

Table 4.3. Overview of OECD countries with dedicated labour migration channels for care workers

Country	Migration channel	Skill/education requirements	Eligibility for permanent residence (PR)	Occupational and Sector Mobility	Size of programme
Canada	Specific pathway (Home Care Worker Pilot) and general pathways	For the pilot, minimum high school diploma and six months work experience or caregiving training	Receive PR on arrival	Full mobility once PR granted	2 720 home support workers (stock under the HCWIP: HS as of 31 December 2025)
Israel	General work visa for live-in care, BLAs with several countries	No requirements	No pathway	No mobility within sector. Workers may change care recipient subject to regulations and PIBA procedures	61 776 legal care workers (stock 2024)
Japan	Four main channels. Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) is the largest	Different requirements for different schemes. For SSW, candidates need to pass a nursing care skill evaluation and a language test	Not eligible for PR, although highly qualified SSW workers may qualify for SSW(ii), which allows extended stay and possible PR eligibility	Workers can change employer freely but not sector	58 992 (SSW stock at August 2025)
United Kingdom	A special route under the Skilled Worker visa (now closed to international recruitment), BLAs with several countries	No requirements	Eligible to apply after five years' legal residence and meeting other conditions (changes to lengthen this under review)	Workers can change employer but not sector	27 174 (primary visa grants 2024)

Note: For countries with multiple pathways, such as Japan and Canada, the table refers to the specific pathway cited.

Canada has been piloting care worker channels for decades

The Canadian Government identified structural shortages in the care sector and developed four programmes/pilots over the years to address these. These include the Live-in Caregiver programme from 1992 to 2014, the Caring for People with High Medical Needs pilot from 2014 to 2019, and the Home Support Worker Pilot from 2019 to 2024 (Desiderio, 2021[25]). In March 2025, Canada opened a new Permanent Residence pathway, the Home Care Worker Immigration Pilot (HCWIP) (with both a childcare and home support pathway – HCWIP: HS – and an onshore and offshore stream). By December 2025, however, the Canadian Government paused the intake of applications until further notice due to high demand and interest exceeding the number of admission spaces available (Government of Canada, 2025[37]).

The current pilot (HCWIP: HS) offers permanent residence on arrival for home support workers and their dependents without the need for prior Canadian work experience. Relative to other occupations, it has lower language and education requirements (a minimum level of Canadian Language Benchmarks 4 in English or French and a secondary school diploma), but applicants need at least six months work

experience gained within or outside Canada or to have completed caregiving training. A Labour Market Impact Assessment is not required – simplifying the procedure and increasing accessibility. However, intake for the HCWIP: HS is capped at 2 750 applications per year (including, in 2025, 140 spaces for undocumented or unauthorised home support workers) (Government of Canada, 2025[37]). An overview of how the current pilot compares to the previous caregiver programmes is in Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4. Comparison of Canada's caregiver immigration programmes, 1992-present

Programme name/ criteria	Permanent Residence (PR)	Education/ skills	Work Permit Restrictions	Dependents
Live in Caregiver programme (1992-2014)	Apply after 24 months of live in work in Canada	Secondary school credential	Permit tied to employer	Can join when eligibility for PR approved
Caring for people with High Medical Needs pilot (2014 to 2019)	After meeting specified caregiver work requirements in Canada	One-year post-secondary credential	Not applicable	Can join when eligibility for PR approved
Home Support Worker pilot (2019-2024)	Apply immediately and receive PR after completing 6months' work experience (foreign or in-Canada depending on stream)	One-year post-secondary credential	Permit tied to occupation not employer	Eligible to join at temporary stage and/or when eligibility for PR approved
Home Care Worker Immigration Pilot (2025 to current)	Receive PR on arrival	Minimum high school diploma and Canadian Language Benchmarks Level 4 in English or French.	Not applicable	Can join when eligibility for PR approved

Changes from one pilot to another reflect lessons learnt identified by government, and in particular, issues that arose when temporary migration channels were used to meet structural shortages. Across the years, reforms were driven by four reoccurring problems: worker vulnerability and abuse, administrative backlogs, misaligned pathways to permanent residence and poor labour-market matching. The Live-in Caregiver Programme required workers to live in their employer's household and work for 24 months in Canada to apply for permanent residence. It was replaced following government gender-based analyses, parliamentary reporting and peer-reviewed studies of live-in arrangements, and delayed access to permanent residence, which identified some vulnerabilities for the cohort including social isolation, excessive working hours, and heightened risks of abuse. Further, large application backlogs undermined the programme's policy objective of providing permanent residence to participating foreign caregivers once they meet the prescribed Canadian work experience requirements.

The 2014 Caring for People with High Medical Needs pilot removed the live-in requirement but was subsequently replaced in June 2019, after department assessments showed low uptake, widespread misunderstanding of eligibility and continued precariousness due to narrow occupational criteria and uncertain pathways to permanent residence. These concerns led to the 2019 Home Support Worker pilot, which aimed to clarify eligibility ex ante, introduced occupation-based work permits (not linked to single employers) and enable earlier family reunification. This pilot had two streams, one for newly arriving care workers, and one for care workers with 12 months of Canadian work experience. However, official data and academic evaluations later showed that complex processing rules and capacity constraints left most applicants in prolonged temporary status, well below stated admissions targets for permanent residence. In 2025, Canada moved toward new pilots granting permanent residence on arrival (Oklikah, Abada and Arku, 2024[38]; Government of Canada, 2020[39]). Table 4.5 gives an overview of admissions under the previous programmes/pilots.

Table 4.5. Canada – Admissions of Permanent Residents under the Caregiver Immigration Category, 2015-2025

Caregiver Stream	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Live-in Caregiver Program	27 055	17 815	21 030	16 055	6 000	960	510	1 100	385	135	100
Caring for People with High Medical Needs Program	160	330	495	440	540	100	20	25	–	–	–
Home Support Worker Pilot	–	–	–	–	–	40	65	220	530	1 350	1 795
Totals	27 215	18 145	21 525	16 495	6 540	1 100	595	1 345	915	1 485	1 895

Note: Data are preliminary estimates and are subject to change. All values between 0 and 5 are shown as "–". This is done to prevent individuals from being identified when IRCC data is compiled and compared to other publicly available statistics. All other values are rounded to the closest multiple of 5 for the same reason; as a result of rounding, data may not sum to the totals indicated.
Source: Canadian Government. IRCC (31 January 2026).

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Other Canadian care worker migration channels

Alongside the HCWIP, Canada uses several other pathways to attract and retain care workers. These include: options to work temporarily through the federal Temporary Foreign Worker programme; permanent immigration through the federal Express Entry programmes, such as the Canadian Experience Class and the Federal Skilled Worker programme, including targeted draws under category-based selection, which has regularly included healthcare in recent years, or the Provincial Nominee Programme and Atlantic Immigration Programme.

The Temporary Foreign Worker Programme allows families to hire home support workers to care for older persons or individuals with disabilities, chronic conditions, or terminal illnesses. It is a general pathway that offers priority processing for in-home caregivers caring for people with high medical needs. Eligible positions include attendant for persons with disabilities, home support worker, live-in caregiver, and personal attendant (NOC 44101: home support workers, caregivers and related occupations) (Government of Canada, 2025[40]). The Temporary Foreign Worker Programme is subject to a labour market test. Labour market test data show that 1 351 tests were approved in 2024 for employment in NOC 44101 and 33102 (nurse aides, orderlies and patient service associates) (this equates to 2 889 positions).

Through the federal Express Entry system, high-skilled workers, including care providers (Nurse aides, orderlies, and patient service associates) in NOC 33102, can apply for permanent residence based on human capital factors such as language proficiency, education, and work experience. In addition to general Express Entry draws, the federal government prioritises occupations facing long-term labour shortages, including, in recent years, healthcare. Healthcare category-based draws include, among other occupations, NOC 33102 occupations; if selected through the healthcare category they are prioritised over other Express Entry candidates (Government of Canada, 2026[41]). Total healthcare category selections in 2024, the first full year the category was used, were over 10 000; there is no breakdown, however, of the specific occupations of the applicants drawn. Care workers may also qualify for the Canadian Experience Class or the Federal Skilled Worker programme within Express Entry. NOC 33102 occupations are eligible for both programmes, subject to meeting requirements related to language ability, education, and work experience.

At the provincial and territorial level, the Provincial Nominee Programme allows provinces and territories to nominate candidates to obtain permanent residence. Each province and territory operates its own PNP streams and eligibility criteria (Government of Canada, 2025[42]). Several explicitly prioritise caregiving occupations.[9]

Finally, the Atlantic Immigration Programme provides a pathway to permanent residence for skilled foreign workers and international graduates who wish to live and work in one of Canada's four Atlantic provinces. The programme supports employers struggling to fill local labour shortages and allows recruitment at most skill levels, including occupations in NOC 33102 (Government of Canada, 2025[43]).

Japan has four care worker migration schemes

Japan has the highest proportion of elderly citizens globally, with 29.4% of its population aged 65 and over (Japan Cabinet Office, 2024[44]). Approximately 2.72 million caregivers will be needed by 2040, bringing the projected shortage to approximately 570 000 additional caregivers, compared to 2020. Enrolment in care training institutions is low, reflecting the challenges in developing the local workforce. Japan has increasingly turned to foreign care labour to address workforce shortages and now has four schemes to facilitate entry of migrants into the care sector (outlined below in Table 4.6).

Table 4.6. Four different channels for care workers in Japan

Scheme	Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)	Status of residence "nursing care"	Technical Intern Training Program (TTIP)	Specified Skilled Worker (SSW)
Initiated	2014	2017	2017	2019
No. of residents (stock)	3 039	15 891	18 400	67 871
	(as of end Jan 2025)	(as of end Dec 2025)	(as of end Dec 2025)	(as of end Dec 2025)
Objectives	Bilateral ties	Accept skilled workers	Skills transfers	Alleviate shortages
Eligibility	Nursing college grads	Certified Care Worker certified	Language ability (JLPT N4)	Long-term care SSW Evaluation Test and JLPT N4
Duration of stay	Max four years (renewable after getting care worker certificate)	Renewable	Max 5 years	Max five years (six years if deemed to have reasonable grounds)

Source: OECD (2024[45]), *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Japan 2024*, https://doi.org/10.1787/0e5a10e3-en.

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The Economic Partnership Agreements were the first scheme to be implemented, applying to candidates from the Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam. Under the agreements, Japan recruits candidates, primarily nurses and certified care workers via a government-to-government framework. It is capped in the number of annual participants from each partner country and involves a subsidised support and training programme.

The "nursing care" status of residence scheme, implemented in 2017, allows foreign nationals with Japan's national care qualification to remain long-term. In the same year, the already established Technical Intern Training Program was extended to include training in care work. There is a pathway for the trainees that successfully completed TITP Type 2 to transition to Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) status without passing language/skills tests which are required in SSW. The Specified Skilled Worker System was introduced in 2019 to mitigate skills shortages by admitting work-ready foreign nationals who have a certain degree of expertise and skills. As shown below in Table 4.7, the number of workers in Japan under SSW (stocks) increased more than ten-fold between 2021 and 2025.

Table 4.7. Stocks of Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) 2021-2025

Stocks/ year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Japan (SSW)	5 155	16 081	28 400	44 367	67 871

Source: OECD Secretariat based on data from the Ministry of Justice of Japan.

StatLink https://stat.link/vtoudx

Israel's long running programme provides live-in foreign caregivers in people's homes

Israel has the largest proportion of foreign-born workers in its social care workforce (70%) among OECD countries (OECD, 2020[3]). As of 2024, Israel hosted a total of 77 762 foreign care workers (61 776 there lawfully and 15 986 that were not in compliance with their visa conditions[10]), up from 75 378 in 2023. This category of workers has been increasing over time and outpacing other groups of temporary migrant workers, such as construction workers. Between 2014 and 2024 the total number of foreign care workers in Israel rose by 42% (below forecasts that the workforce would double between 2010 and 2025 (OECD, 2010[46])). Table 4.8 below outlines the increase in the foreign care workforce from 2014 to 2024.

Table 4.8. Stock of care workers in Israel (by legal status) 2014-2024

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Lawful	43 468	45 632	49 156	50 162	55 425	57 111	55 705	57 509	59 254	60 885	61 776
Not in compliance with permit conditions	11 324	11 800	11 317	13 231	11 434	12 145	13 251	14 039	14 379	14 493	15 986
Total	54 792	57 432	60 473	63 393	66 859	69 256	68 956	71 548	73 633	75 378	77 762

Source: Population, Immigration and Border Authority, Israel.

StatLink https://stat.link/pd3vct

Israel's programme, established in 1991, allows individuals or families to employ foreign caregivers for elderly or disabled care (in the home) upon receiving a permit to hire a foreign care worker from Israel's Population and Immigration Authority (OECD, 2010[46]). Workers are issued with a one-year work visa, which can be renewed up to a total of 63 months (5 years and 3 months). In rare cases, it may be extended beyond this length upon approval by the Population and Immigration Authority to continue care for the same care recipient. Subject to approval, caregivers may change to another care recipient who holds a permit to employ a foreign worker within their region. The permit is restricted to the care sector and there is no pathway to permanent residence or the ability to bring dependents.


Although the permit is restrictive in terms of worker mobility and path to permanent residence, it is liberal in terms of admission requirements, with no requirement to have specific qualifications, professional experience or language skills to work in Israel. Recruitment is currently allowed through private intermediaries or BLAs, however, the government plans to shift recruitment to government-to-government channels, governed by BLAs with sending countries (OECD, 2024[47]). Israel has agreements with several countries for the recruitment of caregivers, including Nepal for institutional care, the Philippines for home-based care and Sri Lanka in both home-based and institutional caregiving.

The United Kingdom's Health and Care Worker visa route led to a spike in migration

The United Kingdom introduced the Health and Care Worker visa (HCWV) in August 2020 as a special route or category under its Skilled Worker visa. Shortly after, it was extended to the social care workforce to address shortages in the LTC sector. Senior care workers became eligible for the visa in January 2021 and care workers (who were allowed to bring their dependents) were added in February 2022. Care providers offering employment were required to have a certificate of sponsorship, as for any other Skilled Worker, but applicants did not have to have any particular qualifications or experience. By March 2023, the number of migrant workers entering on the HCWV ballooned (a total of 57 693 visas granted in the year ending March 2023, more than 34% of the Skilled Worker route). Along with this increase, reports of exploitation by care providers increased.

In 2024, a tightening up of the ability to bring dependents and an increase in the salary requirement and skill level led to falling numbers of visa grants. In July 2025, the United Kingdom Government announced the closure of the HCWV to overseas recruitment of care workers and that they would focus on training local workers. In-country recruitment is still allowed and migrant care workers already in the United Kingdom are able to extend their visas, switch employers, and apply for settlement under the existing rules until 2028. The government has proposed extending the qualifying period for settlement from five to ten years under a new "earned settlement" model, with longer periods, potentially up to 15 years, for some lower paid or medium-skilled workers, such as care workers. The proposal remains under consultation at the time of writing. If the changes come into effect, it is proposed they be applied retroactively, which would affect migrant care workers who entered the United Kingdom in 2021/22 and would have been eligible to apply for settlement from 2026. Figure 4.3 below illustrates the change in visa volumes between 2021 and 2025 (for main applicants and their dependents).

Figure 4.3. Health and Care Worker visa volumes 2021-2025



Source: UK Home Office (2025[48]), Restoring Control over the Immigration System, http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/restoring-control-over-the-immigration-system-white-paper.

StatLink https://stat.link/txyw47

These figures refer to visas issued to care workers arriving from abroad. An additional important channel for care workers in the United Kingdom is change of status, as international students. Just under 45% of international students who graduated and switched directly from study visas to Skilled Worker visas between 2021 and 2025 went into care work (Brindle and Sumption, 2026[49]). This amounted to more than 50 000 care worker visa recipients over this period.

Overview of other mechanisms used to admit migrant care workers

In most OECD countries, recruitment of a migrant care workers is possible, at least in theory, through a general work permit/visa. In practice, however, many countries' salary and skill thresholds for such channels make it difficult for personal care workers, and sometimes assistant/practical nurses, to be admitted. This is the case, for example, in the United States, where the many foreign-born employed in care have come through non-economic channels. In some countries, such as New Zealand, the high salary and qualification thresholds in the general skilled channel have been addressed – due to the importance

of guaranteeing a care workforce – by exemptions or occupation-specific concessions (such as lower formal skill and language requirements or fast-track processing). In other countries, the employment of care workers is facilitated through their inclusion on shortage occupation lists and the use of occupational quotas. This section provides more detail on the variety of mechanisms OECD countries use to facilitate the admission of migrant care workers.

Occupational quotas and shortage lists

Shortage occupation lists function as a selectivity and signalling tool, identifying occupations where international recruitment is considered justified on economic or social grounds. They typically allow employers to bypass or simplify the labour market test. In points-based systems, shortage occupation lists provide additional points and therefore the opportunity to be selected from the migrant pool. Quota based occupation lists are used to ensure international recruitment has a limited impact on the domestic labour market. Different tools aim to address different types of shortages but when they cover LTC occupations they act as a signal for facilitating recruitment. Despite the absence of a dedicated pathway, shortage occupation lists can therefore play a decisive role in enabling employers to recruit care workers from abroad, particularly where employers face persistent recruitment difficulties from the local labour force.

However, the efficacy of this approach depends on several factors. First, designation as a shortage occupation only improves access to migrant labour where the labour market test is the major constraint, not other requirements, such as salary thresholds, credential recognition or processing times. Second, the credibility and usefulness of shortage lists hinge on whether they reflect genuine and current shortages (supported by up-to-date data). Lists that are updated infrequently or based on weak evidence risk either excluding occupations where shortages are acute or allowing access to migration where shortages have eased.

Finally, shortage lists need to be underpinned by a robust understanding of how LTC occupations are defined, classified and segmented within national labour markets. Care work often spans multiple occupational categories, employment relationships and skill levels, and shortages may be concentrated in specific roles, settings or regions rather than across the occupation as a whole. Without sufficiently granular occupational definitions, shortage lists may be poorly targeted, limiting their effectiveness as a tool for improving recruitment outcomes through international migration.

Several OECD countries have care workers on shortage lists, including Austria, Belgium, Canada and France (regional shortage lists), Denmark (the “positive lists”, which use quotas for certain care workers), Finland and Slovenia. Three OECD countries use quotas for care workers (Denmark, Italy and Ireland) although the experience so far indicates that quotas may be set below the level of need for the occupation, or, on the contrary, be undersubscribed for various reasons. In both Italy and Ireland the quota for care workers has not been met in recent years. Box 4.5 below outlines how the care worker quota is used in Ireland.

Box 4.5. Ireland’s care worker quotas and expanding access to general employment permits for healthcare assistants

Quotas aim to meet labour shortages while protecting local workers

In December 2022, following a report by a cross-departmental advisory group on long-term care workforce and in response to recognised shortages in long-term care, the government introduced a quota of 1 000 General Employment Permits (GEPs) for non-EEA care workers. In March 2025, the quota was expanded to a total of 2 000 GEPs. This measure forms part of Ireland’s approach to addressing labour shortages in long-term care while maintaining protections for the domestic workforce.

It also aims to ensure continuity of care for recipients of long-term care where domestic supply is insufficient.

The quota has not been fully used so far

In 2023, 441 new GEPs were issued for care workers and home carers (SOC 6145), in 2024, 835 GEPs were issued, and in 2025, 757 GEPs were issued. In addition, 163 GEPs were renewed in 2025, along with 9 new Reactivation Employment Permits for SOC 6145, which do not count towards the quota. This brings the total number of permits issued under the quota in 2025 to 929. In the first half of 2026, 518 GEPs were issued, and 313 renewed.

Allowing recruitment in the care sector has had limited impact so far

Aside from the quota, the government made Health Care Assistants (HCA) (who work in institutional care settings) eligible for GEPs in June 2021, in response to rising demand and limited supply. The report, the Labour Market Impact of Health Care Assistant (HCA) Employment Permits, published in December 2024, examines the effect of granting GEP access to non-EEA HCAs.

The report finds that at current permit levels the labour market impact has been limited. Permit-holders accounted for a small share – about 10% – of the overall workforce, and shortages persist. However, the report projects significant growth in demand for care workers in the coming decades, suggesting the scheme may become more important over time. It also identifies structural challenges, including low pay, demanding working conditions, work-life balance issues, visa and family-reunification restraints and qualification recognition barriers, which need to be addressed to support longer-term effectiveness.

Sources: Report on the Labour Market Impact of Health Care Assistant Employment Permits (Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment, Ireland). December 2024. Response to Parliamentary question 193 on Thursday 10 April 2025.

In Italy, the entry of foreign workers for employment purposes is regulated by the Flow Decree (Decreto Flussi), a mechanism through which the government determines annually or on a multi-year basis the number of foreign nationals who may legally enter the country for employment. The system is based on numerical quotas for specific occupations and economic sectors.

Under the 2026 Flow Decree, a significant share of the quotas have been allocated to domestic and family care services, covering highly demanded occupations such as:

- Caregivers (badanti)
- Domestic workers/housekeepers (colf)
- Babysitters

For this sector, a total of 13 600 entries have been authorised for foreign workers to be employed under non-seasonal subordinate employment contracts. This allocation reflects the growing demand for care and support services among Italian households, driven largely by population ageing and the increasing need for continuous assistance for elderly and dependent individuals.

The 13 600 quotas are not distributed uniformly across the country. Instead, they are allocated geographically according to the number of applications submitted by employers in different regions (Flussi, 2026[50]).

Alongside the Flow Decree (Decreto Flussi), there is also an out-of-quota channel that allows employers to hire caregivers and babysitters without being subject to the annual entry limits. This measure provides for 10 000 entries per year between 2025 and 2028 for foreign workers employed in the care of people aged over 80, persons with disabilities, and children up to six years of age. Unlike the Flow Decree

procedure, applications are not submitted directly by employers through the click day system. Instead, employers must apply through authorised employment agencies or employers' associations, which submit requests via the Ministry's online portal using dedicated application forms.

An analysis of data by sector shows that domestic work and health and social care services recorded the highest success rate: in 2023, 29.7% of allocated quotas resulted in the signing of an employment contract. This outcome is likely linked to the stronger commitment of employers and the more personal nature of the employment relationship. At the same time, it may also suggest the use of the mechanism as a de facto regularisation channel for workers already present in Italy.

Bilateral Labour Agreements or Skills Mobility Partnerships

Eight OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Slovenia and the United Kingdom) have Bilateral Labour Agreements that include a focus on care workers. Bilateral Labour Agreements create government to government frameworks that formalise recruitment standards, protect workers' rights and align labour supply with destination country labour needs, helping to reduce irregular migration and exploitative recruitment practices. They are particularly suited to migration where supply of workers outstrips demand, and where job requirements, such as training or qualification requirements, are less specific (OECD, 2014[51]).

Skills mobility partnerships are a type of Bilateral Labour Agreements that go a step further by integrating skills development, credential recognition, and circular mobility into migration pathways, ideally enabling origin countries to enhance their workforce and destination countries to address workforce shortages. Although they are often limited in their scale – admitting hundreds of workers over several years – and so not appropriate for addressing structural shortages, they have become popular in recent years, particularly in the EU.

Italy has introduced pre-departure labour mobility schemes under Article 23 of the Italian Immigration Law. These programmes allow employers to recruit workers selected abroad through structured pathways combining job matching, vocational training and Italian language training before departure, with the objective of improving labour market integration and supporting fair and demand-driven international recruitment.

Foreign workers who have completed vocational and civic-language training programmes abroad approved by the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies may enter Italy and be hired at any time of the year, irrespective of the work-entry quotas established under the government's Flow Decrees (Decreti Flussi).

The health and social care sector involves small scale training initiatives across several countries. In Peru, as of June 2026, 180 people have attended programmes for basic social care workers, healthcare assistants, and care service integration. In Sri Lanka and India (Kerala), 20 healthcare assistants have been trained in each country, while in Ecuador 50 professionals have taken part in training and placement programmes in the healthcare sector. Brazil, with 50 participants, is also involved through social and healthcare training initiatives. In addition, 8 participants in Tunisia have been trained for care services, along with 20 participants in Albania, who have also followed healthcare and social care training pathways.

Germany is another example of a country that uses a combination of general skilled migration pathways with BLAs and skill mobility partnerships to facilitate international recruitment into the LTC sector. More information is in the section below.

Germany's system focusses on highly qualified migration for LTC

Germany's migration system relies on qualified workers in regulated professions, principally registered nurses and nursing assistants to address shortages in LTC. Admission is restricted to skilled migrants who

already hold relevant vocational or tertiary nursing qualifications, with stringent requirements for qualification recognition and language proficiency. The channels for international recruitment are the general skilled worker channel (Visa for Qualified Professionals), rather than a specific channel for care workers or health professionals, and, in some cases, the EU Blue Card. Assistant nurses and registered nurses are primarily admitted through the skilled migration channel.

The skilled worker channel in Germany is open to candidates with a recognised university degree or vocational qualification (with a minimum number of years of training). There is no labour market test; the application is reviewed by the Federal Employment Agency to check that the salary and working conditions in the contract are comparable to German conditions. Recognition of qualifications or training is required. Nursing assistants with recognised vocational training may also use the skilled worker channel, as long as they hold a formal nursing assistant/care assistant qualification that has been recognised as equivalent to a German state-recognised vocational training. Access to the skilled worker channel requires a minimum B1 level in German, however, to gain recognition and practice as Registered Nurses migrants must attain a B2 level of German. This is not specified in the Skilled Worker regulations, but reflects standardised administrative thresholds applied across German regions for recognition.

The EU Blue Card is an alternative channel to the skilled worker channel, for highly qualified employment Nurses may be eligible for the EU Blue Card in Germany, but not necessarily in other EU countries as eligibility depends on meeting the requirements of the Blue Card Directive (art. 5) and national implementation rules. For the purposes of the Blue Card, Germany defines ISCO 222 occupations, including registered nurses, as shortage occupations, which allows for facilitated admission conditions, including a lower salary threshold, of about EUR 45 934 in 2026. A Labour Market Test does not apply. The Blue Card is thus a possible, but unlikely, pathway for nurses from abroad who intend to work in the care sector. The EU has also developed Talent Partnerships with partner countries to support skills development and mutually beneficial mobility. In 2026 the EU Talent Pool Regulation (2026/1047) was adopted, which aims to facilitate recruitment of third-country nationals for occupations facing shortages through an EU-wide matching platform.

Germany also introduced an “Opportunity Card”, a job-search visa, which is also available to nurses and nursing assistants based, for example, on the number of years of academic or vocational training. This may allow foreign nurses to enter Germany and seek work, but they would have to receive recognition to work, and at that point be eligible for the Skilled Worker pathway.

Recent reforms to the Skilled Immigration Act, which were passed in November 2023 and fully implemented in June 2024, have introduced additional flexibility into the migration system. One example of this is the “recognition partnership” route, which allows migrants to enter and work in Germany (in regulated occupations such as nursing this is typically only possible at a lower occupational level) while completing the recognition of their qualifications, thereby accelerating labour market access. For more information on Germany’s skill mobility partnerships see Box 4.6.

Box 4.6. Germany’s skill mobility partnerships

Germany has developed a Global Skills Partnerships Nursing training programme that provides training in an individual’s country of origin and offers a curriculum which aligns with both the standards of the individual’s home country and those of Germany. The approach includes language classes to level B1-B2 in German and skills trainings to bridge any differences. Global Skills Partnerships aim to support faster recognition and adaption to the destination country’s labour market (Global Skills Partnerships nursing professionals can benefit from immediate recognition).

The Philippines-Germany Global Skills Partnership was established in 2019 as the first partnership in the nursing sector. This has been followed by nursing Global Skills Partnerships in several other countries: Mexico, Brazil, India, Uzbekistan and Indonesia. So far, more than 100 graduates from Mexico and the Philippines are working in Germany.

The partnerships aim to create structured, mutually beneficial pathways for skilled nursing professionals. The approach (commissioned and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Health) involves a partnership between nursing facilities in origin countries and German healthcare facilities. The Global Skills Partnership addresses the key challenges associated with the labour migration of qualified nursing staff and offers new approaches to mitigate negative consequences. Targeted strategies within the Global Skills Partnership help to empower nursing staff and partner countries, and assist in capacity building and the further development of healthcare systems.

Source: The German Federal Ministry of Health; Global Skills Partnership (2026[52]).

Other mechanisms: Industry agreements and expanding pathways to work in care for foreigners already in the country

Australia's labour agreement with the aged care sector

In May 2023, Australia introduced an aged care industry labour agreement, which allows providers to directly recruit migrants for the following care sector roles under the Skills in Demand (subclass 482) visa (temporary) and the Employer Nomination Scheme (subclass 186) visa (permanent): aged or disabled carer; nursing support worker; and personal care assistant. The settings of the agreement were informed by the findings of the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, which pointed to ongoing aged care workforce shortages, as well as attraction and retention challenges. The settings were also informed by consultation with the government, including the Departments of Health, Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Employment and Workplace Relations. Employers must enter into and maintain a memorandum of understanding with relevant industry union(s) to be able to access the agreement (Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, 2026[53]). The agreement provides access to visa concessions, including a pathway to permanent residence after two years working in the care sector (in Australia), and priority processing.

As shown in Table 4.9. below, between 30 June 2022 and 30 June 2025, as the agreement was moving to full speed, grants for care worker occupations increased by more than nine-fold. The increase was particularly strong for personal care assistants, the occupation that constitutes the bulk of the care workforce and following the 2023 introduction of the aged care industry agreement.

Table 4.9. Australia visa grants for care worker occupations (FY 2022/23 to 2024/25)

Occupation	2022-2023	2023-2024	2024-2025
Aged or disabled carer	91	203	401
Personal care assistant	93	417	1 003
Nursing support worker	6	40	336
Total	190	660	1 740

Note: This data is at a national level and based on occupational codes where captured in the visa issuing process.
Source: Australian Government: Department of Home Office.

StatLink https://stat.link/4e9zwm

As the agreement is relatively new the Home Office does not yet have data on retention (whether and how long people stay in the care sector upon getting PR). One trend visible so far is that most participants were already onshore (i.e. in Australia) and international recruitment is almost absent – 90% of visas granted are to onshore visa holders, particularly student visa holders. This may reflect the interest of students in employment in the care sector, that providers are trying to retain existing part time employees or that student visa holders see this as an accessible and fast pathway to PR. Further, it indicates that either there is sufficient supply of foreigners available in the local workforce or barriers to international recruitment (e.g. lack of recruitment intermediaries who can affordably, effectively and efficiently match employees with providers).

Overall, Australia's labour agreement for the aged care sector offers a balanced model by giving employers a regulated pathway to recruit foreign workers where shortages are acute, while embedding safeguards such as minimum pay rates, skills requirements, and oversight mechanisms that help protect migrant workers from exploitation and ensure fair treatment.

Expanding the eligibility of foreign nationals to work in the Korean care sector

In Korea, admission of foreign care workers under the general non-professional temporary work permit stream, the employer permit system, has not been allowed. Historically, female overseas Koreans holding the H-2 (Work and Visit) visa have served as the main source of labour for the care sector. H-2 visa holders are free to take up employment in most sectors, including care, provided they take a three-day course in language and culture. The private caregiving sector (often in hospital settings but sometimes live-in care) particularly attracts female overseas Koreans, many of whom are H-2 visa holders, as it is unregulated with no required qualifications (Park, Choi and Lee, 2020[54]). The care sector, however, cannot continue to rely on this pool as the pool of candidates eligible is rapidly ageing and diminishing.

More recently, a sub-category under the E-7 (professional or specialised occupations) visa was introduced to attract mid-skilled workers in various sectors such as social welfare, services, and manufacturing. In 2024, "certified care worker" was added to the list of eligible occupations under the E-7-2 category, enabling foreign nationals with the required credentials and Korean-language proficiency to work in the care sector. Under this policy, international students who graduate from Korean universities and obtain a certified care worker qualification may transfer to an E-7 visa upon securing employment at a care facility.

This scheme is currently implemented on a pilot basis with an annual quota of approximately 400 persons. Following an evaluation of its performance, the government will consider whether to implement it as a regular program.

In addition, to facilitate the implementation of the certified foreign care worker program, the Korean Government designated 21 high-performing universities in each metropolitan/provincial area as "certified foreign care-worker training universities" in August 2025. As of March 2026, 505 international students had enrolled in and were studying at these universities. These universities operate formal degree programmes for certified foreign care workers to ensure they meet Korean care-quality standards.

Impact on countries of origin

A key issue regarding the international mobility of health professionals, and a major focus of the political attention in recent decades, is the impact on countries of origin. In 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) established a health workforce support and safeguards list (SSL) comprising 55 countries as part of the revision of the *WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel* (outlined in Box 4.7 below). These countries face particularly acute health-workforce constraints in achieving universal health coverage, as reflected in both a below-median density of doctors, nurses and midwives (less than 49 per 10 000 population) and a universal health coverage service coverage index

below a specified benchmark. The WHO recommends that active international recruitment from these countries be avoided in the absence of appropriate compensatory measures and calls instead for strengthened international support to reinforce their health systems (OECD, 2025[6]).

While the WHO Support and Safeguards List provides an important global benchmark for ethical recruitment, it does not capture all situations in which international recruitment may place pressure on source-country health systems. Countries such as the Philippines illustrate how high levels of health worker production and international mobility can coexist with domestic shortages and significant geographic and sectoral maldistribution.

The implications of international recruitment for countries of origin also depend on the occupational outcomes of migrant workers abroad. When qualified nurses are recruited into lower-skilled LTC roles, the result may be a double loss: source countries lose scarce health professionals in whom substantial training investments have been made, while destination countries do not fully utilise migrants' qualifications and skills. This highlights the importance of recognition pathways, skills-matching policies, and approaches that support circular migration, diaspora engagement and return mobility, helping to reconcile destination-country workforce needs with source-country workforce retention objectives.

Box 4.7. WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel

The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2010, provides an overarching global framework to improve global governance and minimise the negative consequences of health worker migration, particularly from developing countries. It promotes ethical recruitment and helps countries develop systems that balance the interests of both sending and receiving countries, while safeguarding the rights of migrant health workers.

As part of the revision of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, the WHO established in 2023 a health workforce support and safeguards list (SSL) comprising 55 countries. These countries face the most pressing health workforce challenges in relation to universal health coverage. These countries have: 1) a density of doctors, nurses and midwives below the global median (49 per 10 000 population); and 2) a universal health coverage service coverage index below a defined threshold. Active recruitment from these countries, unless accompanied by compensatory measures, should be avoided and, instead, increasing international support for the strengthening of health system in these countries is recommended. The list will be updated every three years.

The third review of the WHO Code of Practice by the Expert Advisory Group concluded to the continued relevant and effectiveness of the Code. The group however stated that the code and its implementation needed to be strengthened and recommended additional elements to be included. On that a draft resolution was adopted by the 79th World Health Assembly (May 2026) that agreed to publish an updated version of the WHO Code of Practice that includes additional text stating notably that "the provisions of the code also apply to health personnel who migrate and take up employment positions as care workers in destination countries". This makes the code fully relevant to ensure a fair management of migrant care workers.

Training, certification and qualification recognition processes

There is variation in how countries regulate care worker occupations

As outlined earlier in this chapter, in most countries LTC work encompasses three main occupations: personal support workers, assistant/practical nurse and registered nurses. These occupations are regulated in different ways, with most OECD countries not regulating personal support workers at all, partially regulating assistant/practical nurses and fully regulating registered nurses. Full regulation means that candidates need to go through licensing or registration and qualification recognition, all of which take time, sometimes including extra study and examinations, and the navigation of processes that can vary by jurisdiction. In most OECD countries, registered nurses require a tertiary level education (typically a bachelor's degree), as well as licensing or registration. For assistant/practical nurses there is more variation across countries and training can range from short courses to one to two-year certificate programmes and upper secondary or post-secondary diplomas. Regulation of these roles is also inconsistent with some countries not regulating them at all and others requiring registration and/or licensing.

Variation in training and experience requirements across countries is especially large for personal support workers. While the low barrier to entry for personal support workers has historically facilitated the entry of migrant care workers to the labour market in many OECD countries, there is a growing trend for countries to introduce some training or experience requirements to access the migration pathway for this occupation. Australia has introduced a skills/experience requirement specifically for labour migrants, who either need to have an Australian Qualifications Framework certificate III in relevant care/health services or 12 months full-time experience in a care role. Similarly, in Estonia migrant personal care workers must meet both formal qualification and experience requirements (Estonian Qualifications Framework Level 3) or a Social and Health Care Specialist (Level 4). In Korea, foreign candidates must complete 320 hours of training and pass an examination to work in care. Table 4.10 below outlines the minimum qualifications for migrants be admitted for work in the care sector in 18 OECD countries that require credentials and/or experience.

Table 4.10. Minimum credentials required for admission to the migration pathway for work in the care sector

Countries	Qualification	Work experience/ training	Comment
Australia	Yes	Yes	Minimum AQF certificate III in relevant care/health services **or** 12 months full time experience in a care role.
Austria	Yes	No	Nursing assistants must have an accredited assistant certificate. Unregulated roles like home helper or live-in carer require no qualifications.
Belgium	Yes	No	Care workers and home care workers require a certificate or diploma or equivalent training. Care workers are regulated at the federal level. Home care workers are regulated at the regional level.
Canada	Yes	Yes	Minimum secondary school diploma for HCWIP (general programmes have their own criteria). Six-months of work experience or caregiving training.
Czechia	Yes	No	For Senior caregivers only.
Denmark	Yes		Social and Health Care Assistants require vocational education and authorisation. Social and Health Care Helpers require a vocational programme but do not require authorisation.
Estonia	Yes	Yes	(EstQF Level 3) or a Social & Health Care Specialist (Level 4) is required to work as a care worker. Non-EU foreigners must meet both formal qualification and experience requirements, which are recognised.

Countries	Qualification	Work experience/ training	Comment
France	Yes	No	Assistant Nurse (Aide-Soignant) requires the Diplôme d'État d'Aide-Soignant (DEAS). Social care assistants (Auxiliaires de Vie Sociale) often require vocational training and certification.
Germany	Yes (for nurses)	No	Nurses require degrees. Nursing assistants need completed vocational training.
Ireland	Yes	Yes	Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) Level 5 in Healthcare Support is the nationally approved qualification (or foreign equivalent). 2-3 years of full-time work experience is also required.
Japan (SSW)	No	No	Different qualifications/experience required for different schemes. For SSW, in principle, candidates need to pass a long-term care SSW Skill Evaluation Test and Japanese language tests (Japanese Language Proficiency Test Level 4 and LTC SSW Japanese Language Evaluation Test.
Korea	Yes	No	Foreign workers must complete a 320-hour training programme (including both theoretical instruction and practical training) at an accredited institution in Korea, pass a national examination administered by the Korea Health Personnel Licensing Examination Institute (KHPLEI), and be registered with the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS). No pathway for recognition.
Latvia	No	No	Only nursing assistants need completion of a certified vocational education programme.
Norway	No	No	Healthcare workers/auxiliary nurses must have completed upper secondary vocational training in health and social care.
Poland	No	Yes (some roles)	For medical caregiver role, 3 years' of training at post-secondary schools (szkoła policealna) is required.
Slovenia	Yes (some roles)	No	A "provider of social care at home" must complete a training programme approved by the Social Chamber and meet the conditions for national vocational qualification.
Spain	Yes (some roles)	No	Varies from degree in Nursing Auxiliary Care Technician to Certificate of Professionalism of Socio-Health Care for Dependents in Social Institutions.
Switzerland	No	Yes	Health Care Assistant requires a 3-year apprenticeship, vocational education and training. Assistant in Health and Social Care requires a 2-year apprenticeship. Note, there is variation in the way cantons regulate medical professions.

Note: Countries that do not require qualifications, training or experience for caregiver roles are omitted from the table. Requirements for domestic/local workers may be different to what is in the table, which is specific to the requirements for the migration pathway.

As described earlier, Germany has higher human capital requirements for the admission of care workers, where internationally recruited care workers must already be trained registered nurses or nurse assistants in their home country. Another country with higher requirements is Japan, where passing the national certified care worker exam – currently administered only in Japan – is the prerequisite to obtain the "nursing care" status of residence. Box 4.8 gives an overview of Japan's certified care worker qualification, which is available to both national and foreign candidates. However, other care worker channels in Japan have their own specific skills thresholds (for example, for Specified Skilled Worker, candidates need to undertake verification of skill and language level).

The significant differences in national frameworks for what qualifications and experience care sector occupations require can pose challenges for international recruitment and intra-regional portability of skills (particularly in the EU). This is because foreign qualifications may not map neatly to domestic occupational standards, and someone who is eligible to perform a role in one country is not necessarily able to do so in another without further evidence of meeting the skills or qualification threshold.

Box 4.8. Japan's certified care worker qualification

Japan's Certified Care qualification is the country's nationally recognised credential for professional caregivers in the long-term care. It confirms that the holder has the specialised skills and knowledge required to provide care tailored to individuals who experience difficulties in daily life due to physical or mental impairments. To obtain the qualification, it is necessary to pass a national exam that tests both technical competence and, for example, ethical understanding of care work. The completion of a certified care training programme, gaining at least three years' experience, along with completion of an accredited practical training course for care workers, are prerequisites). The exam is in Japanese, meaning candidates need to have fluency in the language to pass. Foreign examinees receive extended exam time and question booklets in which furigana (syllabic characters) is provided for all kanji to aid reading.

As of March Fiscal Year 2026, there are just over 2 million Certified Care Workers (2 075 495). In the most recent session, in Fiscal Year 2025, 21.1% of the approximately 78 500 candidates who sat the exam were foreigners.

Pass rates and recent changes to support candidates

In Fiscal Year 2025, while the overall pass rate was 70.1%, the rate for foreign test-takers was approximately 30%, primarily due to language challenges.

Two measures may facilitate future foreign test takers. The first is a general reform of the system: a partial passing system was introduced in Fiscal Year 2025 so that even if a candidate fails based on the total score, each part will be evaluated separately and passing a part of the exam exempts candidates from retaking it on their next and the subsequent attempts.

The second measure is government has also funded a project to support foreign care workers to study Japanese to improve their employment and retention in long-term care. It involves: Japanese-language web content for LTC to enable foreign care workers to study independently; the development of learning materials to support foreign care workers to work in Japanese LTC settings; training sessions for staff at facilities that accept foreign care workers; and preparation courses for foreigners who are taking the national examination for certified care workers.

Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

OECD countries almost universally require ability in the local language

Almost all OECD countries require ability in the destination country's language (normally an intermediate level) but this varies between being an immigration requirement or an employer expectation. For example, Austria requires a Common European Framework of Reference for languages (CEFR) level B2 in German for most regulated care worker occupations (including the role of healthcare assistant and nurse) but may accept a lower level of German for unregulated care occupations such as live-in carer or home helper. In Finland, it is the responsibility of the employer to ensure the care worker has sufficient language skills (an A2 level or above is normally required for training programmes). Greece, on the other hand, does not have a formal language requirement but, practically, care workers need some proficiency in Greek to work in the sector.

Korea and Japan include language proficiency as part of their care worker training programmes – both the national care worker exams administered in Japan and Korea are conducted in the respective national languages. The Japanese Government has recently added Japanese language support for national

examination applicants of the Certified Care qualification who are foreign-born (refer to Box 4.8). Private recruitment intermediaries for the German care sector incorporate language training in their pre-arrival programmes for migrant workers up to level B1 to address this.

Communication is an important part of the job and attaining a certain language level can be challenging for migrants. Language proficiency can be a barrier to attracting migrant care workers, particularly for countries with smaller language communities (e.g. non-English, Spanish or French speaking). It may limit migrants' awareness of their employment rights, slow down the process of qualifications recognition, as well as adaption to new jobs and access to social services. In these circumstances, support from government, employers and/or the sector to improve language skills is important, especially if attaining a certain language level is a pre-requisite for continued stay or licensing. Combined with skills recognition measures, it can facilitate the labour market integration of migrant care workers.

Some countries facilitate migrants to enter while recognition is underway

Where qualifications are required, there is no standardised approach to the recognition of third country nationals' qualifications across OECD countries, and recognition processes may be lengthy and bureaucratic. For example, in Germany, the process involves an equivalence assessment (where the authorities compare the foreign training to the German qualification), the provision of certified translations of all documents, and evidence of German language proficiency at B2 level (CEFR). If the qualification is not deemed equivalent, an adaption course or exam may be required. The whole process can take up to three years. Many countries follow similar processes, which may be started abroad but need to be completed in the destination country. In some countries, such as Korea and Japan, there is no recognition process for foreign training/qualifications, and foreign-born care workers must complete the local training and exam (in the local language).

One solution to the long process for recognition is to allow migrants to enter and work while recognition is underway. This benefits employers by providing labour quickly and can benefit migrants too as long as there is a clear path to attaining recognition. Austria and Germany allow skilled workers to enter, and in some cases work, while the recognition process is underway. Changes to the German Skilled Immigration Act in 2024 introduced the "recognition partnership" route, which lets migrants go through the recognition procedure *after* they arrive in Germany while working in the profession (in regulated occupations such as nursing this is typically only possible at a lower level) (The German Federal Government, 2025[55]).

Provisions to admit migrants for employment while recognition of qualifications is underway can help to reduce barriers and facilitate the international recruitment of care workers. However, there are several factors to consider. First, there is a temporary occupational downgrading, in terms of the tasks performed but also the salary received. For example, during the process, nurses in Flanders are paid on a care assistant scale, and those in Austria and Germany can be paid on an assistant/trainee scale, placing them respectively in a lower occupational category and lower wage group under the collective bargaining coverage or the sectoral care minimum wage (in Germany). The number of hours for additional study – especially language – may be a burden on top of a full-time work week (Missault, 2024[56]). The process usually takes a minimum of six months, but can last much longer, and might not lead to successful recognition of qualifications.

Obstacles related to recognition can lead to attrition (Atanassov et al., 2023[57]), or to a growing stock of nurses working towards authorisation. Of the approximately 1 700 nurses admitted to Denmark between 2019 and 2024 for the purpose of obtaining Danish authorisation – not specifically in the LTC sector – only 200 had achieved this goal by 1 January 2025, while almost all the others were still undergoing the authorisation process, in part due to bottlenecks in the training system. This led Denmark to set a quota for the nurses category – at zero through 2027 (Danish Ministry of the Interior and Health, 2025[58]).

There is a further question of determining who pays for the language and professional training. The reality of occupational downgrading implies a greater need to manage migrants' expectations around pay and tasks for a lower-level occupation than the one they trained for, or are accustomed to perform, in the origin country – and transparency about the outcomes of the process.

For countries like Germany, which only recruit internationally for registered nurses and nurse assistants, aspects such as the qualification recognition process, and the language support are the most influential in supporting smooth labour market integration. Efforts to digitalise and streamline the recognition process are likely to make it faster and more accessible for migrants and employers.

Levers for improving retention of migrant care workers

While improving working conditions is the most effective retention policy (refer to Box 4.1), there are additional measures that can be used to specifically support migrant care worker retention. The following section discusses data on the retention of migrant care workers, followed by measures that can be taken by governments, the sector and employers to improve migrant retention in the LTC sector, with a focus on data and migration system levers.

There is limited evidence on retention outcomes for migrant care workers

Obtaining data on migrant care worker retention is challenging for several reasons. Few countries examine retention in occupation of admission of labour migrants. Tracking retention by occupation is complex and resource intensive as it involves linking administrative data or surveying individual workers, hence it is usually only done in one-off retrospective studies, rather than routinely. Care work presents the added difficulty in that occupational codes sometimes capture other occupations, such as childcare and domestic work (e.g. cleaning) as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Nonetheless, some data, such as turnover rates, average tenure, or year-to-year continuation in the long-term care workforce, is available for a handful of countries. These are reported in one-off studies rather than as part of regularly published statistics.

Data collected by the OECD health division (from the EU and Australian Labour Force Surveys) suggests that tenure of foreign-born care workers is slightly shorter than that of the native-born, although this refers only to tenure with the same employer, rather than to continued employment in the care sector (OECD, 2025[1]).

There is mixed evidence on the effect of gaining permanent residence (and hence labour mobility) on retention in the healthcare sector. A study by the Canadian Government on temporary foreign workers employed in the healthcare sector since 2000, found that one year after transitioning to permanent residence (which enables job mobility), nearly two-thirds of temporary foreign workers remained working in the health sec*tor* (Hou, 2025[59]). Although this study is not specific to the LTC sector, it indicates that most migrant healthcare workers do not immediately leave the sector upon getting permanent residence. An earlier OECD report (OECD, 2019[60]) found, however, that many caregivers from Canada's pilot programmes left the care sector after gaining permanent residence and noted that a longer required period between admission and being eligible for permanent residence could improve retention and limit the need for high intakes in this category.

Data on stay rates of different occupations from a United Kingdom study found that those working as senior care workers, care workers and home carers, and nurses (SOC 2 231) had the highest stay rates (defined as remaining in the United Kingdom not the LTC sector[11]) among common occupations. Excluding care workers, those working in nursing consistently demonstrate the highest stay rates among occupations with 94% remaining in the United Kingdom five years after their first Skilled Worker visa. This may be explained

by several factors: high labour demand in the health and social care sectors, the difficulty of moving roles for licensed professions, such as nursing, and that those arriving on health and social care visas tended to bring higher number of dependents that those on other skilled visas (which makes mobility harder due to factors like schooling). It should be noted that there is a short observation window for care workers and home carers as they were only added to the Skilled Worker route in 2022 (Migration Advisory Committee, 2026[61]).

Evidence is limited on how expanded labour market mobility upon obtaining permanent residence affects longer-term retention in care. In countries where accelerated permanent residence pathways exist, such as Australia and New Zealand, there has not been analysis of whether migrants remain in the care sector after meeting the qualifying employment period. This makes it difficult to assess the extent to which pathways to permanent residence and sector mobility affect retention.

Migration levers can impact retention in the LTC sector in various ways

Governments have a number of useful policy levers to increase retention with the employer for temporary visa holders. They can also create incentives for retention in the country by enabling family reunification, pathways to permanent residence and considering flexible renewal rules.

One commonly used lever is to link temporary work permits to a specific employer, occupation or sector, thereby limiting migrants' ability to change jobs or move into other sectors. In the care sector, such constraints on occupational or sectoral mobility can result in migrant workers remaining in low skilled care roles for the duration of their initial permit, even where their skills or qualifications could allow movement into other occupations or more highly qualified roles within the sector. From a labour supply perspective, these arrangements can help address sector specific shortages and may be associated with longer observed tenure in care roles. At the same time, reduced employer mobility can reinforce power asymmetries between employers and workers, potentially increasing vulnerability and discouraging workers from reporting poor working conditions or abuse. Restrictions on occupational mobility may also affect overall labour market efficiency by limiting workers' ability to move to jobs where their skills are most valued, leading to less successful job matching.

Across the OECD many countries limit migrant care workers to the sector and/or employer and sector for the duration of the initial permit. Some countries, such as Israel, admit workers exclusively for work in the care sector, with no possibility of changing sector. Italy has recently introduced a sector-specific exception to its general labour migration rules, requiring migrants admitted for employment in care to remain in the sector during the first 12 months of their permit. The revised Single Permit (applicable to healthcare workers who fulfil the necessary conditions) streamlines the procedure for non-EU workers to reside and work in the EU. The changes also include the rights to change employer within the scope of the single permit, and protection for single permit holders during unemployment. These measures have a direct impact on third country nationals applying to work in the EU, including in the care sector.

Other countries rely less on direct restrictions and more on conditional incentives. Rather than prohibiting sectoral mobility outright, some systems link access to permanent residence or faster progression to settlement to a minimum period of employment in care. In New Zealand and Australia, for instance, migrants on certain temporary visas can qualify for permanent residence after two years working in the care sector, which is faster than other temporary visa holders.

The design of settlement requirements, such as minimum residence periods, occupational eligibility, and skill thresholds, can influence migrants' decisions about where and how long to remain employed. In the United Kingdom, care workers are currently subject to the same indefinite leave to remain requirements as other skilled workers. However, proposed changes, if implemented, would extend the baseline qualifying period from five to ten years for all migrants, with potentially longer timeframes for medium-skilled occupations, including personal care workers. As a result, care workers who entered under the Health and

Care Worker visa in 2021-2022 would no longer meet the revised settlement requirements, as the proposed changes are retrospective. Longer temporary status may be associated with extended retention in the sector but also prolongs periods during which workers have more limited bargaining power and reduced security.

Permit duration and renewal processes are another set of policy levers that can affect retention and turnover in the care sector. Longer initial permits and predictable, streamlined renewal procedures can reduce uncertainty for workers and employers, supporting job continuity and lowering administrative-driven churn. In contrast, short permits and complex renewal requirements can increase turnover and the risk of status lapses in a sector already facing staffing shortages.

Closely related is the length of time migrants are allowed to remain in the country when they lose or leave a job. Short grace periods may discourage workers from changing employers, even in cases of poor working conditions, reinforcing dependence on a single employer, while longer job-search periods can support better matching and greater stability of labour supply within the sector. Approaches vary across countries: in the United Kingdom, sponsored skilled workers generally have 60 days to find a new sponsor after job loss; in Germany, job-search periods of several months may be granted depending on the decision of the local Foreigner's Authority; and in Canada, recent measures allowing temporary extensions or open work permits for vulnerable workers enable continued job search without immediate loss of legal status.

For migration to play a role, not only as a quick fix but as part of ensuring a sustainable LTC workforce, it is important not only to create a clear pathway to permanent residence but also to create incentives, notably by enabling family reunification – this can be through enabling the principal applicant to sponsor immediate family, non-immediate family, enabling spouse work rights and supporting faster processing for family members. However, this may not be sufficient to ensure retention in the sector if conditions are not generally good for the domestic LTC workforce.

Several actions are in place to support these policy goals at EU level: the European Care Strategy and the Council Recommendation on access to high-quality long-term care provide a comprehensive framework for reforms and investments at EU and national levels to improve provision of care services, and urge Member States to support quality employment, ensure fair working conditions, improve the professionalisation of care, and address skills needs.

In EU/free-movement contexts, retention may depend less on visa settings and more on working conditions, commuting constraints, recognition of qualifications, language support, housing affordability and attractiveness compared with jobs in neighbouring regions.

Overall, migration settings for the care sector involve multiple policy levers, each associated with trade-offs between addressing immediate labour shortages, protecting workers, supporting retention, and maintaining labour market efficiency and coherence across migration streams.

Soft measures can improve job quality, onboarding and support

A few OECD countries include migrant care workers in their national retention strategies and many have other soft measures to encourage retention (see Box 4.9). Soft measures that target the retention of migrant workers based on the unique barriers they face, such as communication challenges, cultural differences, discrimination and need for support in daily tasks/orientation can be effective.[12] For example, since care workers from abroad may not be familiar with the institutional practices in the destination country, it may be necessary to have pre-departure training to make it clearer, for example, with videos of typical tasks and the work environment. These services could be provided by the training institution in the origin country, the employer, recruiter or association in the destination country. Providing such information about the job and workplace supports workers to have realistic expectations about their life in the destination country. This could be supported on the ground by high-quality onboarding, buddy-schemes (particularly with a buddy from the same cultural background), and fostering inclusive, respectful workplaces that address discrimination (both from patients and other colleagues) and provide ongoing language and cultural support.

Box 4.9. Japan and Norway's strategies

Discussion of foreign caregivers within Japan's strategy

Japan's strategy for retaining foreign caregivers, outlined in the Global Health Vision of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, focusses on improving post-arrival support to improve both working and living conditions to encourage long-term employment. Measures include reducing excessive workloads, promoting safer care practices, alongside practical daily life support, such as host organisations helping workers find appropriate housing, access transportation and open bank accounts. The policy emphasises career development through the creation of career-development plans by the host organisation and worker, better access to training programmes and clear advancement paths, as well as exam preparation for national care qualifications to reduce barriers (e.g. by holding test preparation courses). These efforts aim to reduce turnover and ensure continuity of care for Japan's ageing population.

Norway's strategy focusses on strengthening the general health workforce

Norway's national plan to strengthen recruitment, competence, and professional development in the municipal health and care services (Kompetanseløft 2025) includes actions to improve the recruitment, retention and development of personnel. This includes the "Jobbvinner" Programme – a national recruitment campaign focussed on increasing the number of nurses and healthcare assistants, with emphasis on long-term care, and "Menn I helse" – an accelerated pathway for men to obtain vocational certification as healthcare assistants, which promotes gender diversity and supports workforce capacity in long-term care. There are also training programmes for staff, leadership development for managers, which can support retention. The implementation of the plan is being carried out by the Norwegian Directorate of Health, who works closely with the municipalities. While it does not specifically address migrant care workers, it assumes many of the actions to improve recruitment and retention will impact on them.

Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan (2024[62]), Global Health Vision, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/10501000/001295190.pdf; Norwegian Directorate of Health, http://www.helsedirektoratet.no/forebygging-diagnose-og-behandling/organisering-og-tjenestetilbud/kompetanseloft-2025.

At the EU level, the project "Nursing Action" funded under the EU4Health programme, focusses on mitigating nursing shortages through improved recruitment and retention strategies. Additionally, the Joint Action "HEROES" aids in strengthening health workforce planning, and seven projects designed to create training opportunities that enable health professionals to upgrade their skills.

In countries which recruit high qualified care workers who must obtain recognition of their qualifications before being able to work at their level, such as Germany and Finland, clear pathways for professional development and skills development, with support for language study and other required training, may support retention. Information on how long this will take and what the outcomes have been can help better inform candidates and manage expectations. The European Commission Recommendation on the recognition of qualifications of third country nationals sets out measures for Member States to simplify and expedite recognition processes to allow faster access to professions. Furthermore, the Commission announced the development of common rules for recognition of qualifications of third country nationals as one of the actions of the Union of Skills.

The Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs has recently commenced a programme to support the attraction and retention of an additional 6 000 care workers by 2030.The programme involves four pillars, one of which is focussed on inclusive onboarding and workplace-based integration, particularly for migrant care

workers. This tailored onboarding aims to support retention and service quality. The programme is still in progress, with no outcomes to report yet.

Slovenia has introduced a range of measures to improve the recruitment, integration and retention of migrant workers in LTC and social protection services. Targeted integration programmes co-finance costs related to temporary accommodation, recognition of qualifications, Slovenian language training, and support for workers' family members, with particular emphasis on occupation-specific language courses that strengthen safe and high-quality care delivery. The Employment Service of Slovenia complements these efforts through tailored recruitment and integration support, including assistance with employment procedures and documentation, promotion of vacancies in Slovenia and abroad, information on living and working conditions, and Slovenian language courses up to B2 level for both workers and their families. Broader workforce retention measures applicable to all LTC employees include investment in professional development and qualification attainment, scholarships for students in relevant health and social care fields, support for volunteer engagement, initiatives to improve quality and safety through staff training and better human resource management, and the adoption of innovative technologies and equipment to reduce workload, improve working conditions and allow staff to spend more time providing direct care.

In Quebec, a programme called Accompagnement Québec supports new migrants to settle and remain in the province. More information is below in Box 4.10.

Box 4.10. *Accompagnement Québec*

Accompagnement Québec is a government-funded support service delivered by Quebec's Ministry of Immigration, Francisation and Integration that supports newcomers – both permanent and temporary migrants – from before arrival through to long-term settlement in the province. It is aimed at immigrants and their families who need help navigating life in Quebec, particularly in areas such as learning French, accessing employment, understanding public services, and settling in regions outside Montreal. The programme provides personalised support through an assigned integration assistance officer, referrals to local service providers, and access to tools such as francisation courses, labour market integration services, and regional settlement support. By intervening early and offering tailored guidance, *Accompagnement Québec* aims to improve migrants' social and economic integration, encourage retention in Quebec – especially in regions facing labour shortages – and support more durable settlement outcomes aligned with Quebec's linguistic and integration objectives. Participation in the programme is voluntary. Many participants are care workers.

Source: Quebec's Ministry of Immigration, Francisation and Integration.

Conclusion and trade offs

As population ageing intensifies, countries will have to rethink their long-term care workforce strategies in a more strategic way, including how migrant care workers, both those already in the country and recruited internationally, can contribute to addressing persistent labour shortages. Governments should promote the role of migrant care workers, and invest in technological innovation, improved labour conditions, and broader health system reforms. Migrant workers already play a critical role in sustaining care systems in many OECD countries yet attracting and retaining them through effective and ethical migration pathways remains challenging, with no one-size-fits-all solution. While there is no single solution, structural reforms aimed at improving job quality, wages, working conditions, staffing levels and career opportunities remain fundamental for addressing labour shortages and improving retention.

Successful migration channels for care workers must be embedded within overall LTC workforce planning and designed with careful attention to eligibility criteria. Reviewing and adapting existing labour migration channels to ensure they are fit for care occupations, through realistic, occupation-appropriate language, skills and salary requirements, streamlined processing times, and the selective use of labour market tests, can help ensure that qualified workers are able to enter and remain in the sector. When well designed, such pathways can stabilise essential services, improve the continuity and quality of care, reduce reliance on irregular recruitment, and strengthen worker protections, contributing to the professionalisation of the sector. Where there are no or inaccessible lawful pathways, there are risks of exploitation of migrants and unregulated migration.

At the same time, countries face important trade-offs in channel design. More accessible pathways with lower entry thresholds may help alleviate immediate workforce pressures but risk increasing worker vulnerability and weakening incentives to improve pay and working conditions if labour-market safeguards and the enforcement regime (labour inspections and legal redress mechanisms) are insufficient. Conversely, more restrictive approaches may limit exploitation but require greater public investment in the LTC sector or shift costs onto families. Granting faster access to permanent residence can support recruitment but may reduce medium-term retention in the care sector if workers transition quickly to better-paid employment elsewhere (more common for personal care workers than registered nurses). These trade-offs underscore the need to balance flexibility and accessibility with robust labour protections, including clear employment standards, enforceable rights, and mechanisms to prevent misuse of care-worker pathways.

The approach taken by the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada to develop and test different ways of facilitating care workers is useful, however it can lead to a multiplication of channels and complexity in the migration system. Striking the right balance between open and facilitative channels and admission criteria that restricts candidates due to higher requirements remains a challenge for many countries.

Strengthening retention remains essential for both domestic and migrant workers if the LTC sector is to be sustainable over the medium to long term. This requires sustained investment in training, job quality, and career progression pathways for all care workers, complemented by targeted onboarding and integration support for migrants. Efficient and timely recognition of foreign qualifications and skills, ideally allowing recognition to occur while workers are employed in the destination country and harmonised across jurisdictions, can further enhance retention by reducing administrative barriers.

Finally, better data collection is critical to support evidence-based policymaking. Data collection on the care work sector in general could be improved, including better capture of the role of informal carers. For migrant workers, robust systems are needed to monitor tenure, mobility between employers, transitions to permanent status, and exits of migrant care workers from the sector. Such data are essential to assess the impact of visa settings on workforce stability, identify retention challenges – particularly after permanent residence is granted – and guide adjustments to migration and workforce policies. Together, these measures can help ensure that migrant labour contributes not only to short-term gap filling but supports the long-term resilience and quality of long-term care systems.

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Annex 4.A. Supplementary information

Annex Table 4.A.1. EU and non-EU-born LTC workforce as a percentage of the total LTC workforce, 2014 and 2024, selected EU/EFTA countries

	2014			2024		
	EU	Non-EU	Total	EU	Non-EU	Total
Austria	12.0	14.3	26.3	14.9	18.9	33.8
Belgium	5.0	7.2	12.2	8.7	12.8	21.5
Croatia	1.5	11.1	12.5	5.4	12.0	17.4
Czechia	..	..	..	2.2	1.0	3.2
Estonia	..	..	..	1.9	15.9	17.9
Finland	2.8	3.6	6.4	3.2	13.9	17.1
France	3.3	9.0	12.3	2.7	14.7	17.4
Germany	..	..	..	10.1	20.1	30.2
Greece	4.6	9.3	13.9	14.0	4.9	18.9
Hungary	..	..	..	0.5	0.4	0.9
Iceland	6.2	5.4	11.6	8.2	21.2	29.5
Italy	9.2	13.8	23.0	12.5	20.3	32.8
Latvia	4.8	9.6	14.4	0.9	10.3	11.2
Luxembourg	30.9	5.1	36.0	34.4	9.1	43.5
Netherlands	1.6	9.7	11.3	2.8	13.6	16.4
Norway	4.3	12.5	16.9	5.7	21.4	27.1
Slovenia	2.4	4.1	6.5	1.5	13.8	15.4
Spain	3.9	16.4	20.3	4.4	28.9	33.3
Sweden	4.8	20.1	25.0	4.3	38.5	42.7
Switzerland	19.9	15.0	34.9	16.5	24.5	41.0

Source: OECD (2025[1]), *Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators*, https://doi.org/10.1787/8f9e3f98-en (originally from European Union Labour Force Survey).

StatLink https://stat.link/f9od36

Occupational codes for LTC in selected OECD regions

ISCO 08 (primarily used in Europe)

The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is a tool developed by the International Labour Organization to organise all jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according to the tasks and duties withing the job. Other countries' classification systems are generally aligned to ISCO for reporting purposes. The occupational codes most relevant to long-term care are:

- 2221 Nursing professionals
- 3221 Nursing associate professionals
- 5321 Healthcare assistants
- 5322 Home-based personal care workers.

Some care work may be included in the occupational codes below but they are often excluded in Labour Force Surveys:

- 5329 Personal care workers in health services not elsewhere classified (orderlies, for example)
- 9111 Domestic helpers and cleaners.

The Americas

The United States uses the 2018 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system to track occupations. Aged care or caregiving occupations include the following SOC codes:

- SOC 31-1120 – Home Health and Personal Care Aides
- SOC 31-1131 – Nursing Assistants
- SOC 29-1141 – Registered Nurses
- SOC 29-2061 – Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses.

Canada uses the National Occupational Classification (NOC), which is explicitly aligned with ISCO 08. The following occupational codes are relevant:

- 33 102: Nurse aides, orderlies and patient service associates
- 44 101: Home support workers, caregivers and related occupations.

Mexico uses the Sistema Nacional de Clasificación de Occupaciones (SINCO). Relevant occupational codes include:

- 2 821 Nursing Assistants
- 5 221 Carers of children, disabled persons and old people in establishments
- 5 222 Carers of children, disabled persons and old people in private homes (note, the latter two do not distinguish between child and elder care)

Asia Pacific

Japan's Standard Occupational Classification system (JSOC) captures long-term care workers within "service workers", with the following JSOC codes being relevant:

- 361: facility-based care workers,
- 362: home help/home-visit care workers

Korea uses the Korean Standard Occupational Classification of Occupations (KSCO).

- 4 211 Care workers (요양보호사, 간병인) provide personal care, assistance with activities of daily living and support services for older people and persons with disabilities in homes and facilities
- 2 412 Nurse assistants (간호조무사) support nurses and physicians in LTC hospitals and residential care facilities, heavily used in institutional care.
- Australia and New Zealand use the Australia New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZCO).[13] The codes most relevant to long-term care are:
- 423111 – Aged or Disabled Carer (Provides general household assistance, emotional support, care and companionship for aged or disabled people in their own homes). Skill level 4.
- 423313 – Personal Care Assistant (Provides routine personal care services to people in a range of healthcare facilities or in a person's home).
- 423312-Nursing Support Worker (Provides limited patient care under the direction of nursing staff).

Annex Table 4.A.2. Labour migration pathways in LTC – by occupation

Country	Personal support worker	Assistant/Practical nurse	Registered nurse	Comment
Australia	✓	◐	✓	Aged Care Industry Labour Agreement, PALM scheme.
Austria	X	◐	✓	Red-White-Red Card for skilled workers; assistant nurses on shortage list.
Belgium	X	◐	✓	Some occupations on regional shortage lists.
Canada	◐	◐	✓	Caregivers pilot plus other regional and federal pathways.
Chile	X	◐	✓	Personal care workers access through general pathway. Nurses access skilled pathway.
Colombia	X	X	◐	Nurses can access general pathway. No accessible pathway for personal care workers and assistant nurses.
Costa Rica	X	X	◐	Nurses can access general pathway. No accessible pathway for personal care workers and assistant nurses.
Czechia	X	◐	✓	Pathway for nurses. For care workers, potential use of the Employee Card pathway.
Denmark	◐	◐	✓	Personal care worker on positive list and other schemes. Pathway for nurses.
Estonia	X	X	◐	General work permit for most care worker occupations. Blue Card available for nurses in addition to general route.
Finland	◐	◐	✓	Personal care worker on shortage list.
France	◐	◐	✓	Personal care worker on the shortage list in some regions.
Germany	X	✓	✓	Visa for qualified professionals admits assistant and registered nurses
Greece	X	X	X	General work permits that apply to all care occupations.
Hungary	X	X	◐	Limited access for care worker occupations under general work permits.
Iceland	X	◐	✓	Pathways for highly skilled.
Ireland	◐	◐	✓	Healthcare assistants eligible for general work visa. There is a quota for personal support workers (excluding HCAs). Critical skills (employment visa for nurses).
Israel	✓	X	◐	Live-in care worker programme. Limited nurse migration.
Italy	✓	✓	◐	Annual quota system with care worker category. Nurses are quota exempt.
Japan	✓	✓	◐	Range of care worker programmes.
Korea	◐	X	◐	e-7 visa for professionals expanded to include caregivers.
Latvia	X	X	◐	General pathway accessible to nurses.
Lithuania	X	X	◐	General pathway accessible to nurses.
Luxembourg	X	X	✓	Nurses eligible for highly qualified worker.
Mexico	X	X	X	Employer driven work authorisation. No specific pathways for care occupations.
Netherlands	X	X	✓	Fast track route for high-skilled workers. Other care occupations unlikely to meet wage and skill thresholds.
New Zealand	◐	◐	✓	Exceptions to wage and skill thresholds for personal care workers and assistant nurses under general work visa.

Country	Personal support worker	Assistant/Practical nurse	Registered nurse	Comment
Norway	X	◐	✓	Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Poland	X	◐	✓	Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Portugal	◐	◐	✓	Personal care workers and assistant nurses on shortage occupation list. Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Slovak Republic	X	◐	✓	Assistant nurses on shortage occupation list in some regions. Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Slovenia	X	◐	✓	Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Spain	X	◐	✓	Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Sweden	X	◐	✓	Nurses eligible under skilled pathway.
Switzerland	X	◐	✓	Access for nurses via quota-based permits.
Türkiye	X	X	◐	Some access to skilled permits for nurses.
United Kingdom	◐	◐	✓	Health and Care Worker Visa includes personal care workers.
United States	X	X	✓	Nurses eligible for employment-based visas.

Note: This table covers the migration pathways available for each country by LTC occupation (this will not be relevant for nationals that do not require a visa, for example, EU nationals working in another EU country). Definitions: Personal support worker/Care aide: Workers providing direct personal care and assistance with daily living activities in residential or home-based long-term care settings. Often classified as low- to semi-skilled roles. Assistant nurse / Practical nurse: Mid-level nursing roles (e.g. enrolled nurses, practical or licensed nurses) requiring formal vocational training but not full professional nursing registration. Registered nurse: Professionally licensed nurses with tertiary-level qualifications and statutory registration. Key: ✓ Clear, established national labour-migration pathway for the role; ◐ Partial or conditional pathway (regional schemes, pilots, labour agreements, or tied employment); ✕ No dedicated labour-migration pathway; access possible only via general work, family, or humanitarian routes.

Notes

[1] This term refers to an (employed) individual residing outside the country in which they were born. Note, this is not necessarily the same as a “migrant” as the individual may have been naturalised and hold the citizenship of the country they reside in.

[2] A profession or trade for which there is no legal requirement or restriction on practice in relation to licenses, certificates, or registration. This means individuals can work in these fields without needing formal certification or approval from a regulatory body.

[3] Israel, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Norway, Denmark, Czechia, Korea, Hungary, Sweden, Lithuania, Finland, Australia, the Slovak Republic, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Estonia, Portugal.

[4] The method for assessing needs is as follows. People aged 65+ are assigned a score equal to the number of ADL/IADL difficulties they report. Method X:1-2 difficulties = low needs; 3-6 = moderate needs; 7-10 = severe needs. Method Y:1-2 difficulties = low needs; 3-7 = moderate needs; 8-10 = severe needs. The report then estimates prevalence under both methods and averages the results.

[5] The figures in millions are based on data from the OECD Data Explorer showing that a total of 258 312 241 people were aged 65 and over in the OECD in 2024.

[6] They assume the following remain the same: proportion of dependent people receiving formal LTC; the balance between formal and informal care; hours of care per recipient; and staffing ratios.

[7] Note, that these factors are not necessarily deterministic and other factors, such as the type of shortage, type of care occupation targeted and existing migration channels will also have an impact.

[8] For example, The Eurostat-OECD-WHO Joint Questionnaire on Non-Monetary Healthcare statistics (JQNMHC) includes a question on care workers. It combines healthcare assistants (ISCO-08 code 5321) and home-based personal care workers (ISCO-08 code 5322), and countries respond on a voluntary basis. If countries decide to respond to this question, using administrative data covering the entire population, it might address the sample selection of the LFS, but not resolve the classification issue.

[9] For example, British Columbia’s Provincial Nominee Programme identifies nurse aides, orderlies, and patient service associates as high demand healthcare occupations, with eligibility requirements including a job offer and minimum standards for language, education, and work experience (www.welcomebc.ca/immigrate-to-b-c/about-the-bc-provincial-nominee-program).

[10] This could mean 1, overstayed 2, not working in care sector anymore or 3, working in care but not through a registered employer.

[11] Stay rate was demonstrated by valid visa, indefinite leave to remain or citizenship.

[12] According to the literature and interviews with experts.

[13] New Zealand introduced a new system for classifying occupations in 2024, known as the National Occupational List. The ANZCO is still being used during the transition.

5 The impact of migration on productivity growth

This chapter investigates the mechanisms through which immigration may affect productivity growth and reviews the available evidence from OECD countries. It considers the effects of immigration on the skill composition of the workforce, firms' investment and technological choices, and the contribution of immigrants to innovation and entrepreneurship. The chapter also assesses how the distribution of immigrants across firms and sectors with different productivity levels shapes aggregate productivity outcomes. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for migration and integration policy.

In Brief

Key findings

- Productivity growth is a key driver of long-term economic growth and living standards. In a context of demographic ageing and productivity slowdown, reviving productivity growth is top of the policy agenda in most OECD countries. Given the growing contribution of immigrants to OECD labour markets and economies, understanding how immigration affects productivity growth has become increasingly important.
- This chapter investigates the mechanisms through which immigration affects productivity and the available evidence from OECD countries. The analysis suggests that immigration is neither systematically productivity-enhancing nor productivity-reducing. Its impact depends on migrant characteristics, firms' responses, labour market context and institutions, as well as the design and effectiveness of migration and integration policies.
- Immigration changes the skill composition of the host country workforce. In OECD countries, immigrants are over-represented both at the top and the bottom of the educational distribution. However, the translation of education into productivity is not automatic. On average, immigrants have lower literacy and numeracy skills than the native-born with the same educational attainment. They also face more barriers in the labour market, which make them more likely to be over-skilled for their jobs.
- Immigration influences workforce productivity not only directly through immigrants' productivity but it may also change the productivity of the native-born and affect firms' investment and production choices. Evidence from academic literature shows that native-born workers often upgrade towards more complex and communication-intensive tasks in response to immigration. Greater labour availability may slow the adoption of labour-saving technologies, particularly following low-skilled migration inflows. At the same time, immigration can stimulate investment and productivity, as firms expand and invest in complementary capital.
- In addition, migration contributes to productivity growth through its effect on innovation and entrepreneurship. Migrants contribute disproportionately to research and innovation in many OECD countries, reflecting their overrepresentation among STEM graduates, and their concentration in research and development activities. While migrants are over-represented among founders of firms in key innovation hubs in the OECD, most migrant entrepreneurs are own-account workers and small business owners, which limits the contribution of these firms to aggregate productivity.
- The allocation of immigrants across firms and sectors affects aggregate labour productivity. Within sectors, immigrants are disproportionately employed in lower-productivity firms, and sectors with higher migrant shares tend to have below-average labour productivity, across OECD countries.
- A novel decomposition of productivity growth suggests that immigrant employment relocated more to more productive sectors than native-born employment in most countries in the decade to 2024.

- Migration and integration policies can help maximise the productivity potential of immigration and minimising possible negative impacts. Migration and integration policies can boost countries' attractiveness for top talent and increase their retention. Integration policies can promote the effective utilisation of the skills and potential of all immigrants, both recent and settled, and address barriers to immigrant job mobility.
- Labour migration policies need to balance short- and long-term productivity objectives. Recruitment from abroad may help alleviate short-term labour shortages in strategic sectors, potentially supporting productivity growth. However, if migrant recruitment is used to circumvent structural adjustments, it may hinder longer-term productivity growth.
- While effective migration and integration policies can contribute to supporting productivity growth, labour migration systems must balance a broader set of economic and social objectives, such as ensuring the provision of essential services, notably in the care sector, or safeguarding national food security.

Introduction

Productivity growth is a central driver of long-term economic growth and living standards. Productivity growth has gradually slowed down in the OECD in the past five decades and slowed further since the mid-2000s (Box 5.1). Understanding the sources of productivity growth in order to put in place the right policies to revive productivity growth is top of the policy agenda in most OECD countries.

In fact, in the context of ageing populations across the OECD, productivity growth is key to increasing living standards. If the growth rate of labour productivity remains constant,[1] the projected contraction of the share of employed persons in the total population implies that GDP per capita growth in the OECD area will be reduced by about 40%, falling from 1.0% per year in the 2010s to 0.6% per year on average over the period 2024-2060. This corresponds to a loss equivalent to around 14% of GDP per capita by 2060 (OECD, 2025[1]).

Immigrants account for an increasing share of the employed population and employment growth in the OECD. In 2024, immigrants represented 16% of the employed population on average across OECD countries. In ten countries, immigrants represent more than 20% of the employed population and in 15 countries more than 15% (Figure 5.3). Immigrants have accounted for 50% or more of total employment growth from 2014 to 2024 in half of OECD countries (Figure 5.4).

Given the growing contribution of immigration to OECD economies, it is increasingly critical to understand how immigration affects productivity growth. Immigration is not considered in the economics literature as a main determinant of productivity growth (Manning, 2025[2]) nor is it an explanation for the productivity slowdown (Goldin et al., 2024[3]). Nevertheless, migration has an impact on productivity through many different channels. Immigrants are workers, inventors and entrepreneurs. They also influence decision making of other stakeholders and affect the allocation of factors of production.


From a migration policy perspective, the question is: How can migration and integration policies contribute to the overarching goal of reviving productivity growth? How can countries maximise the economic benefits of migration and minimise any potential negative effects?

This chapter examines the mechanisms through which immigration may affect productivity growth and reviews the evidence from OECD countries. Throughout the chapter, productivity refers to labour productivity defined as output per worker. Labour productivity growth includes multi factor productivity (MFP) growth as well as changes in the capital-labour ratio. See Box 5.2 for a discussion of the definition

and measurement of productivity. The evidence reviewed concerns both labour productivity and MFP, and the measure used is specified whenever necessary.

To structure the discussion, the effects of immigration on aggregate macro-level productivity are split into effects at the firm level, at the sector level and across sectors (Figure 5.1). First, immigration affects firm level productivity by changing the skill distribution of the workforce and the capital-labour ratio in the host economy (squares 1 and 2). Second, migrants may affect productivity at the firm level through their effect on R&D and innovation (square 3). Third, migrant entrepreneurs directly contribute to entry and exit of firms, consequently changing sectoral productivity (square 4). Fourth, immigrant allocation across firms of different productivity levels also changes sectoral productivity (square 5). Fifth, the allocation of immigrants across sectors with different productivity levels affects aggregate productivity (square 6).

Figure 5.1. Effects of immigration on aggregate productivity



Source: Based on André and Gal (2024[4]), "Reviving productivity growth: A review of policies". https://doi.org/10.1787/61244acd-en.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section focusses on human capital. It considers how immigration influences productivity both by altering the skill composition of the workforce and by shaping the skills used and acquired by native-born workers. The second section analyses the effect of immigration on capital intensity. It discusses whether investment keeps pace with increased employment due to migration in the short run and how migration impacts firms' investment and technological choices. The third section examines the role immigrants play in innovation and firm creation through entrepreneurship. The fourth section considers the allocation of immigrants across firms with different productivity levels within sectors. The last section describes how immigrants sort into sectors of different productivity levels and how this affects aggregate productivity in the host country.


The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that immigration is neither systematically productivity-enhancing nor productivity-reducing. Its impact depends on migrant characteristics, labour market institutions, firms' responses, and the effectiveness of migration and integration policies.

Box 5.1. The productivity growth slowdown

Productivity growth across OECD economies has been on a long-term downward trajectory since the 1970s, with a particularly marked slowdown since the mid-2000s. Average annual OECD labour productivity growth fell from close to 2% in the 1990s to around 0.8% over the 2010s, and the decline has been broad-based across almost all large economies (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2. Productivity growth has declined in most of the OECD

Labour productivity, average annual growth rate



Note: EU corresponds to the simple average of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece. OECD is the simple average of the average annual growth rate of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Labour productivity is computed as the gross value added over number of workers in real terms (chain value added rebased to 2020 prices).
Source: OECD Productivity Data Base (PDB).

StatLink https://stat.link/490glh

Several structural factors explain this trend. First, earlier waves of transformative innovation have either matured or yielded diminishing returns. While the diffusion of ICT drove a temporary productivity revival in some countries, especially the United States, these gains proved short-lived and were less pronounced elsewhere. At the same time, the shift towards service-based economies, where productivity growth is typically lower than in manufacturing, has exerted a drag on aggregate productivity.

Second, the global financial crisis has had lasting effects, notably through subdued investment. Business investment has remained sluggish limiting both capital deepening and the adoption of new, more productive technologies.

Third, TFP growth has slowed markedly. This may reflect a range of factors, including slower

innovation, reduced firm dynamism, and barriers to the reallocation of resources towards more productive uses. In fact, the pace of productivity-enhancing innovation and its diffusion has weakened. Although firms at the global technological frontier continue to record solid productivity gains, the majority of firms lag behind.

Finally, measurement challenges, particularly related to intangibles and digital services, may have led to some underestimation of productivity growth, although this accounts only for a small share of the slowdown.

Source: Goldin et al. (2024[3]), "Why Is Productivity Slowing Down?", https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221543; André and Gal (2024[4]), "Reviving productivity growth: A review of policies". https://doi.org/10.1787/61244acd-en.

Box 5.2. Measures of productivity

This box discusses two main measures of productivity: labour productivity and multi factor productivity (MFP also referred to as total factor productivity, TFP).

Labour productivity is measured as Output divided by Labour Input, where labour input is measured as hours worked or total employment when hours worked are not available.

Labour productivity is a measure of how effectively labour is used in production. Labour productivity does not measure worker's individual productivity. Changes in capital available to workers, as well as technological, organisational and efficiency changes are also captured in labour productivity growth. The main advantage of labour productivity as a productivity measure is its wide availability and simplicity, as its measurement does not rely on assumptions.

Multi factor productivity (MFP) reflects the ability to produce more output by combining inputs more efficiently driven by new ideas, technological breakthroughs, and improvements in business models. MFP growth is the part of output growth not explained by growth in labour and capital.[1] The advantage of MFP is that it does not depend on changes in production factors. A positive change in MFP raises the volume of output that can be produced with a given volume of capital and labour.


In practice, distinguishing between the contributions of MFP and production factors is not always clear-cut. MFP is not directly observed but estimated. Hence, its measure depends on model assumptions and is sensitive to model misspecification and mismeasurement of inputs.[2] For instance, any change in the quality of the inputs that is not captured in the measured inputs (e.g. change in skill composition of the workforce or intangible capital) will translate into changes in MFP.

Labour productivity growth depends on MFP growth and capital deepening (i.e. the change in capital services per worker). OECD growth-accounting decompositions show that, since the 1980s, total factor productivity has accounted for roughly half of labour-productivity growth on average across OECD economies, with the remainder explained mainly by capital deepening (OECD, 2025[5]).

1. After weighting these inputs by their importance in production.
2. The usual key underlying assumptions are that firms use resources efficiently; that prices reflect costs without distortions; output, labour and capital inputs are accurately measured; full utilisation of capital and labour; constant returns to scale.
Source: OECD (2025[5]), *OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2025*, https://doi.org/10.1787/b024d9e1-en.

Figure 5.3. 16% of the employed population is foreign-born on average in the OECD

Share of foreign-born in the employed population, 2024




Note: OECD is the average for the countries represented in the figure.
Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Colombia: Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH); Costa Rica: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: CPS.

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Figure 5.4. In half of OECD countries, immigrants drove employment growth from 2014-2024

Contribution of foreign-born and native-born to employment growth, 2014-2024



Note: OECD is the average for the countries represented in the figure. For Canada it shows 2014-2025 growth.
Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Emploe (ENOE); United States: CPS.

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Immigration, skills and productivity

Human capital is a key determinant of productivity. Workers with higher skills generally generate greater value added per hour worked.

Whether migration ultimately raises or lowers productivity depends on how the average productivity of immigrants compares with that of native-born workers and also on the extent to which immigration affects the productivity of the native-born.

This section examines these two channels by focussing on the skills that immigrants bring to the host economy. It considers how immigration influences productivity both by altering the skill composition of the workforce and by shaping the skills utilised and acquired by native-born workers.

Immigration increases both the high and low educated population in most OECD countries

How much immigration changes the educational composition of the total workforce in the host country depends on the total share of immigrants in the employed population as well as on the difference in the educational composition across the two groups.

Across the OECD, immigrants tend to be over-represented at both ends of the educational distribution. Immigrants are more likely than the native-born to be tertiary educated (36% compared with 33% on average across OECD countries) and more likely to have completed at most lower-secondary education (25% compared with 23%).[2] Differences in educational attainment between the two groups are particularly large among the very highly educated, defined as having graduated from a master or doctoral programme, and the very low educated, defined as having completed at most primary education.

In 2024, 18% of immigrants in employment on average in the OECD were very highly educated and 9% were very low educated, compared with 14 and 6% of the native-born. Annex Table 5.A.1 presents the educational attainment of the native and foreign-born by country.

Immigrants are over-represented among the very highly educated population in almost all OECD countries. In Switzerland and Ireland, for example, immigrants account for 46% and 39% of the very highly educated employed population, well above their share in employment (35% and 30%). Immigrants who graduated from a master or doctoral programme account for 9% of the total employed population in Switzerland and 6% in Ireland. The contributions are also quantitatively large in Luxembourg or Sweden (Figure 5.5). Exceptions are Southern-European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) and Slovenia where immigrants are under-represented among graduates of master and doctoral programmes.

Conversely, in most OECD countries, immigrants are over-represented among the very low educated. This is the case in Latin American OECD countries (Costa Rica, Colombia) and in many European OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden or France). In six OECD countries, very low educated immigrants account for 3% or more of the total employed population. Their share is particularly significant in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, or the Netherlands, where immigrants account for more than half of the very low educated employed population (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5. Immigrants contribute to increase the high and low educated population

Share of very high and very low educated, 15-64 years old, foreign and native-born, 2024



Note: Very high education corresponds to ISCED levels 6/8. Very low education corresponds to ISCED 0/1. Canadian LFS does not allow to separately identify the Very Low education level.
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

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Attracting highly educated immigrants is one way to strengthen the skill distribution of the resident population and support long-term economic growth. At the same time, improving a country's human capital also depends on retaining highly skilled foreign and native-born workers. As a result, many OECD countries now pursue a dual strategy: attracting and retaining international talent while limiting the loss of highly skilled native-born workers. Box 5.3 presents evidence on the emigration of highly skilled populations to other OECD countries.


Box 5.3. Emigration of highly educated native-born

The most educated residents of the OECD are highly mobile. While efforts are made to attract immigrants (from OECD and non-OECD Member countries), many OECD countries are also trying to retain, or attract back, their own highly skilled citizens.

In 14 OECD countries, 10% or more of the highly educated native-born live in another OECD country, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Portugal. The countries with the highest emigration rates of highly educated native-born are Luxembourg and New Zealand. One-quarter of highly educated individuals born in Luxembourg live elsewhere in the OECD, as do over 20% of New Zealanders. Only in Norway, Spain and the United States is the emigration rate under 5% (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6. Many highly educated OECD native-born live abroad

Emigration rate of highly educated native-born (ISCED 5 to 8), 2020-2021



Note: The emigration rate of country j is the number of tertiary-educated individuals born in country j living in another OECD country divided by the total number of tertiary-educated individuals born in country j.
Source: OECD DIOC 2020.


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In some OECD countries, the contribution of highly educated immigrants to the resident highly educated native-born far outweighs the lost contribution from highly educated emigrants (Figure 5.7). For example, in Australia, immigrants add 78% to the resident native-born highly educated population, whereas if Australian emigrants in other OECD countries would return to Australia they would only add 5% to this population.

In other countries, immigration and emigration have a more similar weight on the composition of the resident highly educated population. For example, in Italy, immigrants add 11% to the native-born highly educated resident population but emigrants could potentially contribute to an 8% increase.

Figure 5.7. Immigration of highly educated foreigners and emigration of highly educated native born

Relative migration rate (% of total native-born highly educated resident population)



Note: OECD simple average excluding Luxemburg.
Source: OECD DIOC 2020.

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Education and skills do not automatically translate into productivity gains


Higher education levels among migrants can raise labour productivity by increasing the economy's stock of human capital, but only to the extent that immigrants' educational attainment translates into skills effectively utilised in the host country labour market.

Tertiary-educated immigrants are more likely than the native-born to work in occupations that do not require a tertiary education degree. According to Labour Force Surveys of OECD countries with available data in 2024, over one-third (33%) of tertiary-educated foreign-born workers are overqualified on average across OECD countries, compared with less than one-quarter (24%) of native-born workers. This means they are working in medium to low-skilled occupations (Figure 5.8).

The overqualification rates of immigrants are particularly large relative to those of the native-born (20 percentage points (p.p.) or more) in Italy, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Poland, Norway and Sweden.

Figure 5.8. Immigrants are more often over-qualified than the native-born

Share of tertiary-educated employed population working in a low to medium skill occupation (Over-education rate), 2024



Note: OECD simple average across all OECD countries with available data. * Data available for the year 2022 instead of 2024.
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

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
Part of this overqualification gap is due to immigrants having on average lower skills than the native-born with the same education level. Degrees acquired abroad in particular may not translate into the same skills as domestic degrees, due to differences in curricula, quality of the educational systems, or language proficiencies.


Immigrants with host country degrees have lower overqualification rates than immigrants with foreign degrees. Host-country degrees reduce the immigrant overqualification gap by 75% EU-wide, and by even more in North America, German-speaking countries, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (OECD/European Commission, 2023[6]).

According to the 2023 wave of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), immigrants have lower literacy and numeracy skills than the native-born of the same level of education in all countries with available data (Figure 5.9). The average literacy score of tertiary-educated immigrants in all countries is at level 2, while for the native-born it is at Level 3 in almost all countries. Level 3 in literacy proficiency indicates that individuals are able to interpret, evaluate, and integrate information across complex or lengthy texts. Numeracy-skills performance patterns are similar to those observed for literacy, though gaps tend to be smaller. Note that part of the observed skills gap is due to differences in language fluency given that skills are evaluated in the host country language, and this may matter more for literacy than numeracy literacy.

Figure 5.9. Literacy and numeracy skills

Mean literacy scores by country of birth and level of education





Note: NB and FB stand for native-born and foreign-born respectively.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 2023.


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Differences in skill levels between immigrants and the native-born are only part of the explanation for differences in labour market outcomes between the two groups. First, the skills immigrants bring to the host country may not be those in demand in the host country labour market. Ensuring that workers have the right skills in rapidly changing labour markets is a priority across the OECD. While labour immigrants are selected based on their contribution to the host country labour market, immigrants migrating for family, humanitarian or other reasons do not primarily migrate for work and may face higher mismatches in the host country labour market.

Second, immigrants may not be able to put their skills to use in the host country labour market due to barriers faced in the labour market. Immigrants educated abroad and in particular those not selected under labour migration channels may face barriers in integrating in the host country labour market due to among other difficulties in recognition of foreign qualifications, occupational licensing procedures and requirements, lack of experience and knowledge about the host country labour market, lack of professional networks, or discrimination. Consistent with barriers faced in the labour market, immigrants more often report being over-skilled for their current position. According to the latest wave of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), almost one-third (31%) of the foreign-born report having more skills than needed for their current role,[3] compared with 27% of the native-born, across all countries participating in the survey (Figure 5.10).

Figure 5.10. Subjective skill mismatch

Share of the employed population aged 16-65 reporting higher skills than needed for job



Note: Countries with immigrant subsample sizes under 30 observations excluded. Hollow markers indicate statistically significant differences compared to the native-born sample.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 2023.

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Immigration changes the incentives for the native-born to participate in the labour market and invest in skills

The impact of immigration on productivity extends beyond its direct effect on the average productivity of workers. Immigration can also influence the behaviour of the native-born, including their decisions regarding labour market participation and investment in education and skills. These responses can, in turn, affect overall productivity.

A first channel through which immigration changes the productivity of the native-born is through the reallocation of time between home and market production. Low-skilled immigrants often provide services that substitute for household production, such as childcare and cleaning. This reduces the cost of these services and allows higher-skilled native-born workers, particularly women, to increase their participation in the labour market. As a result, time is reallocated from lower-productivity home activities to higher-productivity market work. Evidence for this mechanism has been documented for several countries, including the United States (Cortés and Tessada, 2011[7]), Spain (Farré, González and Ortega, 2011[8]), Italy (Barone and Mocetti, 2011[9]), and across a group of OECD countries, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Forlani, Lodigiani and Mendolicchio, 2015[10]).

Whether this translates into higher measured aggregate labour productivity is not automatic. Home production, or unpaid domestic work, is not accounted for in standard measures of aggregate labour productivity, whereas paid domestic work is. The potential productivity gains from the native-born moving from unpaid home production to market production may not materialise in estimated aggregate productivity gains. It will only do so if the average productivity (new market job and domestic work) is higher than the average economy wide productivity.

A second channel relates to human capital investment. Immigration may affect the incentives to invest in education and training of the native-born. Increased competition may encourage the native-born to avoid entering the most exposed educational tracks and occupations to immigration.

On the high-skill side, the concern is whether high-skilled migration drives the native-born to shy away from potentially more productive educational and career paths taken by immigrants to avoid increased competition. This immigration competition effect is most direct in the case of international students as these compete directly with native-born students. The evidence available from OECD countries points to little to no crowding out effects. Borjas (2007[11]) finds a crowd out effect of international graduate students in the United States for white native-born men, but a positive effect for native-born women, Asians and Hispanics. Shih (2017[12]) finds no crowding out effect on graduate programmes in the United States and Machin and Murphy (2017[13]) find also no effects in the United Kingdom. The results are interpreted as net tuition payments from international students contributing to subsidizing the cost of enrolling domestic students.

Lower skilled migration may also impact the choices of the native-born. In Norway, Røed and Schøne (2016[14]) and Schøne and Strøm (2026[15]) show that the increase in immigrants in the building and construction industry following the 2004 EU enlargement led to a decrease in apprentice numbers. This was at least partly driven by a decrease in the number of students enrolling in tracks with the most immigration induced competition. However, this research does not look into which career tracks the native-born chose instead, and so does not inform on potential aggregate effects on productivity.

Increased competition in low-skill occupations, driven by immigration, may also encourage native-born workers to acquire additional skills in order to move into higher-paying or less exposed occupations. Evidence for the United States points to positive effects on educational attainment and school performance of the native-born as a response to immigration. Hunt (2017[16]) shows that immigration led to an increase in high school completion rates of native-born in the United States over a long historical period (1940-2010).

In addition, firms may also have different incentives to train domestic workers depending on access to immigrants (already in the host country or from abroad) with the necessary skills for the domestic labour market.

A few studies for the United Kingdom and Switzerland show that the effect of migration on firm training is small. The results depend on the type of training and the sectors considered. In addition, other effects of immigration may counterbalance the disincentives to firm training due to increased migration.

For the United Kingdom, Mountford and Wadsworth (2023[17]) found a small *positive* association between skilled immigration and training rates of the native-born in the 1995 to 2018 period. However, the correlation depends on the sectors immigrants work in. In traded goods sectors, there is a positive association between training of native-born and immigration (both unskilled and skilled). In non-traded high-wage sectors, the relationship between skilled immigration and training of the native-born is negative.

Focusing on general industry training provided by employers (publicly-funded on-the-job training from the Individualised Learner Record), Manning, Mcnally and Ventura (2024[18]) show that for 2003-2011 the effect of immigration on training is small. The most negative effects are for shorter, considered less valuable, trainings and for low-skilled occupations.

For Switzerland, Oswald-Egg and Siegenthaler (2021[19]) analyse how the opening of the Swiss labour market to workers from the European Union affected the number of apprenticeships that firms provide. The authors show that while the greater availability of foreign workers reduced firms' incentive to train, firms also expanded following increased migration and this had a positive effect on firm training.

Box 5.4. The impact of immigration on educational outcomes

Immigration may also have a direct impact on the educational outcomes of the native-born through peer effects or through changes in resources in schools. This will have an indirect impact on productivity once the affected cohorts enter the labour market. A strand of research has investigated this question in OECD countries with mixed results pointing to the importance of migration and educational context in shaping the effects of immigration. Brunello and Rocco (2013[20]) find small negative effects on native-born student outcomes on a sample of OECD countries based on PISA data. Gould, Lavy and Paserman (2009[21]) find a negative effect of immigrant concentration in elementary schools on native-born educational outcomes following the mass migration wave to Israel in the 1990s. Small negative effects are also found in vocational education in Italy (Frattini and Meschi, 2019[22]). Many country studies find no effects, such as Ohinata and Van Ours (2013[23]) for the Netherlands, (Geay, Mcnally and Telhaj (2013[24]) for England, Figlio et al. (2024[25]) and Figlio and Özek (2019[26]) for the United States.

Immigration leads to greater task specialisation

Immigration changes not only the distribution of workers across skill levels but also the composition of skills available in the labour force. Even among workers with similar levels of formal education, immigrants and native-born workers may differ in language proficiency, cultural knowledge and work experience. Since the skill profile of immigrants differs from that of native-born, there are potential gains from task specialisation. Workers from each group will specialise in tasks in which they have a comparative advantage, thereby improving efficiency in production. As a result, immigration affects productivity not only through the direct contribution of immigrant workers but also through changes in the allocation of tasks among all workers.

There is evidence of task specialisation as a response to both low and high-skilled immigration. A strand of empirical research provides evidence that immigrants do tend to specialise in manual, routine or physically intensive tasks, while the native-born shift towards tasks that require communication, co-ordination and problem-solving skills.

For the United States, Peri and Sparber (2009[27]) show that low educated native-born workers increasingly move into communication-intensive occupations as a response to immigration. Peri, Shih and Sparber (2015[28]) show that following an increase of STEM foreign workers (through the H-1B programme), the native-born shift toward managerial, communication, and complementary cognitive roles, while the foreign-born concentrate more in technical, innovation, and research tasks.

Evidence for other OECD countries also points in the same direction. Foged and Peri (2016[29]) find occupational upgrading among native-born workers in Denmark as a response to refugee immigration in 1991-2008 (dispersion policies). Ortega and Verdugo (2014[30]) show that in France in the period 1968-1999, the native-born moved to higher paid occupations and performed more abstract tasks as a response to immigration. For Korea, Lee, Peri and Yang (2026[31]) show that the sudden suspension of immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic led to reallocating Korean employees toward lower-skilled tasks leading to occupational downgrading. D'Amuri and Peri (2014[32]) document shifts towards more complex tasks across 15 OECD European countries during the 1996-2010 period. Reallocation of the native-born towards more complex tasks was larger in countries with more flexible labour laws.

Despite the evidence on task specialisation as a response to immigration, direct evidence for positive effects on productivity through this channel remains elusive. This reflects both measurement challenges and the difficulty of isolating the contribution of specific mechanisms. Nonetheless, some studies provide suggestive evidence of positive effects, suggesting that specialisation and complementarities between immigrant and native-born workers can contribute to higher overall efficiency. Peri (2009[33]) finds that immigration has positive and significant effects on total factor productivity (TFP) across US states over the 1960-2006 period. The results in Peri, Shih and Sparber (2015[28]) imply, based on a model simulation exercise, that inflows of foreign STEM explain between 30% and 50% of the aggregate productivity growth that took place in the United States between 1990 and 2010.

Even when immigration improves the productivity of the workforce, productivity outcomes depend critically on firms' responses. The next section therefore examines how migration influences investment decisions, capital intensity and technology adoption.

Immigration, investment and production choices

Beyond the direct skills that migrants bring to the host country, their effect on labour productivity also depends on how migration affects firms' investment choices. When migration leads to a reduction in capital use per worker, either because it takes time for firms to invest or because of a deliberate production choice, this likely reduces firm-level labour productivity. This section reviews the evidence on the effect of migration on firms' investment incentives, and which factors shape the response of the aggregate capital stock per worker.

Capital dilution: How quickly does investment adjust to immigration?

A longstanding concern among economists is that in the short run immigration dilutes capital. If immigration significantly increases the number of workers, but investment does not keep up, the capital labour ratio (the capital used per hour worked) decreases leading to lower labour productivity. This may particularly occur in the short run, if capital is relatively slow to adjust.

Standard growth models predict that a sudden increase in labour supply may temporarily reduce capital per worker if investment does not adjust immediately. In the classic Solow growth model, a one-time increase in labour supply through immigration temporarily reduces the capital stock per worker and thereby labour productivity, until in the long run capital is accumulated from domestic savings and the initial levels of capital per worker and labour productivity are restored. In the transitional period the return to capital investment is high. Attracting foreign investment may also speed up the convergence to the new long run equilibrium.

A question in practice is then how quickly capital adjusts to an increase in labour supply. The academic literature has mainly focussed on the employment and wage effects of immigration. There is less empirical evidence on how capital flows respond to immigrant inflows. The adjustment of capital is in many cases assumed to be fixed in the short run and to fully adjust in the longer run. Nevertheless, the observed immigration impacts on the labour market are consistent with capital fully adjusting in less than a decade (Ottaviano and Peri, 2008[34]).

Recent evidence for Canada suggests, however, that in the 2010s capital investment has been sluggish to adjust to increased immigration (Doyle, Skuterud and Worswick, 2025[35]). The authors show that real per capita investment has been flat in Canada between 2010 and 2021, while migration to Canada grew significantly, indicating capital dilution. In addition, the authors show that the stocks of machinery and equipment and intellectual property per worker, which are more closely linked to innovation and future productivity growth, declined after 2014.

While macro data provide suggestive evidence, assessing how capital adjusts to an immigration surge is difficult using aggregate figures alone, as it is challenging to disentangle to which extent changes in the overall capital stock are driven by immigration rather than by other simultaneous shifts in the economic environment. Due to this identification challenge, much of the recent literature has turned to micro-level or subnational data, where these confounding factors can be better isolated. Identifying the adjustment mechanisms at play is also the key to any potential policy response.

Immigration-driven changes in production

While the simplest neoclassical theory predicts that a one-time migration shock should temporarily lower the capital labour ratio (and therefore labour productivity) until the original ratio is restored in the long run, more recent work argues that firms may have incentives to either over-invest or under-invest relative to this neoclassical benchmark.

Firms may, under certain conditions, respond by increasing investment in machinery and equipment, potentially raising capital intensity if investment more than offsets the initial dilution of capital. Such a response is most likely when migrants' skills differ from those of the native-born and are particularly complementary to capital. The literature on capital-skill complementarity (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998[36]; Krusell et al., 2000[37]) suggests that skilled migration may therefore induce additional capital investment. For example, inflows of engineers or technicians can increase the profitability of adopting advanced technologies and equipment. Evidence for this mechanism is scarce and at most indirect (Glennon, 2024[38]).

Firms may also change their production processes due to increased immigration. If (low-skilled) labour is more abundant, and hence cheaper, firms may shift toward more labour-intensive techniques. This leads to firms using less capital per hour worked, a decline in labour productivity. In aggregate data, this response may be difficult to distinguish from capital dilution in the short run: both show capital per worker falling as immigration rises. The difference is that dilution is an involuntary gap between labour and a slow-adjusting capital stock, whereas this is a change in production, with longer term effects.

The rest of this section reviews the empirical evidence for OECD countries on how firms adapt their production choices in response to immigration.

Several studies have highlighted that following immigration surges, firms install less labour-saving equipment than they otherwise would.

In the United States, Lewis (2011[39]) studies metropolitan areas during the immigration wave of the 1980s and 1990s, when inflows of less-educated workers, mainly from Mexico and Central America, raised the supply of high-school dropouts faster in some cities than others. Linking plant-level technology surveys to local skill mix, he finds that plants in cities with faster growth in less-skilled labour added automation machinery more slowly between 1988 and 1993, despite similar initial adoption plans, and that capital-labour and capital-output ratios grew more slowly. Automation machinery substitutes for the least-skilled workers, so firms economised on it where such workers were abundant.

In Denmark, Mann and Pozzoli (2024[40]) examine firm-level robot adoption over 1995-2009 using employer-employee register data. Their variation comes from the inflow of non-Western immigrants, many of them refugees arriving from the mid-1990s who were disproportionately low-skilled and concentrated in routine, blue-collar jobs, distributed unevenly across municipalities. A higher local share of non-Western migrant workers lowers the probability of first-time robot adoption by around 9%, with the effect concentrated in labour-intensive and routine-task industries.

The end of the Bracero programme in the United States provides a negative labour-supply shock. From 1942 to 1964 the programme admitted around half a million Mexican seasonal farm workers each year; their exclusion at the end of 1964 varied across states and crops by prior reliance on bracero labour. Clemens, Lewis and Postel (2018[41]) find that exclusion did little to raise wages or employment for domestic workers, as employers adjusted by changing technique where possible, most visibly through rapid mechanisation of the California tomato harvest.

Beyond the adoption of existing technologies, immigration may also alter the direction of innovation away from labour-saving technology. Acemoglu (2010[42]) argues that if a technology is strongly labour-saving, scarce and expensive labour raises the payoff to inventing it, while abundant labour lowers that payoff. Immigration, by making labour more abundant, should therefore slow the development of labour-saving technology. San (2023[43]) extends the analysis of the Bracero programme to the innovation of new technologies, classifying agricultural patents by crop and task, and finds that the shock raised labour-saving patenting, with the largest effect in the most labour-intensive tasks. An inflow of labour would, by the same logic, have discouraged such invention.

The resettlement of around 2.5 million ethnic Germans, predominantly low-skilled, who resettled in West Germany after 1990 provides a positive labour supply shock. An allocation policy in 1996-1997 distributed them across regions administratively, providing exogenous variation in regional low-skilled labour supply. (Danzer, Feuerbaum and Gaessler (2024[44]) find that a larger inflow reduced the regional share of automation patents, with a 10% increase in the low-skilled workforce lowering the automation-patent share by around 3.3 p.p., while non-automation patenting was unchanged. The effect peaked about four years after the inflow and then faded.

The discouraging effect of migration on automation appears mainly where labour is the binding constraint. Danzer, Feuerbaum and Gaessler (2024[44]) find that efforts to automate are confined to tight labour markets. It also depends on the price and capability of the technology. Mann and Pozzoli (2024[40]) find the immigration-robot substitution weakening as robots became cheaper and more capable; when capital is expensive relative to labour, labour supply strongly affects adoption, but once the machine is cheap and effective firms adopt it regardless. The substitution is concentrated in routine, automatable, labour-intensive tasks (Mann and Pozzoli, 2024[40]; Danzer, Feuerbaum and Gaessler, 2024[44]; San, 2023[43]).

Beyond its effects on labour and capital inputs, migration may influence productivity through technological change itself. The next section examines the role of immigrants in innovation and entrepreneurship.

Migrant innovation and entrepreneurship

Technological progress has long been recognised as the driver of long-term productivity growth (Solow, 1957[45]). Unlike the accumulation of human and physical capital, which tends to face diminishing returns as more investment is added, technological progress can continuously shift the production frontier outward. Advances in technology allow firms to produce more output with the same amount of labour and capital by improving efficiency (See also Box 5.2). This section investigates the impact of immigration on innovation in the host country. It first discusses the contribution of immigrants to research and invention in the host country as an engine of productivity growth. It then focusses on migrant entrepreneurship and on innovation in immigrant founded firms.

How much does migration contribute to inventions in the host country?

Immigrants have made important contributions to scientific discovery and technological innovation throughout modern history. Between 2000 and 2025, immigrants have been awarded approximately 30% of the Nobel Prizes in chemistry, medicine and physics (Ahart, 2025[46]). Beyond the contributions of the world's most exceptional researchers, immigrants also contribute to research and innovation more broadly. This section studies how immigration contributes to research output and inventions in the host country.

Immigrants may have a positive impact on innovation if they tend to concentrate in research activities, whether this is in universities and public research centres or in corporations. In addition, immigrants may contribute disproportionately to innovation in the host country if, compared with otherwise similar native-born researchers, they are more productive or if their presence raises the productivity of native-born researchers through spillover effects. By contrast, if immigrant researchers mainly displace native-born researchers, immigrant innovation may largely substitute for innovation that would have occurred anyway, generating limited additional benefits.

Immigrants are over-represented among STEM graduates in most OECD countries


Among the highly educated population, STEM workers play a particularly central role, as they are directly involved in research and development (R&D) activities, the generation of innovation, and the adoption and diffusion of existing technologies.

Immigrant graduates have more often completed a STEM degree than their native-born counterparts (Figure 5.11). Exceptions are Italy and Norway. On average in the OECD, 28% of university graduates have a STEM degree compared with 23% of the native-born. The over-representation of STEM graduates is large in the United States (32% vs. 17%), Australia (29% vs. 16%), Lithuania (39% vs. 27%) or the Netherlands (29% vs. 19%).

When considering all STEM graduates in the host country, one in five is an immigrant, on average across OECD countries with available data. In Luxembourg, Australia, Switzerland and Ireland, more than one in three STEM graduates is an immigrant. The share of immigrants among STEM graduates is much larger than their share in the employed population in Australia (+24 p.p.), Luxembourg (+13 p.p.) but also in Estonia, Switzerland and the United States (+9 p.p.). (Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.11. Immigrants are more often STEM graduates than the native-born

Share of STEM graduates among all tertiary educated, 2024 or latest available




Note: STEM fields include ISCED-F 2013 fields: 05 (natural sciences, mathematics and statistics), 061 (ICT), and 07 (engineering, manufacturing and construction).
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

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Figure 5.12. 21% of STEM graduates are immigrants on average in the OECD

Share of foreign-born among university graduates from a STEM field



Note: STEM fields include ISCED-F 2013 fields: 05 (natural sciences, mathematics and statistics), 061 (ICT), and 07 (engineering, manufacturing and construction).
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

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From a migration policy perspective, international students play an important role in "feeding" the talent pipeline. International students are over-represented at the highest levels of instruction. Across OECD countries, the proportion of international students increases with the level of higher education. On


average, they account for 5% of bachelor's students, rising to 15% of master's students and 25% of those in doctoral programmes (OECD, 2025[47]).

Encouraging native-born students to pursue a STEM education as well as attracting international students to STEM degrees are common objectives of most OECD countries. International students are more likely to enrol in STEM fields than their native-born counterparts, with 30% of international students choosing STEM programmes compared to just 19% of domestic students (Figure 5.13). This trend is particularly evident in countries like Denmark, Sweden and Türkiye, where over 40% of international students pursue studies in these disciplines (OECD, 2025[47]).

A key issue is whether international students remain in the host country after finishing their studies and contribute to the host country economy. The retention rate of international students varies across OECD countries. OECD (2022[48]) estimates for the 2010 and 2015 entry cohorts that after five years, around 30% of international students are still in the host country.[4] This share drops sharply in most countries when looking at a ten-year horizon for the 2010 cohort but remains at almost 50% in Canada and Germany and around 30% in Australia and New Zealand. The retention rate for Australia is in line with recent research on International Students Pathways in the country that finds that 35 to 40% of international students commencing in the early 2010s received permanent residency within 10 years, with an estimated decline (to around 25 to 30%) for students who commenced in the late 2010s (Jobs and Skills Australia, 2025[49]).

Figure 5.13. Mobile students more often choose STEM fields

Share of students enrolled in a STEM degree, 2022



Note: Mobile students are international students, defined as those who completed their prior education in a different country and do not reside permanently in the host country. In cases where data on international students are unavailable, foreign students – identified by their citizenship differing from that of the host country – may be used as a proxy.
Non-mobile students are students who already resided in the host country prior to enrolment, native-born or not.
Source: OECD (2024[50]), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en.

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Immigrants are over-represented among inventors in OECD countries

Data on immigrant inventors are not directly available in the standard datasets used in the migration literature. As a result, research on immigrant inventors typically relies on information on patent applicants or patent recipients, using patents as a proxy for inventive activity. While patents initially serve to protect private returns to innovation, once they expire or are licensed, they can be adopted by other firms,

contributing to broader productivity gains. In addition to patent data, information on scientific publications is also used to assess the contribution of immigrant researchers to scientific output. Box 5.5 presents patent and bibliometric data sources used to study immigrant researchers and inventors.

Box 5.5. The use of patent and bibliometric data to measure the contributions of immigrant researchers and inventors

Patent data

Patent-based analyses draw on records from national and international patent offices, such as the European Patent Office and the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and harmonised global patent databases. These data identify inventors named on patent applications, usually together with their country of residence or affiliation at the time of filing, as well as information on assignees, technological fields and patent citations. By linking inventors across multiple patents, it is possible to trace geographic mobility and to identify immigrant inventors through changes in country of residence or by combining current location with nationality or name-based indicators of origin. Patent data are particularly well suited to studying applied research and industrial innovation.

Bibliometric data


Bibliometric sources are based on scientific publication databases that report authorship, institutional affiliations, publication dates and research fields. Researchers can be tracked across publications, and international mobility is inferred from changes in country of affiliation over time. Bibliometric data are especially informative for analysing academic and basic research and for studying international collaboration networks and scientific impact through citation measures.

Source: Lissoni and Miguelez (2024[51]), "Migration and Innovation: Learning from Patent and Inventor Data", https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.38.1.27.

According to patents filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty, foreigners were over-represented among inventors in more than half of OECD countries in 2010 (Figure 5.14).[5] This is the case for example in the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Finland. Unfortunately, data for more recent years is not available as data on the country of nationality of inventors is no longer systematically collected. For more details on the data, see (Miguélez and Fink, 2013[52]).

Figure 5.14. Foreigners are over-represented among inventors in OECD countries

Share of foreigners among researchers filing patents in 2010 compared with share of foreigners among population aged 15 to 64



Note: OECD corresponds to the simple average across OECD countries that appear in the Figure (with data available).
Source: Miguélez and Fink (2013[52]), "Measuring the International Mobility of Inventors: A New Database", https://doi.org/10.34667/tind.28871 and OECD DIOC 2010/11.

StatLink https://stat.link/iwzs1v

The rest of this section reviews the evidence on the contribution of immigrants to innovation in OECD countries. A large body of literature seeks to establish a causal effect of immigration on innovation in host countries, using a range of empirical strategies, including sudden immigration waves, instrumental-variable approaches, and policy-induced variation in migration flows.

The contribution of immigrants to innovation: Evidence from OECD countries

A substantial share of the literature finds that high-skilled immigration has a positive effect on innovation. For example, for the United States, Kerr and Lincoln (2010[53]) exploit large fluctuations on the H-1B admissions cap over the 1995-2008 period to examine city-level innovation effects. Identifying immigrant inventors through name ethnicity, they show that increases in the H-1B cap are associated with higher invention rates by inventors with Chinese and Indian names in cities more reliant on the programme. Positive effects of high skill immigration on innovation in the United States are also estimated in Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010[54]) or Bernstein et al. (2022[55]) for example.

For Australia, Crown, Faggian and Corcoran (2020[56]) also find more patent applications in regions with more immigrants in scientific occupations. Using an instrumental strategy, they find that a 1 p.p. increase in the regional employment of higher educated migrants relative to total employment leads, on average, to a 4.8% rise in regional patent applications in the medium run (five years). Positive effects of immigration on innovation in Australia are also estimated in OECD (2024[57]).

Evidence from Switzerland also points to a positive impact of migration on innovation. Cristelli and Lissoni (2026[58]) use the 1999 Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP) between Switzerland and the European Union, which gradually removed mobility restrictions, starting with cross-border workers. Using European Patent Office data for the period 1990-2012, they find that the Agreement led to a substantial rise in cross-border inventors and patenting in border regions, with annual patenting increases of between 15% and 54% during the first eight years after ratification.

For France, Mayda, Santoni and Orefice (2022[59]) show that skilled migrants increase the number of patents at both the district and firm level using an instrumental strategy. In addition, the authors provide evidence on task specialisation, with immigrants specializing in research-oriented tasks (see also section Immigration, skills and productivity).

In a cross-country setting, Bosetti, Cattaneo and Verdolini (2015[60]) use data on patent applications and on citations of published research on 20 EU countries between 1995 and 2008. The authors find a positive effect of high-skilled immigration (measured by educational attainment and also by the actual occupation) on innovation. Importantly, the authors also point out the large positive effect of the country's *knowledge stock* (R&D past expenditure, previous patents) on innovation, indicating that investment in R&D is paramount.


Labour market integration is a key factor shaping the innovation impact of high-skilled immigrants. Evidence from some OECD countries suggests that the innovation benefits of high-skilled immigration may be more muted. Blit, Skuterud and Zhang (2020[61]) analyse changes in the high-skilled immigrant share across 98 Canadian cities and find that increases in the university-educated immigrant population are associated with only modest gains in per-capita patenting. Innovation effects are stronger for STEM educated immigrants working in STEM occupations, but this channel is constrained because only about one-third of STEM educated immigrants in Canada are employed in STEM jobs, compared with around two-fifths of the native-born (see also section Immigration, skills and productivity).

Immigrant STEM graduates are also slightly less likely to work in STEM occupations in other OECD countries. Across OECD countries, 48% of immigrant STEM graduates are employed in a STEM occupation compared with 51% of the native-born (Figure 5.15). The gap is largest in OECD Southern European countries, in Germany, and some Eastern or Baltic countries (Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia and Czechia).

Few academic papers directly evaluate the impact of specific migration channels on innovation. From a migration-policy perspective, it is important to evaluate differences across migration channels, although data limitations often prevent such distinctions. Hunt (2011[62]) shows that immigrants who entered the United States on student, trainee, or temporary work visas have higher rates of patenting and patent commercialisation than the native-born, with particularly strong performance among those arriving as postdoctoral fellows or medical residents. In contrast, immigrants admitted directly as legal permanent residents (largely through family reunification) perform similarly to native-born individuals. For Australia, Crown, Faggian and Corcoran (2020[56]) find a positive effect of the Temporary Graduate Visa program from 2007 to 2014 on the number of patent applications comparing regions across Australia.

Figure 5.15. Immigrant STEM graduates are less likely to work in STEM jobs

Share of STEM graduates working in STEM occupations, 2024



Note: STEM occupations are: Science and engineering professionals; Information and communications technology professionals; Science and engineering associate professionals; Information and communications technicians. STEM fields include ISCED-F 2013 fields: 05 (natural sciences, mathematics and statistics), 061 (ICT), and 07 (engineering, manufacturing and construction).
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

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Beyond aggregate effects, an important question is whether immigrants are more innovative than comparable native-born individuals. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010[54]), using data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, show that immigrants account for 24% of patents, about twice their population share. However, this advantage is entirely explained by their greater concentration in science and engineering fields. Gaulé and Piacentini (2013[63]), analysing data on around 16 000 PhD graduates in US chemistry programmes, find that Chinese students exhibit higher scientific output during their doctoral studies and perform on par with recipients of highly selective National Science Foundation fellowships, conditional on programme admission.

Immigration may also have an impact on innovation by the native-born. A key issue is whether immigrant innovation complements or crowds out innovation by native-born workers. There is limited evidence on immigration crowding out native-born innovation. Borjas and Doran (2012[64]) provide evidence that the post-1992 influx of Soviet mathematicians crowded out American scholars, with total mathematical output remaining stable. Doran, Gelber and Isen (2022[65]) use H1- B lottery data to argue that additional H1-B workers crowd out other workers at the firm and lead to only modest, insignificant impacts on total firm innovation. In contrast, Moser, Voena and Waldinger (2014[66]) show that the influx of Jewish immigrant chemists from Nazi Germany increased patenting in chemistry by 71%, driven by the entrance of new domestic scientists. Cristelli and Lissoni (2026[58]) also find no crowding out effect in Switzerland.

Finally, there is evidence of positive spillover effects from immigrant innovators to native-born researchers. Moser, Voena and Waldinger (2014[66]) show that US inventors who collaborated with émigré professors increased their patenting substantially and remained highly productive in subsequent decades, suggesting long-term knowledge transmission. Bernstein et al. (2022[55]), analysing patenting in the United States between 1976 and 2012, estimate that immigrants account for 32% of total innovative output since 1990, despite representing only 16% of the inventor workforce and directly authoring 23% of patents.

The remaining contribution reflects sizeable human-capital externalities generated by immigrants for native-born inventors.

The large body of literature briefly reviewed in this section focusses on patents as this is a measurable outcome of innovation. Although there is a positive correlation between patenting activity and productivity, patents do not automatically translate into a higher productivity in the host country. Only when firms can effectively diffuse and commercialise new knowledge within the domestic economy does productivity increase. When inventions are primarily exploited abroad or protected in ways that limit diffusion, domestic productivity effects are weaker.

Innovation in the OECD benefits the country where innovation takes place but also all other countries who adopt innovation. The expected gains from immigrant inventors are greater for the host country in cases where innovation takes place in areas of strategic importance and with little expected diffusion abroad. The gains are also greater worldwide if immigrants would have been less innovative or less able to commercialise their innovation elsewhere.

The next section explores the role of immigrants as entrepreneurs.

Migrant entrepreneurship

Immigrants create more firms than the native-born but their contribution to aggregate productivity growth is uncertain

In two-thirds of OECD countries, immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than the native-born. In 2022, 13.8% of the foreign-born employed population was self-employed compared with 13.4% of the native-born, on average across 37 OECD countries. There are large differences across countries, however. Immigrants are substantially more likely to be self-employed than the native-born in Colombia, Central and Eastern European countries, Canada and the United States, as well as Portugal and Spain. Conversely, immigrants are less likely to be self-employed in Japan and Korea, Greece and Italy, as well as Iceland (OECD, 2024[67]).

However, most immigrant businesses are unlikely to drive productivity growth. First, most self-employed, both native- and foreign-born, are own-account workers, i.e. they have no employees. This is particularly the case for migrants, as they are less likely than the native-born to have employees in over three-quarters of OECD countries. Second, among employers, migrants have on average fewer employees than the native-born in almost all countries. Third, in almost all OECD EU-EFTA countries with available data, immigrants are also more likely to exit self-employment than the native-born (OECD, 2024[67]).

Nevertheless, immigrants are over-represented among the founders of the most innovative and productive firms in the OECD (see also section below on innovation). Recent research emphasises the contribution of *standout* firms in driving aggregate productivity growth (McKinsey, 2025[68]). However, no research has estimated the contribution of immigrant founded firms to aggregate productivity growth in OECD countries.

Are immigrant firms more innovative?

There is evidence that immigrant entrepreneurs are over-represented among founders of some of the most innovative and successful firms in the OECD. In the United States, in 2022, the four most valuable private venture backed companies had immigrant founders as well as three of the ten most valuable public companies globally, founded in the United States (Chodavadia et al., 2024[69]). Immigrants have also been shown to be over-represented among founders of firms in the 2017 Fortune 500 ranking, the largest firms in the United States (Azoulay et al., 2022[70]), and among founders of unicorn firms, that is privately owned firms valued at USD 1 billion or more, in the United States (NFAP, 2022[71]) and Germany (Startup Verband, 2025[72]). Immigrants are also over-represented among founders in Silicon

Valley's technology businesses (Saxenian, 2002[73]), among founders of engineering and technology companies, and more recently among top AI firms in the United States (NFAP, 2023[74]).

The over-representation of immigrant founders among the most successful and innovative companies attracts a lot of attention in the media and public opinion given the disproportionate role of these firms in terms of revenue and employment. However, these are exceptional firms, and it is not straightforward to generalise the role of immigrant entrepreneurs in these firms to a more representative population of firms in the economy.

A systematic evaluation of the contribution of immigrant entrepreneurs to innovation across OECD countries is limited by data availability. Ideally, one would need data on measures of innovation at the firm level linked to the characteristics of the founder of the firm. The analysis on migrant entrepreneurs in OECD (2024[67]) showed that only a small share of self-employed individuals (5%) carry out their activities in high and medium-high R&D intensity sectors (the two highest levels of the OECD taxonomy).[6] Immigrants are as likely as the native-born to be self-employed in high R&D intensity sectors on average across the 14 OECD countries considered in the estimation. For Canada, Picot and Ostrovsky (2021[75]) show that incorporated immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely than Canadian-born to work in high and medium-high intensity R&D sectors according to the same OECD Taxonomy in 2016. Ten per cent of the foreign-born entrepreneurs work in these sectors, compared with 6.4% of the adult children of immigrants and 5.3% of the population with no immigrant parent or grandparent.

Recent research in some OECD countries has mobilised detailed firm-level data to study innovation and investment in R&D in immigrant and native-born owned firms. Overall, immigrant firms are similar to those of the native-born in terms of innovation and R&D. In Canada, Germany and the United States, immigrant firms perform as well, and in some cases better than firms of the native-born.

Recent research for the United States finds that firms with at least one immigrant owner are on average more innovative along most of the innovation measures considered, including reported firms' innovation activities, research and development, trademarks, and patents (Brown et al., 2019[76]; Lee et al., 2025[77]; Chodavadia et al., 2024[69]). Previous research based on a survey of 1 300 high-tech companies, found little difference between firms with and without immigrant founders (Hart and Acs, 2011[78]).

The main effect of immigration on innovative entrepreneurship is driven by the concentration of immigrants in key innovation hubs. Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2020[79]) find that immigrant founded companies account for over 40% of startups in leading clusters in the United States. However, immigrant founded firms are similar to those founded by the native-born, indicating that their impact comes mainly from the quantity of immigrant entrepreneurs agglomerating in key hubs.

For Canada, Ostrovsky and Picot (2020[80]) compare innovation of immigrant and native-born owned SMEs and find little difference between the two groups. In immigrant owned firms, there was marginally more product and process innovation, but there was no difference in the use of intellectual property.

The allocation of immigrants across firms and sectors

Immigrants are not evenly distributed across all areas of the economy. In all OECD countries, immigrants tend to concentrate in some sectors of activity (OECD, 2020[81]) and to disproportionately work in firms with a high share of immigrants (OECD, 2025[82]).

Where workers are employed matters for productivity, not only how productive individual workers are. If labour shifts from low-productivity firms or declining sectors to higher-productivity ones, aggregate productivity increases even without changes in sectoral or firm productivity. Conversely, misallocation, for example due to barriers to job mobility or other frictions, may slow productivity growth by keeping workers in lower productivity activities.

Given that immigration has accounted for a large share of employment growth in the past decade in many OECD countries (Figure 5.4), the distribution of immigrants across sectors and firms is likely to matter for aggregate productivity. A key question is therefore whether, and through which mechanisms, the allocation of immigrants across sectors and firms affects aggregate labour productivity.


This section documents the sorting of immigrants across sectors, as well as firms within sectors for selected countries with available data and explores the link between the allocation of immigrants across sectors and firms and aggregate labour productivity.

The allocation of immigrants across firms within sectors

Immigrants are concentrated in specific firms within a same sector. These tend to be firms that disproportionately employ immigrants. Thirty-nine per cent of immigrants worked in firms where 50% or more of the employees were also immigrants, on average across the eight countries with available administrative linked employer-employee data (Figure 5.16). Twenty-two per cent work in firms where three-quarters of employees are immigrants. These shares have increased in the 2010s in all countries in the analysis except in France where it remained constant. This evidence adds to a growing academic literature on immigrant firm segregation from across the OECD.[7] Different mechanisms may be at play that explain immigrant workplace segregation. Many workers find employment through job referrals and their informal networks. If immigrants' networks are disproportionately composed of other immigrants, then immigrants will tend to work together. Barriers in the labour market and employer discrimination may also be at play, leading immigrants to concentrate in workplaces that are easier to access for immigrants or do not discriminate against immigrants at hire.

Figure 5.16. Immigrants often work in segregated workplaces

Share of immigrant workers working in firms where more than half of the workforce is immigrant, 2010 and 2019



Note: OECD represents the average of the eight countries in the figure.
Source: OECD (2025[82]), *International Migration Outlook 2025*, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en, based on administrative linked employer-employee data.

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
Within sectors, immigrants concentrate in firms with lower labour productivity. On average across the seven countries with available data, 23% of immigrants work in the bottom 20% of jobs in terms of firm productivity, 3 p.p. more than if immigrants were evenly distributed across the firm productivity distribution.

At the other extreme, 17% of immigrants work in the top 20% of jobs in terms of firm labour productivity, 3 p.p. less than an even distribution would predict. (Figure 5.17). In Italy and Portugal, the gap in firm labour productivity between immigrants and the foreign-born is larger. 25% of immigrants work in the bottom quintile in both countries and 13% and 11% work in the top quintile in Italy and Portugal. In New Zealand, the allocation of immigrants and native-born across firms with different productivity levels is more similar.

This gap in firm labour productivity is estimated within narrowly defined industries (3-digit level). Differences in labour productivity without netting out sector effects are larger given that immigrants tend to sort into lower productivity sectors as documented in the next section (Annex Figure 5.A.1).

Figure 5.17. Immigrants work in lower productivity firms than the native-born

Distribution of immigrant workers along the firm labour productivity distribution, within industry



Note: OECD represents the average of the seven countries in the figure. For Norway, the values for 2019 correspond to the year 2018.
Source: OECD (2025[82]), *International Migration Outlook 2025*, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en, based on administrative linked employer-employee data.

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The pattern is similar in Australia. Immigrants tend to concentrate in lower productivity firms within sectors and this concentration increased between 2011 and 2020 (Andrews et al., 2023[83]). The authors also show that there are marked differences between immigrants by category of migration. Labour immigrants and their dependents, that is immigrants under the under the Permanent Skilled and Temporary Skilled visas, are more likely than other immigrants and the native-born to work in high productivity firms within sectors. In contrast, international students and working holiday makers work in lower productivity firms.

These results are based on administrative data, which do not cover fully the informal labour market. This is a segment of the labour market which tends to have lower labour productivity and a higher share of immigrants. Hence, the productivity gap between the firms in which immigrants and the native-born work may be larger than the estimates presented.

Misallocation of labour across firms, that is when workers are not employed by the most productive firms, reduces sectoral labour productivity. High-productivity firms, those that could generate more output per worker, are unable to expand employment sufficiently, while low-productivity firms retain too many workers. As a result, within-sector productivity is lower than if labour were efficiently allocated. More efficient reallocation of labour would shift employment toward frontier firms, raising average productivity within sectors and, ultimately, aggregate productivity.

In many OECD countries, firms at the productivity frontier (10% most productive firms in the industry) are two to five times more productive than the median firm in the same industry (OECD, 2025[84]). With efficient allocation, high-productivity firms should employ a larger share of workers. Instead, labour tends to be more evenly distributed across firms. This implies that a significant share of workers remains in below-average productivity firms, dragging down sectoral productivity.

Evidence on the extent immigrants concentrate in low-productivity firms is not available for all OECD countries despite growing interest and evidence on firm productivity gaps. Importantly, more evidence is needed by category of migration. In a medium-run perspective, a key question is whether immigrants move to more productive firms over time. Previous evidence shows that immigrants do move to more productive firms as they accumulate experience in the host country but that significant gaps relative to the native-born remain pointing to barriers to job mobility faced by immigrants in the host country labour market (OECD, 2025[82]).

The allocation of immigrants across sectors and aggregate labour productivity


In all OECD countries, immigrants are concentrated in some sectors of the economy (Annex Table 5.A.3). Immigrants are overrepresented in the accommodation and food sector in all countries. They represent 30% or more of workers in the sector in, for example, Austria, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Spain and Sweden. Immigrants are also over-represented in the construction sector in many countries, such as Costa Rica, Czechia, France, Greece, Italy, Spain or the United States. They tend to be underrepresented in manufacturing, but there are exceptions such as Czechia, Estonia or Iceland.

While immigrants are over-represented in some sectors where many jobs are low-skilled, they are also overrepresented in sectors where most jobs are high skilled, such as in ICT. In Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, New Zealand and the United States, the share of workers in ICT that are immigrants is significantly larger than the share in the overall employed population.

The sectors migrants concentrate in are on average low labour productivity sectors. The share of migrants in employment is higher in sectors with lower labour productivity than in the host country labour market as a whole (Figure 5.18). The correlation is negative in all countries, except Ireland and Luxembourg.

Figure 5.18. Immigrants are concentrated in low labour productivity sectors

Correlation between sectoral log labour productivity and migrant share, 2024



Note: The figure is a bin scatter plot. It shows the average log labour productivity for each of the 20 bins of average share of migrant sectoral employment, net of country fixed effects. The bins are based on 345 country-sector observations (23 countries and 15 sectors).
Source: Productivity Data Base & Labour Force Surveys.

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Some sectors are excluded from this correlation. These are sectors for which there is no good measure of labour productivity: real estate, public administration and defence, education, and health activities. Real-estate activities are excluded because their value added is largely imputed (it includes the value of both actual and imputed housing rents in the economy).[8] Public administration and defence, education and health services are excluded because they are largely non-market. Hence, their output value is measured as the sum of input costs, and in several countries their output volume is measured by deflating input costs, thus conventionally excluding any productivity gains (OECD, 2025[5]).

Approximately one-quarter of immigrants (22%) on average work in sectors for which there is no measure of labour productivity. Although this share is lower than for the native-born (30%), immigrants contribute significantly to the employed population in some of these sectors, as for example, the health sector. On average across the countries in the analysis, 11% of immigrants work in the health sector (Annex Table 5.A.2). In this case, labour productivity is not the right lens through which to study the contribution of immigrants to the host country economy and society.

Immigrant sectoral reallocation and productivity growth

As immigrants account for a growing share of employment across the OECD, an important question is whether this growth has been concentrated in relatively high- or low-productivity sectors and how this may have affected aggregate productivity growth.

Changes in aggregate productivity reflect both productivity improvements within sectors and shifts of employment across sectors. Aggregate labour productivity growth may be decomposed into three components: productivity growth within sectors, a static reallocation component, and a dynamic reallocation component (OECD, 2025[5]). The two reallocation components capture the contribution of

changes in the distribution of employment across sectors to aggregate productivity growth. The static component measures the effect of workers moving between sectors with different initial levels of labour productivity, while the dynamic component captures shifts towards sectors with different rates of productivity growth.

To assess the contribution of immigration to productivity growth through reallocation, this section suggests a novel decomposition of the static reallocation component.[9] The general idea of the decomposition is that immigration may affect the reallocation component of aggregate productivity growth in two separate ways. First, immigrants differ from the native-born in their initial distribution across sectors, as highlighted in the previous subsection. An increase in the share of immigrants in the workforce may therefore change the aggregate sectoral allocation of workers, even if the sectoral allocation of immigrants remains unchanged. Second, immigrant employment may shift to more, or less, productive sectors over time. The decomposition separates these two components and thereby provides a clearer picture of how immigration contributes to aggregate productivity growth (Box 5.6).

Before discussing the results, two caveats are worth bearing in mind. First, labour reallocation accounts for only a small share of overall productivity growth. Most productivity growth occurs within sectors rather than through the movement of workers across sectors (Annex Figure 5.A.2).

Second, the decomposition is descriptive rather than causal. The estimates capture how changes in the distribution of employment across sectors are associated with productivity growth and should not be interpreted as causal effects of immigration on productivity.

Box 5.6. Immigrant sectoral reallocation and aggregate labour productivity growth

This box suggests a novel decomposition of aggregate labour productivity growth that distinguishes between changes in the overall share of immigrants in employment and changes in where immigrants work.

Labour productivity growth within and across sectors

Aggregate labour productivity is the average of sectoral labour productivity weighted by sectoral employment.

Labour productivity growth may be decomposed into within-sector labour productivity growth, a static reallocation term and a dynamic reallocation term as follows:

$$\Delta\left(\frac{Y}{L}\right) = \frac{1}{\frac{Y^0}{L^0}}\left[\sum_s \frac{L_s^0}{L^0}\Delta\left(\frac{Y_s}{L_s}\right) + \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0}\Delta\left(\frac{L_s}{L}\right) + \sum_s \Delta\left(\frac{L_s}{L}\right)\Delta\left(\frac{Y_s}{Y}\right)\right]$$

Where the subscript s indicates the sector and the superscript 0 indicates the initial level.

The static reallocation term indicates the productivity growth due to employment changes in sectors of different initial labour productivity. The dynamic reallocation term indicates the productivity growth due to employment changes in sectors of different labour productivity growth.

Static and dynamic immigrant and native-born reallocation

The change in employment in each sector is due to changes in both native-born and foreign-born employment.

$$\Delta\left(\frac{L_s}{L}\right) = \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^F}{L}\right) + \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^N}{L}\right)$$

Hence, the Static Reallocation Term (SRT) equals:

$$SRT = \frac{1}{\frac{Y^0}{L^0}} \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta\left(\frac{L_s}{L}\right) = \frac{1}{\frac{Y^0}{L^0}} \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^F}{L}\right) + \sum_s \left(\frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0}\right) \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^N}{L}\right)$$

Noting that $\Delta\left(\frac{L^N}{L}\right) = -\Delta\left(\frac{L^F}{L}\right)$

$$SRT = \frac{1}{\frac{Y^0}{L^0}} \left[\frac{L^{0F}}{L^0} \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^F}{L^F}\right) + \frac{L^{0N}}{L^0} \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^N}{L^N}\right) + \Delta\left(\frac{L^F}{L}\right) \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \left(\frac{L_s^{0F}}{L^{0F}} - \frac{L_s^{0N}}{L^{0N}}\right) + \Delta\left(\frac{L^F}{L}\right) \sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \left(\Delta\left(\frac{L_s^F}{L^F}\right) - \Delta\left(\frac{L_s^N}{L^N}\right)\right) \right]$$

$$SRT = \frac{1}{\frac{Y^0}{L^0}} [A + B + C + D]$$

A captures the *immigrant reallocation* effect, the effect of changes in the immigrant distribution across sectors over time, weighted by the initial share of immigrants in total employment.

B captures the *native-born reallocation* effect, the effect of changes in the native-born distribution across sectors over time, weighted by the initial share of native-born in total employment.

C captures the *immigrant share* effect, the effect of the change of the share of immigrants in total employment holding fixed their initial sorting across sectors of different labour productivity levels.

D captures the *combined reallocation and share* effect, the effect of the change of the share of immigrants in total employment together with their change in sectoral allocation over time relative to the native-born.

A similar decomposition may be done for the Dynamic Reallocation Term.


In two-thirds of countries, from 2014 to 2024, the sum of the three immigration components is positive. The largest contributions are in Ireland (3.7 p.p.), Luxembourg (3.0 p.p.), Sweden (0.4 p.p.), Austria and Greece (0.3 p.p.). Countries with negative contributions are Norway (-0.9 p.p.), Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain (-0.4 p.p.).

This total contribution is the sum of two main effects that partially offset each other. On the one hand, migration increased in most countries and immigrants were initially concentrated in lower productivity sectors. The increase in the share of immigrants in the employed population holding fixed their initial distribution across sectors (the *immigrant share* effect) weighted negatively in 70% of countries. For example, in Spain, 42% of immigrants in 2014 worked in Accommodation or Retail, which are relatively low productivity sectors.[10] The increase in immigration from 2014 to 2024 increased the share of employment in these sectors, leading to a negative contribution to aggregate productivity (-1 p.p.).

On the other hand, from 2014 to 2024, immigrant employment shifted to more productive sectors (the *immigrant reallocation* effect), leading to a positive contribution to productivity growth in almost all countries. The most positive contributions were in Ireland (2.3 p.p.), Luxembourg (1.8 p.p.), Sweden (0.7 p.p.), Lithuania and Spain (0.4 p.p.).

Figure 5.19. Decomposition of the static reallocation term

2014-2024



Note: See Box 5.6 for the decomposition and definition of the different terms.
Source: Productivity Data Base and Labour Force Surveys.


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Both native- and foreign-born employment reallocated to more productive sectors over the decade to 2024. The reallocation effects identified above are weighed by (foreign- and native-born) population size. How does the reallocation towards more productive sectors compare for the foreign- and native-born? Figure 5.20 compares the native-born and foreign-born reallocation terms without the population weights for a more direct comparison. In most countries, the dots are above the 45-degree line indicating a larger contribution of foreign- than native-born reallocation across sectors to productivity growth. For example, in Ireland, the share of immigrants working in ICT (one of the sectors with highest initial labour productivity) increased from 8.8% to 14.2% from 2014 to 2024. The increase was more modest among the native-born: 7.7% in 2024, up from 6.6% in 2014.

The larger reallocation effect of foreign-born employment is consistent with immigrants being more mobile in the labour market than the native-born. This is line with previous evidence that immigrant earnings growth relative to the native-born in the first years in the host country is partly due to immigrants moving to higher-paying, and more productive, sectors (OECD, 2025[82]). This result may also be driven by successive cohorts of new entrants in the labour market working in more productive sectors. Understanding the drivers and consequences of immigrant job mobility warrants further research.

Figure 5.20. Reallocation of native- and foreign-born employment to high productivity sectors

2014-2024



Note: Following the decomposition in Box 5.6, for each country, $\sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta \left(\frac{L_s^F}{L^F}\right)$ is the co-ordinate on the y-axis and $\sum_s \frac{Y_s^0}{L_s^0} \Delta \left(\frac{L_s^N}{N}\right)$ the co-ordinate on the x-axis.
Source: Productivity Data Base and Labour Force Surveys.

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Policy discussion

As this chapter demonstrates, the channels through which migration flows may impact productivity are numerous and diverse. Migration can influence labour productivity and multi factor productivity growth. Its effects may arise at firm and sector level, while also generating broader macroeconomic impacts.

Migration affects short term and longer-term allocation of factors of production by influencing employers and workers investment decisions. It can induce changes in production technologies through innovation, adoption of labour-saving technologies and/or externalities.

In most cases, these effects can be either positive or negative, depending on the context and the composition of migration flows. Hence, it is impossible to draw a definite conclusion as to whether migration is a blessing or a curse for productivity growth within individual OECD countries or across the OECD as a whole.

That said, the chapter has clearly identified the mechanisms through which migration may either enhance or hinder productivity growth. In each of these cases, public policy can play a decisive role in fostering positive outcomes. At a time when the working age population is shrinking in all OECD countries, and the scope for further gains in labour market participation may be increasingly limited, raising labour productivity becomes crucial. Well-designed migration and integration policies can contribute to this objective, both directly and indirectly.

The chapter outlines a roadmap for maximising the contribution of migration to productivity growth. It identifies four main channels through which effective migration and integration policies could strengthen the positive relationship between migration and productivity growth.

Attracting, retaining and efficiently utilising skills

Highly skilled immigrants account for a significant and increasing share of the workforce in most OECD countries. Competition for international talent, notably in STEM occupations and, increasingly, in research activities more broadly, has intensified as countries have come to recognise its important contribution to productivity growth. International students constitute a particularly valuable pipeline of talent, as they are more likely to enrol in advanced and STEM-related fields of study. OECD Indicators of Talent Attractiveness shows that migration policies can play a significant role in enhancing a country's talent attractiveness. Half of OECD countries could virtually close their attractiveness gap relative to the OECD top performer country by implementing less stringent migration policies (OECD, 2023[85]).

Beyond attracting talents, OECD countries are increasingly seeking to improve the retention of top talent. Relatively low retention rates in many OECD countries suggest that many could benefit from policies that encourage highly skilled migrants to build their careers over the longer term. Family reunification opportunities, access to permanent residence, exposure to discrimination, and broader career and mobility prospects all potentially affect return or secondary migration decisions. In addition, many OECD countries face significant emigration of highly educated native-born workers. A balanced strategy is therefore needed, combining efforts to attract international talent, and measures to retain and attract back highly skilled nationals.

Realising the productivity gains from migration also requires that migrants' skills are effectively utilised in host country labour markets. A persistent challenge is the high incidence of skills mismatch observed among immigrants, who remain more likely than native-born workers to be overqualified or employed outside their field of study. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive policy approach, including faster recognition of foreign qualifications, occupation-specific language training, addressing barriers to occupational licensing, and fostering hiring practices that place greater emphasis on individuals' skills and competences. Reducing skill mismatches among both native and foreign-born workers could yield substantial labour productivity gains.

Striking the right balance between short term and longer-term objectives

Labour migration programmes in OECD countries are for the most part not designed at the sector level (OECD 2020). Aside from seasonal agricultural programmes, only a few countries operate explicit sector-focussed labour migration programmes, and these tend to be limited or targeted at specific labour market needs or strategic sectors. Examples include Italy's sectoral quota system under the *Decreto Flussi*, Japan's Specified Skilled Worker programme, introduced in 2018 to address shortages in selected sectors, and Korea's Employment Permit System, which targets SMEs in agriculture, livestock, manufacturing, construction, fisheries and selected service activities. In addition, Australia targets highly skilled migrants in selected "future sectors" (e.g. AI, fintech, cybersecurity), while Italy has implemented sector-specific regularisation programmes, particularly in domestic work and agriculture.

Yet, even in the absence of explicit sectoral programmes, migration policy is frequently used to address short-term labour and skills shortages, notably through shortage occupation lists. This may contribute to the concentration of migrants in sectors with occupations in demand. In addition, immigrants tend to work, at least initially, in so called *entry sectors* (Piore, 1979[86]). These are typically sectors with difficult working conditions, such as irregular hours and low pay. As a result, immigrants tend to be overrepresented in low productivity sectors across the OECD.

The concentration of immigrants is not limited to sectors; it also occurs across firms within sectors. OECD (2025[82]) shows that immigrants concentrate in lower-paying and lower labour productivity firms, suggesting that the allocation of migrant workers across firms may also have implications for aggregate productivity outcomes.

Whether the concentration of immigrants ultimately supports or hinders productivity growth critically depends on its underlying drivers. When international recruitment helps firms respond to genuine labour shortage, migration can support structural transformation and productivity growth. However, when migrant recruitment is used to circumvent structural issues and enable firms to delay or avoid necessary adjustments to improve productivity, working conditions and worker retention, it may create a vicious circle. Continued reliance on migrant labour may in this case negatively affect long-term productivity growth within sectors, the main driver of aggregate productivity growth.

Striking the right balance between short-term labour market needs and longer-term productivity objectives is therefore strategic. Migration has sectoral consequences, whether these are intended or not. Being aware of this dimension is a necessary condition both to maximise the intended sectoral benefits of migration and to avoid unintended adverse effects. The question is, however, whether OECD countries will want to use migration policy more proactively to support the development of particular sectors. This question is becoming increasingly relevant as governments expand the use of industrial policies to build resilience to economic shocks, enhance economic security and strengthen their competitiveness. Carefully designed industrial policy, combined with international co-operation, can help countries respond to market concentration or supply chain concerns, adapt to technological change and create new economic opportunities. In this context, migration policy has an important role to play in ensuring that the skills required to support these strategic objectives are available when and where they are needed.

Addressing misallocation and fostering immigrants' job mobility

The efficient allocation of workers across firms and sectors is a key driver of productivity growth. Facilitating labour mobility across sectors is particularly important to sustaining productivity growth notably in the presence of structural labour shortages that require sectoral labour reallocation (OECD, 2022[48]). OECD analysis emphasises that policies improving job mobility are key to maintaining productivity growth in ageing and tightening labour markets (OECD, 2025[1]; André and Gal, 2024[4]). In this context, it is important to recognise that immigrants face greater barriers not only to entering employment but also to changing jobs and sector.

Similar challenges arise within sectors, where immigrants are often concentrated in lower-productivity firms. This pattern may reflect differences in recruitment practices, information asymmetries, weaker professional networks and unequal access to high-quality job opportunities. As a result, immigrant workers may be less likely to match with high-productivity firms, reducing overall efficiency. More broadly, the misallocation of labour across firms with different productivity levels is recognised as a key factor behind weak aggregate productivity performance in many OECD economies (André and Gal, 2024[4]).

Against this backdrop, restrictions limiting migrants' ability to change employer or sector before a minimal time of residence in the host country might therefore have sizeable unintended consequences for productivity. Policies aimed at improving labour market matching, reducing skills mismatches and facilitating access to opportunities in more productive firms and sectors should therefore pay particular attention to the barriers faced by immigrants.

Supporting migrant entrepreneurship

Immigrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs than the native-born in most OECD countries. This reflects a dual reality. On the one hand, immigrants are over-represented among own-account self-employed workers and immigrant founded firms tend to be smaller than those founded by the native-born. On the other hand, immigrants are over-represented among the founders of the most successful firms in the OECD and are essential players in key innovation hubs. The total contribution of immigrant founded firms to aggregate productivity growth is uncertain and little research has been undertaken on this question in OECD countries.

Recognising the potential contribution of entrepreneurship to innovation and productivity growth, most OECD countries have introduced dedicated migration pathways for start-up founders, scientists, researchers, and other highly skilled professionals. However, there has been limited systematic evaluation of these programmes. This applies not only to specialised entrepreneurial and scientific visas but also to broader talent-attraction policies and post-graduate work schemes, whose contribution to innovation and business creation remains insufficiently assessed.

At the same time, migrant entrepreneurs often face specific barriers that can limit their potential and constrain their economic contribution. These include more restricted access to finance, weaker integration into professional and business networks, and administrative obstacles linked to their residence status. Targeted policies can help address these constraints. These include improving access to credit (for example through credit guarantee schemes), facilitating participation in business networks and incubators, and providing support with administrative procedures for firm creation and operation.

While effective migration and integration policies can contribute to the broader policy objective of supporting productivity growth, it should be acknowledged that productivity cannot become the alpha and the omega of migration policies. Labour migration systems must balance a broader set of economic and social objectives. These include, for example, ensuring the provision of essential services, notably in the domestic and care sectors; safeguarding national food security through adequate staffing in agriculture or agrifood industries; addressing labour needs linked to housing supply and affordability challenges; or supporting the tourism industry and the Horeca sector (hotels, restaurants and catering), as well as other labour-intensive strategic sectors.

These are all sectors characterised by relatively low measured productivity or by outputs that are difficult to capture adequately in conventional productivity statistics. They are also sectors in which immigrants tend to be overrepresented. From this perspective, migration policy should be designed not only to support productivity growth but also to support the development of strategic sectors.

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Annex 5.A. Additional tables and figures

Annex Table 5.A.1. Educational attainment, foreign and native-born, 2024

Educational attainment of native and foreign-born per country, 2024

	Native-born					Foreign-born				
	Very-Low	Low	Medium	High	Very-high	Very-Low	Low	Medium	High	Very-high
AUT	0.6	14.7	50.2	21.9	12.7	4.0	22.4	39.7	17.9	16.0
BEL	4.0	16.2	41.3	23.8	14.7	14.8	16.9	34.7	14.5	19.1
CHE	1.6	11.5	48.5	24.2	14.3	4.3	24.1	28.3	18.9	24.4
COL	28.3	3.5	42.9	21.6	3.8	27.9	5.4	49.2	16.2	1.4
CRI	25.7	24.8	28.8	18.1	2.6	43.1	23.2	23.4	9.4	0.9
CZE	1.3	11.8	63.8	7.0	16.1	1.4	15.5	53.1	7.5	22.4
DEU	5.3	11.6	52.8	18.2	12.1	20.9	18.8	32.9	15.4	12.1
DNK	3.8	21.4	39.9	22.0	12.9	6.0	22.6	31.2	18.6	21.6
EST	3.0	17.1	45.7	16.7	17.5	1.8	5.5	45.1	19.4	28.2
ESP	4.5	30.2	24.6	24.4	16.3	13.7	30.8	29.7	14.7	11.1
FIN	2.7	13.8	46.7	22.0	14.9	3.5	23.9	39.5	17.2	15.9
FRA	2.2	16.7	42.5	25.1	13.5	12.0	21.4	31.4	18.2	17.0
GRC	8.3	13.1	47.4	21.2	10.2	18.8	21.0	45.1	11.3	3.7
HUN	0.9	16.9	55.6	13.2	13.3	1.1	10.4	48.2	12.9	27.5
IRL	5.3	14.4	35.7	31.5	13.2	2.7	5.6	30.3	38.7	22.8
ISL	2.6	20.7	38.9	22.4	15.4	1.6	22.3	37.7	22.5	15.9
ITA	2.7	31.7	44.9	6.4	14.3	7.6	35.7	42.7	5.9	8.0
LTU	4.4	7.5	46.5	27.5	14.0	3.2	5.9	45.6	29.9	15.4
LUX	4.4	19.6	41.7	19.0	15.3	9.5	12.1	20.8	20.2	37.4
LVA	2.9	13.9	48.0	20.3	14.8	2.0	4.7	46.9	21.7	24.6
MEX	21.3	26.4	34.4	16.3	1.6	12.8	15.6	43.1	22.3	6.3
NLD	4.6	16.2	40.1	24.6	14.5	24.0	13.9	26.3	20.0	15.8
NOR	6.7	16.5	34.3	30.0	12.5	5.5	20.6	31.0	24.9	18.1
POL	1.2	10.6	54.1	7.9	26.2	1.0	8.0	46.4	16.0	28.6
PRT	19.7	21.1	31.4	10.3	17.5	9.6	15.9	40.7	13.5	20.2
SWE	2.3	12.7	42.7	27.9	14.4	9.6	20.6	25.5	22.5	21.7
SVN	0.6	14.2	52.4	17.6	15.2	0.7	24.8	59.6	7.8	7.2
SVK	1.4	11.5	61.6	4.3	21.3	0.5	4.6	58.9	7.5	28.6
USA	0.3	-	48.6	37.6	13.4	7.4	-	40.8	32.6	19.2
OECD average	5.9	16.9	44.5	19.7	13.6	8.8	16.5	39.6	18.0	17.7

Note: OECD average is the average of the countries in the Table. Very-low education corresponds to ISCED 0/1, low to ISCED 2, medium to ISCED 3/4, high to ISCED 5, very-high to ISCED 6/8.
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

StatLink https://stat.link/xfjv94

Annex Table 5.A.2. Share of immigrants and native-born working in sectors with no measure of labour productivity

2024

	Share in excl. sectors – Foreign-born	Share in excl. sectors – Native-born
AUT	21%	29%
BEL	28%	36%
CHE	24%	32%
CZE	13%	25%
DEU	21%	32%
DNK	27%	35%
ESP	19%	29%
EST	15%	24%
FIN	27%	32%
FRA	27%	32%
GRC	12%	25%
HUN	20%	24%
IRL	25%	30%
ITA	20%	24%
LTU	14%	24%
LUX	29%	58%
LVA	20%	27%
NLD	22%	35%
NOR	31%	38%
POL	9%	24%
PRT	25%	28%
SVK	19%	25%
SVN	13%	25%
SWE	36%	35%

Note: The sectors with no measure of labour productivity are real estate, public administration and defence, education, and health activities.
Source: Labour Force Surveys.

StatLink https://stat.link/zbu5hk

Annex Table 5.A.3. Immigrants are unevenly allocated across sectors

Share of immigrant workers in the sector, per country, 2024

	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Transportation and Storage	Accommodation and Food	Information and Communication	Professional Activities	Administrative Service Activities	Public Administration and Defence	Education	Health	Other Service Activities
AUT	6.8%	24.9%	30.1%	24.6%	34.1%	46.9%	24.3%	22.2%	47.6%	10.1%	23.1%	21.9%	23.6%
BEL	10.8%	21.2%	26.2%	18.1%	26.6%	34.0%	20.8%	17.6%	37.5%	10.6%	11.6%	18.5%	27.3%
CAN*	35.7%	29.8%	15.4%	23.9%	31.0%	37.4%	38.5%	29.9%	36.9%	34.3%	19.6%	26.5%	27.2%
CHE	12.0%	40.2%	40.3%	34.1%	36.3%	59.4%	37.2%	34.2%	51.3%	13.4%	26.2%	32.8%	32.8%
CHL	7.9%	14.4%	11.9%	15.2%	12.5%	28.3%	13.9%	8.6%	14.2%	2.2%	3.5%	7.0%	22.2%
CRI	18.6%	6.2%	25.2%	10.3%	6.7%	18.5%	2.4%	4.4%	9.2%	2.1%	3.4%	4.3%	12.5%
CZE	3.5%	8.3%	10.4%	5.8%	4.7%	7.6%	7.4%	3.7%	9.1%	1.3%	3.5%	4.7%	8.4%
DEU	7.2%	22.2%	24.1%	21.3%	33.2%	46.0%	21.0%	16.1%	36.4%	7.2%	13.3%	20.0%	23.2%
DNK	13.0%	10.5%	5.9%	10.8%	20.2%	23.7%	13.2%	14.0%	17.5%	5.4%	9.0%	9.9%	14.4%
ESP	26.6%	17.5%	35.0%	20.3%	25.6%	44.9%	15.9%	15.2%	31.1%	3.1%	8.8%	14.4%	24.8%
EST	7.5%	16.5%	13.6%	10.2%	18.3%	21.5%	21.7%	10.5%	16.6%	3.1%	9.6%	10.2%	18.7%
FIN	..	9.0%	9.8%	8.4%	12.9%	25.7%	18.7%	10.3%	20.1%	2.2%	11.9%	10.5%	8.0%
FRA	5.9%	9.1%	21.7%	11.0%	15.3%	24.5%	13.7%	13.4%	25.1%	6.5%	11.0%	12.9%	9.4%
GBR	7.9%	20.9%	15.1%	19.6%	29.1%	26.8%	27.3%	21.9%	23.3%	14.5%	17.3%	27.3%	20.3%
GRC	7.6%	8.8%	26.4%	7.0%	3.7%	18.8%	3.5%	2.3%	12.6%	0.9%	3.5%	3.5%	7.0%
HUN	2.4%	3.5%	4.4%	3.0%	2.3%	4.7%	6.2%	5.0%	2.7%	1.5%	3.8%	3.4%	4.0%
IRL	7.5%	33.2%	21.3%	28.3%	27.8%	39.5%	44.1%	29.5%	39.8%	16.4%	19.2%	34.8%	33.8%
ISL	10.6%	33.4%	13.8%	18.7%	16.7%	37.7%	13.6%	13.9%	35.0%	6.0%	20.0%	19.2%	10.2%
ITA	26.1%	16.8%	24.0%	11.3%	19.2%	24.7%	6.3%	5.9%	21.2%	2.3%	4.5%	10.7%	20.3%
LTU	2.0%	2.5%	1.4%	1.1%	4.3%	3.1%	8.4%	1.3%	2.6%	0.7%	1.6%	1.5%	2.8%
LUX	16.7%	76.2%	79.6%	74.2%	62.0%	85.1%	83.6%	77.8%	78.9%	21.0%	25.1%	42.1%	70.3%
LVA	3.1%	8.0%	10.2%	9.3%	11.4%	9.8%	10.7%	5.0%	9.9%	2.4%	8.3%	6.8%	12.2%
MEX	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	..	0.9%	..	0.2%	..	0.7%	0.6%
NLD	12.4%	21.1%	16.0%	16.8%	23.2%	23.5%	21.8%	16.2%	26.2%	10.2%	12.3%	11.2%	17.4%
NOR	11.5%	21.0%	26.8%	17.7%	25.6%	48.7%	19.8%	24.4%	35.6%	10.3%	18.8%	20.6%	29.4%
NZL*	41.3%	35.2%	31.2%	35.1%	29.9%	55.4%	45.9%	37.0%	44.7%	26.7%	31.3%	39.4%	34.7%
POL	0.4%	3.1%	3.0%	1.8%	3.6%	6.0%	6.1%	2.7%	5.1%	0.2%	1.4%	1.4%	3.7%


	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Transportation and Storage	Accommodation and Food	Information and Communication	Professional Activities	Administrative Service Activities	Public Administration and Defence	Education	Health	Other Service Activities
PRT	12.3%	10.1%	18.6%	13.7%	15.9%	24.5%	16.4%	13.8%	21.9%	9.5%	11.7%	13.6%	22.5%
SVK	0.6%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	0.7%	1.7%	2.0%	1.4%	0.8%	0.3%	1.1%	0.3%	0.3%
SVN	2.1%	14.7%	35.4%	10.6%	23.7%	23.0%	6.6%	7.0%	30.7%	2.2%	5.9%	11.6%	9.7%
SWE	7.6%	23.5%	18.0%	20.5%	32.0%	42.1%	26.6%	20.4%	38.5%	14.3%	24.7%	31.5%	23.3%
USA	28.7%	19.4%	29.8%	17.4%	26.1%	22.4%	24.4%	16.5%	26.0%	10.1%	13.1%	17.3%	18.0%
OECD Total	**8.7%**	**13.0%**	**20.3%**	**13.0%**	**19.3%**	**22.2%**	**20.5%**	**13.2%**	**24.5%**	**7.4%**	**11.8%**	**13.7%**	**12.3%**

Source: Labour Force Surveys. Data for Canada and New Zealand is for 2019 from administrative data.

StatLink https://stat.link/56qrmj

Annex Figure 5.A.1. Immigrants work in lower labour productivity firms

Share of immigrants across the firm labour productivity distribution (quintiles), 2010, 2019




Note: For Norway, data is for 2010 and 2018.
Source: OECD (2025[82]), *International Migration Outlook 2025*, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en, based on administrative linked employer employee data.

StatLink https://stat.link/8kd56g

Annex Figure 5.A.2. Decomposition of labour productivity growth

2014-2024



Note: See Box 5.6 for the decomposition.
Source: Productivity Data Base.

StatLink https://stat.link/qkw6ec

Notes

[1] Assuming also constant entry and exit rates by age groups, and constant net migration rates.

[2] Average across 28 OECD countries based on labour force survey data for 2024.

[3] In PIAAC 2023, respondents were asked “Overall, which of the following statements best describes your skills in relation to what is required to do your job?” Those who answered “My skills are higher than required by my job” were classified as over-skilled.

[4] In EU-EFTA OECD countries, only international students with a permit were taken into account. Students from other EU-EFTA countries were not part of the estimation.

[5] The share of immigrants among inventors should be compared with the share of immigrants among the working age population, and not among the total population, given that immigrants are over-presented among the working age population (Manning, 2025[2]).

[6] A first approximation of R&D activity of entrepreneurs is the sector of activity they operate in. The OECD Taxonomy of Economic Activities Based on R&D Intensity classifies sectors in five groups (from lowest to highest) according to their level of R&D intensity, which is estimated as the ratio of R&D to value added within the sector (Galindo-Rueda and Verger, 2016[87]).

[7] Several country studies provide evidence of immigrant workplace segregation across the OECD, such as Åslund and Oskar (2008[88]) for Sweden, Carneiro, Fortuna and Varejão (2012[89]) for Portugal, Andersson et al. (2014[91]) for the United States, Glitz (2014[90]) for Germany, and Ansala, Åslund and Sarvimäki (2021[92]) for Finland.

[8] This value is disproportionate as compared to the corresponding work force in national accounts (mostly real-estate agents and employees of notary offices are attached to the real-estate industry in national accounts).

[9] The exercise in this section focusses on the static reallocation term, which tends to be the dominant part of reallocation for most countries. A similar exercise can be applied to the dynamic reallocation term.

[10] Note that the shares in this paragraph and the one above are shares of employment relative to employment in sectors with a measure of labour productivity, not in total employment including sectors with no available measure of labour productivity.

6 Country notes: Recent changes in migration movements and policies

Australia

Foreign-born population – 2025	32.9% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 8.8 million, 56% women	Evolution since 2015: +31%	United Kingdom (13%), India (11%), China (10%)

In 2025, Australia received 234 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -2.2% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 12% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 26% labour migrants, 53% family members (including accompanying family) and 9% humanitarian migrants. Around 158 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 312 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Sri Lanka registered the strongest increase (2 900) and China the largest decrease (-8 800) in flows to Australia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -7.2%, to reach around 23 000. The majority of applicants came from India (3 200), Indonesia (1 600) and Fiji (1 200). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of India (1 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Viet Nam (-1 000). Of the 63 000 decisions taken in 2025, 13% were positive.

Emigration of Australian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -9% in 2024, to 20 000. Approximately 24% of this group migrated to New Zealand, 17% to the United States and 16% to the United Kingdom.

Net Overseas Migration (NOM) is now forecast to be less than half this post-pandemic peak by 2026-2027. This decline is supported by Australian Government policies to strengthen the integrity of the migration system and better manage the overall volume of migrants. The Australian Government recently announced a number of migration policy changes as part of its annual Budget cycle, which will place downward pressure on NOM.

In November 2025, Australia introduced revised processing priorities for offshore student visa applications. The arrangements retained a provider-based prioritisation framework informed by allocations and integrity considerations, with the aim of supporting a more balanced distribution of international students across education providers and locations. The arrangements prioritise the order in which applications are processed; they do not impose a formal cap on international student numbers.

Australia also continued to implement measures under the Migration Amendment (Strengthening Employer Compliance) Act 2024. These measures strengthen the government's capacity to address migrant worker exploitation and employer non-compliance, including through sanctions and restrictions on employers' access to labour migration programmes. Workplace justice arrangements continued to allow eligible temporary migrants who report workplace exploitation to remain lawfully in Australia while pursuing workplace claims and remedies.

In March 2026, Australia made new legislative instruments to strengthen the regulation of registered migration agents. The measures entered into force on 1 April 2026 and enhanced continuing professional development requirements, including mandatory training on ethical standards and obligations under the Code of Conduct. They also updated qualification requirements for new entrants to the profession. The reforms support oversight of the migration advice sector by the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority (OMARA).

In May 2026, the Australian Government set the planning level for the 2026-2027 Permanent Migration Program at 185 000 places, unchanged from 2025-2026. Of the total, 132 240 places were allocated to skilled migrants and their families, with the remaining 52 760 places to support the reunification of Australian families. The programme is designed to identify, attract and enable migrants with skills needed in the Australian economy while supporting family reunion.


The government expects around 70% of places in the 2026-2027 Permanent Migration Program to be delivered to people already in Australia. Prioritising eligible onshore applicants is intended to support timely decisions and transitions to permanent residence, while helping employers retain workers with skills required in the Australian labour market.

In July 2026, income thresholds for employer-sponsored skilled migration pathways were indexed in line with average annual wage increases across the Australian economy. The revised Core Skills Income Threshold and Specialist Skills Income Threshold applies to new nominations under the Skills in Demand visa and relevant permanent employer-sponsored visa categories. Indexation is intended to maintain the thresholds' alignment with Australian labour market conditions and to support appropriate salary outcomes for sponsored workers.

For further information: www.homeaffairs.gov.au/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Australia

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	210 653	+0%
Seasonal workers	23 215	+0%
Intra-company transfers	2 375	+5%
Postdoc and researchers	8 602	+9%
Other temporary workers	67 496	0%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	2 033	+8%
International students	157 681	-13%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	22 970	-7%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	2 003	13.1	0.1
Outflows (2025)	15 860	-1.4	0.9

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	4.1	+0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11	-1.3
Total	15.1	-1

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/sdrf5c

Austria

Foreign-born population – 2025	22.9% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 2.1 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +40%	Germany (13%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (9%), Türkiye (8%)

In 2025, Austria received 82 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -20% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 62% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 6% labour migrants, 18% family members (including accompanying family) and 13% humanitarian migrants. Around 7 400 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 20 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 329 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, stable compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Germany, Ukraine and Romania were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, China registered the strongest increase (1 500) and Syria the largest decrease (-3 500) in flows to Austria compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -45%, to reach around 12 000. Most applicants came from Syria (3 000), Afghanistan (2 600) and Somalia (800). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (300) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-9 300). Of the 18 000 decisions taken in 2025, 61% were positive.

Emigration of Austrian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2024, to 15 000. Approximately 37% of this group migrated to Germany, 19% to Switzerland and 8% to Türkiye.

A three-party federal government (ÖVP, SPÖ and NEOS) took office in March 2025 and adopted a multi-year government programme setting new priorities in migration, asylum and integration. It aims to reduce irregular migration and asylum applications while further developing skilled labour migration pathways through targeted reforms to the Red-White-Red (RWR) Card system, focussing on the acceleration and simplification of related administrative procedures. Further objectives include streamlining recognition of qualifications and stronger integration obligations including by amending citizenship rule.

Work has begun to evaluate and improve the functioning of the RWR Card system, including a review of the indicators for the shortage occupation list as well as the development of measures to digitalise applications and simplify the recognition of qualifications.

As of 1 January 2026, salary and subsistence requirements for labour migration pathways were adjusted to updated reference rates. Consequently, the minimum salary thresholds for the RWR Card and the EU Blue Card increased in nominal terms only, reflecting updated average income and inflation rates. Proof-of-funds requirements for non-employment-based residence permits were also adjusted accordingly.

On 1 December 2025, the new stay permit for cross-border workers (*Aufenthaltsbewilligung – Grenzgänger)* entered into force. It enables third-country nationals residing in neighbouring countries to work in designated Austrian border districts, subject to labour market testing by the Public Employment Service. It aimed to address regional labour shortages while maintaining labour market safeguards.

Ukrainian students have been exempted from paying tuition fees since the summer semester of 2022; this regulation was extended until the end of the summer semester of 2026 through a further amendment to the Tuition Fee Ordinance in February 2026.

In 2025, Austria continued to tighten procedural controls, including closer scrutiny of family reunification applications and the reinforcement of border and registration measures. The government maintained its objective of sharply reducing asylum applications to limit pressures on reception capacity, education systems and integration services. Policy measures during late 2025 and early 2026 aimed at aligning Austria with broader EU efforts to implement stricter asylum procedures and enforce return decisions. In July 2025, Austria carried out its first forced return of a convicted Syrian national following the fall of the Assad regime, and in September 2025, the deportation of a convicted Afghan national.

Integration policy continued to be guided by the principle “promote and obligate”, combining targeted support with participation requirements. Implementation focussed on reinforcing labour market inclusion, particularly for beneficiaries of international protection and third-country nationals with temporary protection.

Digital language-learning opportunities were being expanded to further promote flexible German language learning, also alongside employment. Furthermore, Austria expanded mandatory Values and Orientation Courses from three to five days.


Building on the Integration Act 2017, the Federal Government agreed to further develop the existing legal framework by establishing a mandatory Integration Programme based on three pillars: German language acquisition, employment and values. The programme envisages close support for target groups through a case management approach, while providing for reductions in social benefits in cases of violations of defined obligations. The draft legislation is currently under negotiation.

For further information: www.migration.gv.at | www.bmi.gv.at | www.emn.at

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Austria

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	579	+0%
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	18 814	+19%
Intra-company transfers	102	-25%
Postdoc and researchers	735	-8%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	4	-20%
International students	7 357	+26%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	12 505	-44%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	3 829	10	0.7
Outflows (2025)	10 811	11.7	1.9

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-1.3	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.3	-2.1
Total	2	-2.2

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/1wirf2

Belgium

Foreign-born population – 2025	20.4% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 2.4 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +35%	Morocco (10%), France (8%), the Netherlands (6%)

In 2025, Belgium received 92 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -14% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 62% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 6% labour migrants, 22% family members (including accompanying family) and 10% humanitarian migrants. Around 10 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 229 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, stable compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

France, Romania and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the West Bank and Gaza Strip registered the strongest increase (1 000) and Romania the largest decrease (-1 400) in flows to Belgium compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -16%, to reach around 28 000. The majority of applicants came from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (2 800), Eritrea (2 600) and Afghanistan (2 400). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (500) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-3 900). Of the 30 000 decisions taken in 2025, 30% were positive.

Emigration of Belgian citizens to OECD countries remained stable in 2024, totalling 28 000. Approximately 28% of this group migrated to France, 21% to Spain and 11% to the Netherlands.

On 18 July 2025, the federal government adopted amendments to the legislation governing family reunification. This reform included, among others, a raise of the minimum income requirements for sponsors to 110% of the average guaranteed minimum monthly income, with additional increases per dependant. The exemption period allowing recognised refugees to apply for family reunification without meeting the material conditions was reduced from one year to six months. The exemption period for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to meet the material conditions was abolished. Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection became subject to a two-year waiting period and the possibility for unaccompanied minors with subsidiary protection to apply for family reunification with their parents was abolished. Furthermore, the minimum age for family reunification with a spouse or partner was raised from 18 to 21 years. Federal authorities presented the reforms as strengthening financial autonomy and integration capacity among families admitted through reunification.

In February 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court suspended various amendments introduced by the law, such as the abolishment of the exemption period to meet the material conditions for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection as well as the two-year waiting period applicable to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. The suspensions are pending the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

In July 2025, Belgium passed a law substantially increasing the administrative fee for obtaining Belgian nationality, raising it from EUR 150 to EUR 1 000, with automatic annual indexation. The measure formally entered into force on 29 July 2025. Federal authorities framed the reform as reinforcing the value of nationality and individual responsibility.

In Flanders, reforms implemented in January 2026 narrowed access to the single permit system by further prioritising highly qualified occupations and terminating eligibility for low-skilled workers (excluding seasonal workers). In October 2025, the Flemish Government adopted a decision to strengthen liability in subcontracting chains through an extension of the duty of care, to enhance oversight of subcontracting arrangements. The Flemish Government also started the preparation of a pre-arrival integration trajectory for labour migrants, as well as their family members. Its implementation is planned for 2027.

In May 2025, the Walloon Government adopted amendments extending the compulsory integration pathway from 18 months to three years, with phased implementation beginning in September 2025. The extension aimed to allow greater flexibility in completing language, citizenship and socio-professional modules.

Integration policy adjustments in Wallonia also included changes to language requirements. From January 2025, exemptions from French language obligations were broadened, and an overall A2 average across competencies became sufficient for completing the language component. Participants below this level can undertake civic integration training in another language. In early 2026, regional integration centres in Wallonia were formally mandated to support labour market inclusion, complementing existing services, including the public employment service, through coaching, skills profiling and employer outreach.


In order to improve co-ordination of migration and asylum management, in March 2026 the Council of Ministers approved the new Federal Public Service on Migration, around four Directorates-General: Protection; Access and Stay; Reception; and Return.

For further information: www.dofi.ibz.be | www.myria.be | www.statbel.fgov.be

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Belgium

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	471	+2%
Working holidaymakers	179	+12%
Seasonal workers	34	-6%
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	344	-14%
Other temporary workers	27	+35%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	338	+1%
International students	10 480	+7%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	27 540	-16%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	16 347	5.6	2.3
Outflows (2025)	11 222	11	1.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-0.3	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	6.4	-0.8
Total	6	-1

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/0ax1mc

Bulgaria

Foreign-born population – 2025	3.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.2 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2015: +99%	Russia (15%), Ukraine (13%), Türkiye (9%)

In 2025, 16 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Bulgaria (excluding EU citizens), 29.8% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 69.9% labour migrants, 13.6% family members (including accompanying family), 6.1% who came for education reasons and 10.5% other migrants. Around 1 500 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 16 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, an 8% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Syria and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Syria registered the strongest increase (500) and Türkiye the largest decrease (-2 600) in flows to Bulgaria compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -69%, to reach around 3 800. The majority of applicants came from Morocco (1 000), Afghanistan (900) and Syria (800). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Morocco (95) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-6 800). Of the 4 660 decisions taken in 2025, 21% were positive.

Emigration of Bulgarian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -19% in 2024, to 65 000. Approximately 43% of this group migrated to Germany, 17% to the Netherlands and 10% to Spain.

In September 2025, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Strategy for Migration and Asylum Management 2025-2030, which sets priorities for border management, asylum procedures, return policy, labour migration and integration, aligning national objectives with the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. It emphasised security, procedural efficiency and labour market needs, while acknowledging weaknesses in integration capacity that require gradual strengthening.

Throughout 2025, Bulgaria intensified border management measures in the context of its full accession to the Schengen Area, which took effect on 1 January 2025 for land borders. During the first half of 2025, transitional arrangements remained in place at the borders with Austria and Hungary under bilateral agreements, while internal checks were gradually reduced.

Efforts continued to improve the efficiency of asylum procedures and reception conditions, while the competent authorities pursued measures in the field of return. Bulgaria continued its preparations for the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, including measures aimed at strengthening the national asylum and reception system. Particular attention was given to improving reception capacity and conditions, enhancing support for vulnerable applicants and unaccompanied minors, strengthening the administrative capacity of the State Agency for Refugees, and further digitalising and modernising asylum procedures and reception infrastructure.

In October 2025, Bulgaria and Switzerland signed a framework agreement to support Bulgaria in strengthening its asylum procedure and structures and improving reception facilities for vulnerable migrants.

Labour migration remained a central policy concern as Bulgaria faced acute workforce shortages in construction, manufacturing agriculture and tourism. On 1 July 2025, amendments to the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria Act entered into force. These amendments tightened conditions for residence as a representative of a foreign commercial company and formally introduced a legal basis for digital nomad residence.

Further legislative amendments revised employment-based residence regimes, including the EU Single Permit and the EU Blue Card. Changes removed proof of accommodation requirement prior to entry and granted access to public health insurance for permit holders.

Salary and subsistence thresholds for employment-based and non-employment residence permits were increased from 1 January 2026, reflecting updated social security reference values.

In February 2026, public consultation of a Draft Law on Asylum and International Protection was launched. Changes have been introduced following this consultation that will be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.

In November 2025, the Council of Ministers adopted an updated Programme for Humanitarian Support and Integration of Persons Displaced from Ukraine, extending housing, employment and social inclusion support for beneficiaries of temporary protection. This programme reinforced labour market access and local-level integration mechanisms.


Measures to encourage return migration included labour market integration programmes and the launch of the “I Choose Bulgaria” programme in August 2025. The programme offers financial and logistical support to returning Bulgarian citizens, such as relocation assistance of up to EUR 2 556 within the EU and EUR 5 112 outside the EU, information about the job market, assistance from the Employment Agency in finding a job and financial support for accommodation.

For further information: www.aref.government.bg | www.mvr.bg

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Bulgaria

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	1 213	-17%
Family	2 927	-3%
Education	1 481	+11%
Other	1 670	+30%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	3 800	-69%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	2 752	4.1	2.1
Outflows (2025)	559	32.1	0.4

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-7.7	-0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.5	-0.6
Total	-2.2	-0.9

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/rf8vgn

Canada

Foreign-born population – 2021	22% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 8.4 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2014: +17%	China (11%), India (11%), Philippines (9%)

In 2025, Canada received 394 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -19% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 32% labour migrants, 50% family members (including accompanying family) and 15% humanitarian migrants. Around 158 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 134 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Cameroon registered the strongest increase (9 500) and India the largest decrease (-12 000) in flows to Canada compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -33%, to reach around 116 000. The majority of applicants came from Haiti (18 000), India (18 000) and Iran (6 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Haiti (9 900) and the largest decrease nationals of India (-14 000). Of the 97 000 decisions taken in 2025, 55% were positive.

Emigration of Canadian citizens to OECD countries increased by 1% in 2024, to 40 000. Approximately 53% of this group migrated to the United States, 6% to the United Kingdom and 5% to Korea.

Canada's recent migration policy was guided by the 2025-2026 Departmental Plan of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the 2025-2027 Immigration Levels Plan, tabled in Parliament in October 2024. For the first time, the Levels Plan incorporated targets for temporary residents, extending migration planning beyond permanent admissions.

A major policy development was the adoption of the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act in March 2026, following parliamentary debates during late 2025 and early 2026. The legislation introduced new eligibility rules for asylum claims, applicable to all claims made on or after 3 June 2025.

Under the new framework, claims made more than one year after a person's first entry into Canada after 24 June 2020, and claims submitted more than 14 days after irregular entry at the Canada-United States land border, are no longer referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board. Individuals affected remain eligible for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, and the Safe Third Country Agreement continued to apply unchanged.

In parallel, IRCC initiated regulatory work during late 2025 and early 2026 to modernise asylum processing, including digital intake, standardisation of claims across entry channels and removal of inactive cases. These operational changes formed part of a broader effort to manage caseloads and improve co-ordination with the Immigration and Refugee Board.

Canada maintained temporary measures for Ukrainians admitted under the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET), including extensions allowing eligible individuals to apply for new or renewed work or study permits until 31 March 2026. Access to settlement services and administrative deferrals of removal also continued.

Canada also expanded humanitarian responses to other displacement crises. In 2025, the government committed to resettle up to 4 000 Sudanese Government-Assisted Refugees by the end of 2026 and facilitate the resettlement of additional Sudanese refugees through private sponsorship and family reunification measures.

Significant adjustments were made to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program and the International Mobility Program in 2025 and 2026, including higher wage thresholds, regional eligibility restrictions linked to unemployment levels, and more limited access to spousal open work permits. Employer compliance requirements and inspection regimes were also strengthened during 2025.

Economic immigration policy also evolved during the period. In March 2025, Canada removed additional Express Entry points previously awarded for arranged employment, as part of broader efforts to strengthen programme integrity. In January 2025, Canada launched the Rural Community Immigration Pilot and the Francophone Community Immigration Pilot to support regional labour market needs and strengthen Francophone minority communities outside Quebec.

Integration policy continued to focus on labour market participation, language acquisition and settlement services, supported by ongoing digitalisation initiatives and enhanced intergovernmental information-sharing.


In December 2025, the government passed Bill C-3, to amend the Citizenship Act. Before this legislation, citizenship by descent was generally limited to the first generation born abroad. The changes expanded access to citizenship by descent for certain individuals born outside Canada beyond the first generation and introduced a framework based on a substantial connection to Canada.

For further information: www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship.html

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Canada

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	45 435	-15%
Seasonal workers	2 180	-24%
Intra-company transfers	5 760	-31%
Postdoc and researchers	4 520	+2%
Other temporary workers	76 145	-47%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	90 772	-57%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	115 838	-33%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	834	-2	0
Outflows (2025)	15 115	-0.7	0.7

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	0.8	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	8.7	-20.8
Total	9.4	-20.9

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/7g9z6b

Chile

Foreign-born population – 2024	9.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.9 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2014: +334%	Venezuela (38%), Peru (14%), Colombia (11%)

Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Bolivia registered the strongest increase (28 000) and Mexico the largest decrease (-200) in flows to Chile compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -78%, to reach around 500. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (300), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (93) and Colombia (58). The largest decrease since 2024 concerned nationals of Venezuela (-1 200). Of the 2 230 decisions taken in 2025, 8% were positive.

Emigration of Chilean citizens to OECD countries decreased slightly by -2% in 2024, to 18 000. Approximately 47% of this group migrated to Spain, 15% to the United States and 9% to Germany.

In July 2025, the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs issued new general guidelines for visa issuance, standardising procedures between consular offices and the National Migration Service (SERMIG), while expanding the use of digital applications and electronic processing. SERMIG also introduced organisational reforms to strengthen regional implementation capacity, particularly in areas most affected by irregular migration flows.

In March 2025, an Innovation Committee was established to modernise processes and improve public services. In August 2025, additional operational responsibilities were delegated to regional offices in the northern border regions, which are particularly affected by irregular migration. The Armed Forces continued to support migration surveillance and control operations in the north under existing mechanisms, alongside co-operation between migration, police and defence authorities. Monitoring of irregular entries and implementation of removal procedures were also strengthened.

Throughout 2025 and 2026, Parliament continued considering several initiatives to amend Migration and Immigration Law No. 21.325, making migration policy a major legislative and public-policy priority. Key proposals include criminalising and sanctioning irregular entry; strengthening administrative removal powers, including allowing the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI), subject to judicial authorisation, to enter the residence of a foreign national subject to a removal order; and introducing certain restrictions on access to state-funded benefits for persons in irregular immigration status, as provided by law.

A constitutional reform initiative was also introduced to extend the maximum period for detaining foreign nationals for removal purposes from the current five-day limit to up to 180 consecutive days, in order to facilitate consular and operational co-ordination.

Since taking office on 11 March 2026, President José Antonio Kast has introduced changes to migration and foreign policy aimed at ensuring the orderly, regular and secure management of migration flows, in accordance with applicable law. The approach seeks to reconcile migration management with public order, national security and sovereignty, while safeguarding migrants' fundamental rights. It prioritises regular migration channels and compliance with legal requirements, while strengthening state capacity to monitor and manage migration flows and discouraging irregular entry and stay.

The current migration policy does not provide for mass regularisation programmes. Instead, it prioritises existing residence categories and ordinary legal regularisation mechanisms, with the aim of maintaining an exceptional approach to regularisation and promoting predictable, sustainable and legally established migration pathways.


Key measures include the Border Shield Plan, which provides for physical barriers, enhanced surveillance technologies and increased military presence along the northern borders, particularly with Peru and Bolivia. The strategy aims to strengthen border control, combat transnational organised crime, and deter irregular entry. As a result, irregular entries reportedly decreased by 31% compared with the same period of the previous year.

President Kast also announced a Voluntary Departure Plan to facilitate the return of irregular migrants to their countries of origin, including those who entered through unauthorised crossings or remained in the country after their tourist permits had expired. Participants would avoid sanctions for the infringement committed and could subsequently obtain temporary residence.


For further information: www.extranjeria.gob.cl | www.serviciomigraciones.cl/en/home/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Chile


Long-term immigration flows
2024 (Source: OECD)




Inflows of asylum seekers
(Sources: UNHCR)



Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	100	0	0
Outflows (2025)	691	-0.1	0.2

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	1.9	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.9	-0.3
Total	4.8	-0.6

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/6rhoqn

Colombia

Foreign-born population – 2024	5.8% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 3.1 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: +2 005%	Venezuela (95%), the United States (1%), Ecuador (1%)

The United States, Venezuela and Peru were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the United States registered the strongest increase (2 500) and Venezuela the largest decrease (-1 500) in flows to Colombia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 17%, to reach around 8 200. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (7 700), Cuba (200) and Ecuador (84). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Venezuela (1 300) and the largest decrease nationals of Cuba (-55). Of the 20 000 decisions taken in 2025, 1% were positive.

Emigration of Colombian citizens to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2024, to 252 000. Approximately 67% of this group migrated to Spain, 12% to the United States and 7% to Chile.

During 2025-2026, Colombia continued to co-operate with international and regional partners on refugee protection, socio-economic inclusion and long-term solutions for displaced populations, while maintaining its role as the main host country for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the region.

National and local authorities continued to develop programmes to support the social and economic integration of Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Measures focussed on access to employment, education, healthcare and local services, as well as support for host communities in areas receiving large numbers of migrants.

Between May 2025 and June 2026, Colombia continued to implement the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPV), with administrative efforts focussed on issuing and delivering Temporary Protection Permits (PPT) to eligible beneficiaries in order to promote their integration. National authorities, with the support of international organisations, continued working to complete documentation procedures for Venezuelans already registered in the programme. In August 2025, UNHCR reported that co-operation with Colombian authorities was continuing to support the issuance of Temporary Protection Permits and the inclusion of permit holders in national systems, while strengthening social cohesion and local integration programmes. During the period, public debate increasingly focussed on Venezuelans who remained without access to regularisation mechanisms after the ETPV registration process closed, as well as on possible alternative pathways to obtain regular status and access services, particularly for those who had arrived more recently.

During 2025, the authorities continued to implement measures associated with the closure of registration under the ETPV, which had ended for new applicants in 2023. Public policy discussions increasingly focussed on migrants who arrived after the registration deadline and therefore remained outside the main regularisation mechanism. During 2025-2026, existing residence and visa channels continued to be used to address individual cases.

A notable development during the period was the operational rollout of the Special Stay Permit for legal representatives of Venezuelan children and adolescents (PEP Tutor). Regulated by Resolution 2451 of 2025, the application period is scheduled from 1 September 2025 to 31 December 2026. Migración Colombia issued the first permits in March 2026, initially in ten cities; coverage was subsequently expanded to 24 additional cities.

The permit grants regular immigration status and work authorisation to the legal representatives of minors who held a PPT or whose PPT had been approved before 31 December 2023. It is valid until 30 May 2031 and will not be renewable.


In January 2026, the government prepared contingency plans for a possible increase in arrivals from Venezuela. The authorities developed a phased response framework for border regions and reception areas, including provisions for registration, humanitarian assistance and co-ordination with local authorities in the event of a significant increase in migration flows.

Decree 071 of 27 January 2026 formalised the elevation of the internal Working Group “Colombia Nos Une” to “Colombia Nos Une” Directorate, attached to the Vice-Ministry of Migration, Consular Affairs and International Protection, previously created by Decree 1081 – 15 October 2025. This complemented the institutional architecture of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the lead agency for the care of Colombians abroad, returning nationals and the regular migrant population in the national territory.

For further information: www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Colombia

Long-term immigration flows
(Sources: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: National source, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	230	14%
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	130	-4%
Other temporary workers	21 000	-3%


Education

	2019	2019/18
Trainees	..	..
International students	4 060	-13%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	8 244	+17%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	13 129	10.6	2.9
Outflows (2025)	429	5.5	0.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	6.4	-0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2	-0.7
Total	8.4	-1.1

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/anq4c2

Costa Rica

Foreign-born population – 2024	12.3% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size : 0.6 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2015: +53%	Nicaragua (67%), Venezuela (5%), Colombia (5%)

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 4.5%, to reach around 30 000. The majority of applicants came from Nicaragua (23 000), Cuba (3 300) and Venezuela (1 700). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Cuba (2 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Nicaragua (-400). Of the 70 000 decisions taken in 2025, 1% were positive.

Emigration of Costa Rican citizens to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2024, to 4 400. Approximately 68% of this group migrated to the United States, 6% to Germany and 5% to Mexico.

Migration governance in Costa Rica is framed by the General Migration and Foreigners Law (Law No. 8 764 of 2009) and the competencies of the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, DGME), operating under the Ministry of Governance and Police.

Costa Rica's migration policy aligns with international protection commitments and regional co-ordination mechanisms, including co-operation with UN agencies and Inter-American frameworks. Institutional co-ordination between DGME and sectoral authorities remained central to service delivery and migration governance.

In May 2026, the DGME created a special temporary supplementary category for Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, Cuban and Colombian nationals whose asylum applications are pending or have been rejected. This humanitarian measure aims to allow them to remain legally in the country. To access this category, individuals must meet previously established requirements and conditions. Those who obtain this status may work freely, either self-employed or as employees. The permit is granted for two-year periods and can be renewed for equal periods. To leave the country, beneficiaries do not require an exit permit, only compliance with the departure and re-entry requirements established by the DGME. The measure takes effect on 1 September 2026.

In March 2026, the government signed an agreement to accept 25 deported migrants per week from the United States. Deported people will be granted a temporary legal status.

As of 16 March 2026, the DGME allows certain regularisation applications to be submitted through selected Costa Rica Post offices. This initiative aims to improve accessibility and expand service coverage, although decisions regarding processing, analysis and resolution remain the exclusive responsibility of the DGME.

Costa Rica's asylum system remained under sustained administrative pressure. In response, DGME implemented procedural measures during 2025 aimed at accelerating the processing of refugee status requests. The strategy combining case file review, closure of inactive applications and prioritisation criteria, supported by a reinforcement of review staff.


Alongside asylum procedures, Costa Rica adopted time-limited regularisation and exceptional admission measures. In March 2025, the government published a resolution in *La Gaceta* extending exceptional authorisations for temporary admission, stay and documentation of certain foreign nationals deported to Costa Rica from the United States. These measures were grounded in humanitarian considerations and applied on a discretionary basis by DGME.

In July 2025, DGME adopted additional resolutions allowing temporary regularisation for specific groups under humanitarian criteria, authorising lawful stay and access to remunerated activities for a defined period.

For further information: www.migracion.go.cr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Costa Rica

Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)



Temporary migration
(Sources: National source, UNHCR)

Education

	2021	2021/20
International students	2 904	9%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	29 559	+5%


Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	853	17.7	0.8
Outflows (2025)	665	5.7	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	4.3	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.9	-0.1
Total	5.2	-0.4

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/8yxq0v

Croatia

Foreign-born population – 2025	14.2% of the population
Size: 0.5 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: 0%

In 2025, 5 500 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Croatia (excluding EU citizens), 82.1% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 64.5% labour migrants, 26.5% family members (including accompanying family), 1.7% who came for education reasons and 7.3% other migrants. Around 300 short-term permits were issued to international students and 44 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 33 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -52% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Nepal, Bosnia and Herzegovina and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nepal registered the strongest increase (4 200) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-9 600) in flows to Croatia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased to 800. The majority of applicants came from Türkiye (200), Russia (100) and Syria (75). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Nepal (40) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-100). Of the 290 decisions taken in 2025, 9% were positive.

Emigration of Croatian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -25% in 2024, to 22 000. Approximately 39% of this group migrated to Germany, 27% to Austria and 9% to Switzerland.

A year after the extensive amendments to Croatia's Law on Foreigners in 2025, further amendments entered into force on 4 June 2026 to address growing pressure from rising foreign labour migration, labour-market abuses and the need to align Croatian rules with EU migration policies. The reform introduces stricter oversight of employers, clearer border screening procedures, and several changes aimed at modernising the residence and work permit system.

Key labour-market reforms include a new Croatian language requirement for some permit renewals, starting in 2027, easier employer changes for foreign workers already holding permits, multi-year seasonal work permits valid up to three years, and longer official deadlines for authorities to process work permit applications.

The law also expands protections and flexibility for foreign workers. Workers who lose their jobs may now remain unemployed for longer periods while searching for new employment, and both employers and workers must report employment termination to the authorities. Croatia is also introducing a special long-term visa for non-EU truck and bus drivers to avoid Schengen 90-day stay limitations that disrupt transport and logistics. Additional practical changes include extending the address registration deadline from 3 to 15 days after arrival, and the possibility for international students to receive residence permits covering the full duration of their study programme, up to three years.

Another major focus of the reform is tighter regulation and stronger monitoring. Croatia is formalising border screening procedures for irregular migrants as part of the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, including identity, health and vulnerability checks in designated facilities. At the same time, the government introduced stricter employer obligations regarding accommodation and health status for foreign workers. Employer-provided housing must now meet minimum living standards, occupancy limits and rent caps, while foreign workers must submit a certificate of health and vaccination status, which must not be more than 90-days old. The reforms aim both to reduce exploitation of foreign workers and to create a more controlled, transparent immigration framework.

The City of Zagreb launched a public consultation in November 2025, on its 2026-2030 integration programme, supporting migrant inclusion through accessible services and intercultural initiatives. The proposal encourages co-operation between public institutions, civil society, businesses and local residents to strengthen social cohesion. Its priorities include inclusive governance, stronger integration capacities and greater public awareness for migrant workers, asylum applicants, and beneficiaries of international protection.


Croatian Parliament enacted adopted amendments to the law on international and temporary protection, which is in force from 12 June 2026. Amendments to the Law stem from the need to transpose and align with the Directive and Regulations that are part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum.

For further information: https://emn.gov.hr | https://mup.gov.hr/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Croatia

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	43 847	-48%
Family	1 075	-23%
Education	287	-19%
Other	275	-65%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	845	-16%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	6 705	10.3	7.2
Outflows (2024)	1 966	52.4	2.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-4.5	+0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.9	-3.2
Total	0.4	-2.8

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/24h8k0

Czechia

Foreign-born population – 2025	10.3% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.1 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +163%	Ukraine (49%), the Slovak Republic (21%), Russia (4%)

In 2025, Czechia received 43 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 7.4% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 30% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 43% labour migrants, 26% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 4 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 108 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 37% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, the Slovak Republic and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, the Philippines registered the strongest increase (1 000) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-21 000) in flows to Czechia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -9.7%, to reach around 900. The majority of applicants came from Viet Nam (200), Ukraine (100) and Uzbekistan (90). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Viet Nam (30) and the largest decrease nationals of Uzbekistan (-85). Of the 570 decisions taken in 2025, 20% were positive.

Emigration of Czech citizens to OECD countries decreased by -8% in 2024, to 13 000. Approximately 30% of this group migrated to Germany, 11% to Austria and 9% to the Netherlands.

In February 2025, the Digital Nomad Programme was expanded to include nationals of Brazil, Israel, Mexico and Singapore. At the same time, eligibility was extended beyond IT specialists to include marketing, reflecting a widening of occupational coverage. These changes remained applicable throughout the reference period.

From March 2025, the relaxed work authorisation rules introduced for nationals of Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States were extended to include nationals of Chinese Taipei.

On 16 April 2025, the parliament supported the amendment relating to tightening of asylum and migration rules. The aim has been to enhance the security of population and improve the knowledge about movement and stay of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in the territory.

The Czech Government approved a draft new Act on the Entry and Residence of Foreign Nationals in March 2026. It aims to modernise and digitalise immigration procedures and is planned to be effective as of January 2029. A new online system called ICAS will manage immigration and residence processes. Foreign nationals, employers and other institutions will use ICAS to upload documents and communicate with authorities. Registration will become mandatory for EU citizens staying more than 90 days, to improve planning for healthcare, education and infrastructure.

The employment of foreign nationals in Czechia has been undergoing a gradual digitalisation process since July 2024, when all registrations, deregistrations and employment-related changes became subject to mandatory online submission, replacing paper-based and in-person procedures. A major milestone was reached on 1 April 2026 with the launch of the Unified Monthly Employer Reporting System (JMHZ), which consolidates several employer reporting obligations into a single electronic submission. In the area of foreign employment, JMHZ replaced previous notification procedures with a unified registration process requiring employers to report foreign workers before they start work. By enabling timely registration and more effective data sharing across public institutions, the system helps detect undeclared work, strengthens labour inspections and contributes to preventing illegal employment and the exploitation of foreign workers.

On 25 May 2026, the Prime Minister announced the government had approved a draft bill under which recipients of temporary protection who would apply for social support would have to be employed self-employed or registered with employment services. They would also have to reside in Czechia for at least 16 days per month for which the aid is paid. These conditions would not apply to children, students or the older people. Temporary protection is also expected to end for those individuals staying outside the Schengen Area for more than 30 days.


Since 1 June 2026, applicants under the Key and Scientific Personnel Programme and the Highly Skilled Employee Programme are generally no longer required to submit criminal record certificates from countries where they resided for more than six months during the previous three years. Instead, they may demonstrate their good conduct through a statutory declaration, simplifying and accelerating residence permit procedures.

For further information: www.mvcr.cz | www.mpsv.cz | www.cizinci.cz

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Czechia

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	549	-2%
Intra-company transfers	357	+26%
Postdoc and researchers	496	-16%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	4 509	-11%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	935	-10%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	4 925	8.2	1.3
Outflows (2025)	5 959	16.6	1.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-3.3	-0.7
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.9	+0.5
Total	0.6	-0.2

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/317r2m

Denmark

Foreign-born population – 2025	12.6% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.8 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +50%	Poland (6%), Ukraine (6%), Romania (5%)

In 2025, Denmark received 52 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -4% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 55% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 23% labour migrants, 20% family members (including accompanying family) and 2% humanitarian migrants. Around 10 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 4 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 55 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -13% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Romania and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nepal registered the strongest increase (1 100) and Poland the largest decrease (-1 000) in flows to Denmark compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -16%, to reach around 1 900. The majority of applicants came from Eritrea (300), Afghanistan (1 100) and Syria (1 300). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Pakistan (50) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-300). Of the 1 200 decisions taken in 2025, 35% were positive.

Emigration of Danish citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2024, to 9 600. Approximately 19% of this group migrated to Sweden, 12% to Spain and 10% to Norway.

On 25 June 2026, the Danish Government proposed a law introducing a new Pay Limit Scheme where the minimum salary required is DKK 322 000 per year (2026). The scheme builds on a common understanding with the Danish social partners concluded in June 2025. The scheme will cover nationals of 16 non-EU countries, linking eligibility to employment covered by specific collective wage agreements and to companies subject to such agreements. To be able to use the scheme, companies must be fulfilling a number of requirements to ensure decent working conditions and be certified by the Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI). The scheme will require a close co-operation between the immigration authorities and the social partners, who will be responsible for monitoring that the collective agreements are respected by the employer.

On 7 October 2025, the Danish government introduced a quota system to ensure that the recruitment of foreign healthcare professionals follows the actual demand in the health and care sector. Consequently, a zero-quota currently applies to foreign nurses and doctors seeking Danish professional authorisation, implying that foreign nurses and doctors, as well as their accompanying family members, cannot obtain a residence permit for the purpose of obtaining Danish authorisation due to lack of demand in the healthcare sector.

Following the parliamentary decisions in June 2024 and November 2024 respectively to participate in those parts of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum linked to the Schengen and “Dublin” now AMMR co-operation, a national implementation bill was presented to parliament in late 2025 and debated during early 2026. However, due to the Danish election and the parliamentary situation in Denmark from February to May 2026 a new national implementation bill was presented to parliament on 25 June 2026 and was passed at the end of August 2026. The new legislation entered into force on 3 September 2026.

From 15 June 2025, rules on suspending sentence for the purpose of return were expanded to include a larger group of foreigners, who have been expelled by court ruling, making it possible to suspend imprisonment sentences of up to one year if immediate return is possible. With effect from 1 January 2026 legislative changes were introduced with the aim of restricting access to some publicly funded services for foreigners without legal residence, and stricter control measures were introduced for foreigners without legal residence who are subject to return procedures.

In accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, Denmark on 12 June 2026 prolonged the temporary border control to run until 11 November 2026.

Residence permits issued under the Special Act for displaced persons from Ukraine were extended until March 2027.


From July 2025, Denmark implemented a new three-tier social assistance framework replacing the previous “self-sufficiency and return benefit” system. The reform introduced differentiated minimum, basic and enhanced benefit levels and linked access to benefits more closely to participation in employment-related activities, Danish language instruction and municipal activation programmes.

For further information: www.uim.dk (in Danish) | www.nyidanmark.dk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Denmark

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	493	-17%
Working holidaymakers	929	+19%
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	188	-36%
Other temporary workers	2 572	-26%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	2 603	+6%
International students	10 358	-10%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 865	-16%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	1 519	-0.1	0.4
Outflows (2024)	4 846	9.7	1.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	0.2	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.3	0
Total	5.5	+0.2

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/0e18du

Estonia

Foreign-born population – 2025	17.9% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.2 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2015: +24%	Russia (25%), Ukraine (23%), Belarus (3%)

In 2025, Estonia received 7 500 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -16% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 39% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 29% labour migrants, 22% family members (including accompanying family) and 10% humanitarian migrants. Around 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 4 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 6 500 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -28% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and Finland were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, France registered the strongest increase (90) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-6 100) in flows to Estonia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -24%, to reach around 1 000. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (900), Russia (30) and Belarus (15). The largest decrease concerns nationals of Ukraine (-300). Of the 810 decisions taken in 2025, 93% were positive.

Emigration of Estonian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2024, to 4 300. Approximately 25% of this group migrated to Finland, 12% to Germany and 9% to the Netherlands.

In May 2026, Estonia adopted two labour migration reforms. Amendments transposing the recast EU Single Permit Directive allow holders of temporary residence permits for employment to change employers without applying for a new residence permit, subject to registration by the new employer. They may remain unemployed for up to three or six months depending on how long the permit has been valid, and up to nine months in exceptional cases. The amendments also allow continued employment while an application to extend or replace the residence permit is pending and raise maximum fines for certain serious infringements by legal persons to EUR 100 000. A separate reform introduced an additional route for workers in sectors experiencing labour shortages, exempt from the ordinary immigration quota and labour-market test, with a separate annual ceiling linked to economic conditions.

In a judgment of 23 March 2026 concerning family reunification, the Supreme Court ruled that the definition of a refugee's family member was unconstitutional insofar as it excluded a de facto cohabiting partner who had lived with the refugee before the refugee's arrival in Estonia and for whom marriage or registration of a partnership had been legally impossible in the country of origin.

On 12 June 2026, a new Act on Granting International Protection to Aliens entered into force to implement the reform of the EU asylum and migration framework. It introduced new border and asylum procedures, clarified applicants' obligations and strengthened procedural safeguards, including access to legal assistance at an earlier stage.

Border management remained a major operational priority. Estonia implemented projects focussed on surveillance systems, telecommunications infrastructure, mobile identification technologies and counter-drone capabilities. Estonia also participated in the progressive rollout of the EU Entry/Exit System from October 2025; the system became fully operational on 10 April 2026.

As of 31 March 2025, Estonia ceased recognising non-biometric Russian foreign passports for entry and for the issuance of Estonian Schengen visas. Authorities implemented the transitional arrangements allowing holders of Estonian or other EU residence permits to enter with non-biometric passports until 30 September 2025.

On 8 May 2025, Estonia introduced a visa requirement for holders of Georgian diplomatic and service passports, implementing the relevant EU decision. In July 2025, amendments entered into force allowing applications for e-resident digital identity cards to be returned without examination where the applicant is a national of a country presenting a higher money-laundering or terrorist-financing risk, or a country with which Estonia lacks sufficient judicial, security or law-enforcement co-operation.

In 2026, Estonia expanded mandatory integration requirements. From 1 January, completion of the basic module of the Settle in Estonia adaptation programme and A2-level Estonian became requirements for a temporary residence permit for settling permanently in Estonia, subject to statutory exemptions. From June, applicants for international protection were required to complete a 16-hour settling-in module and A1-level Estonian-language training.


Following the EU-level decision adopted in July 2026, temporary protection for persons displaced from Ukraine was extended until 4 March 2028.

For further information: www.kul.ee | www.siseministeerium.ee | www.politsei.ee | www.emn.ee

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Estonia

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	808	-11%
Intra-company transfers	1	+0%
Postdoc and researchers	59	+13%
Other temporary workers	3 294	-9%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	464	-5%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 005	-24%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	536	8.1	1.1
Outflows (2025)	291	10	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-4.7	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-2.1	-3.1
Total	-6.8	-3.4

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/46ra3i

Finland

Foreign-born population – 2025	10.4% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.6 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2015: +81%	Former USSR (14%), Estonia (8%), Sweden (6%)

In 2025, Finland received 34 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -3% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 14% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 15% labour migrants, 61% family members (including accompanying family) and 8% humanitarian migrants. Around 10 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 5 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 34 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -12% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, the Philippines and Nepal were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nepal registered the strongest increase (1 400) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-5 900) in flows to Finland compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -13%, to reach around 2 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (300), Somalia (200) and Iraq (100). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (100) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-100). Of the 4 150 decisions taken in 2025, 50% were positive.

Emigration of Finnish citizens to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2024, to 9 300. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Sweden, 13% to Spain and 10% to the Netherlands.

In January 2025, amendments to residence permit rules shortened initial residence permits for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, reinforcing the temporary nature of international protection and introducing more frequent reassessment.

In May 2025, Finland extensively amended the Aliens Act to increase the efficiency of asylum and migration procedures. The reforms modified asylum interview procedures, limited the right of beneficiaries of international protection to travel to their countries of origin, introduced faster enforcement of removal decisions for rejected applications, established a formal obligation to co-operate with authorities following a negative asylum or residence permit decision, tightened rules on entry bans, extended the maximum detention period from 12 to 18 months in matters related to removal decisions, and clarified the conditions for withdrawing residence permits.

Legislative amendments concerning family reunification entered into force in June 2025, introducing a minimum age of 21 for both the sponsor and the spouse (with an exemption for Finnish citizens as sponsors), and a new residence requirement of at least two years under a residence permit where the sponsor is a beneficiary of international protection.

In June 2025, Finland introduced a three- or six-month unemployment period for labour migrants during which residence permits remain valid while job seeking continues. The duration depends on how long the permit has been valid (three months if under two years, six months if two years or more), with longer protection periods for certain specialist categories such as EU Blue Card holders.

At the same time, the scope of work permitted under existing residence permits was broadened to facilitate re-employment. Holders of a residence permit for an employed person may work in occupations in shortage without applying for a new permit, even if those occupations differ from the field for which their permit was originally granted. The government's shortage occupation list is subject to regular review to reflect labour market needs.

The Finnish Government submitted a legislative package to Parliament on 16 April 2026 to implement the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. The proposal covered screening procedures, reception conditions, safe country concepts and return arrangements. The new national legislation entered into application on 12 June 2026.

As of January 2026, Finland has tightened the requirements for permanent residence permits by increasing the general residence requirement from four to six years and introducing new language proficiency and employment history requirements (generally at least two years of work experience). Faster access after four years of residence remains possible for individuals who meet specific integration criteria, including high income levels, advanced Finnish or Swedish language skills, or a higher education degree.


Amendments to the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration, entering into force in January 2027, will place greater responsibility on immigrants for their own integration. The amendments focus on streamlining the integration and literacy training and its financing while enhancing the role of labour market training. Amendments to the Citizenship Act introducing a citizenship test enter into force in January 2027.

For further information: https://intermin.fi/ | https://tem.fi/ | www.emn.fi

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Finland

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	44	-12%
Working holidaymakers	207	-1%
Seasonal workers	3 689	-2%
Intra-company transfers	98	+27%
Postdoc and researchers	1 051	-15%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	68	+10%
International students	10 486	-14%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 970	-13%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	876	8.3	0.3
Outflows (2025)	1 777	12.9	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-2.4	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.4	-2.9
Total	3	-2.7

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/xvn5b4

France

Foreign-born population – 2025	14.5% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 9.6 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2015: +23%	Algeria (15%), Morocco (12%), Portugal (6%)

In 2025, France received 334 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 8.9% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 21% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 16% labour migrants, 32% family members (including accompanying family) and 22% humanitarian migrants. Around 109 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 35 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 472 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 26% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Haiti registered the strongest increase (1 900) and Romania the largest decrease (-1 900) in flows to France compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -10%, to reach around 116 000. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (12 000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (12 000) and Afghanistan (11 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2 300) and the largest decrease nationals of Guinea (-2 600). Of the 151 000 decisions taken in 2025, 40% were positive.

Emigration of French citizens to OECD countries increased by 3% in 2024, to 108 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Switzerland, 15% to Spain and 11% to Belgium.

In 2026, immigration law in France enters a new phase. Several major reforms stemming from the law of 26 January 2024, aimed at controlling immigration and improving integration, are now fully applicable.

The 2024 law maintained until 31 December 2026 an exceptional regularisation procedure for foreign workers present in the country and working in so-called “shortage” occupations. In January 2025, the Minister of the Interior issued a circular that reaffirmed the exceptional nature of the procedure and instructed prefectures to place greater emphasis on integration, knowledge of French, respect for republican values and public-order considerations when assessing applications.

An updated list of shortage occupations was released. This list is used for both new entries of foreign workers and regularisation purposes. The revised list serves as a reference for implementing provisions introduced under the 2024 immigration law concerning foreign workers employed in sectors experiencing persistent labour shortages. The scheme allows eligible workers meeting residence and employment requirements to apply directly for a temporary residence permit without relying on an employer-sponsored application.

On the employers’ side, obligations have been strengthened. The criminal fine for hiring a foreign worker without a valid residence permit is now set at EUR 30 000 per worker concerned, compared to EUR 15 000 previously.

In May 2025, a further ministerial circular tightened administrative practices relating to acquisition of French nationality by decree. Prefectures were instructed to apply stricter assessments of applicants’ economic autonomy, fiscal compliance, professional integration and effective residence in France. The circular also sought to harmonise decision making practices across prefectures.

In 2025, implementing measures were also adopted concerning the high skilled residence permit (Talent), including adjustments to eligibility conditions and permit categories for highly qualified workers and other skilled profiles.

On 1 January 2026, new integration requirements established under the 2024 immigration law entered into force and strengthened the link between long-term residence rights, access to nationality and demonstrated integration outcomes. More demanding French-language requirements became applicable to access several immigration statuses, including multi-year residence permits, long-term residence cards and naturalisation. To obtain these statuses, the reform also introduced new requirements linked to civic integration and knowledge of the values and principles of the French Republic.


A reciprocal pilot “one-in one-out” agreement was signed between France and the United Kingdom in August 2025. For every undocumented asylum seeker who arrives in the United Kingdom via small boat and is subsequently deported to France, the United Kingdom accepts one vetted asylum seeker from France who has valid family ties or a high chance of being granted asylum.

Following the June 2025 decision of the Council of the European Union on temporary protection for persons displaced from Ukraine, France extended implementation of the temporary protection regime until 4 March 2027. Beneficiaries retained access to residence rights, employment, education, healthcare and social assistance under the national framework for temporary protection.

For further information: www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr | www.ofii.fr | www.senat.fr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – France

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	1 569	-7%
Working holidaymakers	5 021	+5%
Seasonal workers	8 212	-28%
Intra-company transfers	2 205	-23%
Postdoc and researchers	6 760	+1%
Other temporary workers	11 568	+38%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	7 380	+4%
International students	109 455	+5%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	116 475	-10%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	40 400	4.2	1.2
Outflows (2025)	20 802	5.7	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-0.1	-0.4
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.4	+1.2
Total	3.3	+0.8

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/0iqrs1

Germany

Foreign-born population – 2025	19% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 16.1 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: +49%	Poland (10%), Türkiye (9%), Ukraine (7%)

In 2025, Germany received 538 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -6.3% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 45% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 16% labour migrants, 21% family members (including accompanying family) and 17% humanitarian migrants. Around 74 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 21 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 508 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -7% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Romania and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (5 900) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-50 000) in flows to Germany compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -51%, to reach around 113 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (24 000), Syria (23 000) and Türkiye (12 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of China (500) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-53 000). Of the 273 000 decisions taken in 2025, 32% were positive.

Emigration of German citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2024, to 139 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Switzerland, 14% to Austria and 12% to Spain.

In 2025, Germany continued to prioritise labour migration as a response to persistent workforce shortages. The Skilled Immigration Act (*Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz*), introduced in 2020 and substantially expanded since November 2023, remained the cornerstone of this strategy. Key instruments include the EU Blue Card, whose eligibility criteria were broadened and salary thresholds adjusted, and the "Opportunity Card" (*Chancenkarte*), allowing third-country nationals to enter Germany to seek employment. From January 2026, the counselling service "Fair Integration" was implemented on a legal basis. It offers counselling for refugees and migrants from third countries on social and labour law issues.

Part of the agreement for a new government in spring 2025 was the creation of a digital "Work and Stay Agency". It is designed as a new central IT platform to streamline and digitalise skilled labour migration by co-ordinating visa and temporary residence permit procedures, recognition of qualifications and integration support. The government agreed upon a key issues paper in November 2025. Contracts for crucial IT components will be commissioned by the end of 2026.

Following the formation of a new coalition in spring 2025, Germany adopted a more restrictive stance on irregular migration. In 2025, temporary border checks were extended until March 2026 and reinforced, with permanent checks reintroduced on several land borders.

In parallel, Germany finalised legislative preparations to transpose the reformed Common European Asylum System (CEAS), adopted at EU level in 2024, into national law. These provisions, which entered into force in June 2026, introduce accelerated border procedures, specialised facilities for certain categories of applicants (including "Dublin cases") and shortened waiting periods for labour market access for asylum seekers. In February 2026, Germany also introduced a new mechanism allowing the Federal Government to designate safe countries of origin for the purposes of international protection by statutory order.

Germany maintained recently relaxed citizenship rules introduced under the previous government, notably the five-year standard residence period and the general acceptance of multiple citizenship. However, the "fast-track" naturalisation route after three years of residence was abolished in 2025.

Germany continued to be the largest host country for displaced persons from Ukraine. Residence permits issued under Section 24 of the Residence Act (temporary protection) were automatically extended following EU and national decisions adopted in 2025. All such permits valid as of 1 February 2026 were extended until 4 March 2027, without requiring individual applications.

The Federal Employment Agency launched the three-year pilot project "Kick-Start Your Career" at the beginning of 2025, which aims to identify successful measures to better support international graduates from universities in Germany in their integration into the German labour market. A special focus has been placed on Indian students as the largest group of foreign students in Germany.


The relaunch of the National Action Plan against Racism (NAP-R) started in 2025. The coalition agreement states that the NAP-R should be revised, based on a scientific definition of racism in order to combat its various manifestations and dimensions. The Directives on standards for equality bodies (EU 2024/1499 and 2024/1500) were due to be transposed at national level by June 2026.

For further information: www.bamf.de | www.bmi.bund.de | www.bams.de

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Germany

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	9 378	-4%
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	3 894	+23%
Intra-company transfers	7 410	-9%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	16 296	+22%
International students	74 330	+45%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	113 235	-51%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	23 900	7.8	0.5
Outflows (2025)	26 675	8.1	0.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-4.2	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.9	-2.5
Total	-1.3	-2.7

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/m7xse3

Greece

Foreign-born population – 2025	11.5% of the population
Size: 1.1 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2015: -8%

In 2025, 70 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Greece (excluding EU citizens), - 20.6% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 17.3% labour migrants, 26.8% family members (including accompanying family), 1.2% who came for education reasons and 54.8% other migrants. In addition, 34 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 20% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -20%, to reach around 55 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (15 000), Egypt (8 200) and Sudan (8 200). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Sudan (6 700) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-18 000). Of the 46 000 decisions taken in 2025, 58% were positive.

Emigration of Greek citizens to OECD countries decreased by -9% in 2024, to 29 000. Approximately 33% of this group migrated to Germany, 19% to the Netherlands and 8% to Switzerland.

Migration management in Greece continued to prioritise the prevention of irregular migration and the effectiveness of returns, while also aiming to promote legal migration policies and improve labour migration management.

In September 2025, Greece adopted new legislation reforming the legal framework for the return of third-country nationals with no legal right to remain, with the aim to improve the effectiveness of the return system, address irregular migration and direct more administrative resources towards persons in genuine need of international protection. The legislation introduced measures to streamline return procedures, including shorter deadlines for voluntary departure, revised provisions on entry bans, detention, as well as electronic monitoring and expanded possibilities for return to safe third countries. The legislation also abolished the possibility of acquiring a residence permit on the basis of prolonged (at least seven years) undocumented stay.

In February 2026, Greece adopted new legislation on legal migration, transposing the EU Single Permit Directive and introducing measures to simplify administrative procedures and improve labour migration management. The reform established a minimum two-year validity for most categories of residence permit, expanded automatic renewal for certain categories, simplified labour migration procedures, increased flexibility for changing employers and introduced fast-track procedures for strategic investments. It also included new provisions to attract highly skilled workers, such as tech and talent visas, extended the duration of the EU Blue Card and strengthened the framework for international students by aligning residence permits with the duration of studies, expanding access to part-time employment and allowing graduates to remain in Greece to seek employment.

In August 2025, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum launched a new programme supporting the labour-market integration of recognised refugees and legally residing migrants. Funded through the Recovery and Resilience Fund, the initiative provides vocational training and employment support, particularly in sectors facing labour shortages such as agriculture, construction and tourism, while placing particular emphasis on women's participation in the labour market.

During 2025, as part of constant efforts for improvement, the Reception and Identification Service issued guidelines updating standard procedures concerning child protection, identification of victims of trafficking, management of vulnerable residents and of cases eligible for relocation under the former EU voluntary solidarity mechanism.

A significant institutional milestone was the entry into application of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in June 2026 and the enactment of new legislation in Greece to align with its provisions, considered to be of particular importance for frontline Member States managing the EU's external borders. The Ministry of Migration and Asylum highlighted in particular the introduction of new screening procedures, accelerated border procedures, a more effective framework for returns and a new mandatory but flexible solidarity mechanism among Member States.


Greece also continued to provide temporary protection for persons displaced from Ukraine. Temporary protection was extended until 4 March 2027. Beneficiaries of temporary protection retained access to employment, healthcare, education and social services and remained eligible to apply for residence permits on other grounds under the Immigration Code without the need for an entry visa.

For further information: www.migration.gov.gr | www.astynomia.gr | www.statistics.gr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Greece


Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)




Inflows of asylum seekers

(Sources: UNHCR)




Inflows of foreign population

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	561	3.6	0.2
Outflows (2024)	3 166	6.1	1.2

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-5.3	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.8	-1.6
Total	-0.6	-1.4

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/69l5v4

Hungary

Foreign-born population – 2025	7.2% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.7 million, 48% women	Evolution since 2015: +46%	Romania (30%), Ukraine (13%), Germany (7%)

In 2025, 65 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Hungary (excluding EU citizens), -3.3% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 65.6% labour migrants, 6.6% family members (including accompanying family), 22.4% who came for education reasons and 5.4% other migrants. Around 6 900 short-term permits were issued to international students and 6 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 76 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 42% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Viet Nam, China and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, China registered the strongest increase (1 500) and the Philippines the largest decrease (-3 000) in flows to Hungary compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 340%, to reach around 100. The majority of applicants came from Syria (15), Russia (10) and Iran (10). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Syria (5) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-10). Of the 50 decisions taken in 2025, 70% were positive.

Emigration of Hungarian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -14% in 2024, to 44 000. Approximately 33% of this group migrated to Germany, 30% to Austria and 9% to the Netherlands.

A comprehensive overhaul of Hungary's labour migration regime took effect on 1 January 2025, with the entry into force of Government Decree 450/2024 (XII. 23.) on the employment of guest workers and third-country nationals. The decree introduced a more restrictive and centralised system for employment-based residence, while Ministerial Decree 51/2024 (XII. 23.) established an annual quota of 35 000 residence permits for employment and guest worker purposes for 2025.

From January 2025, eligibility for guest worker permits became limited primarily to nationals of countries with readmission agreements or officially recognised compliance organisations in Hungary, notably Georgia, Armenia and the Philippines at the outset. This marked a narrowing compared with previous arrangements and reflected a policy objective of ensuring enforceable return of workers at the end of permitted stays.

Further regulatory tightening occurred from 1 July 2025, when additional documentation and qualification requirements were introduced for several employment-related residence permits. Applicants are required to provide official proof of professional qualifications for specific labour categories, including labour migrants, certain investment-related workers and holders of National Cards (*Nemzeti Kártya*). The measures aimed to enhance transparency and labour market matching, while increasing employer and applicant compliance obligations.

Access to the asylum procedure continued to be governed by the "embassy procedure", which limits the ability to lodge asylum applications within the Hungarian territory. In 2025, exception was made for individuals detained or under house arrest so that they may submit an asylum application despite their irregular entry. Hungarian authorities reiterated in December 2025 that they do not intend to implement the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in its current form.

Since October 2025, foreign nationals with residence permits for self-employment, seasonal work, investment, employment or volunteering may apply abroad for a different type of permit without first surrendering their current one. They may return to Hungary under their existing permit while their application is processed and receive the new residence card once approved.

National-level integration measures were complemented by local initiatives and EU-funded projects. In 2025, labour market access for recognised refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection was promoted through targeted counselling and employer engagement measures, particularly in Budapest.

In December 2025, a series of integration-related initiatives were highlighted by the Ministry of Interior and international partners, including the launch of the Navigate Hungary online platform, providing practical information for migrants on employment, healthcare, housing and daily administration.


Further integration support was announced in early 2026, when funding opportunities under the EEA and Norway Grants Civil Society Fund were launched to support projects assisting people displaced from Ukraine, fighting misinformation and strengthening access to services and community participation.

For further information: https://oif.gov.hu/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Hungary

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	6 069	-18%
Family	997	-37%
Education	6 937	-6%
Other	3 161	-28%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	110	+340%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	5 716	2.9	2.3
Outflows (2025)	1 344	13.1	0.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-5.4	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.1	-0.3
Total	-5.4	-0.7

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/wi4phf

Iceland

Foreign-born population – 2025	21.5% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.1 million, 47% women	Evolution since 2015: +117%	Poland (27%), Ukraine (5%), Lithuania (5%)

In 2024, 1 200 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Iceland (excluding EU citizens), -13% compared to 2023. This figure comprises 9% labour migrants, 31.1% family members (including accompanying family), 2.2% who came for education reasons and 57.7% other migrants. Around 700 short-term permits were issued to international students and 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration).

Poland, Ukraine and Romania were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Greece registered the strongest increase (66) and Poland the largest decrease (-1 000) in flows to Iceland compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -9.9%, to reach around 1 600. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (1 100), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (200) and Venezuela (100). The largest decrease concerns nationals of Venezuela (-1 400). Of the 390 decisions taken in 2025, 36% were positive.

Emigration of Icelandic citizens to OECD countries remained stable in 2024, at 2 200. Approximately 41% of this group migrated to Denmark, 20% to Sweden and 12% to Norway.

Iceland introduced administrative adjustments to residence permit processing. On 21 December 2025, Parliament adopted legislation increasing application fees for residence permits and citizenship which came to effect on 1 January 2026. Simultaneously abolishing the fee for expedited processing service for temporary work permits. These changes applied across permit categories and were implemented by the Directorate of Immigration from January 2026.

Amendments to the Foreign Nationals Act No. 80/2016, adopted by Parliament on 16 February 2026, entered into force on 6 March 2026. The amendments included the abolition of the so-called 18-month rule (previously applicants for international protection could be granted a temporary residence permit if the final decision on their application had not been reached within 18 months of the initial submission of their application) and the discontinuation of renewals of residence permits granted on that basis. Moreover, the amendments introduced provisions allowing for the revocation of international protection in cases involving serious criminal offences and a new provision allowing for the granting of a temporary residence permit based on tolerated stay.

On 12 May 2026, Iceland approved a new Visa Act that fully aligns national visa procedures with Schengen rules and modernises how the country issues, processes and reviews short-stay visas. The law strengthens border security measures and updates visa processing requirements.

On 9 June 2026, the parliament passed an Act No. 48/2026 on specialised detention centre for third-country nationals who are subjected to a return procedure and are detained for the purpose of carrying out their return.

On 11 June 2026, the parliament passed an Act amending the Foreign Nationals Act No. 80/2016 and the Police Act No. 90/1996 in connection with Iceland's implementation of relevant regulations of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

On 30 June 2026 the parliament passed an Act amending the Foreign Nationals' Right to Work Act No. 97/2002. The act consolidates the processing of temporary work permits with the processing of the accompanying residence permit and the two permits will now be processed simultaneously with the Directorate of Immigration.


The government put forward an Action Plan on Immigrant Issues in the parliament in spring 2026. The Action Plan is obligatory according to Article 7 of the Act on Matters of Immigrants No. 116/2012.

Concerning persons displaced from Ukraine Iceland applies Article 44 of the Foreign Nationals Act No. 80/2016, which allows for the granting of a residence permit on the basis of temporary protection in situations of mass displacement. The national scheme operates independently of the EU Temporary Protection Directive. Although Iceland is not bound by the EU Temporary Protection Directive, Icelandic authorities seek to align the application of the national temporary protection scheme with relevant EU decision and guidelines, as well as with comparable schemes in Denmark and the other Schengen-associated states (SACs). Following the EU Council decision of June 2025, Iceland extended the validity of temporary protection until March 2027.

For further information: www.stjornarradid.is | www.utl.is | www.vinnumalastofnun.is | www.hagstofa.is

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Iceland

Long-term immigration flows
(Sources: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2024	2024/2023
Employment	405	-36%
Family	846	-5%
Education	716	+16%
Other	19	+171%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 660	-11%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	282	14.4	0.7
Outflows (2025)	737	14.5	1.9

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	4.4	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	8	-2.8
Total	12.5	-2.7

Labour market outcomes
2024 compared to 2025 OECD averages



StatLink https://stat.link/z3dflg

Ireland

Foreign-born population – 2025	24.1% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.3 million	Evolution since 2015: +58%	United Kingdom (28%), Poland (10%), India (6%)

In 2025, Ireland received 62 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -13% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 48% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 37% labour migrants, 7% family members (including accompanying family) and 7% humanitarian migrants. Around 28 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 800 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 22 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -64% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -30%, to reach around 13 000. The majority of applicants came from Somalia (2 000), Nigeria (1 900) and Pakistan (1 700). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Nigeria (1 900) and the largest decrease nationals of Georgia (-400). Of the 5 730 decisions taken in 2025, 63% were positive.

Emigration of Irish citizens to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2024, to 22 000. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to Spain, 12% to Australia and 10% to the Netherlands.

Ireland is developing its first comprehensive National Migration and Integration Strategy for publication in 2026. This strategy will provide a whole-of-government approach to migration and integration policy that is coherent across departments and responsive in seeking to address Ireland's current and future demographic, economic and social policy needs.

The International Protection Act 2026 was commenced on 12 June 2026, giving effect to the EU Migration and Asylum Pact. The legislation represents the most significant reform of Irish asylum laws in the history of the State. Under the Act, upon arrival to the State, applicants will be required to go through screening, which will involve enhanced security and identity checks and the taking of biometric data. The Act also provides for faster processing, including an accelerated Border Procedure for some applicants, through which all decisions and appeals will be concluded within three months. A new State body, the Tribunal for Asylum and Returns Appeals (TARA) will have responsibility for appeals, and the removal and deportation process will be faster and less bureaucratic.

In September 2025, Ireland's Immigration Service Delivery (ISD) launched a new case management system, initially for certain EU Treaty Rights applications, as part of its ongoing modernisation efforts. This system should eventually be expanded to all ISD areas.

Ireland published a revised family reunification policy document introducing several significant changes in November 2025. The changes include higher and indexed income thresholds for sponsoring dependent adults other than spouses or partners, as well as the granting of employment rights for certain migrant workers' children aged 16-18.

On 26 November 2025, the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration announced plans to introduce a mandatory accommodation contribution scheme for international protection applicants who are employed and living in State-provided housing.

In December 2025, the minister announced changes to the mandatory period of reckonable residence for naturalisation for people granted international protection. This period was raised from three years of reckonable residence to five years of reckonable residence, in line with the standard statutory requirement.

In March 2026, Ireland applied the extension of Temporary Protection to beneficiaries under the Directive residing in Ireland with a Temporary Protection Certificate ("yellow paper") valid until 4 March 2026. These expired certificates may be used as proof of entitlement to Temporary Protection until 4 March 2027.


In June 2026, the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment published its evaluation report on the Seasonal Employment Permit pilot scheme implemented in the horticulture sector in 2025. The review recommended a phase two of the pilot in 2027, to fully test the implementation of the legislative framework.

For further information: www.irishimmigration.ie | www.ria.gov.ie | www.enterprise.gov.ie

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Ireland

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	818	-43%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	5	-92%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	35	-17%
International students	28 402	-3%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	12 975	-30%


Inflows of foreign population

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	656	15	0.1
Outflows (2024)	2 690	-2.6	0.4

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	3.4	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	9.4	-3.4
Total	12.8	-3.5

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/09xse2

Israel

Foreign-born population – 2025	18.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.8 million, 55% women	Evolution since 2015: -3%	Former USSR (51%), Morocco (7%), the United States (6%)

In 2025, Israel received 22 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -31% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 29% family members (including accompanying family). Around 47 000 permits were issued to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Russia, the United States and France were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, France registered the strongest increase (1 000) and Russia the largest decrease (-14 000) in flows to Israel compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 58%, to reach around 9 600. The majority of applicants came from Sri Lanka (2 800), India (1 000) and Eritrea (900). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Sri Lanka (2 300) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-300). Of the 6 080 decisions taken in 2025, five were positive.

Emigration of Israeli citizens to OECD countries increased by 8% in 2024, to 12 000. Approximately 37% of this group migrated to the United States, 16% to Germany and 9% to the United Kingdom.

Following a government decision adopted in February 2025, implementation began to enable professional recognition before immigration. The reform introduced remote document submission, temporary licences, shorter internship requirements and faster recognition procedures for professions including engineering, accounting and social work, supporting faster labour market integration of new immigrants.

Israel completed the transition to its Electronic Travel Authorisation system (ETA-IL) for nationals of visa-exempt countries. Following its pilot launch in 2024, the ETA-IL system became mandatory on 1 January 2025. After a transition period, from 1 April 2025 onwards, travellers eligible for ETA-IL were no longer permitted to enter Israel without a valid ETA-IL authorisation. ETA-IL requires visa-exempt travellers to obtain electronic authorisation before travelling to Israel and is intended to support advance screening and border-management procedures.

In March 2025, the Knesset approved a one-year extension of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision 2022) until 14 March 2026. The legislation maintains restrictions on the granting of citizenship, residence permits and certain stay permits to residents of specified territories and countries, while preserving exemptions in defined humanitarian and other exceptional circumstances. The extension remained one of the principal legislative measures affecting admission and residence policy with respect to the populations covered by the law during the reporting period.

Israel continued to facilitate multiple recruitment channels for labour migration to address persistent labour shortages. During 2025, authorities increased admissions of foreign workers in construction, agriculture, caregiving, trade and services, etc. The overall ceiling allowing foreign workers to represent up to 3.3% of the national population was maintained, and the expanded quota framework was implemented. By early 2026, foreign-worker admissions had increased substantially compared with the levels before the conflict started in 2023. In the construction sector, authorities raised recruitment quotas in the private recruitment track to 40 000, while additional measures were adopted to accelerate the arrival of foreign workers on that channel – for example, by easing skills testing requirements in construction. The government also approved an increase in the quota for foreign workers in trade and services (to 29 000 by 2026) and continued recruitment initiatives in agriculture and caregiving.


Israel also strengthened integration measures for foreign workers recruited under the expanded programmes, while intensifying compliance inspections and enforcement against unauthorised employment. Increased monitoring focussed particularly on construction, agriculture, hospitality, trade and service activities.

Israel continued to apply protection measures for Ukrainian nationals who are not eligible for immigration under the Law of Return. Existing arrangements concerning lawful stay and protection from removal remained in force.


For further information: www.gov.il/en

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Israel


Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)




Inflows of asylum seekers
(Sources: UNHCR)



Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	1 165	22.3	0.2
Outflows (2025)	1 619	17.9	0.3

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	13.3	+0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-1.2	-3.6
Total	12.1	-3.5

Labour market outcomes
2021 compared to 2025 OECD averages



StatLink https://stat.link/gp0l61

Italy

Foreign-born population – 2025	11.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 6.9 million, 52% women	Evolution since 2015: +19%	Romania (13%), Albania (8%), Morocco (7%)

In 2025, Italy received 249 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 46% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 15% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 13% labour migrants, 67% family members (including accompanying family) and 5% humanitarian migrants. Around 35 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 21 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 225 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 33% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Bangladesh, Albania and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Tunisia registered the strongest increase (5 700) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-8 500) in flows to Italy compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -16%, to reach around 127 000. Most applicants came from Bangladesh (27 000), Peru (15 000) and Egypt (11 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of India (2 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Bangladesh (-5 400). Of the 105 000 decisions taken in 2025, 30% were positive.

Emigration of Italian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2024, to 146 000. Approximately 31% of this group migrated to Spain, 14% to Germany and 12% to Switzerland.

In October 2025, the government adopted a new three-year *Decreto Flussi* covering the period 2026-2028, authorising 497 550 entries of non-EU workers over three years. The annual quota was set at 164 850 for 2026, rising gradually to 166 850 by 2028. Compared with the previous framework, the new plan increased the share allocated to non-seasonal employment and expanded dedicated quotas for domestic and care workers, reflecting persistent labour shortages linked to population ageing. Seasonal employment in agriculture and tourism continued to account for the largest share of admissions, while preferential allocations were maintained for nationals of countries that have signed with Italy co-operation agreements on migration issues. The decree introduced procedural provisions aimed at improving the matching of quotas with labour demand, including territorial allocation mechanisms and deadlines for processing applications, implemented progressively from early 2026. The decree places more emphasis on care and domestic assistance: 13 600 places in 2026, rising to 14 200 in 2028, for family assistance and care workers, compared with around 9 500 places under the previous framework.

In June 2025, Italy expanded labour mobility pathways for refugees through new agreements supporting entry under dedicated quotas linked to training and employment offers. These schemes complement existing programmes facilitating access to employment for beneficiaries of international protection already residing in the country.

In May 2025, Parliament converted Decree Law No. 37/2025 into Law No. 75/2025, expanding the use of facilities established in Albania under the Italy-Albania protocol.

Up to June 2026, data on overseas vocational training programmes developed under Article 23 of Italy's Immigration Law indicate growing use of labour mobility pathways. Article 23 allows foreign workers who complete vocational, language and civic training programmes approved by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies to enter Italy and be recruited outside the annual *Decreti Flussi* quotas. As of 5 August 2026, 137 training programmes had been approved in 34 countries and 3 755 participants completed the training. These initiatives support skills development, improve labour market matching and facilitate migrant workers' integration through fair, demand-driven international recruitment mechanisms.

Italy maintained the temporary protection regime for displaced persons from Ukraine. As of March 2025, approximately 165 000 beneficiaries were registered. Italy extended temporary protection until March 2027 and encouraged transitions to alternative residence permits, including employment-based permits, while preserving access to protection for the duration of the regime.

Controls at the land border with Slovenia were reintroduced until 18 December 2026, due to the high level of irregular migration including a strong presence of smuggling and trafficking networks.

In June 2025, a referendum proposing to reduce the residence requirement for naturalisation from 10 to 5 years failed due to insufficient turnout, leaving Italy's citizenship legislation unchanged.


In May 2025, the government adopted a new National Plan against Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance covering 2025-2027. The Plan identified six priority areas for intervention – employment, housing, education, health, security and justice, and media and communication – complemented by cross-cutting actions on training, awareness-raising and local partnership networks.

For further information: www.lavoro.gov.it/ | www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Italy

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	174	+43%
Seasonal workers	20 526	+23%
Intra-company transfers	392	-7%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	37	+76%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	1 181	+36%
International students	35 267	+76%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	126 635	-16%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	12 837	5.7	0.5
Outflows (2025)	13 914	10.5	0.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-5	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5	+0.9
Total	0	+0.6

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/05uqdz

Japan

Foreign population – 2025	3.1% of the population	Nationalities:
Size: 3.8 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2014: +78%	China (23%), Viet Nam (17%), Korea (11%)

In 2025, Japan received 192 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 9.5% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 63% labour migrants, 35% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.6% humanitarian migrants. Around 176 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students, 112 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants and 174 000 to trainees.

Viet Nam, China and Indonesia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nepal registered the strongest increase (19 000) and Viet Nam the largest decrease (-14 000) in flows to Japan compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -15%, to reach around 12 000. The majority of applicants came from Thailand (1 600), Myanmar (1 500) and India (1 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Myanmar (900) and the largest decrease nationals of Sri Lanka (-1 600). Of the 21 000 decisions taken in 2025, 6% were positive.

Emigration of Japanese citizens to OECD countries increased by 5% in 2024, to 23 000. Approximately 19% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to the United States and 10% to New Zealand.

The Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) was restructured into a new programme called “Employment for Skill Development” (ESD). The latter was established to develop human resources with skills at the level of Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) through employment in Japan in industrial fields facing labour shortages, while ensuring continuity between ESD and TITP. While the legal framework was adopted in 2024, the new programme is scheduled to enter into force in April 2027, and preparatory work continued throughout 2025.

ESD Programme will allow foreign nationals to engage in employment-based skill development for up to three years, with training objectives aligned to the skill level required for SSW status. Quotas will be determined by field, notably based on labour shortage assessments.

Japan continues to expand the SSW programme. The five-year framework covering 2024-2028 provides for the admission of up to 805 700. The system covers 19 fields, including Long-term care, Construction industry, Industrial product manufacturing, Agriculture, Accommodation industry and Automobile transportation business. In April 2026, the food service field was expected to reach its field-specific allocation limit.

To facilitate recruitment of SSWs in Automobile transportation business, a dedicated Designated Activities status was introduced in 2025 allowing prospective SSW workers to remain in Japan while obtaining a Japanese driving licence and completing required training (up to six months for truck drivers and up to one year for taxi and bus drivers).

From April 2025, employers accepting Specified Skilled Workers must co-operate with local authorities on integration and multicultural coexistence measures in order to prepare and implement support plans for foreign workers.

Japan further diversified stay options for foreign graduates seeking employment. Under the “Job-seeking Promotion Project for Foreign Students Graduating from Overseas Universities in National Strategic Special Zones”, created in March 2024, eligible foreign nationals who graduate from overseas universities, complete study at a Japanese language institute for one year and satisfy designated requirements, may apply for a Designated Activities status. This residence status allows them to remain in Japan for up to one year to seek employment.

“Zero Illegal Foreign Residents Plan for the Safety and Security of People in Japan” announced in May 2025, aims to reduce the number of individuals whose deportation has been decided. Measures include accelerating the examination of applications for recognition of refugee status and promoting government-funded deportations with escort officers. Furthermore, in May 2026, the “Zero Illegal Foreign Residents Plan: Enhanced Promotion Package” was announced. This Package was compiled to identify priority measures to be intensively implemented.


On integration, Japan continued to revise annually its “Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals”, first decided in 2018. These measures provide a whole-of-government framework covering Japanese language education, access to services, consultation systems and support throughout the life course. In 2026, Japan adopted new “Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance of Foreign Nationals and Well-Ordered and Harmonious Coexistence.”

Japan continued to provide integration support to individuals benefiting from complementary protection, aligning their access to services with that of recognised refugees.

For further information: www.mhlw.go.jp/english | www.isa.go.jp/en | www.moj.go.jp

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Japan

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	22 476	+11%
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	9 144	+4%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	85 329	+16%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	174 126	+6%
International students	176 119	+5%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	11 607	-15%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	4 727	1.8	0.1
Outflows (2025)	7 168	18	0.2

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-7.3	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.1	-0.7
Total	-5.2	-0.8

Labour market outcomes
2020 compared to 2025 OECD averages



StatLink https://stat.link/4bh2fa

Korea

Foreign-born population – 2025	4% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 2 million, 44% women	Evolution since 2015: +87%	China (42%), Viet Nam (13%), Uzbekistan (4%)

In 2025, Korea received 67 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -11% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 14% labour migrants, 25% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 63 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students, 150 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants and 45 000 to trainees.

China, Viet Nam and the United States were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Viet Nam registered the strongest increase (18 000) and China the largest decrease (-20 000) in flows to Korea compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -20%, to reach around 15 000. The majority of applicants came from Russia (2 000), India (1 500) and Kazakhstan (1 200). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Philippines (300) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-2 500). Of the 17 000 decisions taken in 2025, 1% were positive.

Emigration of Korean citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2024, to 41 000. Approximately 37% of this group migrated to the United States, 11% to Japan and 11% to Canada.

To attract high-level expertise in advanced sectors such as semiconductors and bio-health, the “Top-Tier” Visa was launched in April 2025. This programme offers Resident (F-2) status to senior engineers and world-class talent, providing a direct pathway to permanent residency after three years. Furthermore, the “Corporate-Customised Internship (K-Trainee)” programme was established in October 2025 as a pilot targeting selected Asian countries, allowing global talent hired by overseas subsidiaries to participate in internships at the company’s headquarters in Korea.

To retain domestically-trained international talent, the government introduced the “Fast Track for Permanent Residency and Naturalization for Outstanding Scientists and Engineers” in January 2023 to facilitate pathways to permanent residency and naturalisation for outstanding foreign master’s and doctoral students at five universities in Korea. In February 2026, the programme was renamed the “K-STAR Visa Track” and expanded to include 27 additional universities. Under the expanded programme, outstanding graduates may transition to Resident (F-2) status, significantly shortening the time required to obtain permanent residency.

To revitalise local economies, the “Region-Specific Visa Program” was expanded in 2025. A total of 13 metropolitan and provincial governments are participating in the Region-Specific Visa Program designed to encourage the long-term settlement of foreigners in depopulating areas, thereby alleviating labour shortages and revitalising local economies.

In December 2025, the Ministry of Employment and Labor announced a scaling down of the E-9 visa quota for 2026 to 80 000. This is the second consecutive year of reductions, which was explained by a decline in demand for foreign labour to pre-pandemic levels.

Meanwhile, the number of seasonal work visas (E-8) has been increasing, reaching 95 700 in 2025 and 117 113 in 2026. The Immigration Act was amended in July 2025 to provide a statutory basis for the seasonal worker programme, with new provisions on specialised agencies, broker bans and sanctions. The amendments entered into force in January 2026.

In August 2025, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health and Welfare designated about 21 universities and colleges, recommended by the metropolitan local governments, as participating institutions for training foreign caregivers. The designated institutions are scheduled to operate degree programmes for caregivers during the two-year pilot period, providing education for caregiver certification that includes customised Korean language training.


In November 2025, the government amended the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Act to introduce the “Exemption from the Obligation to Notify about Foreign Workers Who Are Victims of Unpaid Wages, Unfair Labor Practices, or Other Labor-Related Violations.” This reform aims at strengthening the protection of migrant workers’ rights and removes barriers that have discouraged foreign victims from exercising their legal rights.

Significant reforms were also made to support the long-term settlement of foreign youth. From April 2025, immigrant youth who grew up in Korea are eligible to remain and seek employment even if they do not pursue a university enrolment, provided they meet specific residency and education requirements such as graduating from a local high school. This policy is designed to facilitate the stable integration of individuals who have already spent their formative years in Korea.

For further information: www.eps.go.kr | www.immigration.go.kr | www.mrtc.re.kr/eng/main/main.php

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Korea

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	3 347	+6%
Seasonal workers	69 961	+49%
Intra-company transfers	300	-8%
Postdoc and researchers	655	+9%
Other temporary workers	75 994	-24%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	45 150	+4%
International students	63 012	+13%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	14 572	-20%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	7 071	-2.9	0.4
Outflows (2025)	14 309	-0.2	0.8

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-2.1	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.3	-0.6
Total	0.2	-0.4

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/zqe3jv

Latvia

Foreign-born population – 2025	11.6% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.2 million, 62% women	Evolution since 2015: -19%	Russia (43%), Ukraine (20%), Belarus (16%)

In 2025, 5 100 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Latvia (excluding EU citizens), -6.6% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 51% labour migrants, 9.7% family members (including accompanying family), 34% who came for education reasons and 5.4% other migrants. Around 1 200 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 600 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 8 100 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 53% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, India and Uzbekistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (400) and India the largest decrease (-100) in flows to Latvia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 61%, to reach around 1 300. The majority of applicants came from Somalia (200), Afghanistan (100) and Ethiopia (100). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Somalia (200) and the largest decrease nationals of Tajikistan (-80). Of the 520 decisions taken in 2025, 30% were positive.

Emigration of Latvian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -12% in 2024, to 10 000. Approximately 25% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to the Netherlands and 7% to Norway.

Labour migration policy in 2025 focussed on implementation of the stricter employer obligations introduced in January 2025. Employers recruiting third-country nationals were required to justify vacancies to the State Employment Agency, assess domestic candidates proposed by the agency and provide written explanations when rejecting them.

The Parliament of the Republic of Latvia adopted amendments to the Immigration Law on 23 April 2026, the main purpose of which is to implement the revised Directive (EU) 2024/1233 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, and other changes including (i) to prohibit to use the sole existence of a child as a pretext for requesting a residence permit; (ii) to abolish the possibility of requesting a temporary residence permit for the purchase of securities; (iii) to eliminate the advantages granted to Belarusian citizens in relation to other third-country citizens; (iv) to exclude the possibility of requesting a permanent residence permit if a temporary residence permit was issued for the purpose of studies; (v) to enable to delegate the verification of documents required for a residence permit to external service providers; and (vi) to expand the protection of employees.

Latvia maintained enhanced border control measures at the Belarus border throughout 2025-2026. In March 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers extended the special border management regime for an additional six-month period in response to continuing irregular crossing risks. The regime was subsequently renewed again in December 2025, extending emergency border arrangements up to June 2026. Restrictions limiting crossings at the Pāternieki, Terehova and Grebņeva checkpoints to motor vehicles remained in force. In October 2025, the Immigration Law was amended to limit grants of residence permits to third-country nationals with criminal records.

Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Plan 2024-2028 continued during 2025, focussing on institutional co-ordination, border surveillance infrastructure and co-operation with EU partners. During 2025-2026, Latvia maintained entry and visa restrictions for Russian and Belarusian citizens. Since July 2025, Latvia recognises only biometric passports of Russian citizens.

Latvia extended the validity of temporary protection residence permits for displaced persons from Ukraine from two to three years and prolonged eligibility periods for housing and social assistance measures. In January 2026, the regulation on education financing for Ukrainians was amended.

Implementation of the Development Plan for a Cohesive and Civically Active Society 2024-2027 continued during 2025-2026 at national and municipal level. Measures focussed on language learning, civic participation, access to services and support for beneficiaries of international protection and persons under temporary protection.


In February 2025, the State Audit Office published a performance report on the cohesive society policy under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture which provided three recommendations: a clearer and more purposeful cohesive society policy; the establishment of a transparent monitoring system; and that of an effective, co-ordinated Latvian language learning system.

For further information: www.pmlp.gov.lv | www.csp.gov.lv | www.emn.lv

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Latvia

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	1 562	+11%
Family	872	-12%
Education	1 242	+47%
Other	296	-8%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 290	+61%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	1 443	7.9	3
Outflows (2025)	672	16.5	1.4

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-7.7	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-0.7	+1.8
Total	-8.3	+1.6

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/75klxa

Lithuania

Foreign-born population – 2025	9.9% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.3 million, 44% women	Evolution since 2015: +107%	Belarus (23%), Russia (22%), Ukraine (22%)

In 2025, Lithuania received 8 200 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 30% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 15% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 34% labour migrants, 49% family members (including accompanying family) and 2% humanitarian migrants. Around 6 800 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 66 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 9 800 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 10% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Belarus and Uzbekistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Pakistan registered the strongest increase (700) and Belarus the largest decrease (-10 000) in flows to Lithuania compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants remained stable at around 300. The majority of applicants came from Belarus (120), Somalia (45) and Ukraine (30). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Somalia (45) and the largest decrease nationals of Belarus (-45). Of the 290 decisions taken in 2025, 45% were positive.

Emigration of Lithuanian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -13% in 2024, to 15 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Germany, 14% to Spain and 12% to the Netherlands.

Lithuania continued implementing labour migration reforms adopted in 2024, with most operational effects materialising during 2025-2026. The shortlist was abolished and the employment quota for third-country nationals was fixed at 24 830 for 2025, and at 24 706 for 2026. Highly qualified specialists remained exempt from the quota.

On 14 May 2026, amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners were adopted (LLSF, No. IX-2206). The amendments aim at streamlining migration procedures and at strengthening employer liability for violations related to the employment of foreign workers. Foreign nationals will only need to satisfy one of the following conditions to obtain a temporary residence permit on employment grounds: (i) qualifications related to the intended work; or (ii) at least one year of work experience related to the intended work acquired within the last three years; or (iii) remuneration not lower than the average gross monthly salary. The amendments also clarify cases where employment quotas will not apply (e.g. completed studies in Lithuania within five years after graduation; people granted temporary protection or a temporary residence permit on humanitarian or family reunification grounds).

The implementation of the Integrated Border Management Plan 2025-2027 continued into 2025-2026, focussing on inter-agency co-ordination, modernisation of border infrastructure and surveillance capacity. Lithuania also adopted amendments in April 2025, allowing revocation of Russian nationals' residence permits if individuals travelled repeatedly to Russia or Belarus within a three-month period without justified grounds. Pursuant to a joint order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, from June 2025 Lithuania no longer recognises non-biometric ordinary passports issued by the Russian Federation.

From January 2026, foreigners working in customer-facing roles are submitted to Lithuanian language proficiency requirements, with exemptions for Ukrainian refugees. They must pass A1-level immediately and A2-level after two years.

In December 2025, the government decided to accept half of the migrants allocated to Lithuania under the EU's solidarity mechanism in 2026 and contribute financially for the remainder.

Municipal implementation of Lithuania's new integration strategy expanded in 2025. Integration co-ordinators employed in 16 municipalities continued preparing and implementing locally tailored measures in areas including language learning, access to public information, socio-cultural orientation and mental health support.

A new information system to administer and centralise translation services was launched in January 2026. It allows for centralised ordering and management of translation services for all third-country nationals or stateless persons in Lithuania and can be used by municipalities, migrants, and other interested parties.


Lithuania also continued implementing the Action Plan for Combating Human Trafficking 2024-2026. Activities included specialised training for migration, labour inspection and law-enforcement authorities, aimed at improving identification of trafficking victims and co-ordination between institutions.

For further information: www.migracija.lt | www.stat.gov.lt | www.emn.lt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Lithuania

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	17	-23%
Postdoc and researchers	49	+81%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	-100%
International students	6 845	+17%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	330	+12%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	1 372	30.5	1.4
Outflows (2025)	1 054	55.9	1.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-6.9	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.8	-2.2
Total	-1.1	-2.8

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/azswq1

Luxembourg

Foreign-born population – 2025	52% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.4 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2015: +41%	Portugal (20%), France (13%), Italy (6%)

In 2025, Luxembourg received 25 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -2.9% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 64% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10% labour migrants, 22% family members (including accompanying family) and 3% humanitarian migrants. Around 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 53 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 2% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Portugal, France and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Eritrea registered the strongest increase (98) and Syria the largest decrease (-300) in flows to Luxembourg compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -17%, to reach around 1 800. The majority of applicants came from Eritrea (400), Syria (200) and Venezuela (90). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (25) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-200). Of the 1 200 decisions taken in 2025, 51% were positive.

Emigration of Luxembourg citizens to OECD countries increased by 10% in 2024, to 4 800. Approximately 40% of this group migrated to Germany, 25% to France and 8% to Belgium.

In March 2025, Luxembourg published its annual list of occupations in high shortage, updating the sectors eligible for facilitated recruitment of third-country nationals. The revised list contained 22 occupations and continued to serve as the basis for accelerated recruitment procedures, exempting them from the labour market test and fast granting of the required certificates for employers who are recruiting them.

Occupations related to the industrial and logistic sector were added to the shortage occupation list, while six others were removed following improvements in labour-market matching. The annual revision remained a key instrument for aligning labour migration policy with labour-market demand.

Following the transposition of the EU Blue Card Directive (EU) 2021/1883 into national law, which entered into force on 1 July 2024, Luxembourg continued throughout 2025-2026 to implement the reformed framework for highly qualified workers, updating the salary threshold and adapting the fiscal regime.

In February 2026, Luxembourg announced the extension of temporary protection until 4 March 2027, following the corresponding decision at EU level. Beneficiaries retained access to residence rights, employment, education, social assistance and healthcare under the existing temporary protection framework. Implementation of the biometric residence card system for beneficiaries of temporary protection continued during the reporting period replacing the paper attestations. This card allows the holder to access rights and services associated with their temporary protection status. Administrative procedures for issuance and renewal of biometric cards were further rolled out during 2025 and 2026.

Regarding irregular migration, the Return House (Maison Retour) was opened on 1 September 2024, in order to offer social support to people awaiting return, to encourage voluntary returns.

Luxembourg continued implementing the Law on Intercultural Living Together, which entered into force on 1 January 2024. Policy efforts focussed on operationalising the new governance framework established by the law and expanding participation in its voluntary instruments.

Additional municipalities joined the Communal Pact for Intercultural Living Together (*Gemengepakt*), extending local participation in programmes aimed at civic engagement, intercultural dialogue and social cohesion. The Citizen Pact (*Biergerpakt*) continued to be promoted as a voluntary framework open to all adults living or working in Luxembourg.


Throughout 2025 and the first half of 2026, Luxembourg continued administrative and institutional preparations for the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, scheduled to apply from 2026.

For further information: www.guichet.public.lu | www.ona.gouvernement.lu | www.integratioun.lu

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Luxembourg

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	279	+14%
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	186	+59%
Postdoc and researchers	153	+9%
Other temporary workers	81	+14%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	82	-7%
International students	499	-8%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 770	-17%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	2 704	7.5	2.7
Outflows (2025)	20 007	6.7	19.8

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	3	+0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	10.1	-1.6
Total	13.1	-1.6

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/rdw0n4

Mexico

Foreign-born population – 2024	1.2% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1.6 million, 47% women	Evolution since 2015: +56%	United States (66%), Guatemala (5%), Venezuela (4%)

In 2025, Mexico received 63 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -15% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 12% labour migrants, 33% family members (including accompanying family) and 29% humanitarian migrants. Around 4 700 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 24 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Honduras, Guatemala and Cuba were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Honduras registered the strongest increase (5 000) and Venezuela the largest decrease (-2 100) in flows to Mexico compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -11%, to reach around 70 000. The majority of applicants came from Cuba (35 000), Venezuela (14 000) and Haiti (9 100). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Cuba (17 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Honduras (-23 000). Of the 102 000 decisions taken in 2025, 17% were positive.

Emigration of Mexican citizens to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2024, to 227 000. Approximately 88% of this group migrated to the United States, 5% to Spain and 3% to Canada.

Mexico's migration policy is guided by Objective 5 of the 2025-2030 Sectoral Programme of the Ministry of the Interior, published in the Official Gazette on 3 September 2025. The policy adopts a comprehensive approach to migration management, emphasising respect for migrants' human rights, their integration into productive sectors and stronger inter-institutional co-ordination to provide support and protection, particularly to people in situations of social vulnerability.

In 2025, Mexico relaunched the "Dual Nationality Project" (*Proyecto de Doble Nacionalidad*) programme in six states, aimed at facilitating dual nationality and supporting the integration of children returning from the United States. The project issued 11 081 Unique Population Registry Codes (CURP) to returnee children and adolescents across 26 municipalities. By helping children born abroad to Mexican citizens obtain recognition of Mexican nationality and legal identity, the programme facilitates their access to public services, including education and healthcare.

More broadly, Mexico has taken steps to consolidate integrated information systems, strengthen its ability to measure the results and impacts of migration initiatives, and expand socio-economic reintegration mechanisms, particularly in co-ordination with local and regional stakeholders.

The Migration Law also provides several pathways for foreigners seeking to remain legally in Mexico. These mechanisms allow, under certain circumstances, the regularisation of immigration status as temporary residents, including access to work permits. The framework aims to protect the dignity, integrity and security of migrants in irregular situations and refugees against discrimination, aggression and violence. The Instituto Nacional de Migracíon (INM) continues to process regularisation applications through statutory residence channels, assessing cases individually and taking humanitarian considerations into account where applicable.

In July 2025, the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs issued new General Guidelines for Visa Issuance, standardising visa procedures and promoting the digitalisation of migration administration. Measures include greater use of electronic processing, biometric data collection, e-visas and integrated digital platforms.

Mexico has also taken steps to strengthen the management of migration flows at regular points of entry, with efforts to modernise processes and streamline administrative requirements to facilitate regular migration pathways.

In September 2025, la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR), in co-ordination with national and international partners including UNHCR, opened a Multiservice Centre for Refugees in Tapachula, Chiapas. The centre seeks to streamline asylum procedures by bringing refugee-status determination, legal guidance, healthcare and integration assistance together in one location, particularly in Tapachula, one of Mexico's principal entry points for asylum seekers.


Mexico has also significantly raised immigration residence fees following a 2025 reform to the Federal Law on Fees, with costs for temporary and permanent residence increasing by approximately 100%, while visitor permits saw more moderate increases. The reform aims to update fees and ensure a more proportional contribution from foreigners towards public services, while offering discounts of up to 50% in certain circumstances, including family reunification and employment.

Finally, amendments published in May 2026 expanded administrative facilities for temporary residence visas and work permits. They facilitate the entry and employment of highly specialised foreign professionals, including those providing independent or subordinate services to legally established Mexican entities.

For further information: www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx | www.comar.gob.mx

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Mexico

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	4 980	-30%
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	19 308	-2%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	4 654	+5%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	70 482	-11%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	64 392	-4.8	3.5
Outflows (2025)	1 183	-9.6	0.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	3.7	+0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.6	-0.4
Total	8.3	-0.3

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/76gvfk

Netherlands

Foreign-born population – 2025	16.5% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 3 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +52%	Türkiye (8%), Poland (6%), Suriname (6%)

In 2025, the Netherlands received 171 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -6.2% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 47% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 12% labour migrants, 25% family members (including accompanying family) and 15% humanitarian migrants. Around 21 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 2 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 254 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 31% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Syria and Poland were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Syria registered the strongest increase (6 200) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-8 300) in flows to the Netherlands compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -25%, to reach around 24 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (3 300), Eritrea (3 100) and Türkiye (1 500). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Eritrea (1 700) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-8 200). Of the 16 000 decisions taken in 2025, 48% were positive.

Emigration of Dutch citizens to OECD countries increased by 5% in 2024, to 45 000. Approximately 23% of this group migrated to Spain, 17% to Belgium and 13% to Germany.

In July 2025, an interministerial policy study on how to manage labour migration was published. Among other recommendations, the study suggests making better use of the labour potential in the Netherlands, such as migrants already in the country and innovation. The study also formulated recommendations on the integration of labour migrants.

In November 2025, the Senate approved the Labour Provision Accreditation Act (Wtta), introducing a mandatory certification system for temporary employment agencies, including financial guarantees and compliance requirements, with entry into force scheduled for 1 January 2027.

An issue regarding the position of EU self-employed workers in the Netherlands is the problem of false self-employment. A bill introducing a presumption of an employment relationship to improve the legal position for workers who receive less than a certain amount of remuneration per hour was adopted by parliament. It is scheduled to take effect on 1 December 2026.

The Netherlands also prepared for the transposition of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, due to apply from June 2026. Draft national legislation was debated during 2025-2026, with some proposals adopted and others rejected by the Senate, notably measures to criminalise irregular stay, which did not pass at national level.

The House of Representatives passed the Two-Status System Act (*Wet invoering tweestatusstelsel)* which introduces a distinction between refugees with “A status” and those granted subsidiary protection “B status”. Permit holders with B status will face stricter requirements for family reunification.

Dutch authorities increased the use of accelerated procedures for asylum applications, expanded the capacity of (migrant) detention and strengthened enforcement of return decisions. Reception capacity remained under pressure, prompting the government to scale back and reorganise accommodation facilities. In parallel, investments continued in agreements with third countries aimed at preventing irregular migration and facilitating returns.

Temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees was extended following a decision at the EU level, until 4 March 2027, ensuring continued access to residence, accommodation, healthcare, education and the labour market.

After March 2027 the temporary directive will be extended until 2028, with a restriction in scope.

At the same time, the government progressively adjusted social assistance rules, reducing allowances for beneficiaries with sufficient income and increasing contributions towards accommodation costs. In parallel, authorities are working on a long-term transition framework to prepare for the post-2028 period to further promote the self-reliance and participation of displaced persons from Ukraine who have not yet returned.


Integration policy focussed on employment and Dutch language proficiency. Measures under the national Action Agenda for Integration and an Open and Free Society aimed to strengthen the open and free society, ensure that newcomers participate as soon as possible, and foster social cohesion. The 2025 decisions by the European Court of Justice and the Dutch Council of State stipulate that there can be no fines imposed to those falling under obligatory civic integration policy.

For further information: www.government.nl

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Netherlands

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	1 988	-21%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	21 078	-4%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	24 115	-25%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	4 719	10.4	0.4
Outflows (2024)	18 126	7.3	1.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-0.5	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.2	-0.8
Total	4.8	-0.8

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/b2ow01

New Zealand

Foreign-born population – 2023	28.8% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size 1.5 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2018: +10%	United Kingdom (17%), China (11%), India (10%)

In 2025, New Zealand received 41 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -23% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 9% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 13% labour migrants, 68% family members (including accompanying family) and 11% humanitarian migrants. Around 23 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 103 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, France registered the strongest increase (1 400) and the Philippines the largest decrease (-23 000) in flows to New Zealand compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -14%, to reach around 2 100. The majority of applicants came from India (700), China (300) and Sri Lanka (200). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Bangladesh (65) and the largest decrease nationals of India (-300). Of the 1 550 decisions taken in 2025, 27% were positive.

From 1 June 2026, English language requirements for Accredited Employer Work Visa (AEWV) applicants in mid-skilled occupations have been aligned with those for low-skilled occupations (IELTS level 4, or equivalent).

On 8 December 2025, the government opened two new seasonal visas under the AEWV framework: (i) the Global Workforce Seasonal Visa, an (up to) three-year visa allowing experienced and skilled seasonal workers to return year-on-year, subject to an annual offshore stay; and (ii) the Peak Seasonal Visa, allowing short-term stays of up to seven months for lower-skilled or entry-level seasonal jobs. Both have experience requirements (three and one seasons, respectively) and are limited to specified seasonal occupations. Visa holders cannot support family visa applications.

In September 2025, the Job Check stage of the AEWV was redesigned. The updated process includes a simplified online form, clearer guidance and built-in completeness checks, with additional information required upfront.

In September 2025, the government announced two new residence pathways under the Skilled Migrant Category Resident Visa. Opening for applications on 24 August 2026, these pathways target skilled workers with appropriate work experience in specific trades and technician roles.

On 27 November 2025, the Immigration (Fiscal Sustainability and System Integrity) Amendment Act 2025 (FSSI) received royal assent. FSSI expands the cohort of people who can be charged immigration levies; closes a legislative gap around the charging of premiums for employment; amends the definition of a “mass arrival group” to capture all possible modes of entry; responds to the recommendations of independent reviews of the immigration system; and makes deportation liability for residence class visa holders as a consequence of criminal offending (rather than requiring conviction).

In November 2025, New Zealand increased in-study work rights from 20 to 25 hours per week for eligible international students. On 16 November 2026, a new Short-term Graduate Work Visa will be introduced for international graduates who have a completed New Zealand Qualifications and Credentials Framework (NZQCF) Level 5-7 qualification, and Post- Study Work Visa eligibility will be extended to most applicants who have an NZQCF Level 7 Graduate Diploma.

In September 2025, applications opened for the Parent Boost Visitor Visa, a five-year, renewable, multiple-entry visitor visa for parents of New Zealand citizens and residents. The visa includes specific health, insurance and income requirements.

Following major changes to the Active Investor Plus (AIP) visa settings in April 2025, several targeted changes have been made to clarify and expand investment options, strengthen compliance powers and improve the operation of the visa. Other reforms were made outside of the immigration system to reduce barriers to migration and investment. In particular, changes have been made to foreign investment fund tax rules, while holders of an AIP visa are now able to purchase or build a residential property in New Zealand valued above NZD 5 million.


In November 2025, New Zealand introduced a new Business Investor Visa for experienced businesspeople ready to invest in, actively operate and grow established businesses. It requires a minimum investment of NZD 1 million or NZD 2 million under a fast-track pathway.

For further information: www.immigration.govt.nz/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – New Zealand

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	44 562	-8%
Seasonal workers	18 318	-8%
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	40 593	+12%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	648	+28%
International students	22 923	-6%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	2 058	-14%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2022)	407	-11.8	0.2
Outflows (2022)	902	0.2	0.4

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	3.8	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.1	-1.4
Total	6.9	-1.5

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/rkd45z

Norway

Foreign-born population – 2025	18.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 1 million, 49% women	Evolution since 2015: +41%	Poland (11%), Ukraine (8%), Sweden (5%)

In 2025, Norway received 35 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -2% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 45% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10% labour migrants, 42% family members (including accompanying family) and 4% humanitarian migrants. Around 3 200 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 6 900 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Ukraine, Poland and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Sweden registered the strongest increase (200) and Ukraine the largest decrease (-12 000) in flows to Norway compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -29%, to reach around 3 400. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (1 100), Syria (400) and Eritrea (300). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Ukraine (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-1 700). Of the 2 190 decisions taken in 2025, 30% were positive.

Emigration of Norwegian citizens to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2024, to 9 200. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Spain, 19% to Denmark and 15% to Sweden.

In May 2025, the government confirmed its commitment to implementing those parts of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum that are binding on Norway through the Schengen and Dublin co-operation frameworks. Additional budgetary resources were allocated in the revised national budget to enable implementation of EU screening, border-procedure, return and Eurodac regulations by summer 2026, including capacity building within the Directorate of Immigration (UDI), the police and the Immigration Appeals Board.

In parallel, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security initiated legislative work to amend the Immigration Act and Immigration Regulations, with a particular focus on procedures for temporary collective protection and more efficient case processing. A formal consultation on proposed amendments was launched in December 2025, covering rules on registration, renewal and transition between protection statuses.

In preparation, Norway advanced administrative and operational adjustments aimed at faster case handling, increased use of screening at entry points and more consistent return procedures. These measures were framed as part of efforts to ensure predictability and compliance with Schengen-relevant obligations.

The government continued its temporary collective protection scheme for displaced persons from Ukraine, extending eligibility to a fourth year and confirmed a fifth-year extension. At the same time, restrictions were introduced for applicants from areas in Ukraine deemed safe, shifting them to individual protection assessments. The resettlement quota for refugees was reduced from 1 000 places in 2024 to 500 in 2025, partly due to capacity constraints following the influx of Ukrainians.

A proposal to constitutionalise the right to seek asylum is still under consideration, while a temporary suspension of the processing of asylum applications from Syrian nationals was implemented in June 2025 following the regime change in Syria. Processing of applications for protection from people from Syria resumed on 25 December 2025.

In June 2025, an amendment to the Integration Act raised the age limit for the Introduction programme from 55 to 60, and the rules regarding the programme's duration were revised. Measures have been adopted to improve the recognition of foreign qualifications and strengthen the fight against discrimination, including three new national action plans aimed at combating racism and hate speech.

Since September 2025, completing courses in Norwegian and passing a civic integration test will no longer be a requirement for obtaining a permanent residence permit but applicants must pass an oral Norwegian language test at level A2 or higher (one level higher than before) and a civic integration test in their preferred language.


In August 2025, the government unveiled a renewed action plan targeting social dumping and labour market crime, aimed at protecting workers' rights and curbing exploitation, particularly among foreign nationals in vulnerable employment situations.

For further information: www.udi.no | www.imdi.no | www.regjeringen.no

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Norway

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	-100%
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	4 431	+18%
Intra-company transfers	1 402	+0%
Postdoc and researchers	252	+10%
Other temporary workers	804	+0%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	50	-6%
International students	3 198	+8%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	3 320	-31%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	1 031	8.9	0.2
Outflows (2025)	6 285	10.2	1.2

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	1.8	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4	-2.2
Total	5.9	-2

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/yahsqi

Poland

Foreign-born population – 2025	2.5% of the population
Size: 0.9 million, 53% women	Evolution since 2015: +54%

In 2025, 201 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Poland (excluding EU citizens), 11.5% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 71% labour migrants, 19% family members (including accompanying family) and 9.2% other migrants. Around 20 000 short-term permits were issued to international students and 176 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 116 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 10% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Belarus and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -23%, to reach around 11 000. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (6 200), Belarus (2 700) and Russia (300). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Ukraine (100) and the largest decrease nationals of Belarus (-900). Of the 7 590 decisions taken in 2025, 48% were positive.

Emigration of Polish citizens to OECD countries decreased by -18% in 2024, to 111 000. Approximately 38% of this group migrated to Germany, 20% to the Netherlands and 7% to Spain.

Poland's Migration Strategy for 2025-2030, adopted in October 2024, prioritises national security through enhanced selectivity and tighter controls. Key legislative reforms entered into force on 1 June 2025, fundamentally reshaping the labour migration system, admission criteria and compliance frameworks.

A major structural shift is the abolition of the traditional labour market test. It has been replaced by an automated registry of "protected" positions, dynamically updated by regional authorities based on local labour shortages. To streamline admission for high-demand occupations, a new "fast-track" procedure was introduced to accelerate work permit issuance. Concurrently, employer compliance obligations have been strengthened. Employers must now verify the legal stay of foreign nationals, submit signed employment contracts electronically before work begins, and adhere to shortened reporting deadlines. Additionally, Poland transposed EU Directive 2021/1883, reforming the EU Blue Card framework to streamline the entry, long-term mobility and family reunification rules for highly skilled third-country professionals.

Visa compatibility rules have also been tightened, explicitly prohibiting work on visas issued by other Schengen states unless accompanied by a specific domestic work authorisation. Financial penalties for non-compliance have risen significantly, reaching up to PLN 50 000 for employers and PLN 5 000 for foreign nationals. To prevent corporate abuse and tighten regulations for employment agencies, work permits are automatically rejected if evidence suggests the worker will be deployed to an entity other than the one named in the application.

Administrative procedures are now digitised. Since June 2025, work permit applications must be submitted exclusively via the Praca.gov.pl portal, while paper applications are left unconsidered. Similarly, effective 27 April 2026, residence permit applications must be submitted exclusively through the government's official Case Handling Module (MOS) platform. This digital process requires applicants to complete forms, apply electronic signatures and upload all supporting documents online, completely eliminating initial in-person visits and enabling real-time online tracking. Crucially, submitting a permit extension digitally within the system before the current one expires automatically grants the applicant continuous residence authorisation until a final decision is rendered.

Temporary protection for Ukrainian nationals remains integrated into regular protection laws. Beneficiaries with continuous "UKR" status can transition into the regular immigration system by applying for a dedicated three-year temporary residence permit (CUKR). To monitor this transition, Statistics Poland launched an interactive dashboard in January 2026 to track socio-economic and labour market trajectories, supported by expanded EU and EEA funding for social cohesion.


Finally, following the entry into application of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum on 12 June 2026, the Ministry of Interior and Administration announced that Poland would not accept relocated migrants or bear related financial costs, citing its prior reception of massive refugee numbers. To mitigate ongoing migratory pressure, temporary controls at the German and Lithuanian borders have been extended through 2026, alongside strict security measures and a temporary buffer zone at the Belarusian border. Lastly, enhanced admission protocols for non-EU students remain enforced, requiring formally recognised certificates and verified B2-level language proficiency.

For further information: migrant.info.pl | www.emn.gov.pl | www.mos.cudzoziemcy.gov.pl/en

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Poland

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	175 507	-15%
Family	3 255	+31%
Education	20 012	-18%
Other	67 670	-10%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	11 155	-23%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	9 461	8.9	0.9
Outflows (2025)	5 597	-28.4	0.5

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-4.6	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.1	-0.8
Total	-4.5	-1.1

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/f9beg0

Portugal

Foreign-born population – 2024	16.3% of the population	Main countries of birth (2021):
Size: 1.7 million, 53% women	Evolution since 2015: +47%	Brazil (25%), Angola (14%), France (9%)

In 2025, Portugal received 319 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 130% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 12% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 75% labour migrants, 6% family members (including accompanying family). In addition, 81 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 10% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Brazil, Angola and Cape Verde were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -34%, to reach around 1 800. The majority of applicants came from Colombia (200), China (200) and Angola (200). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of China (95) and the largest decrease nationals of Senegal (-300). Of the 1 380 decisions taken in 2025, 33% were positive.

Emigration of Portuguese citizens to OECD countries remained stable in 2024 at 61 000. Approximately 20% of this group migrated to Switzerland, 19% to Spain and 13% to France.

The merge of the former Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF) and the High Commission for Migration (ACM) occurred at the end of 2023 with the operational creation of the Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum (AIMA). The Agency aims to bring together responsibilities for migration management, integration and asylum under a single institution.

In June 2024 the Portuguese Government launched the Migration Action Plan, a reform representing a significant shift towards a more regulated, orderly and human-centred migration governance model.

Throughout 2025, AIMA addressed the legacy backlog of pending procedures while simultaneously modernising administrative processes and improving response capacity. With this regard, more than 770 000 appointments were made resulting in the issuance of more than 500 000 residence cards.

As part of this effort, new procedural standards were introduced to ensure that residence applications are submitted with complete documentation, promoting greater legal certainty, administrative efficiency and predictability for both applicants and public authorities.

A major step in the reform of Portugal's migration framework was the adoption of Law No. 61/2025, which entered into force in October 2025. The reform reinforced the principle that migration pathways should be based on prior legal entry and transparent procedures, strengthening the integrity, sustainability and credibility of the migration system.

Family reunification provisions were updated to ensure a balanced approach that safeguards family unity while promoting effective integration, including through stable accommodation, financial self-sufficiency and participation in integration measures.

The new legal framework also streamlined access channels for nationals of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), reinforcing the use of regular visa procedures through Portuguese consular networks while maintaining Portugal's commitment to mobility and co-operation within the CPLP community.

At the same time, Portugal further aligned labour migration policies with national economic priorities. The job-seeker visa was refocussed on highly qualified professionals, supporting the attraction of talent and specialised skills that contribute to innovation, productivity and economic competitiveness.

The implementation of a national Co-operation Protocol for Regulated Labour Migration sets a public partnership between public authorities and employers' associations, establishing a structured legal fast-track for international recruitment. The model promotes ethical recruitment, strengthens employer accountability regarding working and living conditions, and responds to current and emerging labour market needs while reducing incentives for irregular migration.

Portugal also strengthened its institutional architecture through the creation of the National Unit for Foreigners and Borders within the Public Security Police reinforcing operational capacity in border management and return procedures.

Integration remains a central pillar of Portugal's migration strategy. Programmes aimed at strengthening Portuguese learning, skills recognition, employability and social participation through civil society engagement were expanded, an example is the partnership with the Ministry of Education to place linguistic and cultural mediators in all public schools to work with migrant children and families to improve language learning and school success.


These efforts continue to be supported through strong partnerships between central government, municipalities, social partners and civil society organisations. Alongside AMIF, AIMA maintains national funding programmes dedicated to migrant support, capacity-building initiatives and digital migration services.

For further information: www.aima.gov.pt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Portugal

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2025	2025/2024
Employment	116	-59%
Family	354	+59%
Education	5 511	-28%
Other	13 159	+8 615%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 755	-34%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	1 842	6.1	0.6
Outflows (2024)	482	30.8	0.2

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-3	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	6.2	-7.2
Total	3.2	-7.1

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/2azji5

Romania

Foreign-born population – 2025	3.6% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.7 million, 42% women	Evolution since 2015: +146%	Ukraine (26%), Moldova (18%), Italy (10%)

In 2025, 69 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Romania (excluding EU citizens), 34.9% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 84.3% labour migrants, 8.5% family members (including accompanying family), 5.3% who came for education reasons and 1.8% other migrants. Around 1 800 short-term permits were issued to international students and 2 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 47 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, stable relative to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Nepal and Sri Lanka were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the largest decrease (-10 000) in flows to Romania compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -49%, to reach around 1 100. The majority of applicants came from Syria (300), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (200) and Iraq (100). The largest decrease concerned nationals of Syria (-400). Of the 1 190 decisions taken in 2025, 53% were positive.

Emigration of Romanian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -13% in 2024, to 213 000. Approximately 36% of this group migrated to Germany, 18% to Spain and 11% to Italy.

In April 2026 Romania introduced a new legal framework (Government Emergency Ordinance 32/2026), replacing its old work permit system with a digital, centralised model. Full implementation is scheduled for August 2026 with the launch of an online platform, “WorkinRomania.gov.ro” which will serve as the single-entry point for all employer registrations and visa applications.

Employers can operate either as registered employers, who recruit through authorised placement agencies, or, exceptionally, as authorised employers, who hire directly, under stricter conditions (minimum 24-month activity, at least 50 employees, guarantee of EUR 1 000/per foreigner).

Foreigner placement agencies are subject to a new authorisation regime, with guarantees of EUR 75 000 for a number of up to 250 placed foreigners. For each additional 250 placed foreigners, the value of the financial guarantee increases by EUR 50 000. Foreigner placement agencies are prohibited from charging any fee from foreign workers.

The reform introduces two distinct long-stay visa categories for non-EU labour migration. The D/AM1 visa targets highly qualified workers and certain special categories and is not subject to quotas or shortage constraints. In contrast, the D/AM2 visa governs general labour migration and is regulated by an annual quota and a forthcoming Shortage Occupations List, which acts as a positive list.

Employment from third countries remains subject to the “List of Shortage Occupations” (289 occupations), approved by order of the Minister of Labour, Family, Youth and Social Solidarity. Procedures for the employment of permanent, seasonal and cross-border workers from third countries may be initiated, as a rule, only for the occupations included in this list. The list shall be drawn up and updated every six months or whenever necessary.

Stricter employer requirements brought by the reform include bilingual employment contracts, mandatory language training, stronger reporting requirements, financial guarantees and higher penalties for non-compliance.

Under the new provisions, direct posting of workers employed by companies from outside the EU, EEA or Switzerland is no longer permitted under the standard regime. Additionally, the requirement to obtain a work authorisation for posted workers has been eliminated, such workers now being able to apply directly for the long-stay posting visa.

The new system includes enhanced traceability mechanisms linking workers and employers directly through official identifiers. Visa documents will include the worker’s Romanian personal identification number (CNP), while residence permits will display the employer’s company identifier (CUI).

WorkinRomania.gov.ro will store detailed records linking workers and employers, while Entry Exist System will track cross-border movements for short stays. Together, these systems allow authorities to compare travel histories with employment records, making it harder to misuse short-stay visas for work.

In 2025, Romania extended accommodation support, access to employment and social assistance for beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine.


In July 2025, Romania created a central migration governance body, the Committee for the Admission and Regulation of Foreigners’ Stay, bringing together relevant ministries to co-ordinate migration policy, monitor inflows and regulate recruitment channels.

For further information: igi.mai.gov.ro/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Romania

Long-term immigration flows

2024 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration

(Sources: Eurostat, UNHCR)

Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)


	2024	2024/2023
Employment	2 583	-47%
Family	651	-29%
Education	1 802	+2%
Other	564	-9%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	1 145	-49%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	10 647	11.8	2.5
Outflows (2025)	2 652	25.8	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-5.5	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.4	+1.7
Total	-0.1	+1.6

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/e7udni

Slovak Republic

Foreign-born population – 2025	4.2% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.2 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: +29%	Czechia (45%), the United Kingdom (7%), Ukraine (6%)

In 2025, the Slovak Republic received 23 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 9.7% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 4% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 78% labour migrants and 15% family members (including accompanying family). Around 5 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 500 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 40 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 16% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Hungary and Czechia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (800) and Poland the largest decrease (-23) in flows to the Slovak Republic compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -7.1%, to reach around 100. Of the 140 decisions taken in 2025, 50% were positive.

Emigration of Slovak citizens to OECD countries decreased by -4% in 2024, to 24 000. Approximately 29% of this group migrated to Czechia, 17% to Germany and 16% to Austria.

Since December 2024, the computerisation of processes related to the stay of foreigners has been introduced, reducing the need for in-person visits to police services. The extension of deadlines and the reinforcement of staff capacities also alleviate the administrative burden.

The amendment to the Act on the Residence of Foreigners, which entered into force on 1 July 2025, tightened the conditions for the residence of foreigners for business purposes. Applications are submitted exclusively through Slovak embassies abroad, and applications within the country are not allowed; a business plan is required, and an annual quota of 700 permits has been introduced. New temporary stays for business purposes started to be issued for a maximum period of three years. When changing the purpose of residence for business purposes – a third-country national who has been granted residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic for less than two years cannot apply to change the purpose of residence. In the case of residence for the purpose of study, it is possible to apply for another purpose of residence only after successful completion of studies. The validity of long-stay visas issued for residence applications has been extended from 90 to 120 days.

Since July 2026, the amendment to Act on the Residence of Foreigners has applied clearer rules on applying for national visas, including document requirements, time limits for decision making and uniform validity of visas from 90 to 120 days. Arrears vis-à-vis tax and levy institutions are also a new reason for the withdrawal of residence for business purposes.

On 12 June 2025, the government of the Slovak Republic approved the National Strategy for Asylum and Migration Management for the next five years, addressing the broader perspective of migration (legal migration and emigration, return of the workforce). It was followed by an action plan approved on 1 July 2026, which identifies objectives, measures, responsibilities and indicators in 10 thematic areas.

In February 2025, the Ministry of Interior and UNHCR launched the Refugee Response Plan 2025-2026, focussing on housing, education, healthcare and employment.

As of 1 March 2025, the duration of accommodation and financial assistance to newly arrived Ukrainian refugees has been reduced to three months, with the exception of vulnerable groups.


Since 12 June 2026, a new law on international protection has been in force, introducing an asylum border procedure directly at the external borders of the European Union within a period of 12 weeks; free legal counselling to applicants during the procedure; an obligation to make audio recordings of interviews; better protection of vulnerable persons and an independent monitoring mechanism.

For further information: www.minv.sk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovak Republic

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	1 439	+20%
Intra-company transfers	17	+42%
Postdoc and researchers	48	+12%
Other temporary workers	30	-6%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	2	-75%
International students	5 989	+117%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	130	-7%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	3 196	8.2	2.1
Outflows (2025)	654	15.6	0.4

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-2.1	-0.7
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.3	-0.1
Total	-1.9	-0.9

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/f1bwm6

Slovenia

Foreign-born population – 2025	15.6% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 0.3 million, 43% women	Evolution since 2015: +39%	Bosnia and Herzegovina (45%), Croatia (12%), Serbia (10%)

In 2025, Slovenia received 25 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -5.7% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 19% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 57% labour migrants, 24% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 3 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 300 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 22 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a -37% decrease compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (400) and Bosnia and Herzegovina the largest decrease (- 1 900) in flows to Slovenia compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -27%, to reach around 3 000. The majority of applicants came from Morocco (2 400), Egypt (300) and Algeria (300). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Egypt (200) and the largest decrease nationals of Morocco (-1 000). Of the 230 decisions taken in 2025, 31% were positive.

Emigration of Slovenian citizens to OECD countries decreased by -11% in 2024, to 4 100. Approximately 25% of this group migrated to Austria, 23% to Germany and 13% to Switzerland.

A major reform of Slovenia's migration framework was adopted in April 2025, when the National Assembly approved amendments to the Foreigners Act (ZTuj 2I) and the Employment, Self-Employment and Work of Foreigners Act (ZZSDT E). These amendments were aligned with EU Directive 2021/1 883 and aimed to facilitate access for highly skilled workers and to improve procedures.

The first set of changes entered into force on 21 May 2025, extending the initial validity of the single residence and work permit from one year to two years, and allowing renewals for up to three years. These measures reduced administrative turnover for both employers and foreign workers. From June 2025, third-country nationals legally residing in Slovenia for reasons other than employment will be allowed to take up employment before receiving a residence permit, and employers who have made staff redundant for economic reasons in the last six months will not be permitted to hire foreign workers.

Further reforms, implemented on 21 July 2025, reshaped the EU Blue Card regime. Salary thresholds were lowered to the level of the average gross salary (against 1.5 times currently), the minimum employment contract duration was reduced to six months, and professional experience (at least three years of relevant work experience) was explicitly recognised as an alternative to formal qualifications in selected professions. Short-term mobility for Blue Card holders from other EU Member States was also simplified.

Finally, on 21 November 2025, Slovenia introduced a digital nomad temporary residence permit for third-country nationals working remotely for foreign employers. This permit allows a one-year stay, subject to income requirements, with possible reapplication after a six-month interval. At the same time, procedures were further digitalised, allowing certain applications and biometric submissions to be completed directly in Slovenia.

Temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine remained in force under EU extensions adopted prior to the period. Slovenia maintained access to employment, healthcare and education for beneficiaries throughout 2025 and early 2026.

In 2025, the Ministry of Interior's practices regarding asylum interviews changed. Individual interviews with asylum seekers whose applications are being processed under the standard procedure are no longer conducted by officials responsible for lodging the applications but by decision makers, which has tended to lengthen the process.

Throughout 2025, the government Office for the Support and Integration of Migrants continued to implement programmes related to the Temporary Protection of Displaced Persons Act, with the majority of national funding directed towards supporting refugees from Ukraine.


The Information Centre for Foreigners opened in June 2025 in Ljubljana, providing advice as well as administrative and integration support to migrants.

For further information: www.stat.si | www.gov.si/en/news | www.infotujci.si

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovenia

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	289	+85%
Intra-company transfers	52	+100%
Postdoc and researchers	..	-100%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	3 507	+0%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	3 965	-27%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	1 088	19.9	1.4
Outflows (2025)	593	3.3	0.7

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-2	+0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4	-1.4
Total	2	-1.2

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/kpqc38

Spain

Foreign-born population – 2025	19.8% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 9.5 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +61%	Morocco (12%), Colombia (10%), Venezuela (7%)

In 2025, Spain received 460 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 25% more than in 2024. This figure comprises 24% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 8% labour migrants, 44% family members (including accompanying family) and 5% humanitarian migrants. Around 66 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 49 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 236 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 24% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Colombia, Morocco and Venezuela were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Venezuela registered the strongest increase (15 000) and Romania the largest decrease (-7 600) in flows to Spain compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -15%, to reach around 141 000. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (84 000), Mali (15 000) and Colombia (14 000). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Venezuela (19 000) and the largest decrease nationals of Colombia (-25 000). Of the 148 000 decisions taken in 2025, 51% were positive.

Emigration of Spanish citizens to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2024, to 79 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Germany, 13% to the Netherlands and 12% to Switzerland.

A major regulatory reform entered into force in May 2025. The new regulation aimed to simplify procedures, enhance legal certainty and facilitate the integration of migrants in the labour market, education and family life. Among the main measures, visa categories were reorganised, residence pathways were clarified and the validity of most initial residence authorisations is one year, with renewals generally up to four years. The reform also streamlined transitions between residence statuses. Students who have finished their studies can reside and work without having to wait for acceptance of their application for a single permit.

The use of *arraigo* residence mechanisms was expanded. From May 2025, five distinct *arraigo* categories were operationalised: social, socio-labour, family, socio-educational and a “second chance” *arraigo* for individuals who had held a residence permit in the previous two years but failed to renew it. The required duration of stay for most *arraigo* categories was reduced from three to two years, facilitating faster access to legal residence and employment. Labour market access under these permits was broadened, allowing both employed and self-employed work from the outset.

In January 2026, the Council of Ministers approved a major regularisation process (formally the Royal Decree 316/2026). It was published in April 2026 and its application window opened on 16 April 2026 to run until 30 June 2026. The process targets foreign nationals residing in Spain before 1 January 2026. Applicants must demonstrate at least five months of residence in Spain before the application, have no criminal record and meet other specific requirements set out in the regulation. Beneficiaries will be granted a residence permit, with an initial one-year validity subject to renewal and be allowed to work in any sector and location in Spain. This measure was meant to address existing irregular residence, labour demand and social cohesion considerations, allowing progression into standard residence categories after the initial year. As of 2 July 2026, approximately 1.2 million applications have been submitted and almost 610 000 have been admitted for processing, according to the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration.

Integration policy remained anchored in the Strategic Framework for Citizenship and Inclusion against Racism and Xenophobia 2023-2027, with monitoring updates presented in February 2025.


In March 2025, the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration was amended in order to establish a framework for the distribution, reception and protection of unaccompanied foreign minors to address the capacity constraints of border territories and better distribute unaccompanied minors across Spain.

Spain adopted Action Plan III against Hate Crimes 2025-2028 and expanded the use of artificial intelligence-based monitoring tools by OBERAXE (Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia) to detect and report hate speech on social media. Monitoring data for 2024-2025 show persistent online hostility targeting migrants and minorities.

For further information, see www.inclusion.gob.es

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Spain

Long-term immigration flows
2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	6 887	-67%
Intra-company transfers	1 355	-11%
Postdoc and researchers	1 685	-6%
Other temporary workers	39 379	+23%


Education

	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	39 539	-22%
International students	66 463	-5%


Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	141 055	-15%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	6 856	8.3	0.4
Outflows (2025)	794	35	0

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	-2.5	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11.8	0
Total	9.4	0

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/0hje7m

Sweden

Foreign-born population – 2025	20.7% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 2.2 million, 50% women	Evolution since 2015: +37%	Syria (9%), Iraq (7%), Finland (6%)

In 2025, Sweden received 67 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -11% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 34% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 15% labour migrants, 46% family members (including accompanying family) and 4% humanitarian migrants. Around 11 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 2 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 95 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 22% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, India and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (30 000) and India the largest decrease (-1 700) in flows to Sweden compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -27%, to reach around 4 900. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (400), Syria (400) and Eritrea (300). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Georgia (70) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-500). Of the 8 630 decisions taken in 2025, 25% were positive.

Emigration of Swedish citizens to OECD countries increased by 3% in 2024, to 23 000. Approximately 17% of this group migrated to Spain, 14% to Germany and 10% to Norway.

On 1 June 2026, new rules on labour migration took effect, tightening conditions, strengthening protection and encouraging skilled-workers migration. The minimum salary threshold for work permits was raised to 90% of Sweden's median wage (SEK 34 470 per month, circa EUR 3 000), and comprehensive health insurance for permits shorter than one year will be implemented. The government announced that 27 shortage occupations are exempt from the new salary threshold. Selected highly skilled employees and beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine that transition to a work permit are also exempt. For exempted occupations or individuals, a salary requirement corresponding to 75% of the median wage applies.

Researchers and doctoral students can obtain permanent residence more quickly (after three years in eligible permit categories). Doctoral students can in some cases obtain research permits, and graduates receive up to 18 months to seek employment after completing their studies or research. The legislation also introduces stricter requirements for international students, including limits on work alongside studies and stronger academic progress requirements for permit renewal.

The government has proposed stricter family reunification rules, including a requirement that most holders of temporary residence permits must have held their permit for at least two years to sponsor family members, as well as higher and broader income requirements. Labour migrants, researchers, doctoral students and certain refugees would be exempt from the waiting-period requirement. The changes are proposed to enter into force on 1 October 2026.

At the end of 2025, a government bill referred to the Council on Legislation proposed to phase out the granting of permanent residence permits to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and certain related categories, including their family members. The legislative changes came into force on 12 July 2026. Under the new system, affected individuals will instead receive five-year temporary residence permits, which can be renewed.

Since January 2026, financial support has been increased for persons residing lawfully in Sweden and choosing to repatriate to their country of origin or another country where they have the right to settle. An adult may receive SEK 350 000 (circa EUR 31 200), and a family may receive up to SEK 600 000 (circa EUR 54 500).

From 13 July 2026, several public authorities must proactively share information with the police if they have reason to believe that a foreign national does not have the right to stay in Sweden. The law also gives the police and the Swedish Migration Agency additional tools to verify identities.

The extension of the EU Temporary Protection Directive until March 2028 allows beneficiaries to remain lawfully in Sweden during this period. As of 11 June 2026, people from Ukraine who hold a Swedish residence permit under the Temporary Protection Directive can apply for certain other residence permits.

In June 2026, a new bill established stricter requirements for obtaining Swedish citizenship (Govt Bill 2025/26:175). These include an increase in the minimum duration of residence from five to eight years and requirements in Swedish proficiency and knowledge of Swedish society. Applicants should also lead a law-abiding life and be able to support themselves.


At the local level, municipalities developed targeted integration initiatives. The City of Stockholm, for example, launched an integration pact bringing together public authorities, private employers and civil society actors to promote labour market inclusion.

For further information: www.migrationsverket.se | www.regeringen.se

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Sweden

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	728	-47%
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	1 499	+3%
Other temporary workers	..	..

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	..	..
International students	11 445	-4%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	4 940	-27%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	5 228	18.1	0.8
Outflows (2025)	4 202	3.7	0.6

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	0.5	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	1.2	-1.5
Total	1.7	-1.7

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/z26deq

Switzerland

Foreign-born population – 2025	32.9% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 2.9 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +25%	Germany (13%), Italy (9%), Portugal (7%)

In 2025, Switzerland received 132 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -2.4% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 77% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 2% labour migrants, 15% family members (including accompanying family) and 7% humanitarian migrants. Around 6 100 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 3 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Germany, France and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Afghanistan registered the strongest increase (2 900) and Germany the largest decrease (-1 700) in flows to Switzerland compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants was stable at around 23 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (5 300), Eritrea (3 300) and Türkiye (2 100). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Eritrea (1 400) and the largest decrease nationals of Türkiye (-1 700). Of the 21 000 decisions taken in 2025, 53% were positive.

Emigration of Swiss citizens to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2024, to 10 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Spain, 18% to Germany and 8% to Portugal.

The Swiss Federal Council has confirmed unchanged quotas in 2026 for non-EU/EFTA nationals, EU/EFTA service providers (over 120 days) and UK nationals based on economic forecasts and quota usage.

In November 2025 all three levels of the Swiss Government jointly reviewed the performance of the asylum system. They reaffirmed their commitment to the present framework, but also identified areas where action is needed to further develop and improve the system. This includes, among other things, exploring an early screening process to prevent individuals with no protection needs from entering the asylum system as well as efforts to improve its ability to deal with individuals who have committed criminal offences.

In August 2026, the Federal Council extended protection status S for displaced persons from Ukraine until 4 March 2028, aligning its practice with that of the EU. At the same time, additional restrictions complemented a 2025 revised eligibility framework for new applicants; since 31 July 2026, compliance with the military obligations applicable in Ukraine is observed.

In parallel with the extension of status S, the Federal Council prolonged federal financial support for cantonal integration measures under Programme S until March 2028. Persons who, after five years' residence in Switzerland, are granted a long-term residence permit linked to protection status S are entitled to integration support under the cantonal integration programmes. Subject to certain conditions, persons in need of protection may obtain a hardship-based long-term residence permit independent of protection status S.

In March 2026, the Federal Council opened a consultation on amendments to several ordinances aimed at strengthening labour-market integration. The proposed changes include granting labour-market access to persons with pending status S applications, expanding the use of federal integration funding for employability measures and placing the *Integrationsvorlehre* (INVOL) vocational preparatory programme on a permanent footing.

From 1 January 2025 Croatian nationals enjoyed full free movement of persons as it applies to nationals of the other EU member states. The conditions for activating the unilateral safeguard clause in 2026 were not met in accordance with the transitional arrangements.

In April 2025, the Federal Council decided to extend Switzerland's resettlement programme until the end of 2027. The programme continued to constitute a key legal pathway for refugee admission.

Switzerland continued preparations for the implementation of the digital Schengen visa procedure following the Federal Council's earlier approval of the relevant legislative amendments.

On 12 June 2026, Switzerland started to apply the EU Pact of Migration and Asylum and the new related legal framework.


On 14 June 2026, Swiss citizens voted on the popular initiative: "No to a Switzerland with 10 million! (Sustainability Initiative)". The initiative was rejected by 54.8% against 45.2%.

For further information: www.sem.admin.ch | www.eda.admin.ch

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Switzerland

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	..	..
Seasonal workers	..	..
Intra-company transfers	..	..
Postdoc and researchers	915	+2%
Other temporary workers	2 196	-9%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	202	+7%
International students	6 120	-4%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	23 415	+3%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	3 872	6.5	0.4
Outflows (2025)	42 676	6.4	4.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	0.7	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	7.4	-1.5
Total	8.1	-1.5

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/ok7vu9

Türkiye

Foreign-born population – 2025	3.4% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 3 million, 54% women	Evolution since 2015: +89%	Bulgaria (11%), Germany (11%), Syria (10%)

Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Uzbekistan registered the strongest increase (5 100) and Russia the largest decrease (-12 000) in flows to Türkiye compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -28%, to reach around 6 500. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (3 500), Iraq (1 500) and Iran (600). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Ukraine (100) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-2 100).

Emigration of Turkish citizens to OECD countries decreased by -23% in 2024, to 122 000. Approximately 48% of this group migrated to Germany, 8% to the Netherlands and 7% to the United States.

In terms of labour migration governance, the International Labour Force Advisory Board chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Security has begun to convene in 2025 and continued to ensure co-ordination among relevant public institutions via working group meetings.

As a follow-up to updates to the "Work Permit Evaluation Criteria" in 2024 including measures to introduce sectoral flexibility and employment exemptions in sectors where local labour supply is insufficient, livestock sector-specific steps are taken by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security as of June 2025 targeting foreign shepherds and herd managers to be employed in registered livestock enterprises. In this scope, enterprises may employ up to three foreign workers provided that they meet eligibility criteria based on herd size. This measure aims to reduce informal employment and support the sustainability of the livestock sector.

Similarly, starting from the last quarter of 2024, for foreigners seeking employment in the domestic service without a valid work permit, a six-month residence permit is issued based on the employer's notarised guarantee and this information is transmitted to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security by the Presidency of Migration Management to allow work permit applications with a view to address sector's needs and to ensure formal employment.

During 2025, digital work permit application systems (including web services among relevant authorities) have been upgraded and made more functional, and provincial specialised information offices have been operationalised across the country to provide face-to-face guidance on legal pathways for labour market access and work permit processes to promote formal employment.

On the other hand, regulatory framework to tackle informality has been updated so that the administrative detention and deportation costs (up to three months) of foreigners and their family members in cases of employment without a work permit are now to be covered directly by the employer (rather than being a burden on the public budget) was introduced in 2025.


Driven by these initiatives, the growth trend in the number of work permits and exemptions for foreigners persisted, surging by 21% compared to the previous year to surpass 520 000 in 2025 indicating positive employment outcomes and a higher rate of formality.

With respect to Syrians under temporary protection, voluntary, safe, regular and dignified returns still remain a priority area within Türkiye's migration governance framework. To accommodate cautious approach of refugees, those wishing to observe conditions in Syria before making a final decision were allowed to undertake up to three "go-and-see" visits between 1 January and 1 July 2025. This permission was granted to one family member, referred to as the "pioneer". As of August 2026, more than 730 000 Syrians under temporary protection have returned to Syria since 8 December 2024.


For further information: www.csgb.gov.tr/uigm/en/ | www.turkiyetechvisa.gov.tr | www.goc.gov.tr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Türkiye

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024
(National definition)




Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2024)	982	-4.6	0.1
Outflows (2024)	1 534	54.3	0.1

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	4.7	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.3	+2.1
Total	5	+1.6

Labour market outcomes
2025



StatLink https://stat.link/osewt0

United Kingdom

Foreign-born population – 2024	19% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 13.1 million	Evolution since 2015: +55%	India (9%), Poland (7%), Pakistan (5%)

In 2025, the United Kingdom received 296 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -32% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 23% labour migrants, 57% family members (including accompanying family) and 17% humanitarian migrants. Around 398 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 102 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 139 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2024, a 40% increase compared to 2023. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

India, Nigeria and Pakistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2024. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nigeria registered the strongest increase (50 000) and China the largest decrease (-22 000) in flows to the United Kingdom compared to the previous year.

In 2025, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -6.9%, to reach around 101 000. The majority of applicants came from Pakistan (11 000), Eritrea (8 900) and Iran (7 400). The largest increase since 2024 concerned nationals of Eritrea (3 900) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-4 700). Of the 195 000 decisions taken in 2025, 32% were positive.

Emigration of the United Kingdom citizens to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2024, to 83 000. Approximately 22% of this group migrated to Spain, 13% to the United States and 13% to Australia.

The UK's migration policies are focussed on strengthened border security through reduced net migration, increased returns and reform of the refugee and asylum system. Following the publication of the Immigration White Paper, *Restoring Control over the Immigration System*, in May 2025, several reforms have been introduced while others are subject to consultation and a phased introduction over the coming years.

Substantial changes to the Skilled Worker route entered into force in July 2025, lifting the skill threshold for sponsorship from Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 3 (equivalent to high school) to Level 6 (undergraduate degree level). The general salary threshold for Skilled Worker visas increased to GBP 41 700 (c. EUR 48 800). Transitional arrangements allow existing Skilled Worker visa holders in lower-skilled occupations to extend or switch visas until April 2030, provided their original sponsorship predated earlier cut-off dates. Over 100 medium-skilled occupations were removed from eligibility for new overseas sponsorship.

The Asylum Policy Statement in November 2025, *Restoring Order and Control*, outlined major reforms to the UK's immigration and asylum systems. This includes the introduction in late 2026 of stricter minimum requirements for indefinite leave to remain. The "baseline" qualifying period will be 10 years, but this will be adjusted up or down depending on individual circumstances. For example, people in higher-skilled jobs who either earn over GBP 50 270 or work in public sector healthcare and teaching roles could qualify for settlement after five years, whereas for people in jobs considered low-skilled or medium-skilled, the baseline starting point could be 15 years. The government ran a public consultation to gather views on the earned settlement proposals, which closed in February 2026, and is analysing the responses to help inform the development of the final model.

The Policy Statement also sets out a new approach to refugee protection in the United Kingdom, with refugee status becoming temporary (known as "core protection") with periodic review, as opposed to automatic long-term settlement. To incentivise integration, refugees will have the option to switch into a bespoke protection, work and study route to access family reunion and settlement rights. Building on Canada's successful refugee resettlement model, a new "community sponsorship" scheme was also announced, with the first arrivals expected in autumn 2027.

Legislatively, the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 enhanced intelligence-gathering through new electronic device seizure powers and also introduced new offences and powers to enable earlier intervention against criminal networks. These measures allow law enforcement to target those who facilitate irregular migration at an earlier stage, including through the supply of equipment, preparatory activity and online advertising.

Returns and removals to deter irregular migration remain key and a reciprocal pilot "one-in one-out" agreement was signed with France in August 2025. For every undocumented asylum seeker who arrives via small boat and is subsequently deported to France, the United Kingdom accepts one vetted asylum seeker from France who has valid family ties or a high chance of being granted asylum. The agreement is due to expire in October.


For further information:

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office | www.gov.uk/government/collections/migration-statistics

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United Kingdom

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	..	..
Working holidaymakers	21 209	-13%
Seasonal workers	38 805	+10%
Intra-company transfers	12 515	-9%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	29 103	+1%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	479	-3%
International students	398 293	+4%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	100 620	-7%


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	5 364	11	0.1
Outflows (2025)	13 169	7.3	0.3

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	0	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.9	-0.6
Total	6	-0.7

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/h2se89

United States

Foreign-born population – 2025	15% of the population	Main countries of birth:
Size: 52 million, 51% women	Evolution since 2015: +20%	Mexico (23%), India (8%), China (5%)

In 2025, the United States received 1 288 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -10% compared to 2024. This figure comprises 6% labour migrants, 75% family members (including accompanying family) and 12% humanitarian migrants. Around 270 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 830 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

In 2025, migration policy increasingly emphasised enforcement and removals. This approach was reinforced by the enactment in July 2025 of a major budget and policy package that substantially expanded resources for border management, detention and immigration enforcement. The legislation delegated significant implementation responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its agencies. In addition, the United States has pursued third-country repatriation agreements with many foreign countries.

Throughout 2025, DHS increased administrative co-ordination between U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), with a focus on screening, vetting and execution of removal decisions. CBP Home now offers “assistance to voluntarily self-deport.”

Changes to asylum processing, introduced through administrative and regulatory measures in mid-2025, expanded use of expedited procedures; migrants who cross irregularly can be deported faster without a court hearing. Administrative guidance issued mid-2025 reinforced requirements for pre-scheduled appointments at ports of entry and broadened the scope for accelerated case handling.

DHS extended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Ukraine through 19 October 2026. In 2025 and early 2026, DHS issued notices terminating or announcing the intent to terminate TPS designations for several countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Somalia, considering they no longer met the conditions. Implementation in several cases has been subject to litigation and court orders.

Labour-migration policy changes during the reference period affected both access channels and conditions attached to work authorisation. In September 2025, a Presidential proclamation introduced a USD 100 000 fee for new H-1B Specialty Worker petitions submitted after 21 September 2025 and directing agencies to revise selection and wage-prioritisation mechanisms for this temporary programme. Subsequent agency guidance was issued by USCIS, CBP and the Department of State during autumn 2025.

In March 2026, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a proposed rule aimed at reforming the method of calculating wages for workers admitted under the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3 and PERM programmes. The DOL seeks to raise the minimum wages that employers must pay to foreign workers before the government certifies their labour requests, across all four wage levels used in the H-1B system. Under the proposal, entry-level prevailing wage requirements would increase by approximately one-third. In October 2025, the Department of Labor revised the methodology used to calculate H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs). The new system introduced skill-based wage categories and generally reduced minimum wage requirements for many H-2A positions, although the magnitude of the change varied across states and occupations.

In October 2025, DHS issued an interim final rule ending the automatic extension of employment authorisation documents (EADs) for most applicants filing renewal requests on or after 30 October 2025. Automatic extensions already granted, as well as certain extensions provided by statute or Federal Register notice, were not affected.

In July 2025, the Department of Health and Human Services rescinded a 1998 policy and reclassified several programmes as federal public benefits under stricter rules. Some immigrants (including those with TPS or parole) saw their eligibility for these programmes become restricted, as under the 1996 welfare law.


From 1 January 2026, nationals of 19 countries are barred from entering the United States for both immigrant and non-immigrant visas (Afghanistan, Burma, Burkina Faso, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Laos, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen). Nationals of 19 additional countries face restrictions on immigrant visas and certain non-immigrant categories.

For further information: www.whitehouse.gov/ | www.loc.gov/ | www.federalregister.gov/ | www.uscis.gov/

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United States

Long-term immigration flows

2025 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration

(Sources: OECD, UNHCR)

Temporary labour migration

	2025	2025/2024
Au pair	16 840	-13%
Working holidaymakers	104 609	-2%
Seasonal workers	453 569	+1%
Intra-company transfers	75 461	+0%
Postdoc and researchers	..	..
Other temporary workers	168 269	-12%

Education


	2025	2025/2024
Trainees	569	-30%
International students	259 839	-33%

Humanitarian

	2025	2025/2024
Asylum seekers	..	..


Inflows of top 10 nationalities

(National definition)



Emigration of national citizens to OECD countries in 2024

(National definition)



Annual remittances


	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2025)	9 044	3.8	0
Outflows (2025)	107 097	3.8	0.3

Components of population growth

	2025 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2025/2024 difference
Natural increase	1.5	0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.7	-4.4
Total	5.2	-4.4

Labour market outcomes

2025



StatLink https://stat.link/m9p8f3

Annex A. Statistical annex

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

A.1. Inflows of foreign population into OECD countries

B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality

A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Metadata relative to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Inflows of asylum seekers

A.3. Inflows of asylum seekers into OECD countries

B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.3 and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries

B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth

Metadata relative to Tables A.4 and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population

A.5. Stocks of foreign population in OECD countries

B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.5 and B.5. Stocks of foreign population

Acquisitions of nationality

A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries

B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.6 and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality

Introduction

Most of the data published in this annex have been provided by national correspondents of the OECD Expert Group on Migration appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of member countries. Consequently, these data are not necessarily based on common definitions. Countries under review in this annex are OECD countries for which data are available. The OECD Expert Group on Migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. It is an observatory which, by its very nature, has to use existing statistics. However, it does play an active role in suggesting what it considers to be essential improvements in data collection and makes every effort to present consistent and well-documented statistics.

The purpose of this annex is to describe the “immigrant” population (generally the foreign-born population). The information gathered concerns the flows and stocks of the total immigrant population as well as the acquisition of nationality. These data have not been standardised and are therefore not fully comparable across countries. In particular, the criteria for registering persons in population registers and the conditions for granting residence permits, for example, vary across countries, which means that measurements may differ greatly even if the same type of source is being used.

In addition to the problem of the comparability of statistics, there is the difficulty of the very partial coverage of unauthorised migrants. Part of this population may be counted in censuses. Regularisation programmes, when they exist, make it possible to identify and enumerate a far from negligible fraction of unauthorised immigrants. In terms of measurement, this makes it possible to better measure the volume of the foreign-born population at a given time, even if it is not always possible to determine the year these immigrants entered the country.

Each series in the annex is preceded by an explanatory note concerning the data presented. A summary table then follows (series A, giving the total for each destination country), and finally the tables by nationality or country of birth, as the case may be (series B). At the end of each series, a table provides the sources and notes for the data presented in the tables for each country.

General comments

The tables provide annual series covering the period 2014-24 or 2015-25.

- The series A tables are presented in alphabetical order by the name of the country. In the other tables, nationalities or countries of birth are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
- In the tables by country of origin (series B), only the 15 main countries are shown. “Other countries” is a residual calculated as the difference between the total foreign or foreign-born population and the sum for all countries indicated in the table. For some countries, data are not available for all years and this is reflected in the residual entry of “Other countries”. This must be borne in mind when interpreting changes in this category.
- There is no table by nationality for the series on outflows of the foreign population (series A.2). These statistics, as well as data by gender, are available online (https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/312).
- The rounding of data cells may cause totals to differ slightly from the sum of the component cells.
- The symbol “..” used in the tables means that the data are not available.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

OECD countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data. This note describes more systematically what is measured by each of the sources used.

Flows derived from population registers

Population registers can usually produce inflow and outflow data for both nationals and foreigners. To register, foreigners may have to indicate possession of an appropriate residence and/or work permit valid for at least as long as the minimum registration period. Emigrants are usually identified by a stated intention to leave the country, although the period of (intended) absence is not always specified.

In population registers, departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, emigrants who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about their departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register. Registration criteria vary considerably across countries; in particular the minimum duration of stay for individuals to be registered ranges from three months to one year, which poses major problems of international comparisons. For example, in some countries, register data cover many temporary migrants, in some cases including asylum seekers when they live in private households (as opposed to reception centres or hostels for immigrants) and international students.

Flows derived from residence and/or work permits

Statistics on permits are generally based on the number of permits issued during a given period and depend on the types of permits used. The so-called “settlement countries” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) consider as immigrants persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence, and this right is often granted upon arrival. Statistics on temporary immigrants are also published in this annex for these countries. In the case of France, the permits covered are those valid for at least one year (excluding students).

Another characteristic of permit data is that flows of nationals are not recorded. Some flows of foreigners may also not be recorded, either because the type of permit they hold is not included in the statistics or because they are not required to have a permit (freedom of movement agreements). In addition, permit data do not necessarily reflect physical flows or actual lengths of stay since: i) permits may be issued overseas but individuals may decide not to use them, or delay their arrival; ii) permits may be issued to persons who have in fact been resident in the country for some time, the permit indicating a change of status.

Flows estimated from specific surveys

Ireland provides estimates based on the results of Quarterly National Household Surveys and other sources such as permit data and asylum applications. These estimates are revised periodically on the basis of census data. Australia and New Zealand conduct passenger surveys, which enable them to establish the length of stay on the basis of migrants’ stated intentions when they enter or exit the country.

Table A.1. Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Australia	233.9	223.7	218.5	224.2	186.6	155.8	137.5	153.8	217.4	219.5	202.8
Austria	154.3	198.7	158.7	139.3	131.7	135.0	121.3	139.5	246.3	181.6	164.9
Belgium	106.3	128.8	106.1	109.2	119.7	129.5	101.6	122.4	192.0	153.9	146.0
Canada	260.3	271.8	296.7	286.4	321.0	341.1	184.6	406.0	437.6	471.8	483.7
Chile	..	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	154.6	76.5	198.4	70.5	115.1
Colombia	..	..	..	104.5	217.9	225.8	74.8	40.7	108.1	49.9	61.8
Costa Rica	..	15.7	6.6	8.6	9.2	7.8	..	9.1	11.2	10.2	11.6
Czechia	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3	53.8	67.3	347.7	139.9	120.2
Denmark	64.5	75.4	71.2	66.4	64.6	61.9	48.0	57.3	101.2	78.9	82.6
Estonia	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0	10.3	12.5	42.4	20.6	13.4
Finland	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2	23.3	28.0	42.5	66.0	57.2
France	236.9	240.5	243.6	246.2	259.9	268.5	208.5	250.4	284.9	263.5	262.9
Germany	1 342.5	2 016.2	1 719.1	1 384.0	1 383.6	1 345.9	994.8	1 139.8	2 481.0	1 741.2	1 505.1
Greece	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4	63.4	28.7	63.4	70.5	80.2
Hungary	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	43.8	49.1	55.5	61.4	49.3
Iceland	4.8	5.6	8.6	12.5	12.5	10.7	8.9	10.0	17.0	16.6	14.8
Ireland	47.9	52.9	57.2	52.1	66.4	61.6	43.6	47.0	129.7	106.6	93.4
Israel	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	19.7	25.5	74.7	46.1	31.1
Italy	248.4	250.0	262.9	301.1	285.5	264.6	191.8	243.6	336.5	378.4	393.1
Japan	336.5	391.2	427.6	475.0	519.7	592.0	220.6	80.0	561.8	619.7	657.1
Korea	407.1	372.9	402.2	452.7	495.1	438.2	233.1	220.6	412.9	479.8	450.9
Latvia	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.5	6.6	4.6	6.4	30.6	15.6	14.7
Lithuania	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	22.3	21.1	81.0	50.2	32.8
Luxembourg	21.0	22.6	21.6	23.2	23.4	25.2	21.0	23.8	29.9	25.1	23.9
Mexico	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.8	38.7	40.5	58.4	68.5	75.6	69.9	73.8
Netherlands	139.3	159.5	182.2	183.9	191.0	215.2	170.6	208.1	359.3	291.2	273.3
New Zealand	90.7	101.5	104.0	103.4	104.2	124.7	54.5	28.2	92.6	207.6	130.9
Norway	61.4	59.1	58.5	49.8	44.4	44.6	30.8	46.6	83.3	79.3	58.8
Poland	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.2	163.5	224.2	335.3	374.1	354.0
Portugal	35.3	37.9	46.9	61.4	93.2	129.2	118.1	111.3	143.1	329.0	218.3
Slovak Republic	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.0	1.8	2.1	3.2
Slovenia	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	24.8	19.7	31.9	29.9	28.3
Spain	264.5	290.0	352.2	454.0	560.0	666.0	415.2	752.3	1 120.5	1 098.0	1 144.2
Sweden	106.1	113.9	143.0	125.0	114.4	98.2	65.8	74.4	86.5	77.2	97.3
Switzerland	152.1	150.4	143.1	137.8	140.1	140.6	137.0	141.5	162.4	181.6	170.6
Türkiye	..	..	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	242.5	615.1	399.6	214.8	210.9
United Kingdom	357.7	366.5	374.9	317.7	317.7	356.1	199.8	369.0	487.1	741.6	433.9
United States	1 016.5	1 051.0	1 183.5	1 127.2	1 096.6	1 031.8	707.4	740.0	1 018.0	1 193.8	1 425.1

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

StatLink https://stat.link/kr1oyp

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Australia (permanent)

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	39.6	34.7	38.6	40.0	33.1	32.6	24.5	26.4	44.5	55.3	51.6	47
China	28.5	29.4	30.9	31.1	27.7	27.2	20.1	21.0	35.7	36.3	27.6	55
Philippines	10.3	11.9	12.0	12.1	10.9	9.2	8.5	9.8	13.3	13.1	11.7	60
United Kingdom	23.8	22.2	19.0	17.6	14.1	13.3	10.8	9.9	11.4	10.2	10.4	47
Nepal	4.4	4.2	5.1	4.4	3.0	3.8	4.7	6.8	13.4	13.8	10.1	49
Pakistan	5.7	8.0	7.0	6.8	6.3	4.7	3.8	4.7	5.5	7.5	9.8	47
Sri Lanka	4.5	3.9	3.8	3.2	2.7	2.7	2.4	3.2	4.8	6.1	9.0	51
Viet Nam	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.5	5.1	7.8	8.0	7.5	6.2	60
South Africa	4.9	4.7	4.0	4.8	4.3	4.0	3.8	3.7	5.4	5.2	4.7	51
Brazil	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.6	2.2	2.3	2.7	3.6	3.1	3.2	51
Afghanistan	5.7	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.8	2.2	2.2	1.2	1.9	4.3	3.1	63
Iran	2.7	3.9	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.4	3.7	4.4	3.7	3.1	53
Malaysia	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.2	3.4	2.5	2.1	2.9	3.7	3.5	3.1	56
Ireland	6.3	6.3	4.9	3.9	2.4	2.3	1.8	1.7	2.4	2.3	2.6	50
United States	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.6	2.7	3.6	3.2	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.3	54
Other countries	82.5	77.3	73.1	78.7	62.9	37.9	39.7	44.8	56.2	44.7	44.4	
Total	**233.9**	**223.7**	**218.5**	**224.2**	**186.6**	**155.8**	**137.5**	**153.8**	**217.4**	**219.5**	**202.8**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Austria

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Germany	16.8	17.0	16.1	16.2	17.0	18.3	19.0	19.4	21.7	19.8	19.4	49
Ukraine	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	2.0	78.4	15.7	16.8	55
Romania	20.7	17.5	16.7	17.9	19.2	20.3	17.5	17.9	21.7	19.3	16.1	43
Hungary	14.5	14.4	13.3	13.1	12.6	12.1	10.1	9.6	12.5	14.7	13.1	45
Syria	7.4	22.6	9.0	6.7	2.1	1.6	3.7	13.4	15.1	15.2	11.7	53
Croatia	6.0	5.8	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.5	7.2	8.4	9.2	7.9	6.1	42
Türkiye	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.3	2.5	3.1	4.9	7.6	5.2	39
Serbia	7.4	7.6	7.3	7.2	6.8	6.5	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.4	5.2	44
Italy	4.1	4.6	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.0	4.8	4.7	4.6	44
Bulgaria	5.8	5.2	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.7	4.4	4.5	5.6	4.9	4.2	46
Slovak Republic	6.5	6.1	5.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.2	4.1	4.6	4.3	3.9	47
China	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.1	1.3	1.6	2.4	3.9	44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.2	5.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.3	3.5	4.1	4.4	3.8	46
Poland	6.9	6.1	5.4	5.2	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.9	4.5	3.6	38
Russia	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.8	2.1	3.5	3.7	2.7	54
Other countries	42.5	75.8	56.8	40.0	36.8	37.9	31.1	36.6	47.9	47.1	44.6	
Total	**154.3**	**198.7**	**158.7**	**139.3**	**131.7**	**135.0**	**121.3**	**139.5**	**246.3**	**181.6**	**164.9**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Belgium

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
France	12.0	12.0	11.3	11.3	11.7	12.0	11.3	11.9	12.0	11.8	11.7	52
Romania	11.3	10.6	10.9	11.9	13.4	14.3	11.3	13.0	14.2	12.9	11.5	36
Ukraine	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.8	49.2	12.0	11.0	53
Netherlands	8.1	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	6.9	7.6	8.1	7.4	7.4	48
Syria	2.8	10.4	4.7	5.5	3.6	2.8	1.7	3.3	3.6	5.5	6.4	44
Spain	5.0	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.7	4.5	5.8	6.6	6.4	6.3	49
Morocco	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.5	5.0	5.8	4.7	5.3	5.9	6.2	6.1	54
Türkiye	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.8	4.7	6.1	5.6	41
Italy	5.3	5.1	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.5	4.7	4.9	5.5	5.6	5.4	47
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.9	2.8	2.6	0.7	1.7	3.9	4.0	5.0	22
Portugal	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.5	3.9	4.4	4.7	42
Afghanistan	1.1	7.5	2.6	1.6	2.2	3.8	3.2	6.2	6.9	3.9	3.7	51
Bulgaria	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.7	4.1	4.4	4.7	3.9	3.2	46
Poland	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.3	3.4	4.0	3.7	2.9	47
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.9	2.3	2.9	52
Other countries	38.9	49.9	40.1	42.0	48.2	52.8	38.1	46.3	56.9	57.8	52.2	
Total	**106.3**	**128.8**	**106.1**	**109.2**	**119.7**	**129.5**	**101.6**	**122.4**	**192.0**	**153.9**	**146.0**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Canada (permanent)

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	38.3	39.5	39.8	51.6	70.0	85.6	42.9	127.9	118.3	139.8	127.4	..
China	25.2	20.2	28.1	31.6	31.3	31.8	17.6	33.3	35.6	39.4	33.5	..
Philippines	40.0	50.8	41.8	40.9	35.1	27.8	11.0	18.0	22.1	27.0	32.3	..
Cameroon	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.3	3.0	1.6	2.6	6.3	11.7	21.2	..
Nigeria	4.2	4.1	4.4	5.4	10.9	12.6	6.4	15.6	22.1	17.5	20.4	..
Eritrea	2.0	2.2	4.6	4.7	5.7	7.0	2.6	5.4	7.7	10.7	16.6	..
Afghanistan	1.5	2.6	2.6	3.5	3.6	3.9	1.7	8.6	23.8	20.2	12.3	..
Pakistan	9.1	11.3	11.3	7.7	9.5	10.8	6.2	8.5	11.6	11.9	12.0	..
Iran	16.8	11.7	6.5	4.7	5.5	6.1	3.8	11.3	11.1	10.7	11.2	..
France	4.7	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.2	5.0	4.6	12.7	14.2	10.1	9.9	..
United States	8.5	7.5	8.4	9.1	10.9	10.8	6.4	12.0	10.4	10.6	9.3	..
Colombia	2.9	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.5	4.1	3.8	4.7	8.9	..
Algeria	3.7	2.8	2.8	2.6	3.2	3.7	2.7	3.1	6.2	5.2	8.3	..
Syria	2.1	9.9	34.9	12.1	12.0	10.1	4.9	5.6	8.5	9.3	7.8	..
Morocco	2.5	2.7	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	6.4	6.4	7.6	..
Other countries	96.8	96.4	98.0	99.2	109.9	117.8	67.8	134.5	129.8	136.8	145.1	
Total	**260.3**	**271.8**	**296.4**	**286.5**	**321.1**	**341.2**	**184.6**	**406.1**	**437.6**	**471.8**	**483.7**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Chile

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Bolivia	27.5	28.4	21.7	28.5	40.3	29.1	17.4	7.7	24.4	13.7	42.1	50
Venezuela	2.9	8.4	22.8	72.3	144.1	159.5	80.9	43.6	115.0	25.1	33.9	56
Colombia	29.1	38.7	34.8	37.4	41.2	31.9	23.5	16.8	40.5	15.1	16.8	56
Peru	40.4	50.1	41.5	41.4	46.6	31.4	20.0	12.5	35.4	10.8	14.9	53
Haiti	3.7	9.2	23.9	46.4	125.7	37.3	33.0	4.8	6.8	4.4	10.3	54
Ecuador	4.3	5.2	6.0	8.2	9.1	6.9	4.6	2.7	8.2	3.4	4.8	52
Argentina	6.6	7.4	6.6	6.8	6.1	7.0	4.6	3.1	5.9	4.3	4.7	37
China	2.2	2.8	2.7	3.4	3.3	2.8	1.6	0.7	1.5	1.6	3.3	37
Brazil	1.7	2.3	2.7	3.1	2.9	3.4	2.2	1.3	2.2	1.4	1.5	52
Dominican Republic	2.6	2.1	1.4	1.4	3.9	4.2	1.2	0.7	2.0	1.3	1.4	53
Cuba	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.9	3.7	3.6	1.7	0.9	1.5	1.4	1.3	54
United States	3.4	2.9	2.3	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.0	0.5	1.4	0.5	1.0	38
Spain	4.8	4.0	2.9	2.2	1.5	1.5	1.2	0.7	1.5	1.0	0.9	41
Paraguay	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	0.7	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.6	61
Mexico	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	56
Other countries	7.7	8.6	7.3	6.8	6.1	5.9	4.0	2.0	4.9	3.9	3.8	
Total	**139.9**	**173.6**	**179.8**	**263.1**	**438.4**	**328.4**	**198.6**	**98.9**	**252.8**	**89.4**	**142.0**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Colombia

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
United States	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10.1	13.7	14.8	17.2	
Venezuela	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12.2	17.9	12.3	10.8	
Peru	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3.3	5.6	5.7	6.4	
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3.8	5.3	5.5	6.1	
Spain	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4.4	5.3	5.0	5.4	
Brazil	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2.3	4.0	3.9	4.8	
Argentina	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2.4	4.2	4.0	4.7	
Ecuador	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2.0	3.3	3.7	4.4	
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.1	1.9	2.1	2.7	
France	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.7	2.2	2.4	2.6	
Italy	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.4	2.1	2.0	1.9	
Germany	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.7	
Canada	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.4	
Netherlands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Panama	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.9	
Other countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9.3	14.5	14.6	15.7	
Total	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**57.2**	**84.7**	**80.6**	**87.7**	

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Czechia

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	8.4	5.5	5.8	10.3	16.7	22.8	21.1	32.1	311.0	106.0	84.1	55
Slovak Republic	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.7	5.8	7.2	7.0	6.4	6.5	7.0	46
Philippines	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.5	1.4	2.3	3.3	27
Viet Nam	1.7	1.3	1.8	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.4	1.6	1.9	1.9	2.0	53
India	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.2	2.0	1.9	1.8	35
Mongolia	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.3	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.7	40
China	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.7	47
Kazakhstan	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.3	43
Romania	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	29
Türkiye	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.9	1.0	33
Moldova	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	24
Hungary	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.8	34
Russia	4.9	2.9	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.3	3.4	3.7	3.3	0.8	0.8	42
Bulgaria	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	21
United States	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	47
Other countries	9.5	8.3	9.5	11.0	13.8	15.6	11.6	12.9	12.4	11.4	11.2	
Total	**38.5**	**31.6**	**34.8**	**43.5**	**55.9**	**63.3**	**53.8**	**67.3**	**347.7**	**139.9**	**120.2**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Denmark

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.4	2.3	1.5	1.9	31.1	8.2	8.9	53
Romania	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.2	4.4	6.8	7.5	6.1	5.4	29
Germany	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.5	4.1	5.6	5.0	5.0	53
United States	3.3	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.8	1.4	1.5	3.8	4.2	4.5	66
Poland	5.0	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.3	3.9	3.2	4.8	5.2	4.9	3.9	36
Italy	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.3	3.3	3.9	3.4	3.7	46
Nepal	0.6	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.7	1.0	2.1	3.3	50
India	2.1	2.3	2.8	2.7	3.0	3.1	1.7	2.1	3.5	3.4	2.9	42
Iran	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.3	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.4	2.2	2.7	51
Bangladesh	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.6	2.4	39
Spain	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	48
China	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.3	1.4	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.3	57
Sweden	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	50
Norway	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	59
France	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.8	50
Other countries	31.9	41.9	36.9	31.2	28.9	27.2	21.0	22.2	28.0	28.1	29.6	
Total	**64.5**	**75.4**	**71.2**	**66.4**	**64.6**	**61.9**	**48.0**	**57.3**	**101.2**	**78.9**	**82.6**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Estonia

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.8	2.4	3.0	33.2	13.1	7.0	42
Russia	0.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.1	0.6	60
Finland	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	37
Latvia	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	31
Germany	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	51
France	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	43
India	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	33
Spain	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	38
Italy	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	35
Moldova	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	24
Stateless	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	31
Türkiye	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	37
United States	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	35
Romania	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	30
Pakistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	48
Other countries	0.3	1.9	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.6	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.1	2.4	
Total	**1.3**	**7.4**	**7.7**	**9.1**	**9.7**	**11.0**	**10.3**	**12.5**	**42.4**	**20.6**	**13.4**	**42**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Finland

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.5	19.9	14.0	52
Philippines	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	2.9	3.5	3.8	55
Nepal	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.3	2.8	42
Sri Lanka	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.1	3.3	2.7	54
India	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.4	2.6	3.1	2.6	43
Bangladesh	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	1.2	2.5	2.5	36
Russia	2.4	2.1	2.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	2.3	2.7	6.0	4.4	2.4	49
China	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2	2.1	2.2	49
Pakistan	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	1.0	1.4	1.8	39
Viet Nam	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.7	51
Nigeria	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.2	47
Türkiye	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.2	41
Iran	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	49
Estonia	4.7	3.4	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.6	2.4	1.8	1.4	1.1	44
Somalia	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	51
Other countries	11.0	10.4	16.1	14.7	13.7	12.8	12.8	14.1	18.4	18.0	15.4	
Total	**23.6**	**21.4**	**27.3**	**23.7**	**23.1**	**24.2**	**23.3**	**28.0**	**42.5**	**66.0**	**57.2**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – France

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Algeria	22.0	22.4	21.8	21.8	22.6	21.8	17.9	18.4	20.2	20.8	20.5	52
Morocco	18.1	18.4	18.8	19.1	20.8	22.5	17.5	22.2	27.0	17.7	17.2	57
Tunisia	10.8	10.5	11.3	11.9	14.2	15.0	11.5	13.2	16.9	14.7	13.3	48
Afghanistan	0.8	0.6	1.7	5.0	5.3	5.5	5.4	8.6	9.9	11.0	12.3	26
Italy	12.7	13.2	13.9	13.6	14.4	14.6	11.5	9.7	11.2	10.7	10.6	52
Spain	12.9	12.4	10.7	10.9	12.7	10.5	8.2	11.4	10.2	10.4	8.9	57
Germany	6.4	7.1	6.2	5.7	6.1	5.7	4.5	5.8	7.6	7.3	8.4	55
Portugal	14.7	11.6	12.4	8.3	8.0	7.6	6.0	7.7	10.2	8.1	8.1	47
Côte d'Ivoire	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.2	5.3	6.8	6.6	8.8	8.5	7.9	8.0	48
Belgium	6.5	6.4	6.7	6.6	7.4	6.8	5.3	6.7	7.5	8.1	7.9	51
Türkiye	5.3	4.9	5.0	5.0	4.8	5.1	4.0	5.3	6.3	6.8	6.7	37
Guinea	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.4	4.7	5.8	7.9	7.2	6.2	6.3	40
Haiti	3.3	3.2	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.7	1.6	2.6	2.6	3.9	5.8	55
Romania	8.1	10.1	8.5	8.1	8.4	8.6	6.8	6.1	7.0	7.6	5.8	49
China	5.3	5.0	5.3	4.7	4.6	5.4	3.6	3.7	4.6	5.8	5.5	58
Other countries	104.1	108.6	112.3	115.8	119.1	125.0	92.2	112.5	128.1	116.4	117.7	
Total	**236.9**	**240.5**	**243.6**	**246.2**	**259.9**	**268.5**	**208.5**	**250.4**	**284.9**	**263.5**	**262.9**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Germany

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	13.5	15.8	13.3	13.1	14.2	15.8	11.8	12.4	1073.2	283.6	233.0	51
Romania	198.7	221.4	222.3	230.6	252.0	245.0	198.4	202.7	217.0	202.0	184.3	34
Syria	69.1	309.7	179.4	76.4	49.0	44.1	31.1	58.8	92.3	128.7	99.9	33
Türkiye	22.1	23.7	28.6	33.7	40.6	43.8	30.4	41.9	72.2	115.9	78.9	34
Poland	192.2	190.8	160.7	149.7	143.6	128.6	101.9	94.4	100.2	97.9	76.3	35
India	22.4	26.1	27.7	29.5	33.7	39.1	20.5	34.1	53.4	54.1	60.1	42
Bulgaria	80.1	86.3	83.0	81.6	85.7	87.4	76.2	75.7	76.6	65.9	53.6	39
Afghanistan	12.9	84.9	75.8	12.5	12.5	13.0	14.1	40.1	68.5	58.5	42.2	32
Italy	56.7	57.2	52.6	51.5	53.3	50.4	36.6	34.8	37.9	38.5	35.5	39
Hungary	58.8	58.1	51.6	48.1	43.9	36.7	28.4	27.7	30.1	34.0	29.0	34
China	23.2	25.5	26.6	26.6	25.9	25.6	11.4	15.7	15.3	20.9	24.6	49
Spain	27.1	23.6	21.9	18.5	18.6	18.7	16.3	20.6	21.8	21.9	21.8	42
Serbia	38.4	39.7	22.9	24.5	25.6	26.2	20.5	23.1	24.6	24.2	21.2	36
Iran	7.1	17.2	23.0	13.7	19.4	16.2	9.0	13.0	22.0	23.4	20.9	50
Albania	15.2	69.4	13.0	14.9	17.3	19.1	14.5	17.0	22.0	22.1	19.4	37
Other countries	505.2	766.9	716.7	559.2	548.1	536.2	373.7	427.7	553.7	549.5	504.5	
Total	**1 342.5**	**2 016.2**	**1 719.1**	**1 384.0**	**1 383.6**	**1 345.9**	**994.8**	**1 139.8**	**2 481.0**	**1 741.2**	**1 505.1**	**41**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Greece

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
EU	16.0	16.5	16.6	17.2	16.7	13.8	7.5	3.3	4.9	7.2	8.2	48
Non-EU	13.5	17.5	69.5	63.3	70.6	81.6	55.9	25.4	58.5	63.3	71.9	35
Total	**29.5**	**34.0**	**86.1**	**80.5**	**87.3**	**95.4**	**63.4**	**28.7**	**63.4**	**70.5**	**80.2**	**36**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Hungary

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Viet Nam	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.3	2.0	1.8	1.1	2.1	9.7	8.0	35
China	4.7	3.5	1.5	2.3	2.0	2.4	1.2	1.3	1.7	3.4	4.9	26
Germany	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.7	4.0	3.8	2.5	3.5	44
India	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.3	2.3	2.9	2.5	21
Ukraine	0.7	1.1	1.2	6.3	16.7	21.2	8.9	15.4	14.9	4.3	2.1	51
Philippines	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	1.9	6.0	2.1	31
Türkiye	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.3	2.2	1.7	30
Romania	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.0	1.4	36
Korea	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.5	1.4	33
Russia	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.7	1.9	2.4	1.3	46
Slovak Republic	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0	2.5	1.7	1.2	1.2	53
United States	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.4	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	47
Pakistan	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.9	26
Mongolia	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.4	1.1	1.9	0.9	47
Bangladesh	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	13
Other countries	9.8	10.2	10.4	14.9	15.9	15.5	14.3	15.8	17.3	19.2	15.5	
Total	**26.0**	**25.8**	**23.8**	**36.5**	**49.3**	**55.3**	**43.8**	**49.1**	**55.5**	**61.4**	**49.3**	**37**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Iceland

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Poland	1.5	1.7	3.1	4.7	4.1	3.1	2.3	2.3	4.3	4.4	3.3	37
Ukraine	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.7	1.2	55
Romania	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	1.3	1.2	1.2	20
Lithuania	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	16
Latvia	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.6	17
Spain	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	42
Czechia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	51
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	65
United States	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	55
Philippines	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	74
Greece	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	44
Italy	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	45
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	33
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	53
France	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	41
Other countries	1.7	1.8	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.1	4.2	4.2	3.8	
Total	**4.8**	**5.6**	**8.6**	**12.5**	**12.5**	**10.7**	**8.9**	**10.0**	**17.0**	**16.6**	**14.8**	**40**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Ireland

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
EU	26.8	29.4	28.9	28.5	32.3	30.3	18.8	17.2	29.3	23.6	19.0	57
Non-EU	20.3	22.5	27.2	22.7	32.8	30.1	23.9	29.7	100.4	83.0	74.5	47
Total	**47.9**	**52.9**	**57.2**	**52.1**	**66.4**	**61.6**	**43.6**	**47.0**	**129.7**	**106.6**	**93.4**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Israel

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Russia	4.6	6.6	7.0	7.1	10.5	15.8	6.7	7.6	45.6	33.1	19.1	53
United States	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	3.5	3.0	2.4	2.9	54
France	6.5	6.6	4.2	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.4	3.6	2.2	1.0	2.0	53
Ukraine	5.7	6.9	5.8	7.0	6.4	6.2	2.9	3.1	14.7	2.1	0.9	52
Belarus	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	1.0	2.2	1.8	0.7	52
United Kingdom	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.6	53
Argentina	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.5	0.4	52
Georgia	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	47
Canada	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	51
South Africa	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	48
Brazil	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	51
Uzbekistan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	46
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	52
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	55
Cyprus	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	48
Other countries	2.5	2.6	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.6	2.2	3.3	3.4	2.9	2.7	
Total	**24.1**	**27.9**	**26.1**	**26.4**	**28.2**	**33.3**	**19.7**	**25.5**	**74.8**	**46.1**	**31.1**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Italy

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Bangladesh	12.7	12.4	10.7	14.6	13.4	11.8	7.8	14.6	21.1	26.0	30.7	13
Albania	11.4	11.5	13.0	15.4	18.0	22.2	17.2	22.1	29.1	30.0	27.6	47
Ukraine	9.7	9.3	8.7	7.9	7.7	6.6	5.2	8.7	29.9	33.9	25.4	66
Morocco	17.6	15.0	14.7	15.7	16.9	20.3	12.5	15.4	19.4	20.9	24.5	40
Romania	50.7	46.4	45.2	43.5	40.1	39.2	28.7	28.4	31.8	26.7	23.1	53
Pakistan	9.6	11.4	14.7	15.0	13.2	9.9	9.7	14.3	16.7	20.4	21.4	21
Egypt	8.7	7.4	6.6	7.7	7.4	9.0	5.7	7.9	13.1	21.4	20.9	25
Tunisia	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.7	4.9	3.3	5.0	7.8	12.6	18.3	34
Argentina	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.4	2.2	4.3	2.2	6.1	14.6	17.1	16.9	50
Peru	2.8	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.4	3.2	2.7	4.8	8.7	11.3	16.2	56
Brazil	5.0	7.0	10.5	15.7	18.0	20.6	8.7	8.2	15.1	15.0	14.5	52
India	11.1	11.2	10.0	7.7	11.1	12.0	7.3	11.3	13.0	13.7	13.8	42
Senegal	6.3	7.5	8.5	10.9	8.8	5.8	4.6	5.8	6.8	6.2	8.0	29
China	15.8	14.9	12.4	11.3	10.0	10.8	4.9	6.2	8.2	8.1	7.2	53
Burkina Faso	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.9	3.4	6.8	7
Other countries	82.2	88.6	100.7	127.7	111.6	83.4	70.9	84.0	100.4	111.7	117.8	
Total	**248.4**	**250.0**	**262.9**	**301.1**	**285.5**	**264.6**	**191.8**	**243.6**	**336.5**	**378.4**	**393.1**	**42**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Japan

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Viet Nam	43.0	65.9	77.5	98.6	123.3	148.2	71.1	24.2	127.9	133.7	119.3	..
China	99.7	101.9	104.9	112.1	117.1	133.9	46.3	15.3	99.0	106.7	106.5	..
Indonesia	11.8	14.3	16.8	19.6	23.2	28.8	13.7	2.3	51.3	67.1	69.7	..
Nepal	11.5	13.4	14.1	14.5	13.0	13.1	4.2	1.5	44.5	39.6	58.4	..
Myanmar	3.3	5.2	6.1	7.6	8.1	11.6	6.2	1.4	19.5	30.8	47.9	..
Philippines	19.9	24.0	26.2	29.6	31.3	34.7	12.7	4.9	34.4	37.3	35.6	..
Korea	21.1	22.6	25.6	28.0	32.4	33.9	8.3	2.9	23.1	27.6	34.0	..
United States	22.0	21.5	22.2	22.0	22.9	24.1	6.2	5.2	17.6	19.7	20.8	..
Thailand	14.3	14.5	15.4	16.4	17.1	17.9	6.4	1.6	13.1	16.8	15.9	..
Sri Lanka	2.2	3.1	4.7	5.6	4.0	3.3	2.9	0.8	9.9	11.3	15.7	..
Chinese Taipei	7.7	10.8	12.2	13.7	14.9	16.3	4.2	1.3	9.4	13.6	15.7	..
India	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.9	9.6	11.0	3.7	1.3	11.7	10.5	10.5	..
Bangladesh	2.0	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5	1.4	0.7	6.1	6.5	8.0	..
United Kingdom	5.9	6.7	6.6	6.7	7.1	7.7	1.5	1.1	6.4	6.2	7.5	..
Brazil	6.1	9.1	12.8	14.2	15.8	16.6	4.1	2.3	9.5	8.8	7.2	..
Other countries	59.1	69.1	72.5	75.7	77.3	88.3	27.6	13.3	78.5	83.4	84.7	
Total	**336.5**	**391.2**	**427.6**	**475.0**	**519.7**	**592.0**	**220.6**	**80.0**	**561.8**	**619.7**	**657.1**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Korea

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
China	193.8	177.8	166.5	157.8	170.2	139.4	97.0	95.5	95.9	132.9	112.6	52
Viet Nam	28.0	30.2	40.1	48.0	56.0	61.3	28.0	17.4	51.7	70.8	88.5	46
United States	24.5	22.7	21.8	19.8	21.2	20.8	21.3	17.0	21.5	23.7	23.3	54
Thailand	48.3	20.1	28.5	71.5	80.3	53.3	8.7	5.2	34.7	34.8	20.7	54
Uzbekistan	12.9	14.2	16.2	18.5	18.8	26.0	8.0	13.1	22.2	19.1	17.5	33
Philippines	10.7	9.9	9.5	9.0	10.1	9.1	2.9	1.8	13.6	17.5	16.3	35
Nepal	6.8	6.5	8.7	8.6	9.8	8.8	3.0	1.0	16.0	20.1	16.2	34
Indonesia	10.5	8.5	9.0	6.9	10.7	9.8	3.4	3.1	16.7	18.0	16.0	15
Cambodia	9.5	9.6	10.2	9.5	8.7	9.9	3.5	4.6	12.0	14.2	15.4	30
Myanmar	5.1	5.2	6.7	6.3	7.4	5.9	1.9	1.5	10.2	12.6	13.2	21
Russia	3.2	6.8	15.0	18.6	18.7	18.0	6.7	7.3	12.3	17.6	12.0	47
Mongolia	4.0	8.3	8.2	11.8	10.2	8.7	7.1	3.8	10.8	11.7	10.1	53
Laos	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	1.3	3.5	9.7	39
Sri Lanka	4.8	5.5	7.1	3.9	3.9	4.1	1.2	1.4	7.7	8.6	8.3	20
Kazakhstan	1.4	3.5	7.7	13.4	15.7	12.5	3.5	6.1	15.6	10.1	6.8	53
Other countries	43.2	43.7	46.9	48.8	52.8	50.0	36.7	41.5	70.7	64.4	64.3	
Total	**407.1**	**372.9**	**402.2**	**452.7**	**495.1**	**438.2**	**233.1**	**220.6**	**412.9**	**479.8**	**450.9**	**45**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Latvia

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.5	..	..	0.9	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.5	24.3	2.1	2.6	..
India	0.1	..	..	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.6	0.5	..
Uzbekistan	0.1	..	..	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.1	..
Belarus	0.3	..	..	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.1	..
Sri Lanka	0.0	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	..
Lithuania	0.2	..	..	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	..
Viet Nam	0.0	..	..	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	..
Germany	0.2	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	..
Azerbaijan	0.0	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	..
Sweden	0.1	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..
Finland	0.0	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	..
United Kingdom	0.1	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	..
Kazakhstan	0.0	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	..
Israel	0.0	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..
Pakistan	0.0	..	..	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..
Other countries	2.7	..	..	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.8	2.8	3.5	12.0	10.8	
Total	**4.5**	**4.5**	**3.4**	**5.1**	**6.5**	**6.6**	**4.6**	**6.4**	**30.6**	**15.6**	**14.7**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	1.1	1.1	1.6	4.3	5.7	8.9	9.3	6.3	61.5	10.5	6.9	..
Belarus	0.5	0.4	1.2	2.7	3.3	6.4	7.3	8.3	9.8	15.7	5.2	..
Uzbekistan	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.7	4.4	3.2	..
India	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	2.4	2.9	..
Tajikistan	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.8	3.2	2.4	..
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.6	1.7	1.7	..
Kyrgyzstan	..	..	..	..	..	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.1	3.2	1.7	..
Pakistan	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	1.1	..
Kazakhstan	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	1.6	1.1	..
Türkiye	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.6	..
Bangladesh	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	..
Russia	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.8	2.8	1.7	0.5	..
Georgia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.4	..
Philippines	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	..
Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	..
Other countries	1.2	..	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.9	2.0	3.3	3.9	
Total	**4.8**	**3.7**	**6.0**	**10.2**	**12.3**	**19.7**	**22.3**	**21.1**	**81.0**	**50.2**	**32.8**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Portugal	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.5	46
France	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.1	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.1	3.1	45
Italy	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	41
Spain	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	48
India	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.5	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.9	48
Germany	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	53
Belgium	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	40
Ukraine	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	4.3	0.8	0.7	56
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	61
Syria	0.1	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.5	45
Romania	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	51
United States	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	51
China	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	54
Eritrea	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	34
Türkiye	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	47
Other countries	6.0	6.9	6.6	6.9	7.3	8.0	6.5	7.2	9.0	8.6	8.2	
Total	**21.0**	**22.6**	**21.6**	**23.2**	**23.4**	**25.2**	**21.0**	**23.8**	**29.9**	**25.1**	**23.9**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Mexico

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Honduras	2.3	1.8	2.6	2.5	3.4	3.6	7.9	12.4	13.8	12.5	17.5	..
Guatemala	2.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.9	2.5	4.3	6.3	8.6	11.0	..
Cuba	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.7	5.1	5.1	4.6	4.1	6.6	..
United States	9.4	7.1	6.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.3	6.9	7.6	7.7	6.2	..
El Salvador	1.2	1.1	1.8	2.3	2.8	2.5	3.6	4.0	4.6	4.7	4.8	..
Colombia	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.8	2.7	3.9	5.2	5.2	5.3	4.4	..
Venezuela	2.6	2.2	2.5	3.4	6.3	7.4	11.0	10.6	9.6	6.1	4.0	..
Haiti	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.4	2.5	3.1	1.8	3.0	..
China	2.6	2.2	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.7	..
Canada	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.8	2.9	1.7	..
Argentina	2.1	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	..
Spain	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	..
Brazil	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.8	..
Ecuador	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	..
Peru	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	..
Other countries	9.5	7.2	7.5	6.6	6.3	7.5	10.0	9.1	11.1	9.3	7.4	
Total	**43.5**	**34.4**	**35.9**	**32.8**	**38.7**	**40.5**	**58.4**	**68.5**	**75.6**	**69.9**	**73.8**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.4	104.5	38.5	30.2	58
Syria	6.9	17.3	25.1	15.3	5.3	5.7	5.7	11.9	17.1	19.6	25.8	35
Poland	23.8	23.0	23.1	23.8	25.5	27.3	24.4	25.1	26.3	25.3	22.1	43
Romania	4.6	4.3	5.2	7.5	9.4	11.8	10.7	12.9	14.8	13.9	14.2	38
Bulgaria	5.2	4.8	5.0	6.0	6.9	9.2	9.2	10.4	12.5	12.3	10.8	42
Türkiye	2.8	2.8	3.2	4.4	5.5	6.6	5.2	7.3	12.1	11.3	10.2	43
Italy	5.1	5.7	6.5	7.6	8.5	9.4	7.7	9.1	10.3	10.6	10.1	47
Spain	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.9	6.5	7.6	6.3	8.9	10.6	10.4	10.0	48
Germany	8.2	8.6	9.4	10.5	10.9	11.7	10.4	11.1	10.5	10.4	9.4	58
India	5.1	6.1	7.2	8.6	10.6	12.3	5.9	9.8	14.6	12.1	9.0	47
China	4.8	5.4	5.7	6.5	6.8	7.5	4.4	6.0	6.1	8.0	7.6	55
Portugal	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.7	3.2	4.4	5.7	6.1	6.3	42
Greece	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.7	4.0	5.2	6.3	5.9	5.7	42
France	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.9	5.0	5.9	6.3	5.9	5.5	54
United States	3.8	4.7	4.7	5.6	5.8	6.0	4.0	4.4	5.6	5.7	5.4	56
Other countries	54.7	61.6	70.7	69.7	75.4	84.5	63.5	74.2	96.1	95.3	91.0	
Total	**139.3**	**159.5**	**182.2**	**183.9**	**191.0**	**215.2**	**170.6**	**208.1**	**359.3**	**291.2**	**273.3**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – New Zealand

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	16.2	19.5	14.7	14.0	14.3	15.1	9.2	3.7	14.0	47.2	27.1	50
China	13.7	15.8	17.3	16.3	15.7	16.1	4.6	3.2	11.6	26.2	16.4	55
Philippines	6.5	8.4	8.2	9.1	9.1	10.6	3.1	2.2	13.1	38.8	15.0	54
Sri Lanka	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.9	0.8	0.2	2.2	7.0	5.9	50
United Kingdom	8.7	8.6	8.8	8.8	8.1	9.6	4.8	2.5	4.5	5.8	5.6	48
Fiji	2.4	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.9	1.2	0.4	4.3	11.2	5.1	53
Australia	6.1	6.6	6.9	6.8	6.6	7.5	3.3	3.4	5.1	5.2	4.8	50
South Africa	2.5	3.4	5.8	5.8	7.0	12.2	3.9	1.0	5.8	8.7	4.5	51
United States	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.4	3.4	4.4	2.9	1.3	2.7	4.2	3.6	51
Samoa	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.4	1.8	1.6	2.0	3.0	2.9	47
France	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	2.7	1.4	0.2	1.0	1.2	2.6	48
Germany	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.1	0.3	0.9	1.0	2.4	56
Japan	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.9	0.7	0.3	1.0	1.5	2.4	62
Tonga	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.2	1.2	0.3	1.1	2.7	2.0	51
Viet Nam	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	0.6	0.1	0.9	5.9	2.0	49
Other countries	22.6	23.2	25.4	25.0	26.0	30.6	13.9	7.4	22.3	38.0	28.8	
Total	**90.7**	**101.5**	**104.0**	**103.4**	**104.2**	**124.7**	**54.5**	**28.2**	**92.6**	**207.6**	**130.9**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Norway

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.4	32.3	32.9	20.3	52
Poland	9.9	8.2	6.0	5.2	5.0	5.0	3.7	8.1	6.6	6.4	4.1	42
Syria	2.1	4.0	11.2	7.0	3.8	1.5	1.5	2.2	2.4	3.1	2.5	41
Sweden	4.6	3.6	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4	43
India	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.4	1.0	1.3	2.6	2.1	1.6	44
Lithuania	4.4	3.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.5	1.8	3.1	2.6	2.3	1.5	38
Germany	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.4	54
Spain	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	45
Romania	2.1	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.3	39
Philippines	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.7	1.6	1.2	1.2	75
Denmark	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	48
Italy	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	42
Pakistan	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.9	50
United States	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	49
Afghanistan	0.8	1.4	2.2	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.8	48
Other countries	26.0	26.0	23.2	21.0	19.2	21.4	13.9	19.0	22.8	19.7	16.6	
Total	**61.4**	**59.1**	**58.5**	**49.8**	**44.4**	**44.6**	**30.8**	**46.6**	**83.3**	**79.3**	**58.8**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Poland

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Ukraine	7.8	45.2	63.8	79.0	88.7	108.4	111.0	154.8	..	..	..	46
Belarus	1.4	3.2	3.5	6.2	7.9	9.1	8.1	17.2	..	..	..	45
Germany	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.9	4.1	4.3	5.9	..	..	..	18
Georgia	0.8	1.9	2.8	4.1	4.5	4.9	4.9	5.3	..	..	..	29
Bulgaria	1.1	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.4	4.5	..	..	..	51
Romania	2.0	3.3	3.2	4.0	3.0	2.6	2.7	3.1	..	..	..	42
India	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.8	2.0	2.9	..	..	..	34
Russia	1.6	3.8	3.9	4.2	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.1	..	..	..	44
Spain	1.6	3.8	3.9	4.2	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.1	..	..	..	44
Netherlands	0.9	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.7	2.0	..	..	..	24
Italy	0.2	0.5	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.4	..	..	..	10
Uzbekistan	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	..	..	..	34
United Kingdom	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.1	..	..	..	45
Moldova	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.0	..	..	..	20
Lithuania	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.0	0.9	..	..	..	22
Other countries	11.3	15.4	15.4	15.7	15.7	17.5	15.9	18.5	..	..	..	
Total	**32.0**	**86.1**	**107.0**	**128.0**	**137.6**	**163.2**	**163.5**	**224.2**	**335.3**	**374.1**	**354.0**	**43**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Portugal

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2023 (%)
Brazil	5.6	5.7	7.1	11.6	28.2	48.8	42.2	39.5	48.3	147.3	38.7	46
Angola	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.9	4.5	4.8	4.6	6.9	24.4	33.8	54
Cape Verde	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.6	4.4	4.2	3.9	4.7	14.6	15.0	50
Sao Tome and Principe	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.6	2.0	2.8	14.5	11.9	49
India	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.8	4.1	6.3	7.2	7.4	7.4	12.2	11.2	35
Guinea-Bissau	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.9	3.5	3.4	3.7	4.2	10.3	11.6	39
Bangladesh	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.1	6.2	10.1	10.8	26
Italy	1.1	1.6	3.1	5.3	7.0	7.9	4.5	5.3	7.0	8.8	6.4	43
United Kingdom	1.5	1.9	3.1	3.8	5.1	8.4	13.2	0.4	3.0	7.4	..	44
Pakistan	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.0	1.3	2.0	4.0	6.9	7.2	20
Germany	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	3.9	4.0	5.5	..	47
France	1.9	2.5	3.5	4.7	5.3	4.4	4.1	4.8	4.7	5.1	..	45
Russia	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.5	4.9	..	50
United States	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.1	2.5	3.3	4.8	..	51
Spain	1.5	1.7	2.2	2.7	2.9	3.2	2.8	3.6	3.6	4.3	..	45
Other countries	14.8	15.6	18.7	21.4	25.2	28.4	22.4	25.0	31.5	48.0	..	
Total	**35.3**	**37.9**	**46.9**	**61.4**	**93.2**	**129.2**	**118.1**	**111.3**	**143.1**	**329.0**	**218.3**	**45**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	1.3	36
Hungary	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	29
Czechia	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	52
Russia	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	46
Serbia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	24
Viet Nam	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	32
Poland	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	44
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	32
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	44
Italy	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	13
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20
Romania	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	30
Iran	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	49
Sweden	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	24
Korea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45
Other countries	0.7	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	
Total	**2.4**	**3.8**	**3.6**	**2.9**	**2.9**	**2.5**	**2.8**	**2.0**	**1.8**	**2.1**	**3.2**	**37**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.4	4.7	4.8	6.2	11.7	13.8	11.3	8.4	11.4	12.0	10.1	32
Serbia	1.3	1.3	1.6	2.0	3.2	3.8	3.0	2.1	2.7	3.0	3.3	31
North Macedonia	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.7	1.9	2.2	43
Ukraine	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	6.2	2.0	1.8	54
Russia	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.2	50
Croatia	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	46
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	12
Bulgaria	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	33
Italy	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	40
Türkiye	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.3	16
China	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	44
Nepal	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	10
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	42
Montenegro	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	39
Bangladesh	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	10
Other countries	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.8	4.0	4.8	5.3	5.0	6.7	6.7	6.0	
Total	**11.3**	**12.7**	**13.8**	**15.5**	**24.1**	**27.6**	**24.8**	**19.7**	**31.9**	**29.9**	**28.3**	**36**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Spain

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Colombia	8.5	9.4	22.6	34.1	53.3	76.8	51.4	64.5	172.2	170.7	168.1	54
Morocco	20.0	23.8	29.7	39.8	60.9	72.9	44.9	99.5	113.7	123.5	133.1	33
Venezuela	7.2	10.5	18.5	31.6	47.1	58.1	29.7	37.4	82.5	88.4	103.2	54
Peru	4.7	5.3	8.0	13.9	19.3	28.6	18.1	26.1	65.2	66.9	69.6	53
Italy	14.9	18.6	21.7	28.8	31.3	33.4	21.3	42.1	48.8	48.1	45.8	48
Romania	29.7	28.8	28.6	31.0	29.1	27.0	15.7	47.5	48.0	45.7	38.1	48
Argentina	4.2	5.0	6.4	8.8	11.1	17.9	10.7	20.8	33.9	35.0	32.5	51
Ukraine	5.7	8.8	6.9	7.8	8.2	8.1	4.2	9.9	91.6	34.4	31.5	52
Honduras	5.7	7.6	10.9	18.3	23.4	29.1	18.7	19.9	34.6	32.4	29.1	61
Paraguay	4.2	4.7	7.2	8.4	9.3	12.0	6.5	10.4	23.5	24.3	24.7	59
Ecuador	4.9	5.3	6.8	8.8	9.3	10.7	5.8	12.8	18.0	21.8	24.6	50
China	9.4	10.1	10.2	11.4	11.9	12.1	5.1	18.2	14.3	20.5	24.3	52
Algeria	4.5	4.2	4.4	4.8	6.5	7.4	4.3	9.5	12.4	15.1	23.0	23
Cuba	4.6	4.9	5.9	8.0	11.3	14.2	6.4	12.0	18.2	20.4	22.1	53
Senegal	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.3	6.7	7.8	5.1	12.2	11.5	11.2	20.4	13
Other countries	133.3	139.7	160.7	194.1	221.2	250.1	167.2	309.6	332.0	339.8	354.0	
Total	**264.5**	**290.0**	**352.2**	**454.0**	**560.0**	**666.0**	**415.2**	**752.3**	**1 120.5**	**1 098.0**	**1 144.2**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Sweden

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.4	29.9	58
India	3.0	3.5	4.2	5.7	7.3	7.4	4.0	6.0	8.0	7.5	5.7	46
Germany	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.3	3.4	4.5	3.8	3.6	53
China	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.8	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.6	3.4	51
Poland	5.1	5.6	5.0	4.4	3.8	3.2	2.5	3.2	4.7	4.5	2.9	37
Pakistan	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.1	2.4	3.2	3.3	2.4	2.3	48
Syria	21.7	28.0	49.0	20.9	13.9	6.0	3.2	3.6	3.9	2.5	2.1	67
Netherlands	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.8	50
Denmark	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	39
Türkiye	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.5	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.8	2.2	1.7	1.7	46
Romania	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.0	1.4	1.7	2.5	2.2	1.7	36
Italy	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.7	46
Finland	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.6	56
Iran	1.7	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.5	2.3	1.5	2.0	2.3	1.9	1.5	53
Afghanistan	3.8	3.4	4.1	11.3	9.6	7.9	2.6	2.2	3.3	3.1	1.5	68
Other countries	55.0	55.1	61.6	61.6	57.0	51.7	36.1	38.5	42.1	37.6	34.0	
Total	**106.1**	**113.9**	**143.0**	**125.0**	**114.4**	**98.2**	**65.8**	**74.4**	**86.5**	**77.2**	**97.3**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Germany	23.8	22.1	20.9	19.7	20.2	19.9	19.2	20.6	23.3	26.2	24.5	43
France	13.8	14.8	13.8	14.1	13.8	14.0	15.7	14.9	17.3	20.0	19.6	42
Italy	17.8	18.2	18.1	15.5	16.5	15.9	16.5	15.5	18.0	19.5	18.0	38
Portugal	14.9	12.6	10.1	9.2	8.7	8.3	7.6	7.6	9.6	12.8	12.2	42
Spain	7.6	7.0	5.8	5.2	5.6	5.2	5.4	6.0	7.4	9.0	9.1	45
Romania	2.4	2.0	2.9	2.9	2.4	4.5	4.8	5.2	6.7	7.5	6.9	39
Afghanistan	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	2.4	3.0	3.5	6.3	52
Poland	4.8	4.8	4.1	4.1	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7	6.3	7.6	6.3	37
Türkiye	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.8	3.6	46
China	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.2	3.5	3.3	56
Hungary	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.3	4.2	3.2	42
Austria	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.0	43
India	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.5	2.9	3.2	3.5	2.8	46
Greece	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.3	43
United States	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.3	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.2	52
Other countries	47.7	49.1	48.3	47.7	48.6	48.3	44.3	45.2	49.9	52.5	47.2	
Total	**152.1**	**150.4**	**143.1**	**137.8**	**140.1**	**140.6**	**137.0**	**141.5**	**162.4**	**181.6**	**170.6**	**45**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Türkiye

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Azerbaijan	..	..	15.3	20.9	23.2	26.6	9.0	27.1	18.2	17.7	20.8	47
Turkmenistan	..	..	8.4	20.3	34.9	80.0	17.9	24.5	8.9	15.6	20.6	49
Uzbekistan	..	..	9.0	17.9	15.2	25.1	14.5	40.0	15.1	11.0	16.1	45
Russia	..	..	6.4	7.3	13.8	17.3	15.3	31.5	99.8	28.3	15.7	55
Iran	..	..	15.5	17.8	31.9	42.4	13.4	67.0	25.8	14.5	12.4	55
Kazakhstan	..	..	3.6	4.3	7.4	10.0	9.0	20.2	15.7	10.8	9.9	56
Germany	..	..	8.6	8.4	8.9	9.4	7.6	13.2	11.5	9.4	8.1	47
Afghanistan	..	..	27.9	37.7	45.0	47.2	22.9	34.1	21.5	12.7	7.4	31
Kyrgyzstan	..	..	6.0	9.0	9.1	10.0	5.2	11.8	6.6	5.5	6.9	62
Ukraine	..	..	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.6	4.1	8.5	32.5	8.5	6.2	64
Indonesia	..	..	1.2	1.6	2.1	2.7	1.3	5.7	4.2	4.2	6.2	65
Iraq	..	..	70.9	97.1	110.3	83.8	28.8	74.3	19.2	7.7	6.0	48
West Bank and Gaza Strip	..	..	2.0	4.8	8.6	10.0	3.9	13.1	4.4	2.1	4.9	46
Egypt	..	..	4.1	8.6	13.5	12.5	4.3	13.4	5.6	3.4	4.6	30
Pakistan	..	..	1.1	1.5	2.7	4.5	2.7	11.9	5.0	2.8	3.9	25
Other countries	..	..	87.4	101.1	134.3	190.4	82.7	218.9	105.7	60.7	61.1	
Total	**..**	**..**	**273.9**	**364.6**	**466.9**	**578.5**	**242.5**	**615.1**	**399.6**	**214.8**	**210.9**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	46.0	36.0	35.0	50.0	62.3	92.0	31.8	63.5	112.2	144.2	66.5	..
Pakistan	11.0	8.0	11.0	15.0	9.9	16.0	14.9	27.7	24.5	59.3	50.6	..
Nigeria	7.0	8.0	6.0	10.0	10.0	6.0	7.2	14.4	35.9	85.4	26.0	..
China	39.0	43.0	40.0	66.0	63.9	82.0	3.5	79.1	57.8	35.5	25.3	..
Zimbabwe	..	1.0	..	..	..	..	2.0	4.1	23.6	46.3	17.9	..
Afghanistan	..	1.0	..	..	..	..	1.5	18.0	8.1	15.9	15.6	..
Iran	1.0	..	..	..	..	..	3.3	4.8	5.5	14.0	13.1	..
Philippines	4.0	3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	12.0	6.8	11.1	18.4	19.8	13.0	..
Bangladesh	5.0	2.0	..	..	..	..	5.6	9.1	7.0	27.5	12.8	..
Ghana	1.0	2.0	..	..	..	..	2.0	4.9	10.3	35.4	12.2	..
United States	20.0	18.0	17.0	19.0	16.5	17.0	5.3	8.7	10.0	10.9	10.3	..
Syria	1.0	1.0	..	..	..	..	2.2	3.8	3.9	10.0	9.8	..
Sri Lanka	2.0	3.0	..	..	..	..	1.6	2.0	6.4	15.3	8.4	..
Nepal	1.0	2.0	..	..	..	..	2.2	3.0	4.7	8.4	8.0	..
Eritrea	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.7	2.5	3.5	8.3	7.1	..
Other countries	366.0	353.0	343.0	355.0	318.9	282.0	51.5	89.5	112.0	142.3	110.9	
Total	**504.0**	**481.0**	**455.0**	**520.0**	**486.5**	**507.0**	**143.1**	**346.4**	**443.8**	**678.4**	**407.5**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – United States (permanent)

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Mexico	133.2	158.3	173.5	170.1	161.6	155.7	100.0	107.0	138.7	190.6	198.4	..
Cuba	45.9	53.6	65.6	64.5	75.5	39.4	15.1	21.6	31.3	88.5	178.3	..
China	78.3	76.6	84.5	74.3	67.8	62.3	41.7	49.7	68.1	57.2	75.8	..
Dominican Republic	43.7	50.0	59.9	58.1	57.0	49.4	29.7	24.1	39.5	67.7	67.0	..
India	76.3	62.8	63.0	59.1	58.9	53.8	45.8	92.6	125.1	68.4	66.0	..
Afghanistan	10.6	8.5	12.5	19.8	13.7	10.5	11.7	9.6	14.4	35.6	58.6	..
Philippines	49.2	56.0	52.2	48.7	46.9	45.6	25.2	27.5	36.3	48.7	47.9	..
Viet Nam	29.4	30.4	40.1	37.9	33.4	39.2	29.5	16.1	23.8	37.0	36.2	..
El Salvador	19.2	19.4	23.1	24.9	28.1	27.5	17.8	18.6	30.5	27.3	34.2	..
Colombia	17.7	16.8	18.0	17.4	17.1	19.3	11.7	15.0	21.4	26.2	31.4	..
Jamaica	18.7	17.4	22.9	21.7	20.2	21.5	12.7	13.2	16.3	22.1	30.0	..
Brazil	10.2	11.2	13.5	14.7	15.1	19.4	16.3	18.0	23.6	27.4	28.0	..
Pakistan	18.7	18.1	19.2	17.0	15.4	13.6	10.2	9.6	11.4	11.4	27.3	..
Canada	18.5	20.1	20.3	18.8	16.1	17.8	14.5	15.3	19.3	19.0	21.2	..
Nigeria	12.6	11.3	14.1	13.4	13.8	15.7	12.2	12.9	12.1	16.3	20.5	..
Other countries	434.4	440.5	501.1	466.7	456.1	441.2	313.1	289.2	406.1	450.3	504.2	
Total	**1 016.5**	**1 051.0**	**1 183.5**	**1 127.2**	**1 096.6**	**1 031.8**	**707.4**	**740.0**	**1 018.0**	**1 193.8**	**1 425.1**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/kr1oyp.

Table A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Thousands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Austria	76.5	80.1	89.0	89.6	91.7	90.0	79.4	84.6	103.0	109.7	109.1
Belgium	64.9	59.8	61.8	58.6	56.8	46.5	52.0	59.1	54.7	65.5	69.3
Czechia	16.1	15.0	13.4	14.4	16.2	17.5	26.8	18.2	16.9	43.7	82.3
Denmark	30.4	30.6	37.4	41.5	45.4	52.4	41.7	31.9	42.3	48.6	50.8
Estonia	0.3	4.0	4.7	4.3	3.9	6.2	5.5	5.5	4.3	7.0	10.8
Finland	5.5	6.7	7.5	6.8	7.6	7.2	6.6	5.2	6.5	6.5	7.9
Germany	765.6	859.3	1 083.8	885.5	923.6	961.3	746.2	746.5	935.5	1 004.5	994.0
Greece	51.2	53.4	51.8	49.7	53.1	49.5	54.3	51.3	51.0	49.8	45.9
Hungary	10.8	10.4	10.5	12.9	24.4	27.9	48.0	46.3	29.6	35.6	43.0
Iceland	3.0	3.3	4.0	5.2	7.1	7.9	7.8	6.6	7.8	9.6	10.6
Ireland	30.0	27.5	29.1	31.4	26.6	25.9	25.9	30.9	30.5	33.5	35.2
Italy	47.5	44.7	42.6	40.6	40.2	57.5	38.9	64.1	50.7	44.4	35.2
Japan	212.9	223.5	233.5	259.2	292.1	333.6	173.0	140.0	191.1	223.2	240.9
Korea	270.5	301.0	325.0	348.7	365.1	425.6	361.6	263.3	244.6	319.1	353.1
Latvia	1.4	2.6	3.0	2.3	2.9	4.1	3.8	3.7	4.8	9.4	9.3
Lithuania	3.5	7.6	4.3	2.6	3.2	4.8	7.8	6.4	10.3	11.7	19.2
Luxembourg	9.5	10.4	11.3	11.6	11.6	13.0	12.0	12.9	14.0	13.5	13.1
Netherlands	83.4	85.2	89.9	96.4	102.8	109.9	113.2	100.6	124.8	144.5	151.4
New Zealand	35.7	37.0	38.9	45.3	47.0	55.1	39.3	44.0	42.5	36.1	56.7
Norway	23.3	27.4	30.7	26.6	24.5	17.6	19.9	26.0	23.1	24.8	22.8
Poland	68.6	89.5	40.1	45.8	43.0	43.9	57.5	72.9	65.9	68.9	80.2
Portugal	1.9	0.5	1.1	0.6	2.3	0.7	2.0	1.3	1.4	4.1	5.7
Slovak Republic	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	6.2	6.3	6.8	7.7	6.9	8.5	11.9	2.6	3.1	3.6	4.2
Spain	320.0	249.2	237.5	282.0	230.3	220.2	183.1	541.3	390.8	481.8	524.6
Sweden	26.4	31.3	23.5	23.4	24.1	25.3	26.7	22.8	20.6	35.7	46.9
Switzerland	69.2	73.4	77.6	79.1	80.7	80.0	70.3	74.4	73.7	75.3	78.9
Türkiye	..	..	178.0	253.6	323.9	245.4	342.7	184.0	327.4	423.2	273.2
United Kingdom	171.0	164.0	195.0	222.0	203.0	202.0	..	..	..	..	

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata in the following table.

StatLink https://stat.link/1o64z9

Metadata related to Tables A.1, B.1 and A.2. **Inflows and outflows of foreign population**

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Australia	*Inflows:* Includes persons who are entitled to stay permanently in Australia at arrival (Settler Arrivals) as well as those who changed status from temporary to permanent residence. Settler arrivals include holders of a permanent visa, holders of a temporary (provisional) visa where there is a clear intention to settle, citizens of New Zealand indicating an intention to settle and persons otherwise eligible to settle. *Outflows:* People leaving Australia for 12 months or more in a 16-month period. Net Overseas Migration (NOM).	Data refer to the fiscal year (July of the year indicated to June). From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Home Affairs.
Austria	*Inflows and outflows:* Foreigners holding a residence permit and who have actually stayed for at least 3 months.	Outflows include administrative corrections.	Population Registers, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for a period that is of at least 3 months (up to 2009) or of at least 12 months (from 2010). *Outflows:* Up to 2009: Departures and automatic write-offs. From 2010: Changes of usual residence for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.	Both series include breaks in 2010 and in 2011.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	Admissions of permanent residents by country of citizenship.	Due to privacy considerations, the figures have been subjected to random rounding (either up or down to multiples of 5).	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Table A.1. Total inflows of foreign population: Estimation by the OECD Secretariat based on residence permits. Table B.1 by nationality: Total number of people who obtained a temporary visa for the first time.		Register of residence permits, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Colombia	Inflows of all foreign nationals who entered Colombia in the given year and subsequently stayed for at least 90 days.		Migration Colombia, Ministry of External Relations.
Costa Rica	Foreigners holding a residence permit.		Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería.
Czechia	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a permanent or a long-term residence permit (visa over 90 days) or who were granted asylum in the given year. Excludes nationals of EU countries if they intend to stay for less than 30 days in the country. *Outflows:* Departures of foreigners who were staying in the country on a permanent or temporary basis.	Country of origin refers to country of last permanent or temporary residence. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries are likely to be underestimated.	Register of Foreigners, Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	*Inflows:* Foreigners who live legally in Denmark, are registered in the Central population register, and have been living in the country for at least six months. *Outflows:* Include administrative corrections.	Excludes asylum seekers and all those with temporary residence permits.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	*Inflows and outflows:* Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.	The number of nationals from other EU countries who are staying temporarily in the country for at least 12 months may be underestimated.	Statistics Estonia.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Finland	*Inflows and outflows:* Foreign nationals with a residence permit valid for more than one year and nationals of EU countries who intend to stay in the country for more than 12 months. Nordic citizens who are moving for less than 6 months are not included.	Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Excludes asylum seekers and persons with temporary residence permits. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries can be underestimated.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	*Inflows:* Inflows of non-EU nationals are first issuances of permanent-type permits. They include status changes from a temporary-type permit to a permanent-type permit. Inflows of EU nationals included from 2013 onwards are extracted from the permanent census.		*Inflows:* Ministry of the Interior and INSEE.
Germany	*Inflows:* Foreigners who had previously no registered address in Germany and intending to stay at least one week in the country. *Outflows:* Deregistrations from population registers of persons who move out of their address without taking a new address in the country and administrative deregistrations.	Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes inflows of ethnic Germans *(Aussiedler)*.	Central Population Register, Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	*Inflows:* Eurostat dataset Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship. *Outflows:* Eurostat dataset Emigration by age group, sex and citizenship		Eurostat.
Hungary	*Inflows:* Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for at least 90 days. *Outflows:* Foreign citizens having a residence or a settlement document and who left Hungary in the given year with no intention to return, or whose permission's validity has expired and did not apply for a new one or whose permission was invalidated by authority due to withdrawal. From 2012 on, includes estimations.	Excluding asylum seekers	Population Register, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	*Inflows and outflows:* Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.		Register of Migration Data, Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	*Inflows:* Eurostat dataset Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship. *Outflows:* The estimates derive from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and relate to the persons who were resident in the country at a point in the previous twelve-month period who are now living abroad.	Figures for Table A.2. are based on May to April of the year indicated. Figures for Table A.1 and B.1. are based on Eurostat figures.	Central Statistics Office. Eurostat.
Israel	Data refer to permanent immigrants by last country of residence.	The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	*Inflows and outflows:* Changes of residence.	Excludes seasonal workers. Administrative corrections are made following censuses (the last census took place in 2011).	Administrative Population Register (Anagrafe) analysed by ISTAT.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Japan	*Inflows:* Foreigners who entered the country, excluding temporary visitors and re-entries. *Outflows:* Foreigners who left Japan without re-entry permission. Excludes temporary visitors.		Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	*Inflows and outflows:* Data refer to long-term inflows/outflows (more than 90 days).		Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	*Inflows and outflows:* Long-term migration (permanent change of residence or for a period of at least one year).	The population size at the beginning of 2023 and 2024 has been recalculated using a new estimation method.This affects the migration estimates and results in a methodological break in the time series.As the migration data for 2022 were not recalculated, they are not fully comparable with the population size at the beginning of 2023.The population estimate published on 2 June was revised on 2 October 2025, and the usually resident population now includes foreign students.	Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	*Inflows and outflows:* Foreign citizens who have been residing in the country for at least 6 months.		Lithuanian Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 12 months. *Outflows:* Foreigners who left the country with the intention to live abroad for at least 12 months.		Central Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Until 2012, number of foreigners who are issued an immigrant permit for the first time *("inmigrante" FM2)*. 2011 and 2012 also include new and former refugees who obtained immigrant status *("inmigrado")*. From 2013 on, number of foreigners who are issued a permanent residence card, as the 2011 Migration Act came into effect.	The sharp increase in the numbers of 2013 is explained by administrative changes with the implementation of the 2011 Migration Act. Most of these "new residents" are foreigners already in the country on a temporary status.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least four of the next six months. *Outflows:* Outflows include the "net administrative corrections", i.e. unreported emigration of foreigners.	Inflows exclude asylum seekers who are staying in reception centres.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
New Zealand	*Inflows:* Permanent and long-term arrivals to live in the country for 12 months or more. *Outflows:* Permanent and long-term departures: Foreign-born returning to live overseas after a stay of 12 months or more in New Zealand.	This data is based on Stats NZ migration flows data calculated using the 12/16 month rule. This data is provisional until 16 months after the fact and updated afterwards.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 6 months. Include EU/EFTA foreigners. *Outflows:* Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and who stayed in the country for at least 6 months.	Asylum seekers are registered as immigrants only after having settled in a Norwegian municipality following a positive outcome of their application. An asylum seeker whose application has been rejected will not be registered as an 'immigrant', even if the application process has taken a long time and return to the home country is delayed for a significant period.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Poland	*Inflows:* Number of permanent and "fixed-term" residence permits issued. Since 26 August 2006, nationals of European Union Member States and their family members are no longer issued residence permits. However, they still need to register their stay in Poland, provided that they are planning to stay in Poland for more than 3 months. *Outflows:* Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.		*Inflows:* Office for Foreigner. *Outflows:* Eurostat.
Portugal	*Inflows:* Data based on residence permits. Following the new legislation, the data include the new residence permits delivered to every foreigner with a citizenship from an EU or non-EU country. Includes continuous regularisation. *Outflows:* Departures of usual residents for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.		*Inflows:* AIMA and National Statistical Institute (INE); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (before 2008). *Outflows:* Eurostat.
Slovak Republic	*Inflows and outflows:* Includes permanent, temporary, and tolerated residents.		Register of Foreigners, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
Slovenia	*Inflows and outflows:* Persons who immigrated/emigrated to Slovenia from abroad and have usual residence in Slovenia (intend to stay for a year or more).		Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS). Eurostat.
Spain	*Inflows and outflows:* Changes in regular residence for at least 12 months declared by foreigners.	From 2008 on, data correspond to Migration Statistics estimates that are based on the number of registrations and cancellations in the Municipal Registers by all foreigners, irrespective of their legal status.	Municipal Population Registers *(Padron municipal de habitantes),* National Statistical Institute (INE).
Sweden	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least one year (including nationals of EU countries). *Outflows:* Departures of foreigners who have the intention to live abroad for at least one year.	Excludes asylum seekers and temporary workers.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	*Inflows:* Foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit. Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. *Outflows:* Departures of foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit and of holders of an L-permit who stayed in the country for at least one year. The data include administrative corrections, so that, for example, foreigners whose permit expired are considered to have left the country.		Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Türkiye	*Inflows:* Residence permits issued for the first time to foreigners intending to stay 12 months or more in the country (long-term residents). *Outflows:* Departures of long-term residents.		Turkish Statistical Institute.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
United Kingdom	*Inflows:* Table A.1. OECD Secretariat calculation based on entry clearance data. Table B.1. by nationality: Data up to 2019 based on International Passenger Survey (IPS). Data since 2020 are based on entry clearance data. Outflows: Non-British citizens leaving the United Kingdom.		Home Office and ONS.
United States	Permanent migrants: Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) ("green card" recipients).	Includes persons already present in the United States who changed status. Certain LPRs are admitted conditionally and are required to remove their conditional status after two years; they are counted as LPRs when they first enter. Data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the year indicated).	Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security; Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/312.

Inflows of asylum seekers

Statistics on asylum seekers published in this annex are based on data provided by Eurostat, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the Australian Department of Home Affairs. Since 1950, the UNHCR, which has a mission of conducting and co-ordinating international initiatives on behalf of refugees, has regularly produced complete statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and other countries of the world (https://www.unhcr.org/data.html).

These statistics are most often derived from administrative sources, but there are differences depending on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative authorities will review the applicants' claims and grant them certain rights during this review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicants' family members, who are admitted under different provisions (France), while other countries count the entire family (Switzerland).

Table A.3. New asylum requests in OECD countries

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Australia	12 305	27 685	36 295	28 840	27 405	19 220	14 155	19 305	32 550	24 755	22 970
Austria	85 520	39 905	22 470	11 610	11 010	13 415	37 830	109 800	56 160	22 255	12 155
Belgium	39 065	14 290	14 055	18 160	23 140	12 930	19 605	32 140	29 305	32 710	27 540
Canada	16 560	23 620	47 845	55 375	58 340	19 045	23 365	94 375	146 740	173 930	115 840
Chile	615	2 280	5 635	5 775	770	1 675	2 500	5 055	3 625	2 495	545
Colombia	405	405	610	2 675	10 620	11 920	15 940	5 530	5 790	7 050	8 245
Costa Rica	2 190	4 485	6 320	27 970	59 180	21 125	108 425	129 480	34 645	28 275	29 560
Czechia	1 240	1 205	1 140	1 360	1 575	795	1 060	1 335	1 135	1 035	935
Denmark	20 855	6 070	3 140	3 495	2 645	1 435	2 015	4 505	2 380	2 210	1 865
Estonia	225	150	180	90	100	45	75	2 940	3 980	1 330	1 005
Finland	32 150	5 295	4 350	2 955	2 455	1 455	1 365	4 835	4 465	2 275	1 970
France	70 570	76 790	91 965	126 580	138 290	81 735	103 810	137 605	145 160	129 910	116 475
Germany	441 900	722 365	198 310	161 930	142 510	102 580	148 235	217 775	329 120	229 750	113 235
Greece	11 370	49 875	56 950	64 985	74 915	37 860	22 660	29 135	57 900	68 995	55 380
Hungary	174 435	28 215	3 120	635	470	90	40	45	30	25	110
Iceland	340	1 090	1 070	770	835	625	855	4 490	4 125	1 820	1 640
Ireland	3 270	2 235	2 910	3 655	4 740	1 535	2 615	13 645	13 220	18 435	12 975
Israel	7 535	15 045	15 345	16 260	9 445	1 885	1 925	3 915	6 815	6 080	9 630
Italy	82 790	121 185	126 560	53 440	35 005	21 340	45 200	77 200	130 565	151 120	126 635
Japan	7 575	10 900	19 650	10 495	10 375	3 935	2 415	3 770	13 825	13 645	11 605
Korea	5 690	7 520	9 925	16 125	15 430	6 665	2 330	11 540	18 825	18 325	14 570
Latvia	330	345	355	175	180	145	580	545	1 625	800	1 290
Lithuania	275	415	520	385	625	260	3 905	905	510	295	330
Luxembourg	2 360	2 065	2 325	2 225	2 200	1 295	1 370	2 405	2 615	2 125	1 770
Mexico	3 410	8 760	14 585	29 610	70 365	41 205	131 420	118 735	140 980	78 965	70 480
Netherlands	43 035	19 285	16 090	20 465	22 540	13 720	24 755	35 530	38 370	32 000	24 115
New Zealand	335	380	430	425	540	435	415	335	1 720	2 385	2 060
Norway	30 505	3 275	3 385	2 550	2 205	1 340	1 615	4 650	5 135	4 800	3 395
Poland	10 255	9 785	3 005	2 405	2 765	1 510	6 240	7 700	7 720	14 445	11 155
Portugal	870	710	1 015	1 240	1 735	900	1 350	1 980	2 600	2 675	1 755
Slovak Republic	270	100	155	155	215	265	330	505	375	140	130
Slovenia	260	1 265	1 440	2 800	3 615	3 465	5 220	6 645	7 185	5 465	3 965
Spain	14 610	15 570	33 040	52 745	115 190	86 385	62 065	116 150	160 470	165 465	141 055
Sweden	156 195	22 385	22 225	18 685	20 805	11 800	9 055	13 210	8 960	6 780	4 940
Switzerland	38 120	25 875	16 670	13 535	12 600	9 765	13 295	23 130	26 895	22 750	23 415
Türkiye	133 305	78 595	126 050	83 795	56 415	31 335	29 255	33 245	19 015	9 010	6 460
United Kingdom	38 855	38 500	33 500	37 445	44 465	36 025	56 465	89 395	84 415	108 135	100 620
United States	172 740	261 970	331 700	254 300	301 070	250 940	188 860	730 400	1 176 050	729 105 (S1)	911 952 (partial)
OECD Total	**1 662 335**	**1 649 890**	**1 274 335**	**1 136 120**	**1 286 785**	**852 100**	**1 092 615**	**2 087 980**	**2 715 350**	**..**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.3.

StatLink https://stat.link/pj3a4w

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Australia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
India	644	1 117	1 299	1 813	2 495	1 762	833	1 562	2 410	2 014	3 194
Indonesia	213	318	510	618	752	605	384	705	1 004	1 102	1 590
Fiji	248	390	260	638	1 093	649	..	498	385	777	1 183
Philippines	75	93	190	318	671	363	..	175	632	1 296	1 166
Viet Nam	217	772	1 263	812	959	1 165	764	721	2 979	2 003	1 024
Pakistan	627	1 334	1 404	657	801	495	392	881	1 418	684	922
Malaysia	2 771	7 258	7 983	9 791	7 065	4 010	2 149	1 030	989	872	733
Myanmar	26	60	208	27	74	156	499	549	703	626	566
Nepal	154	173	126	174	182	202	..	222	252	332	565
Iran	816	2 971	5 075	744	1 069	1 289	846	1 916	4 408	383	530
Sri Lanka	778	2 662	2 184	451	836	534	432	1 149	1 165	639	492
Bangladesh	216	433	462	252	308	336	15	192	371	443	456
Thailand	112	204	301	1 481	919	636	515	474	746	525	425
Colombia	29	65	46	39	71	111	..	95	283	1 138	407
Papua New Guinea	112	176	186	143	173	187	..	149	452	278	321
Other countries	5 322	9 606	14 748	10 881	9 937	6 720	..	8 987	14 353	11 644	9 396
Total	**12 360**	**27 632**	**36 245**	**28 839**	**27 405**	**19 220**	**14 155**	**19 305**	**32 550**	**24 756**	**22 970**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Austria

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Syria	24 720	8 640	7 255	3 300	2 675	5 080	16 130	19 585	20 850	13 215	3 965
Afghanistan	24 840	11 520	3 525	1 765	2 585	2 825	8 050	24 445	7 760	2 310	2 640
Somalia	2 040	1 505	655	475	600	615	1 575	1 715	1 380	755	840
Türkiye	190	310	260	175	245	280	875	5 240	7 675	980	585
Iran	3 380	2 400	950	1 050	660	310	405	585	640	470	410
Russia	1 340	1 235	1 035	690	550	360	365	715	855	430	385
Stateless	2 000	1 065	755	390	245	355	715	595	530	530	355
China	290	245	195	170	175	80	75	135	255	265	190
Georgia	355	290	380	410	265	80	145	335	315	160	170
Iraq	13 225	2 725	1 345	650	605	625	955	900	795	205	170
Morocco	670	935	205	90	110	705	1 850	8 625	6 800	455	145
Algeria	840	850	220	80	120	325	425	580	240	145	135
Egypt	175	200	130	85	45	165	955	1 550	1 190	165	130
India	370	415	310	195	295	140	870	19 855	1 145	255	130
Moldova	20	10	25	40	10	15	190	155	110	30	130
Other countries	11 065	7 560	5 225	2 045	1 825	1 455	4 250	24 785	5 620	1 885	1 775
Total	**85 520**	**39 905**	**22 470**	**11 610**	**11 010**	**13 415**	**37 830**	**109 800**	**56 160**	**22 255**	**12 155**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Belgium

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
West Bank and Gaza Strip	10	140	815	2 420	2 320	455	1 200	2 500	2 965	5 330	2 815
Eritrea	335	330	665	725	1 155	805	1 505	1 880	2 130	2 295	2 590
Afghanistan	7 730	2 225	995	1 045	2 245	2 310	5 155	5 760	2 535	1 870	2 395
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	630	500	550	405	520	385	275	815	990	1 595	2 110
Türkiye	185	650	465	785	1 000	585	560	1 620	2 400	1 995	2 105
Burundi	255	270	235	400	620	320	480	2 720	745	1 085	1 435
Syria	10 295	2 235	2 625	2 770	2 730	1 320	1 765	3 215	3 935	5 135	1 280
Cameroon	280	255	350	355	390	270	400	695	1 100	1 010	1 135
Guinea	635	720	750	1 000	830	455	535	725	1 160	990	1 085
Georgia	195	185	415	640	500	210	485	840	660	730	525
Angola	55	75	120	90	200	85	35	85	165	355	525
Somalia	2 010	725	295	380	765	600	935	640	690	735	475
Russia	535	410	390	355	405	220	170	500	730	335	465
Moldova	15	5	5	5	5	170	435	910	660	565	405
Armenia	120	135	130	110	125	70	140	315	415	325	345
Other countries	15 780	5 430	5 250	6 675	9 330	4 670	5 530	8 920	8 025	8 360	7 850
Total	**39 065**	**14 290**	**14 055**	**18 160**	**23 140**	**12 930**	**19 605**	**32 140**	**29 305**	**32 710**	**27 540**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Canada

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Haiti	306	634	7 329	1 403	1 374	1 056	755	11 194	5 585	8 124	18 010
India	374	580	1 487	4 524	5 150	1 564	1 705	4 273	11 520	32 539	17 551
Iran	156	302	694	2 483	3 663	689	1 396	4 768	5 961	6 777	6 960
Nigeria	820	1 565	5 459	9 599	3 976	646	326	1 892	9 253	13 222	6 518
Mexico	99	256	1 446	3 156	5 061	1 776	2 292	16 620	24 132	9 088	5 130
China,	1 581	1 336	1 159	1 870	1 412	279	454	1 086	1 983	4 003	4 475
Pakistan	912	1 165	1 640	2 031	2 059	684	521	2 649	5 334	5 610	3 669
Bangladesh	210	288	470	813	731	194	235	862	4 474	15 736	3 647
Ghana	86	114	225	155	152	74	78	452	1 936	7 066	2 953
Colombia	683	821	1 347	2 571	3 040	974	1 441	7 833	6 237	4 386	2 481
Sri Lanka	232	210	390	524	664	267	228	1 181	2 739	9 877	2 443
Algeria	57	105	208	430	520	177	200	403	1 127	3 341	2 195
United States	147	128	2 097	1 311	1 076	345	214	1 133	707	721	1 916
Guinea	45	71	122	208	175	55	69	175	877	2 658	1 868
Romania	..	121	113	1 345	435	93	96	986	1 751	1 709	1 765
Other countries	10 362	16 137	25 239	22 962	28 852	10 172	13 355	38 868	63 124	49 073	34 257
Total	**16 070**	**23 833**	**49 425**	**55 385**	**58 340**	**19 045**	**23 365**	**94 375**	**146 740**	**173 930**	**115 838**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Chile

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Venezuela	14	246	1 345	1 666	226	394	2 065	3 430	2 266	1 484	268
West Bank and Gaza Strip	..	7	12	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	93
Colombia	490	1 803	2 516	1 157	252	670	98	821	809	640	58
Afghanistan	..	..	12	..	..	..	74	146	..	..	34
Cuba	17	56	1 603	2 764	272	531	158	183	212	136	19
Syria	8	12	29	19	7	..	..	..	..	..	16
Ukraine	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	96	25	..	16
Ecuador	7	20	8	..	..	..	..	..	101	102	15
Russia	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	67	..	25	10
Türkiye	..	9	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Bolivia	9	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Nicaragua	..	1	..	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	5
Other countries	..	138	106	173	..	..	..	..	..	..	0
Total	**630**	**2 299**	**5 656**	**5 784**	**770**	**1 675**	**2 500**	**5 055**	**3 625**	**2 495**	**544**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Colombia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Venezuela	119	316	575	2 592	10 479	11 832	15 811	5 184	5 613	6 361	7 683
Cuba	227	54	24	41	24	57	111	233	108	301	246
Ecuador	..	5	..	..	..	5	7	23	25	89	84
Peru	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	..	23	24
Lebanon	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13
Panama	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10
Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	9
Syria	7	5	..	6	..	..	5	..	..	..	9
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7
Other countries	..	24	..	..	..	26	6	80	39	276	159
Total	**406**	**404**	**612**	**2 676**	**10 620**	**11 920**	**15 940**	**5 530**	**5 790**	**7 050**	**8 244**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Costa Rica

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Nicaragua	38	66	78	23 138	31 624	9 416	101 962	119 425	28 469	23 443	23 042
Cuba	129	89	172	42	1 856	1 644	344	1 095	2 839	1 265	3 283
Venezuela	280	1 423	3 175	2 884	2 626	742	2 928	5 634	1 830	1 670	1 724
Colombia	583	669	778	533	1 137	377	789	1 492	1 039	1 168	823
China	..	..	5	12	153	60	113	66	13	262	169
Honduras	82	149	225	188	436	129	325	353	85	83	113
El Salvador	801	1 471	1 644	1 059	1 149	152	335	367	65	55	75
Ecuador	..	..	5	5	5	..	44	80	38	75	74
Peru	..	..	..	5	..	7	47	49	32	47	49
Dominican Republic	..	..	..	..	67	21	41	88	21	28	25
Panama	5	..	6	5	9	5	57	52	8	26	20
Guatemala	6	9	26	13	37	8	76	44	13	22	18
Mexico	5	6	8	13	15	5	22	47	7	6	16
Bolivia	..	..	5	..	..	..	9	9	..	7	15
United States	..	7	12	16	12	5	11	11	5	10	11
Other countries	260	597	183	59	20 054	8 554	1 322	668	181	108	102
Total	**2 189**	**4 486**	**6 322**	**27 972**	**59 180**	**21 125**	**108 425**	**129 480**	**34 645**	**28 275**	**29 559**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Czechia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Viet Nam	55	55	60	75	120	40	50	105	95	140	170
Ukraine	565	355	295	280	215	240	265	205	105	175	135
Uzbekistan	5	15	10	90	65	35	25	75	110	175	90
Moldova	15	5	15	10	40	45	55	70	90	70	60
Russia	30	50	40	70	80	30	15	135	95	70	55
Georgia	15	45	110	140	190	85	185	70	45	30	35
Türkiye	5	25	25	35	20	25	35	220	185	55	35
Kazakhstan	10	15	35	30	95	20	10	15	30	20	30
Syria	130	65	70	30	35	20	30	45	45	30	25
Nigeria	15	20	10	10	15	5	5	20	15	25	20
Myanmar	0	5	5	5	0	0	5	20	25	25	20
Algeria	10	5	5	15	10	5	20	10	15	20	20
Belarus	15	10	15	10	10	60	35	40	35	15	20
Afghanistan	25	35	15	20	20	5	175	60	30	10	15
Pakistan	5	5	10	15	10	0	10	10	10	5	15
Other countries	340	495	420	525	650	180	140	235	205	170	190
Total	**1 240**	**1 205**	**1 140**	**1 360**	**1 575**	**795**	**1 060**	**1 335**	**1 135**	**1 035**	**935**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Denmark

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Eritrea	1 705	250	295	675	480	165	380	195	200	215	250
Afghanistan	2 215	1 110	170	115	90	70	555	375	440	170	175
Syria	8 580	1 255	765	600	490	340	320	370	480	445	150
Stateless	1 685	490	120	140	200	75	60	75	85	115	115
Türkiye	25	15	35	25	25	35	35	60	60	265	100
Iran	2 745	315	145	195	135	80	65	120	125	85	90
Pakistan	90	75	20	25	40	20	15	30	25	30	80
Russia	170	70	45	80	60	30	15	105	120	60	60
Ukraine	95	95	40	45	35	20	10	2 065	100	100	60
Morocco	175	325	300	175	155	100	65	100	65	75	55
Iraq	1 470	435	130	120	115	55	65	100	55	45	50
India	35	30	25	20	40	20	15	35	25	10	50
Algeria	95	150	80	70	40	45	25	35	30	40	45
Uganda	40	20	10	10	10	5	5	5	15	35	45
Somalia	255	250	85	105	160	40	40	40	40	35	40
Other countries	1 475	1 185	875	1 095	570	335	345	795	515	485	500
Total	**20 855**	**6 070**	**3 140**	**3 495**	**2 645**	**1 435**	**2 015**	**4 505**	**2 380**	**2 210**	**1 865**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Estonia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	95	5	10	15	5	0	5	2 610	3 775	1 215	900
Russia	15	10	15	10	30	15	10	215	75	40	30
Belarus	0	0	5	0	0	0	5	30	20	15	15
Venezuela	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
India	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	10	5
Iran	0	10	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Afghanistan	10	5	5	0	5	0	15	15	15	0	5
Georgia	10	5	10	0	5	0	0	10	10	0	5
Syria	15	45	80	5	5	5	0	0	5	5	5
Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	5	0	5
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other countries	75	70	45	50	45	20	40	55	70	45	15
Total	**225**	**150**	**180**	**90**	**100**	**45**	**75**	**2 940**	**3 980**	**1 330**	**1 005**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Finland

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	5 190	685	305	135	125	190	225	215	310	235	340
Somalia	1 975	425	100	155	140	180	140	190	805	300	210
Iraq	20 400	1 080	1 000	565	270	475	150	185	230	100	110
Türkiye	55	100	110	285	360	80	125	175	325	170	100
Iran	615	140	90	230	95	25	30	95	150	120	85
Russia	165	175	395	455	285	95	70	1 095	345	125	80
Nigeria	155	160	95	90	105	35	55	90	120	170	65
Rwanda	10	5	15	5	20	0	20	55	45	40	65
China	15	50	25	15	40	5	15	10	65	40	55
Syria	875	600	740	105	95	55	85	135	690	170	50
Georgia	15	20	120	70	60	5	50	65	90	55	45
Myanmar	5	5	0	5	5	0	0	5	15	15	45
Pakistan	55	95	30	25	15	15	15	35	65	50	35
Stateless	60	70	25	25	30	10	15	15	10	20	35
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	20	35	20	25	20	10	5	20	30	15	35
Other countries	2 540	1 650	1 280	765	790	275	365	2 450	1 170	650	615
Total	**32 150**	**5 295**	**4 350**	**2 955**	**2 455**	**1 455**	**1 365**	**4 835**	**4 465**	**2 275**	**1 970**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – France

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	1 625	525	530	755	1 175	2 110	2 240	1 770	3 390	13 270	11 675
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3 800	3 385	3 805	4 225	4 545	3 120	2 750	6 760	8 815	9 295	11 555
Afghanistan	2 410	6 015	6 600	11 885	11 685	10 000	16 005	22 585	16 550	10 260	11 395
Haiti	3 185	5 290	5 600	2 245	4 720	2 830	2 620	1 885	2 820	5 630	6 410
Sudan	5 315	6 085	4 680	2 980	2 120	1 355	2 210	2 520	5 615	5 145	5 845
Guinea	2 040	2 645	4 130	7 985	7 045	4 690	5 250	6 200	10 510	7 855	5 290
Côte d'Ivoire	1 270	1 675	3 620	6 465	6 725	4 635	6 210	5 915	9 560	6 870	4 805
Türkiye	1 015	1 010	1 290	2 110	4 110	3 095	4 965	10 005	9 805	5 855	4 420
Georgia	1 085	870	1 895	7 405	7 985	1 805	4 580	8 905	6 120	3 450	3 685
Bangladesh	3 345	2 440	2 620	4 045	6 705	4 615	6 200	10 555	9 565	5 385	3 685
Angola	475	685	880	1 365	1 835	1 265	400	985	2 125	2 685	3 380
Somalia	1 305	875	905	3 785	3 160	2 390	3 145	1 905	2 030	2 305	2 950
China	2 960	1 965	2 070	2 740	3 840	930	840	1 150	1 355	2 130	2 220
Sri Lanka	1 405	1 275	1 305	1 750	1 970	1 020	905	1 995	3 565	2 940	1 865
Kosovo*	3 825	2 350	2 680	2 160	2 000	865	855	1 415	1 220	3 150	1 780
Other countries	35 510	39 700	49 355	64 680	68 670	37 010	44 635	53 055	52 115	43 685	35 515
Total	**70 570**	**76 790**	**91 965**	**126 580**	**138 290**	**81 735**	**103 810**	**137 605**	**145 160**	**129 910**	**116 475**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Germany

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	31 380	127 010	16 425	9 945	9 520	9 900	23 275	36 360	51 275	34 150	23 970
Syria	158 655	266 250	48 970	44 165	39 270	36 435	54 905	70 975	102 930	76 765	23 255
Türkiye	1 500	5 385	8 025	10 160	10 785	5 780	7 065	23 940	61 180	29 175	11 920
Somalia	5 125	9 850	6 835	5 075	3 570	2 605	3 650	3 940	5 300	6 955	4 340
Iraq	29 785	96 115	21 930	16 330	13 740	9 845	15 605	15 175	11 150	7 840	3 860
Russia	5 255	10 985	4 885	3 940	3 145	1 700	1 440	2 850	7 665	4 700	3 100
Eritrea	10 875	18 855	10 225	5 570	3 520	2 560	3 170	3 925	4 115	3 130	2 490
Iran	5 395	26 425	8 610	10 855	8 405	3 120	2 695	6 320	9 385	5 230	2 270
Guinea	660	3 460	3 955	2 870	2 420	1 270	880	1 320	3 300	3 050	1 995
Viet Nam	660	530	530	615	825	1 110	985	955	1 070	1 585	1 940
Venezuela	20	90	205	405	725	555	390	1 820	3 730	3 005	1 800
Georgia	2 780	3 450	3 080	3 765	3 330	2 050	3 685	7 965	8 415	2 635	1 665
Algeria	2 040	3 565	1 950	1 200	1 060	1 205	1 520	1 445	2 030	2 060	1 665
China	520	1 015	525	405	920	250	175	220	620	1 130	1 660
Colombia	5	55	60	135	450	350	325	1 380	3 280	3 840	1 485
Other countries	187 245	149 325	62 100	46 495	40 825	23 845	28 470	39 185	53 675	44 500	25 820
Total	**441 900**	**722 365**	**198 310**	**161 930**	**142 510**	**102 580**	**148 235**	**217 775**	**329 120**	**229 750**	**113 235**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Greece

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	1 545	4 295	7 480	11 820	23 665	11 100	3 195	4 085	8 770	15 155	15 100
Egypt	230	260	810	915	1 695	710	775	1 335	2 160	7 085	8 180
Sudan	115	45	85	80	90	50	55	455	970	1 490	8 170
Syria	3 325	26 630	16 305	13 145	10 750	7 415	2 945	4 280	13 865	21 875	3 235
Bangladesh	535	1 055	1 255	1 435	2 375	1 625	2 480	1 280	340	770	2 840
Iraq	575	4 770	7 870	9 640	5 590	1 465	990	2 030	6 080	2 235	2 250
Nepal	0	45	90	115	135	100	50	55	530	1 185	1 490
Somalia	95	125	230	715	2 270	1 530	1 485	1 985	2 840	1 390	1 485
Türkiye	40	180	1 820	4 820	3 795	1 590	1 910	1 395	2 650	4 230	1 475
Yemen	35	95	195	310	275	130	60	560	935	1 580	1 340
Pakistan	1 505	4 420	8 345	7 185	6 420	3 515	3 415	2 555	1 965	1 075	1 295
Eritrea	135	415	320	330	305	200	140	630	1 810	2 255	1 285
West Bank and Gaza Strip	55	850	1 305	1 515	2 140	1 260	760	2 895	6 720	2 570	1 275
Iran	190	1 085	1 295	1 730	2 325	835	575	415	620	755	860
Albania	915	1 300	2 345	3 125	2 795	1 025	1 125	885	535	590	600
Other countries	2 075	4 305	7 200	8 105	10 290	5 310	2 700	4 295	7 110	4 755	4 500
Total	**11 370**	**49 875**	**56 950**	**64 985**	**74 915**	**37 860**	**22 660**	**29 135**	**57 900**	**68 995**	**55 380**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Hungary

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Syria	64 080	4 875	565	50	20	10	0	0	0	5	15
Russia	15	5	0	0	0	5	0	5	10	0	10
Iran	1 785	1 250	95	30	20	5	10	5	0	0	10
Mongolia	100	15	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
West Bank and Gaza Strip	1 010	195	15	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Nigeria	940	45	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Bangladesh	4 005	255	10	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Afghanistan	45 560	10 775	1 365	270	185	15	5	15	0	0	5
Ghana	320	10	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Morocco	250	935	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Sierra Leone	90	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Türkiye	275	410	20	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Pakistan	15 010	3 650	100	20	25	25	0	0	0	0	5
Other countries	40 995	5 790	930	260	200	25	25	20	20	20	25
Total	**174 435**	**28 215**	**3 120**	**635**	**470**	**90**	**40**	**45**	**30**	**25**	**110**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Iceland

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	10	10	10	30	10	5	..	2 350	1 625	1 235	1 085
West Bank and Gaza Strip	5	15	15	25	20	120	90	230	215	91	170
Venezuela	..	..	..	15	180	105	355	1 220	1 570	170	145
Uganda	..	..	..	..	5	..	5	5	5	10	30
Nigeria	5	20	10	35	50	35	50	65	115	40	30
Colombia	..	..	..	5	10	5	15	40	45	40	25
Iraq	30	70	110	110	135	110	60	70	45	35	20
Afghanistan	20	25	15	45	45	30	90	65	40	40	20
Serbia	5	10	20	10	15	..	5	..	..	..	15
China	..	..	5	..	5	..	..	..	5	5	15
Jordan	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	15	5	5	10
Syria	40	35	30	40	20	60	65	90	80	35	10
Georgia	..	40	290	30	20	5	..	20	15	10	10
United States	5	5	5	10	5	5	..	5	5	10	10
India	..	..	..	5	5	..	..	..	5	..	5
Other countries	..	..	..	370	275	145	..	355	345	134	60
Total	**360**	**1 132**	**1 065**	**730**	**805**	**625**	**865**	**4 530**	**4 120**	**1 860**	**1 660**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Ireland

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Somalia	15	30	20	55	135	165	335	1 570	1 095	1 305	2 015
Nigeria	185	175	185	250	385	210	450	1 105	2 080	4 015	1 910
Pakistan	1 350	235	195	240	205	85	55	240	620	1 385	1 665
Afghanistan	125	120	75	95	105	70	200	850	1 105	1 000	1 290
Georgia	40	75	300	450	635	35	330	2 705	1 050	655	865
Viet Nam	5	5	0	15	20	10	15	20	35	250	680
Bangladesh	285	55	60	55	60	30	35	160	445	1 005	660
Ukraine	45	20	15	5	10	0	5	420	215	250	310
Zimbabwe	95	190	260	280	445	80	145	975	765	555	220
Sudan	15	15	20	50	30	15	25	95	165	185	200
Brazil	5	30	35	110	115	70	40	90	170	230	200
Albania	215	220	280	460	970	40	65	220	165	180	190
West Bank and Gaza Strip	10	20	20	45	35	10	10	35	120	970	170
India	145	45	30	45	65	15	15	70	145	160	165
Egypt	15	15	35	35	40	20	25	340	280	170	135
Other countries	720	985	1 380	1 465	1 485	680	865	4 750	4 765	6 120	2 300
Total	**3 270**	**2 235**	**2 910**	**3 655**	**4 740**	**1 535**	**2 615**	**13 645**	**13 220**	**18 435**	**12 975**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Israel

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Sri Lanka	160	..	430	540	446	134	174	151	292	508	2 819
India	..	..	322	671	636	189	268	279	751	580	1 021
Eritrea	3 596	2 143	2 299	6 348	129	88	138	16	41	81	881
Thailand	..	..	5	9	9	5	20	19	20	193	714
Malawi	..	..	10	26	30	13	5	11	60	528	572
Russia	..	395	635	2 772	4 477	325	53	1 012	1 864	700	447
Sudan	1 373	661	936	766	41	13	25	110	85	118	396
Colombia	..	..	21	127	212	85	16	143	166	242	332
Ethiopia	292	127	195	136	133	43	28	68	171	240	245
Uzbekistan	..	..	72	356	190	38	18	111	204	199	231
Ukraine	703	6 880	7 711	1 765	633	217	117	95	..	7	201
China	..	..	52	40	248	88	405	185	272	277	178
Moldova	..	302	332	436	242	75	193	218	348	200	171
Türkiye	..	5	41	169	322	89	128	159	256	161	151
Tanzania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	47	111	114
Other countries	..	..	2 307	2 102	1 697	483	337	1 338	2 238	1 935	1 159
Total	**5 010**	**8 150**	**15 368**	**16 263**	**9 445**	**1 885**	**1 925**	**3 915**	**6 815**	**6 080**	**9 632**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Italy

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Bangladesh	6 010	6 570	12 125	4 165	1 340	2 275	6 635	14 590	23 195	32 865	27 480
Peru	35	40	120	750	2 445	735	570	3 000	7 485	15 595	15 335
Egypt	560	775	810	740	805	360	2 680	8 835	18 175	11 595	11 090
Pakistan	10 275	13 470	9 470	7 445	7 305	4 960	6 880	11 370	16 685	11 740	9 585
Morocco	575	1 545	1 860	1 875	1 510	475	1 575	2 785	5 085	9 985	8 870
India	250	535	505	915	1 035	205	140	535	1 780	4 835	7 075
Tunisia	295	330	445	1 005	705	1 000	6 360	5 365	7 515	9 435	5 455
Georgia	130	195	540	1 155	970	495	1 335	3 240	3 040	3 365	4 295
Sri Lanka	85	135	325	500	385	85	110	415	1 330	4 335	3 885
China	360	870	315	365	465	145	85	150	345	2 360	3 200
Colombia	40	90	210	580	875	540	380	1 765	2 080	3 325	2 720
Afghanistan	3 975	2 830	1 010	495	590	640	5 235	2 100	1 900	2 035	2 705
Venezuela	45	140	520	1 260	1 545	830	455	1 350	1 410	2 385	1 960
Nigeria	17 755	26 550	24 950	5 510	1 255	855	1 300	1 805	1 960	2 190	1 655
Senegal	6 340	7 550	8 295	2 490	865	280	435	610	1 545	2 030	1 610
Other countries	36 060	59 560	65 060	24 190	12 910	7 460	11 025	19 285	37 035	33 045	19 715
Total	**82 790**	**121 185**	**126 560**	**53 440**	**35 005**	**21 340**	**45 200**	**77 200**	**130 565**	**151 120**	**126 635**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Japan

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Thailand	83	21	65	40	..	..	..	..	184	2 128	1 556
Myanmar	808	650	962	656	788	..	..	298	324	627	1 490
India	229	470	603	549	730	..	..	172	934	951	959
Sri Lanka	469	938	2 226	1 551	1 530	..	..	502	3 778	2 455	905
Bangladesh	244	242	438	542	662	..	..	230	538	568	777
Türkiye	926	1 143	1 198	563	1 331	..	..	445	2 406	1 223	683
Pakistan	295	289	469	720	971	..	..	238	1 062	700	534
Indonesia	969	1 829	2 038	634	53	..	..	..	..	226	496
Ghana	50	174	106	50	75	..	..	31	98	251	492
Cameroon	67	66	98	203	234	..	..	84	175	139	325
Nigeria	154	108	77	98	120	..	..	56	193	114	315
Uzbekistan	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	210	473	265	292
Nepal	1 768	1 451	1 451	1 713	1 256	..	..	130	697	506	291
China	167	156	315	308	134	..	..	45	90	195	254
Cambodia	67	318	772	961	1 321	..	..	578	888	364	204
Other countries	1 284	3 044	8 432	1 905	..	..	..	..	1 985	2 933	2 034
Total	**7 580**	**10 901**	**19 250**	**10 493**	**10 375**	**3 935**	**2 415**	**3 770**	**13 825**	**13 645**	**11 607**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Korea

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Russia	27	324	692	1 916	2 829	1 064	45	1 038	5 750	4 546	2 026
India	295	218	691	1 120	959	420	148	1 278	1 189	1 403	1 462
Kazakhstan	45	539	1 223	2 496	2 236	603	36	2 456	2 094	1 347	1 216
Malaysia	5	6	448	1 236	1 438	452	..	140	1 205	1 113	726
Pakistan	1 143	809	667	1 120	790	303	131	349	476	775	716
Mongolia	..	34	199	450	200	86	40	159	836	1 015	715
Viet Nam	202	275	53	106	381	56	5	10	14	392	691
China	401	1 062	1 413	1 199	2 000	311	301	772	1 282	1 571	620
Uzbekistan	82	145	43	146	235	168	64	265	477	380	515
Philippines	137	260	246	507	229	154	105	42	82	179	493
Bangladesh	388	335	383	608	491	435	233	304	334	394	468
Türkiye	..	11	42	158	320	171	16	1 188	564	785	416
Egypt	812	1 002	741	870	114	718	117	288	322	353	406
Tajikistan	5	21	9	11	8	6	20	49	182	308	362
Indonesia	6	5	12	16	87	15	6	..	31	329	335
Other countries	2 162	2 496	3 080	4 188	3 113	1 703	1 063	3 202	3 987	3 435	3 405
Total	**5 710**	**7 542**	**9 942**	**16 147**	**15 430**	**6 665**	**2 330**	**11 540**	**18 825**	**18 325**	**14 572**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Latvia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	35	240
Afghanistan	35	35	15	5	5	10	70	110	305	150	140
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	110
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	10	90
Tajikistan	0	15	15	5	5	0	0	5	10	165	85
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	80
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	70
Egypt	0	0	0	10	5	0	5	0	5	0	65
Eritrea	0	10	20	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	60
Pakistan	5	20	0	5	5	5	5	5	10	35	40
Bangladesh	0	5	5	5	5	5	0	5	40	50	35
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	35
Russia	10	25	25	50	25	10	30	120	45	40	30
Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	30
Iran	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	60	210	30	20
Other countries	280	235	275	90	125	110	465	235	905	280	160
Total	**330**	**345**	**355**	**175**	**180**	**145**	**580**	**545**	**1 625**	**800**	**1 290**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Lithuania

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Belarus	15	10	35	15	15	80	245	400	280	125	70
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	45
Ukraine	60	30	35	15	15	0	0	10	5	25	30
Russia	35	50	80	50	275	65	115	140	50	40	25
Tajikistan	5	20	50	120	205	40	35	45	15	10	20
Afghanistan	30	30	15	20	10	10	115	40	25	10	20
Pakistan	0	5	10	0	0	0	30	0	0	10	10
Azerbaijan	15	5	5	25	10	0	5	5	5	10	10
Iran	0	0	0	15	5	0	75	10	10	0	10
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	10	20	10
Türkiye	0	5	20	20	15	15	30	5	5	10	10
Sri Lanka	0	5	20	15	0	5	65	10	15	0	5
United States	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Moldova	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
Other countries	115	255	250	85	70	35	3 170	240	85	35	50
Total	**275**	**415**	**520**	**385**	**625**	**260**	**3 905**	**905**	**510**	**295**	**330**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Luxembourg

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Eritrea	45	115	230	410	565	255	320	450	490	445	365
Syria	635	330	405	280	375	360	445	1 045	785	370	210
Venezuela	0	0	0	10	65	45	35	85	125	115	90
Algeria	25	75	160	75	75	35	20	30	65	130	85
Afghanistan	220	60	40	180	170	100	115	185	130	55	80
Türkiye	20	15	10	45	60	45	25	90	75	105	75
Somalia	15	25	20	30	45	20	15	20	25	35	60
Colombia	0	0	0	5	10	10	10	20	70	100	60
Sudan	5	15	30	65	40	15	40	15	130	30	50
Morocco	15	75	205	90	45	25	15	25	50	70	50
Tunisia	20	40	100	90	30	20	15	30	40	50	45
Ukraine	25	35	35	20	25	5	0	10	20	30	45
Guinea	5	20	35	50	40	25	15	30	65	60	40
Iraq	545	180	140	185	130	65	55	20	35	15	35
Ethiopia	10	15	25	30	25	10	35	25	35	45	35
Other countries	775	1 065	890	660	500	260	210	325	475	470	445
Total	**2 360**	**2 065**	**2 325**	**2 225**	**2 200**	**1 295**	**1 370**	**2 405**	**2 615**	**2 125**	**1 770**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Mexico

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Cuba	37	43	796	212	8 683	5 758	8 319	18 095	18 386	17 884	34 581
Venezuela	57	361	4 042	6 344	7 665	3 292	6 223	14 915	5 518	5 419	14 321
Haiti	16	47	436	82	5 536	5 964	51 827	17 153	44 239	10 853	9 074
Honduras	1 560	4 119	4 272	13 631	30 093	15 469	36 361	31 092	41 936	27 889	4 754
Colombia	26	44	96	204	558	501	1 275	2 490	2 566	2 315	2 141
Guatemala	102	437	676	1 383	3 778	3 005	4 149	5 269	6 111	3 725	1 119
El Salvador	1 475	3 488	3 708	6 186	8 999	4 053	6 037	7 806	6 118	5 479	1 110
Ecuador	5	20	23	22	78	85	245	1 241	1 574	1 048	823
Peru	5	2	5	7	25	51	112	338	173	333	353
Nicaragua	28	70	62	1 246	2 232	802	2 919	8 984	1 363	940	352
Chile	..	..	..	5	418	808	6 970	885	3 489	817	308
Brazil	..	5	5	5	552	372	3 836	2 594	3 678	531	162
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	541	1 744	142	140
Dominican Republic	..	5	5	10	34	32	200	1 423	440	212	139
Russia	7	8	15	8	26	5	16	257	137	108	122
Other countries	102	132	455	278	1 688	1 008	2 925	5 652	3 508	1 270	983
Total	**3 420**	**8 781**	**14 596**	**29 623**	**70 365**	**41 205**	**131 420**	**118 735**	**140 980**	**78 965**	**70 482**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Netherlands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Syria	18 640	2 865	2 965	2 960	3 675	4 070	8 385	12 645	13 030	11 525	3 280
Eritrea	7 390	1 865	1 590	1 410	500	370	770	1 365	2 345	1 470	3 135
Türkiye	55	235	480	1 300	1 250	990	2 460	2 685	2 860	1 870	1 480
Somalia	260	155	125	135	220	200	905	1 455	1 805	1 070	1 290
Algeria	45	980	890	1 270	1 210	995	1 105	1 205	1 560	950	1 205
Nigeria	215	195	245	560	2 105	635	415	520	655	770	815
Sudan	235	190	260	270	200	155	135	195	810	525	795
Afghanistan	2 550	1 025	320	325	435	390	3 010	2 730	670	490	765
Pakistan	155	160	180	310	395	265	445	875	640	490	695
Ethiopia	130	155	125	55	90	45	165	305	325	415	670
Morocco	80	1 270	980	1 065	1 060	775	905	720	885	605	670
Iraq	3 010	960	845	745	620	335	745	670	1 495	2 225	575
Sierra Leone	40	35	65	90	110	60	65	85	340	245	525
Yemen	50	45	170	530	645	410	1 190	2 430	1 980	1 080	505
Iran	1 885	885	720	1 870	1 535	370	265	700	1 125	700	430
Other countries	8 295	8 265	6 130	7 570	8 490	3 655	3 790	6 945	7 845	7 570	7 280
Total	**43 035**	**19 285**	**16 090**	**20 465**	**22 540**	**13 720**	**24 755**	**35 530**	**38 370**	**32 000**	**24 115**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – New Zealand

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
India	21	31	43	49	66	43	140	68	677	1 079	749
China	23	64	76	103	91	65	68	71	401	340	283
Sri Lanka	23	13	30	42	50	25	29	21	65	198	198
Pakistan	24	14	18	28	12	..	5	14	45	95	126
Bangladesh	17	14	27	12	21	7	12	5	8	48	113
Malaysia	7	11	10	18	36	38	11	34	234	75	76
Afghanistan	9	6	27	7	32	13	5	13	29	66	69
Nepal	..	5	..	..	5	..	..	..	13	80	66
Iran	19	15	19	20	32	14	..	..	16	64	40
Myanmar	..	..	5	10	..	..	17	12	18	34	29
Indonesia	..	5	..	..	5	111	26	5	5	10	22
Fiji	28	12	8	..	12	18	5	18	6	13	21
Russia	5	5	22	7	11	11	15	10	7	12	17
South Africa	22	13	5	6	14	8	10	5	6	11	16
Viet Nam	6	..	..	5	5	..	..	..	6	5	16
Other countries	146	179	270	148	148	82	72	59	184	255	217
Total	**350**	**387**	**560**	**455**	**540**	**435**	**415**	**335**	**1 720**	**2 385**	**2 058**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Norway

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	90	25	30	35	25	10	5	750	1 030	755	1 110
Syria	10 535	540	1 000	415	535	540	585	1 575	1 545	2 120	380
Eritrea	2 785	545	840	220	180	150	185	310	320	275	265
Afghanistan	6 910	365	135	90	95	55	250	500	255	155	170
Colombia	0	10	15	10	35	25	45	150	185	160	155
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	155
Türkiye	80	80	160	770	360	85	100	210	530	265	125
Russia	110	60	45	50	80	25	10	250	185	65	70
Iran	1 310	115	85	110	70	45	30	70	80	65	65
China	60	20	25	15	15	15	100	15	30	55	60
Venezuela	0	10	10	20	20	15	30	90	105	60	55
Sudan	360	45	40	40	25	10	5	15	40	30	50
Ethiopia	655	155	85	40	40	20	35	55	50	35	50
Iraq	2 935	205	140	95	50	35	30	35	40	40	45
Yemen	70	15	10	10	30	10	10	30	35	30	40
Other countries	4 605	1 085	765	630	645	300	195	595	705	615	600
Total	**30 505**	**3 275**	**3 385**	**2 550**	**2 205**	**1 340**	**1 615**	**4 650**	**5 135**	**4 800**	**3 395**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Poland

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	1 575	595	300	225	215	95	115	1 505	1 625	6 135	6 245
Belarus	20	35	30	25	30	385	2 130	2 880	3 515	3 615	2 715
Russia	6 985	7 435	2 120	1 600	1 770	495	340	1 350	970	515	280
Afghanistan	15	20	25	40	55	120	1 595	245	125	225	195
Tajikistan	525	830	85	35	80	45	95	95	110	305	190
Somalia	0	0	5	0	5	5	55	10	55	485	140
Ethiopia	0	0	5	5	5	0	10	5	35	520	135
Eritrea	5	0	5	5	0	5	0	5	15	500	95
Pakistan	20	20	20	25	15	10	15	60	20	70	75
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	35	20	225	70
Georgia	230	55	20	20	50	20	45	60	30	55	65
Moldova	0	5	5	0	5	0	0	5	30	30	60
Syria	285	40	40	25	25	35	125	85	115	405	50
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	35	50
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	30	10	50	45
Other countries	595	750	345	400	510	290	1 700	1 330	1 030	1 275	745
Total	**10 255**	**9 785**	**3 005**	**2 405**	**2 765**	**1 510**	**6 240**	**7 700**	**7 720**	**14 445**	**11 155**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Portugal

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Colombia	0	5	0	20	15	5	10	85	255	255	245
China	75	10	0	5	15	5	0	5	30	75	170
Angola	20	30	120	225	305	115	45	55	155	200	155
Venezuela	0	15	35	40	95	15	15	25	55	165	105
Gambia	5	25	20	20	175	150	65	165	315	275	100
Guinea	35	50	45	70	120	80	50	35	85	95	80
Morocco	20	5	10	30	35	85	115	110	120	95	75
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	15	65
Nigeria	5	5	10	20	60	35	15	25	55	70	60
Senegal	10	25	25	20	70	80	45	90	195	390	50
Afghanistan	5	20	30	5	20	10	595	250	305	175	45
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	25	40	160	130	85	25	10	60	60	70	40
Russia	10	15	30	10	15	0	0	55	30	15	35
Algeria	5	10	20	5	15	5	15	45	45	40	35
United States	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	0	5	10	35
Other countries	655	455	510	635	710	285	370	975	870	730	460
Total	**870**	**710**	**1 015**	**1 240**	**1 735**	**900**	**1 350**	**1 980**	**2 600**	**2 675**	**1 755**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovak Republic

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Ukraine	15	15	5	0	5	0	0	150	20	30	35
Afghanistan	25	10	25	30	85	50	90	15	20	15	20
Belarus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	15	15
Russia	5	0	5	5	5	0	0	35	10	5	10
Syria	5	10	10	10	5	35	10	10	5	5	10
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Pakistan	5	15	10	10	5	5	10	15	15	5	5
Morocco	0	0	5	0	5	40	105	70	20	5	5
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	5	5	5
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	5	0	5
India	5	5	0	0	5	10	15	5	5	0	5
Other countries	205	45	85	85	85	105	90	145	210	55	10
Total	**270**	**100**	**155**	**155**	**215**	**265**	**330**	**505**	**375**	**140**	**130**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovenia

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Morocco	5	40	40	170	720	1 215	160	370	5 745	3 455	2 415
Egypt	0	0	10	15	40	145	105	15	15	170	345
Algeria	0	40	190	470	1 010	275	80	85	410	415	265
Syria	15	270	90	155	60	55	90	40	45	195	115
Bangladesh	0	0	5	60	175	150	265	825	40	55	90
Afghanistan	45	410	575	455	415	740	2 590	1 205	100	375	70
Pakistan	25	105	140	775	520	490	490	555	130	80	65
Tunisia	0	10	15	40	130	30	55	70	75	90	55
Ukraine	10	0	0	0	0	5	0	195	90	120	55
India	0	5	5	35	25	20	35	850	110	40	50
Burundi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	230	5	25	45
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0	5	10	20	45	10	25	5	20	30	40
China	0	5	5	5	5	0	5	5	15	5	35
Türkiye	5	60	100	65	65	55	275	200	25	30	35
Iraq	45	115	20	95	85	85	255	180	10	30	30
Other countries	110	200	235	440	320	190	790	1 815	350	350	255
Total	**260**	**1 265**	**1 440**	**2 800**	**3 615**	**3 465**	**5 220**	**6 645**	**7 185**	**5 465**	**3 965**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Spain

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Venezuela	585	3 960	11 390	19 070	40 305	28 065	15 655	45 225	60 000	65 595	84 235
Mali	215	210	300	650	1 190	1 440	4 470	1 625	1 240	10 600	15 460
Colombia	120	610	3 150	8 465	28 880	27 180	11 100	35 515	53 040	39 790	14 310
Peru	10	30	255	525	3 965	5 145	2 235	8 850	14 255	10 380	3 465
Senegal	30	45	235	435	720	665	3 145	1 255	2 145	7 700	3 300
Morocco	395	335	520	1 280	2 470	945	6 440	3 765	2 980	4 020	2 910
West Bank and Gaza Strip	795	350	1 225	1 965	580	145	135	130	145	915	1 650
Nicaragua	10	20	80	1 360	5 840	3 680	1 195	2 040	2 695	2 100	1 570
Somalia	160	130	55	45	115	40	70	10	840	515	1 195
Guinea	80	190	440	695	940	325	445	265	385	720	1 070
Mauritania	5	10	45	55	55	40	170	80	55	1 815	1 030
Gambia	55	70	265	125	175	245	655	245	290	1 245	810
Afghanistan	40	65	90	70	115	30	1 580	1 310	765	930	745
Russia	85	170	345	630	760	445	365	660	1 615	890	655
Honduras	150	385	1 155	2 400	6 730	5 465	2 195	2 970	3 655	1 885	650
Other countries	11 875	8 990	13 490	14 975	22 350	12 530	12 210	12 205	16 365	16 365	8 000
Total	**14 610**	**15 570**	**33 040**	**52 745**	**115 190**	**86 385**	**62 065**	**116 150**	**160 470**	**165 465**	**141 055**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Sweden

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	41 190	2 145	1 245	685	770	670	915	770	615	420	410
Syria	50 890	4 710	5 250	2 635	3 455	1 350	1 815	1 580	945	930	410
Eritrea	6 515	740	1 540	1 000	1 000	825	535	520	415	325	255
Türkiye	220	690	825	440	630	395	480	445	490	360	230
Iran	4 270	935	905	1 115	965	510	255	390	430	265	225
Ukraine	1 335	545	460	510	830	510	410	1 785	430	260	215
Uzbekistan	285	220	280	665	970	725	160	615	695	445	200
Iraq	20 190	2 045	1 475	1 070	855	575	445	405	240	195	170
Colombia	20	120	190	330	490	150	115	545	390	210	150
Pakistan	515	270	230	330	345	195	130	155	130	95	115
Georgia	780	640	1 005	1 055	905	360	225	140	80	40	110
Uganda	95	65	50	80	90	75	30	90	180	140	105
Nigeria	405	300	320	325	305	215	140	240	155	180	105
Mongolia	970	350	335	310	305	375	120	85	100	95	95
Azerbaijan	315	165	235	330	270	125	75	210	180	100	90
Other countries	28 200	8 445	7 880	7 805	8 620	4 745	3 205	5 235	3 485	2 720	2 055
Total	**156 195**	**22 385**	**22 225**	**18 685**	**20 805**	**11 800**	**9 055**	**13 210**	**8 960**	**6 780**	**4 940**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Switzerland

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	7 800	3 185	1 180	1 125	1 350	1 630	2 960	6 940	5 860	5 045	5 345
Eritrea	9 860	5 040	3 155	2 495	2 500	1 635	1 725	1 595	1 880	1 880	3 255
Türkiye	385	475	770	925	1 225	1 130	2 245	4 680	6 635	3 770	2 090
Algeria	285	520	515	710	780	935	960	1 305	1 740	2 020	2 050
Somalia	1 215	1 530	795	510	360	260	395	450	600	715	1 905
Morocco	370	795	420	440	320	370	510	490	1 565	1 245	1 005
Ethiopia	565	1 010	305	190	145	100	175	195	245	430	955
Syria	4 650	2 040	1 810	1 195	945	755	905	1 165	1 340	1 385	870
Iraq	2 285	1 250	545	520	490	270	495	455	415	525	530
Tunisia	285	215	180	245	125	135	170	380	545	630	440
Colombia	10	30	30	55	120	60	75	145	235	240	325
Stateless	385	140	85	110	90	55	70	160	145	155	320
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	150	155	130	90	75	95	70	185	200	265	315
Georgia	365	395	615	805	530	205	335	660	515	365	285
Sri Lanka	1 775	1 315	730	500	475	340	270	285	405	390	270
Other countries	7 735	7 780	5 405	3 620	3 070	1 790	1 935	4 040	4 570	3 690	3 455
Total	**38 120**	**25 875**	**16 670**	**13 535**	**12 600**	**9 765**	**13 295**	**23 130**	**26 895**	**22 750**	**23 415**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Türkiye

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Afghanistan	63 443	34 775	67 352	53 029	35 042	22 606	21 926	19 400	13 068	5 550	3 472
Iraq	55 574	28 763	44 500	19 959	15 532	5 875	4 961	4 083	2 776	1 881	1 463
Iran	11 383	12 115	9 186	6 387	3 558	1 425	1 032	1 140	1 416	784	585
Ukraine	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7 131	713	139	29
Other countries	2 774	1 935	2 332	4 278	2 283	1 429	1 336	1 491	1 042	656	910
Total	**133 590**	**77 851**	**123 597**	**83 818**	**56 415**	**31 335**	**29 255**	**33 245**	**19 015**	**9 010**	**6 459**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United Kingdom

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Pakistan	3 365	3 775	3 195	2 625	2 566	1 525	1 159	2 582	5 273	10 542	10 638
Eritrea	3 755	1 265	1 125	2 210	1 927	2 604	5 019	3 275	3 870	5 053	8 948
Iran	3 715	4 835	3 095	4 005	5 464	4 199	10 446	9 183	7 397	8 099	7 419
Afghanistan	2 850	3 115	1 960	2 105	2 135	1 546	3 088	10 872	9 307	8 508	6 462
Bangladesh	1 320	2 255	2 005	1 465	1 364	876	887	3 468	4 258	7 225	6 247
Sudan	3 020	1 445	1 840	1 785	1 784	2 153	2 385	3 191	3 453	4 833	5 869
India	1 325	2 055	1 820	1 685	1 910	1 046	1 125	3 248	5 253	5 312	5 751
Somalia	435	405	340	335	356	308	725	558	692	1 379	4 777
Nigeria	1 590	1 895	1 665	1 415	1 430	1 015	1 027	1 168	1 263	2 841	2 904
Viet Nam	620	820	1 155	1 280	1 584	982	1 844	990	2 304	5 259	2 428
Brazil	25	40	35	70	202	205	137	651	1 857	2 669	2 416
Iraq	2 650	3 735	3 355	3 660	3 901	3 281	7 721	6 295	3 985	3 469	2 370
Sri Lanka	1 410	1 250	960	620	759	402	329	1 108	2 016	2 862	2 243
Ethiopia	770	360	470	525	327	334	843	844	583	961	2 096
Syria	2 795	1 570	785	920	1 374	1 746	3 895	4 534	3 772	6 680	1 959
Other countries	10 325	9 560	9 575	12 660	17 382	13 803	15 835	37 428	29 132	32 443	28 093
Total	**39 970**	**38 380**	**33 380**	**37 365**	**44 465**	**36 025**	**56 465**	**89 395**	**84 415**	**108 135**	**100 620**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United States

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Venezuela	7 369	18 312	29 926	27 483	25 664	23 530	27 020	138 597	185 344	116 653	141 616
Mexico	19 294	27 879	26 065	20 026	22 525	15 402	12 135	18 850	44 980	53 985	86 001
Haiti	2 220	3 969	8 643	4 112	3 945	7 116	10 038	41 864	75 861	46 629	52 130
Colombia	1 058	1 767	3 204	2 678	3 334	3 852	11 263	32 189	128 129	79 303	50 868
Cuba	135	147	770	1 579	9 155	9 497	12 879	157 226	99 426	13 644	40 348
Guatemala	16 419	25 723	35 318	33 073	51 502	36 490	23 008	39 522	43 073	31 231	39 353
Honduras	14 255	19 470	28 806	24 435	39 466	30 815	19 596	43 190	49 088	35 171	39 035
Ecuador	3 732	4 423	3 884	2 386	2 748	3 378	5 625	21 220	34 005	37 742	37 704
El Salvador	18 883	33 620	49 459	33 391	33 619	23 352	14 913	27 147	24 833	14 719	21 188
Nicaragua	387	518	857	1 527	5 474	3 736	4 724	33 080	90 791	32 062	16 633
Brazil	916	1 454	2 625	2 282	2 798	4 593	4 915	25 334	28 290	16 204	15 946
Peru	509	826	838	616	588	394	517	5 398	44 131	26 452	15 480
India	3 650	6 162	7 435	9 440	10 607	5 599	4 886	21 415	51 353	27 609	10 417
Dominican Rep.	230	362	379	310	314	290	322	961	4 987	4 869	6 373
Russia	1 714	2 158	2 936	1 900	2 595	2 775	3 831	18 197	42 846	13 989	5 104
Other countries	45 205	58 011	60 994	88 916	86 597	79 998	33 188	106 209	228 914	178 843	333 756
Total	**135 976**	**204 801**	**262 139**	**254 154**	**300 931**	**250 817**	**188 860**	**730 399**	**1 176 051**	**729 105** (S1)	**911 952** (partial)

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/pj3a4w.

Metadata related to Tables A.3 and B.3. **Inflows of asylum seekers**

Totals in Table A.3 might differ from the tables by nationality (Tables B.3) because the former totals get rounded to the nearest 0 or 5 for all countries, while the latter are only rounded where the source data is. Data refer to first instance/new applications only and exclude repeat/review/appeal applications.

Comments on countries of asylum:

France: Data include unaccompanied minors.

EU/EEA countries (source Eurostat): Figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of 5.

Other countries (source UNHCR): values between zero and five have been rounded to multiples of five. No data or 0 are indicated with "..".

United States: Statistics are based on official data from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for affirmative claims and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for defensive claims. In 2025, the latter covers the full year, while the former covers January to September 2025 only and is reported by cases instead of individuals. In 2024, only the first semester is covered by EOIR and USCIS data.

Australia: From 2021 on, Australian data are numbers of protection visa lodgements made onshore during the period (reported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs). Prior 2021, Australian data are extracted from the UNHCR database.

Comments on countries of origin:

Serbia (and Kosovo): Data may include asylum seekers from Serbia, Montenegro and/or Former Yugoslavia.

Source for all countries: European countries: Eurostat; other countries: governments, compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data Unit (https://popstats.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/).

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Who is an immigrant?

There are major differences in how immigrants are defined across OECD countries. Some countries have traditionally focused on producing data on foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea), whilst others refer to the foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). This difference in focus relates in part to the nature and history of immigration systems and legislation on citizenship and naturalisation.

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born. For example, where inflows have been declining over time, the stock of the foreign-born will tend to age and represent an increasingly established community.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country. The characteristics of the population of foreign nationals depend on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisations. Both the nature of legislation on citizenship and the incentives to naturalise play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be foreign nationals.

Sources for and problems in measuring the immigrant population

Four types of sources are used: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. In countries which have a population register and in those which use residence permit data, stocks and flows of immigrants are most often calculated using the same source. There are exceptions, however, with some countries using census or labour force survey data to estimate the stock of the immigrant population. In studying stocks and flows, the same problems are encountered whether population register or permit data are used (in particular, the risk of underestimation when minors are registered on the permit of one of the parents or if the migrants are not required to have permits because of a free movement agreement). To this must be added the difficulty of purging the files regularly to remove the records of persons who have left the country.

Census data enable comprehensive, albeit infrequent analysis of the stock of immigrants (censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years). In addition, many labour force surveys now include questions about nationality and place of birth, thus providing a source of annual stock data. The OECD produces estimates of stocks for some countries.

Some care has to be taken with detailed breakdowns of the immigrant population from survey data since sample sizes can be small. Both census and survey data may underestimate the number of immigrants because they can be missed in the census or because they do not live in private households (labour force surveys may not cover those living in collective dwelling such as reception centres and hostels for immigrants). Both these sources may cover a portion of the unauthorised population, which is by definition excluded from population registers and residence permit systems.

Table A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries

Thousands and percentages

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Australia	6 730	6 912	7 139	7 333	7 533	7 653	7 502	7 686	8 187	8 576	8 834
% of total population	28.3	28.6	29.1	29.4	29.8	29.8	29.0	29.5	31.1	32.3	32.9
Austria	1 485	1 595	1 656	1 697	1 729	1 765	1 798	1 842	1 976	2 039	2 085
% of total population	17.3	18.3	18.9	19.2	19.5	19.8	20.1	20.5	21.6	22.3	22.9
Belgium	1 786	1 849	1 881	1 920	1 973	2 056	2 080	2 126	2 249	2 332	2 403
% of total population	15.9	16.3	16.6	16.8	17.2	17.8	18.0	18.3	19.2	19.9	20.4
Canada	7 287	7 541	7 714	7 896	..	..	8 362	..	..	..	
% of total population	20.4	20.9	21.1	21.3	..	..	21.8	..	..	..	..
Chile	465	..	746	..	1 307	1 487	1 535	1 631	1 836	1 919	
% of total population	2.6	..	4.1	..	6.9	7.7	7.9	8.4	9.4	9.7	..
Colombia	145.5	..	..	.	.	1 932.8	..	..	..	3 064	
% of total population	0.3	..	..	..	..	3.8	..	..	..	5.8	..
Costa Rica	412	.	.	.	.	521	..	..	..	628	
% of total population	8.6	..	..	..	..	10.4	..	..	..	12.3	..
Czechia	416	433	465	468	507	534	570	686	991	1 070	1 096
% of total population	4.0	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.8	5.1	5.4	6.5	9.2	9.9	10.3
Denmark	501	541	571	592	608	614	618	641	698	725	753
% of total population	8.9	9.5	9.9	10.2	10.5	10.6	10.6	10.9	11.8	12.2	12.6
Estonia	195	194	193	196	198	199	198	201	235	244	242
% of total population	14.8	14.7	14.6	14.9	15.0	15.0	14.9	15.0	17.2	17.9	17.9
Finland	322	337	358	373	387	404	421	442	477	535	583
% of total population	5.9	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.6	8.0	8.5	9.5	10.4
France	7 847	8 028	8 099	8 200	8 368	8 473	8 549	8 636	8 963	9 362	9 634
% of total population	12.1	12.4	12.4	12.5	12.7	12.9	13.0	13.0	13.5	14.1	14.5
Germany	10 792	11 392	12 609	13 088	13 520	13 754	13 882	13 444	14 564	15 469	16 051
% of total population	13.2	13.8	15.2	15.7	16.2	16.4	16.6	16.0	17.3	18.3	19.0
Greece	1 243	1 220	1 251	1 278	1 307	1 348	1 362	1 198	1 166	1 148	1 142
% of total population	11.4	11.3	11.6	11.9	12.2	12.6	12.7	11.4	11.3	11.3	11.5
Hungary	476	504	514	537	565	594	598	613	649	682	693
% of total population	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.7	7.0	7.2
Iceland	39	42	47	55	61	67	69	72	82	81	85
% of total population	11.9	12.6	13.7	15.7	17.2	18.3	18.7	19.1	21.4	20.7	21.5
Ireland	805	810	845	879	914	948	983	1 017	1 114	1 220	1 275
% of total population	17.2	17.1	17.7	18.2	18.6	19.1	19.6	20.1	21.6	23.3	24.1
Israel	1 817	1 818	1 812	1 811	1 809	1 812	1 797	1 793	1 835	1 804	1 766
% of total population	22.8	22.3	21.9	21.5	21.1	20.8	20.3	19.9	20.0	19.3	18.7
Italy	5 805	5 907	6 054	6 175	6 069	6 161	6 262	6 161	6 417	6 674	6 928
% of total population	9.6	9.8	10.0	10.2	10.1	10.3	10.5	10.3	10.8	11.2	11.7
Latvia	265	259	251	246	242	237	230	224	241	239	216
% of total population	13.4	13.1	12.9	12.7	12.6	12.4	12.1	11.9	12.8	12.7	11.6
Lithuania	136	130	127	131	138	153	165	169	232	268	281
% of total population	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.9	5.5	5.9	6.0	8.2	9.4	9.9
Luxembourg	249	261	271	281	291	302	310	319	334	343	352
% of total population	44.2	45.2	45.8	46.6	47.4	48.2	48.8	49.4	50.5	51.3	52.0
Mexico	1 007	..	..	1 075	..	1 212	..	.	..	1 567	
% of total population	0.8	..	..	0.9	..	1.0	..	..	..	1.2	..
Netherlands	1 996	2 057	2 137	2 216	2 299	2 400	2 451	2 551	2 777	2 915	3 026
% of total population	11.7	12.0	12.4	12.8	13.2	13.6	13.9	14.3	15.4	16.0	16.5

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
New Zealand	..	..	..	1 330	..	..	..	..	1 468	..	
% of total population	..	..	..	27.8	..	..	..	..	28.8	..	..
Norway	742	772	800	822	842	868	878	898	957	1 011	1 046
% of total population	14.4	14.8	15.2	15.5	15.8	16.2	16.3	16.6	17.4	18.2	18.7
Poland	612	626	652	696	761	849	902	951	933	936	940
% of total population	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5
Portugal	1 161	1 170	1 200	1 237	1 307	1 416	1 496	1 568	1 733	1 704	
% of total population	11.2	11.3	11.6	12.0	12.7	13.7	14.4	15.1	16.6	16.3	..
Slovak Republic	178	182	186	190	194	198	202	227	227	228	229
% of total population	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.2
Slovenia	238	241	245	250	265	282	293	295	309	320	330
% of total population	11.5	11.7	11.9	12.1	12.8	13.5	13.9	13.9	14.6	15.1	15.6
Spain	5 891	5 918	6 025	6 199	6 539	6 997	7 215	7 365	8 204	8 838	9 464
% of total population	12.6	12.7	12.9	13.2	13.8	14.7	15.1	15.4	17.1	18.4	19.8
Sweden	1 604	1 676	1 784	1 877	1 956	2 020	2 047	2 091	2 146	2 171	2 200
% of total population	16.5	17.0	17.9	18.5	19.1	19.6	19.7	20.0	20.4	20.5	20.7
Switzerland	2 355	2 416	2 480	2 519	2 553	2 590	2 630	2 672	2 734	2 866	2 939
% of total population	28.6	29.0	29.4	29.7	29.9	30.1	30.3	30.6	30.9	32.2	32.9
Türkiye	1 592	1 777	1 924	2 278	2 669	2 610	3 141	3 243	3 003	2 931	3 016
% of total population	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.4
United Kingdom	8 482	8 988	9 369	9 388	9 482	9 539	9 614	11 457	12 411	13 115	
% of total population	13.0	13.7	14.2	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.3	16.9	18.1	19.0	..
United States	43 290	43 739	44 525	44 729	44 933	44 258	45 273	47 331	49 060	51 227	52 009
% of total population	13.3	13.4	13.5	13.4	13.4	13.1	13.3	13.9	14.3	14.9	15.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.4. The percentage of total population is based on the UN and Eurostat estimates of the total population and may differ from national estimates.

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Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Australia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
United Kingdom	1209.1	1 202.1	1 197.2	1 190.0	1 182.0	1 177.2	1 160.6	1 144.7	1 145.2	1 147.8	1 155.1	49
India	449.0	489.4	538.3	593.3	665.4	724.1	712.0	753.7	846.9	916.0	971.0	46
China	606.7	658.2	706.4	748.2	766.0	746.0	691.9	712.9	778.0	827.7	862.9	55
New Zealand	575.4	568.2	572.3	577.5	582.9	584.5	584.0	586.1	598.5	617.6	637.7	49
Philippines	241.1	252.7	265.3	276.9	294.2	308.4	308.2	320.4	362.9	393.9	412.5	59
Viet Nam	235.6	243.2	251.9	259.7	268.1	275.9	274.8	282.0	299.5	318.8	326.6	56
South Africa	177.4	180.5	185.6	189.7	195.1	200.9	202.7	206.8	215.0	224.3	230.0	50
Nepal	50.2	59.0	73.9	95.0	119.1	132.4	130.3	151.1	179.1	197.3	213.6	46
Sri Lanka	119.7	124.5	128.4	132.2	137.5	142.7	140.1	145.4	158.7	172.9	184.8	48
Malaysia	143.4	152.9	165.0	174.5	177.5	178.8	174.0	176.3	180.6	183.4	184.3	54
Italy	198.5	195.8	190.8	185.3	179.6	174.8	167.6	161.6	159.0	155.9	152.6	49
Pakistan	62.3	69.7	76.6	84.3	91.7	97.1	96.2	103.1	120.6	134.8	143.9	40
Indonesia	77.0	79.0	83.1	86.9	91.0	94.9	92.7	96.8	109.5	120.1	128.1	56
United States	104.7	105.8	108.8	110.1	111.0	113.2	113.5	112.6	115.1	119.3	122.0	52
Korea	106.6	111.6	114.8	116.7	116.4	112.0	107.1	108.9	115.7	119.4	121.7	55
Other countries	2 373.1	2 419.8	2 483.5	2 526.4	2 572.2	2 609.6	2 570.1	2 619.5	2 796.9	2 926.8	2 987.5	
Total	**6 729.7**	**6 912.1**	**7 142.0**	**7 346.5**	**7 549.7**	**7 672.5**	**7 525.9**	**7 681.7**	**8 181.0**	**8 575.9**	**8 834.3**	**56**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Austria

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Germany	215.0	219.9	224.0	227.8	232.2	237.8	244.9	251.6	258.6	265.1	270.5	52
Bosnia and Herzegovina	158.9	162.0	164.3	166.8	168.5	170.5	172.4	174.3	176.7	178.9	179.8	51
Türkiye	160.0	160.2	160.4	160.3	159.7	159.6	159.1	159.1	161.1	165.3	166.8	47
Romania	91.3	98.7	105.6	113.3	121.1	128.8	134.2	138.3	145.0	148.5	148.6	52
Serbia	134.7	137.1	139.1	141.9	143.2	144.4	144.4	143.9	144.3	144.5	144.5	52
Hungary	61.5	67.7	72.4	75.8	79.0	81.9	83.9	85.3	88.9	94.7	98.3	54
Syria	12.3	33.6	41.6	47.0	48.5	49.7	52.3	63.0	73.9	85.6	94.8	37
Ukraine	10.7	11.9	12.7	13.4	14.0	14.8	15.4	16.5	80.4	81.5	88.7	63
Poland	69.9	72.2	73.8	75.1	75.6	76.1	76.6	76.5	77.1	77.5	76.5	52
Croatia	41.7	43.3	44.5	45.2	46.7	48.1	50.6	53.5	56.5	58.6	59.2	51
Slovak Republic	35.5	38.0	40.0	41.5	42.7	43.8	44.9	45.8	47.0	47.9	48.2	62
Afghanistan	20.3	36.6	44.7	44.4	43.1	42.2	42.2	43.0	44.9	47.0	48.2	36
Russia	31.7	33.0	33.9	34.4	34.7	35.2	35.8	36.6	40.5	42.7	43.9	61
Italy	29.3	31.2	32.3	33.3	34.1	35.1	35.9	36.4	37.5	38.2	38.9	45
Bulgaria	21.6	23.8	25.7	27.4	29.2	31.1	32.2	33.0	34.6	35.2	35.0	55
Other countries	390.2	425.4	441.5	449.8	456.2	466.0	472.7	485.7	508.8	527.5	543.1	
Total	**1 484.6**	**1 594.7**	**1 656.3**	**1 697.1**	**1 728.6**	**1 765.3**	**1 797.6**	**1 842.4**	**1 975.9**	**2 038.7**	**2 085.1**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Belgium

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Morocco	208.1	211.2	214.1	217.4	221.0	226.5	229.7	233.6	238.9	244.3	249.0	50
France	182.2	183.7	184.5	184.9	186.1	189.2	191.0	191.9	194.2	196.0	198.1	54
Netherlands	128.5	129.4	129.8	130.0	130.7	131.6	131.8	132.8	134.9	136.3	137.6	50
Romania	65.2	71.7	77.3	83.5	90.9	99.9	104.7	108.0	113.8	117.5	119.7	46
Türkiye	98.3	98.3	98.5	99.1	100.1	102.0	102.6	104.1	107.9	112.8	117.4	47
Italy	120.0	120.1	119.7	119.1	119.1	119.5	118.3	117.1	116.8	116.4	115.8	49
Former USSR	51.8	51.2	51.7	53.1	54.6	58.5	58.2	59.5	85.8	91.4	94.9	61
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	83.6	84.1	84.4	84.9	85.4	86.4	86.7	87.1	87.9	89.0	90.6	55
Germany	81.5	81.1	80.6	80.2	80.2	80.2	79.8	79.6	79.9	80.0	79.9	54
Poland	73.4	75.5	76.3	76.9	77.4	78.2	77.5	76.6	77.3	77.7	76.9	57
Spain	46.0	47.0	47.2	47.9	48.9	50.5	51.7	53.5	55.9	57.9	59.6	53
Syria	10.9	21.3	25.1	30.0	33.1	35.7	36.4	38.7	42.0	46.5	52.1	42
Bulgaria	28.7	31.3	32.9	34.8	36.9	40.4	42.6	44.5	47.0	47.9	48.0	50
Former Yugoslavia	43.1	42.9	42.9	43.1	43.8	46.9	44.9	45.1	45.6	45.8	45.9	50
Afghanistan	12.8	20.4	22.1	22.9	24.2	28.2	30.0	35.4	41.6	43.7	45.9	31
Other countries	551.9	580.0	593.6	612.7	640.8	682.7	694.0	718.2	779.2	828.6	871.1	
Total	**1 786.1**	**1 849.3**	**1 880.8**	**1 920.5**	**1 973.0**	**2 056.4**	**2 079.8**	**2 125.7**	**2 248.6**	**2 331.7**	**2 402.6**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Canada

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
China	..	858.2	..	..	..	..	929.7	..	..	..	..	45
India	..	668.6	..	..	..	..	898.1	..	..	..	..	50
Philippines	..	588.3	..	..	..	..	719.6	..	..	..	..	42
United Kingdom	..	499.1	..	..	..	..	464.1	..	..	..	..	49
United States	..	253.7	..	..	..	..	256.1	..	..	..	..	45
Pakistan	..	202.3	..	..	..	..	234.1	..	..	..	..	51
Italy	..	236.6	..	..	..	..	204.1	..	..	..	..	50
Iran	..	154.4	..	..	..	..	182.9	..	..	..	..	50
Viet Nam	..	169.3	..	..	..	..	182.1	..	..	..	..	45
Jamaica	..	138.3	..	..	..	..	145.4	..	..	..	..	44
Korea	..	123.3	..	..	..	..	138.4	..	..	..	..	46
Sri Lanka	..	132.0	..	..	..	..	136.2	..	..	..	..	49
Poland	..	146.5	..	..	..	..	135.0	..	..	..	..	45
Portugal	..	139.5	..	..	..	..	128.8	..	..	..	..	49
Germany	..	145.8	..	..	..	..	126.5	..	..	..	..	48
Other countries	..	3 085.0	..	..	..	..	3 480.5	..	..	..	..	
Total	**..**	**7 540.8**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**8 361.5**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Chile

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Venezuela	..	..	83.0	..	344.5	470.8	488.4	535.8	683.3	728.6	..	..
Peru	..	..	187.8	..	228.1	236.3	242.9	252.9	257.5	260.8	..	..
Colombia	..	..	105.4	..	153.8	168.3	172.5	187.5	203.1	209.9	..	..
Haiti	..	..	62.7	..	179.9	181.2	183.7	185.4	188.6	188.1	..	..
Bolivia	..	..	73.8	..	110.6	123.5	131.6	143.7	163.9	180.3	..	..
Argentina	..	..	66.5	..	74.1	76.7	78.6	80.3	80.9	83.3	..	..
Ecuador	..	..	27.7	..	37.7	40.3	41.3	44.3	47.6	50.5	..	..
Dominican Republic	..	..	11.9	..	17.9	19.4	19.6	19.8	21.1	22.8	..	..
Cuba	..	..	6.7	..	15.8	18.1	19.5	19.8	19.6	21.3	..	..
Brazil	..	..	14.2	..	17.5	18.6	19.3	20.1	20.8	21.3	..	..
Spain	..	..	16.7	..	18.5	19.0	19.4	19.4	19.5	19.9	..	..
China	..	..	10.1	..	13.4	14.1	14.0	14.3	14.4	15.1	..	..
United States	..	..	12.3	..	14.6	15.1	14.3	14.9	15.1	14.8	..	..
Mexico	..	..	5.8	..	6.9	7.4	7.7	7.8	7.9	8.5	..	..
Germany	..	..	5.7	..	6.3	6.9	6.7	6.8	7.0	7.1	..	..
Other countries	..	..	56.1	..	67.3	71.0	75.2	78.0	85.8	86.4	..	
Total	**465.3**	**..**	**746.4**	**..**	**1 306.9**	**1 486.8**	**1 534.8**	**1 630.8**	**1 836.1**	**1 918.6**	**..**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Colombia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Venezuela	33.1	..	..	..	..	1 796.1	..	..	..	2 904.9	..	51
United States	18.9	..	..	..	..	20.9	..	..	..	22.5	..	44
Ecuador	16.3	..	..	..	..	19.2	..	..	..	21.4	..	49
Spain	11.9	..	..	..	..	16.5	..	..	..	19.5	..	41
Argentina	4.5	..	..	..	..	5.7	..	..	..	6.5	..	38
Mexico	4.3	..	..	..	..	5.5	..	..	..	6.4	..	44
Peru	5.1	..	..	..	..	5.7	..	..	..	6.2	..	38
Chile	3.4	..	..	..	..	4.6	..	..	..	5.4	..	40
Brazil	3.5	..	..	..	..	4.6	..	..	..	5.3	..	50
France	2.6	..	..	..	..	3.2	..	..	..	3.6	..	35
Italy	2.9	..	..	..	..	3.2	..	..	..	3.5	..	33
Panama	2.6	..	..	..	..	3.1	..	..	..	3.5	..	46
Cuba	2.2	..	..	..	..	2.7	..	..	..	3.2	..	38
Germany	2.1	..	..	..	..	2.2	..	..	..	2.2	..	37
Costa Rica	1.4	..	..	..	..	1.8	..	..	..	2.1	..	49
Other countries	30.7	..	..	..	..	37.7	..	..	..	47.3	..	
Total	**145.5**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**1 932.8**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**3 063.5**	**..**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Costa Rica

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Nicaragua	292.2	..	..	..	..	350.9	..	..	..	423.4	..	50
Venezuela	1.4	..	..	..	..	28.2	..	..	..	34.0	..	49
Colombia	21.3	..	..	..	..	25.5	..	..	..	30.8	..	48
El Salvador	13.9	..	..	..	..	16.7	..	..	..	20.1	..	53
United States	12.7	..	..	..	..	15.2	..	..	..	18.4	..	41
Panama	11.4	..	..	..	..	13.7	..	..	..	16.5	..	47
Caribbean	7.6	..	..	..	..	9.1	..	..	..	11.0	..	48
Cuba	5.8	..	..	..	..	6.9	..	..	..	8.3	..	45
Honduras	3.9	..	..	..	..	4.7	..	..	..	5.7	..	54
Peru	3.8	..	..	..	..	4.5	..	..	..	5.5	..	46
China	3.3	..	..	..	..	3.9	..	..	..	4.8	..	45
Mexico	3.1	..	..	..	..	3.7	..	..	..	4.5	..	51
Guatemala	2.7	..	..	..	..	3.2	..	..	..	3.9	..	47
Spain	2.2	..	..	..	..	2.6	..	..	..	3.1	..	42
Italy	2.1	..	..	..	..	2.6	..	..	..	3.1	..	36
Other countries	24.4	..	..	..	..	29.2	..	..	..	35.3	..	
Total	**411.7**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**520.7**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**628.4**	**..**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Czechia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Ukraine	100.7	104.1	110.3	107.5	122.9	136.8	156.6	174.9	463.1	527.3	538.7	54
Slovak Republic	89.3	94.0	98.9	102.4	106.6	110.1	112.7	234.2	232.3	232.5	232.1	53
Russia	32.7	33.7	36.2	33.4	35.1	35.3	39.3	41.5	44.2	42.7	40.6	60
Viet Nam	45.5	45.6	46.6	46.1	47.2	47.7	48.0	35.3	35.7	36.2	37.0	48
Poland	18.8	19.0	19.4	19.7	20.3	20.7	19.6	19.1	18.8	18.9	18.8	63
Moldova	6.8	7.3	8.3	8.3	9.5	10.5	11.4	10.2	11.8	13.0	13.9	41
United States	5.2	5.4	7.7	7.6	7.6	5.6	6.2	8.0	9.4	11.1	12.9	47
Bulgaria	9.3	10.1	11.2	12.6	14.2	15.6	16.2	11.3	11.6	12.2	12.4	37
Romania	5.4	6.1	7.1	8.0	9.1	9.9	10.5	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.3	43
Germany	15.6	16.2	16.8	16.8	16.9	17.1	16.6	10.5	10.2	10.3	10.4	43
Philippines	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.5	2.2	2.6	2.5	4.2	6.5	10.4	35
Kazakhstan	6.6	7.0	7.8	7.1	7.5	7.5	8.4	8.7	9.7	9.9	10.1	55
United Kingdom	4.9	5.1	5.3	5.6	6.0	7.0	7.6	8.9	9.2	9.6	9.9	34
China	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.7	6.2	6.4	6.8	5.3	5.6	6.9	8.5	51
India	1.7	2.0	2.9	3.3	4.0	4.5	5.4	5.1	6.5	7.6	8.5	31
Other countries	68.6	72.2	80.3	82.5	92.4	96.6	102.2	99.1	107.3	113.8	120.0	
Total	**416.5**	**433.3**	**465.1**	**467.6**	**507.1**	**533.6**	**570.1**	**685.8**	**990.8**	**1 069.6**	**1 095.6**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Denmark

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	34.5	37.1	39.1	40.6	41.5	41.5	41.9	44.2	46.9	48.6	48.6	48
Ukraine	7.5	8.1	8.7	9.8	11.1	12.1	12.3	13.4	38.8	40.7	45.3	58
Romania	18.7	21.9	24.3	26.3	28.5	29.4	30.3	34.1	38.2	39.6	39.3	42
Germany	28.7	29.1	29.6	29.8	30.3	30.6	30.9	32.4	35.0	36.8	38.5	52
Türkiye	32.4	32.5	32.6	32.9	33.1	33.1	33.2	33.5	34.1	34.8	35.5	48
Syria	11.6	24.1	33.6	35.4	35.9	35.5	35.7	35.3	34.9	35.0	35.4	45
Iran	14.9	15.6	16.0	16.8	17.1	17.2	17.6	18.0	19.1	20.9	22.9	46
Iraq	21.2	21.2	21.4	21.6	21.9	21.8	21.9	22.0	22.0	22.1	22.1	46
India	7.4	8.5	9.8	10.7	11.8	12.8	12.7	13.7	16.0	17.7	19.0	44
United Kingdom	13.0	13.4	14.1	14.8	15.3	15.5	15.8	16.0	16.2	16.4	16.5	35
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17.3	17.2	17.1	17.1	17.0	16.8	16.6	16.5	16.4	16.3	16.2	51
Pakistan	13.5	13.8	14.0	14.2	14.4	14.5	14.5	14.6	14.8	15.2	15.9	48
Norway	15.1	15.6	15.8	15.8	15.7	15.7	15.6	15.6	15.7	15.7	15.7	64
Sweden	13.4	13.6	13.8	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.6	14.8	15.1	15.3	15.5	60
Afghanistan	12.6	12.8	13.0	13.5	13.8	13.9	13.9	14.0	14.7	14.8	14.8	46
Other countries	239.4	256.0	267.7	278.2	286.1	289.6	290.3	302.7	320.1	335.0	351.7	
Total	**501.1**	**540.5**	**570.6**	**591.7**	**607.6**	**614.4**	**617.8**	**640.9**	**698.0**	**724.7**	**752.9**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Estonia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Russia	129.2	126.2	122.9	120.6	118.1	115.9	113.1	110.2	109.5	107.5	59.8	59
Ukraine	21.8	22.4	22.7	23.2	24.0	25.0	26.4	28.6	59.3	69.7	55.3	53
Belarus	11.1	10.9	10.7	10.6	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.3	10.4	10.2	7.0	48
Finland	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.4	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.6	36
Latvia	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.5	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.7	6.7	5.3	43
Germany	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	42
Kazakhstan	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0	2.7	52
France	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	..	..	1.4	1.3	1.8	33
India	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.0	..	..	1.6	1.8	1.6	33
Azerbaijan	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.6	48
Lithuania	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.6	46
Italy	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.2	..	..	1.3	1.2	1.5	29
United Kingdom	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.4	..	..	1.8	1.8	1.3	19
Moldova	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	..	..	1.7	1.9	1.2	40
Spain	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	..	..	1.0	0.9	1.2	36
Other countries	11.6	12.4	13.2	15.9	17.6	19.4	26.6	28.8	23.4	24.6	90.1	
Total	**194.7**	**193.9**	**192.6**	**196.3**	**198.1**	**199.0**	**198.2**	**200.6**	**234.7**	**244.4**	**241.7**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Finland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Former USSR	54.7	55.6	56.5	56.7	57.1	58.1	59.0	60.6	63.9	74.8	81.8	59
Estonia	42.7	44.5	45.7	46.0	46.2	46.0	46.2	46.9	47.2	47.3	46.7	48
Sweden	31.9	32.0	32.1	32.4	32.7	32.9	33.4	33.7	33.9	34.2	34.5	48
Russia	12.0	12.8	13.7	14.2	14.9	15.7	16.6	17.8	20.5	22.4	23.3	53
Iraq	10.0	10.7	13.8	16.3	17.9	19.0	20.1	20.9	21.7	22.5	23.1	37
Ukraine	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.7	4.5	5.4	16.1	23.0	51
China	9.4	10.0	10.4	10.9	11.4	11.9	12.6	13.5	14.5	16.3	18.0	55
Philippines	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.3	4.8	5.6	6.2	6.9	9.8	13.2	16.8	63
India	5.4	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.8	7.9	8.4	9.4	11.6	14.3	16.4	43
Somalia	10.1	10.6	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	12.4	12.7	13.2	13.7	14.6	49
Viet Nam	6.0	6.6	7.5	8.0	8.5	9.0	9.4	10.1	10.9	12.1	13.7	54
Thailand	9.2	9.7	10.2	10.5	10.9	11.3	11.7	12.0	12.5	13.1	13.6	77
Iran	5.8	6.1	6.8	7.2	7.4	7.9	8.3	8.9	9.8	11.1	12.3	46
Türkiye	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.1	7.5	8.2	8.8	9.2	10.1	11.1	12.2	36
Afghanistan	4.0	4.3	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.3	7.8	8.5	9.3	10.4	10.9	41
Other countries	109.6	116.8	125.4	132.8	139.8	148.1	156.2	166.7	182.7	202.9	222.2	
Total	**322.0**	**337.2**	**357.5**	**372.8**	**387.2**	**404.2**	**420.8**	**442.3**	**476.9**	**535.5**	**583.2**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – France

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Algeria	1376.9	1 383.7	1 386.4	1 390.3	1 386.2	1 397.4	1 416.1	1 388.8	1 400.6	1 429.6	1 438.8	..
Morocco	954.7	967.2	981.2	992.1	1 009.6	1 019.5	1 036.1	1 037.5	1 053.2	1 093.9	1 136.4	..
Portugal	648.1	648.1	644.2	624.2	617.1	602.3	595.8	598.5	601.1	586.3	598.7	..
Tunisia	398.2	403.7	410.7	415.6	427.8	427.0	433.5	447.0	459.4	490.5	500.3	..
Italy	324.0	322.7	322.0	314.9	315.9	311.6	309.0	313.2	309.1	306.4	305.4	..
Spain	286.2	285.2	284.1	275.8	276.7	272.0	271.8	275.3	271.9	275.3	267.6	..
Türkiye	260.8	258.2	257.7	256.7	264.0	257.6	262.4	245.6	258.3	276.6	292.2	..
Germany	208.4	206.4	204.3	198.3	200.3	196.0	195.0	196.1	201.9	199.8	204.7	..
United Kingdom	166.5	165.6	165.0	162.3	168.8	166.8	166.4	167.6	171.3	170.9	171.8	..
Senegal	132.9	137.3	143.6	148.4	156.3	158.9	161.4	171.8	177.2	191.5	203.3	..
Belgium	152.8	154.1	155.6	154.3	155.6	153.7	155.8	160.5	168.9	170.5	183.8	..
Comoros	104.0	108.4	131.4	137.6	143.3	149.7	153.7	161.1	66.6	175.0	183.9	..
Madagascar	132.7	134.8	137.9	140.3	141.3	149.8	151.8	149.0	141.3	157.5	160.7	..
Côte d'Ivoire	109.1	114.6	120.5	127.5	133.7	143.5	145.9	159.4	170.8	188.5	207.9	..
Romania	117.3	124.6	131.9	135.7	136.9	134.5	137.5	143.8	150.1	151.3	152.0	..
Other countries	2 543.2	2 613.7	2 622.5	2 725.6	2 834.9	2 932.9	2 956.7	3 070.8	3 380.6	3 499.8	3 622.0	..
Total	**7 915.8**	**8 028.2**	**8 098.9**	**8 199.7**	**8 368.3**	**8 473.3**	**8 548.9**	**8 686.0**	**8 982.1**	**9 363.2**	**9 629.4**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Germany

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	1253	1 328	1 460	1 548	1 663	1 638	1 456	1 507	1 545	1 543	1 549	54
Türkiye	1 343	1 362	1 321	1 195	1 320	1 340	1 285	1 298	1 310	1 379	1 427	48
Ukraine	214	211	222	251	266	261	258	231	484	866	1 117	60
Russia	936	954	955	1 058	1 077	1 076	958	986	1 020	1 034	1 043	58
Syria	70	141	453	620	711	722	874	779	898	944	985	41
Kazakhstan	725	735	735	910	947	926	833	930	960	961	960	52
Romania	484	545	653	667	777	812	742	774	846	876	864	50
Italy	425	439	506	470	511	525	519	500	486	472	465	40
Bosnia and Herzegovina	157	164	171	263	289	304	334	306	357	369	377	50
Afghanistan	101	111	176	179	209	233	250	243	307	343	366	37
Bulgaria	119	146	214	226	264	269	229	261	281	305	302	53
Iraq	97	104	151	193	233	245	252	251	276	283	284	40
Greece	233	256	281	264	299	295	293	264	253	256	260	46
Croatia	219	254	305	242	277	296	280	281	279	272	255	52
Iran	115	118	129	154	185	187	206	207	232	253	251	45
Other countries	4 301	4 524	4 877	4 848	4 492	4 625	5 113	4 626	5 030	5 313	5 546	
Total	**10 792**	**11 392**	**12 609**	**13 088**	**13 520**	**13 754**	**13 882**	**13 444**	**14 564**	**15 469**	**16 051**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Greece

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
EU countries	345.7	350.1	345.6	344.1	348.7	350.0	330.4	247.9	234.4	234.4	233.6	61
Non-EU countries	897.3	870.3	905.2	933.8	958.8	998.2	1 031.3	950.2	931.8	913.4	908.6	50
Total	**1 242.9**	**1 220.4**	**1 250.9**	**1 277.9**	**1 307.5**	**1 348.2**	**1 361.7**	**1 198.1**	**1 166.2**	**1 147.8**	**1 142.2**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Hungary

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Romania	203.4	208.4	206.3	207.4	207.1	210.4	208.0	207.4	208.2	207.8	207.8	51
Ukraine	42.0	50.2	55.8	61.6	68.5	72.2	71.5	74.5	82.2	82.6	88.0	52
Germany	30.2	31.7	32.4	33.6	34.4	37.9	39.0	42.6	46.3	48.3	51.0	49
Serbia	32.4	34.0	34.7	39.4	42.2	43.0	41.0	41.5	42.3	42.6	42.0	44
China	14.8	18.2	17.5	18.2	17.0	17.8	16.8	16.0	16.6	19.6	22.9	44
United Kingdom	7.9	9.4	11.2	12.9	14.6	16.7	18.0	19.3	20.5	21.3	21.9	46
Slovak Republic	21.1	21.1	21.1	20.9	20.3	20.5	21.3	21.2	21.4	21.2	21.2	59
Former USSR	13.2	13.3	12.7	14.6	23.4	27.6	27.1	28.5	29.2	24.9	20.8	54
Viet Nam	3.3	3.5	3.6	4.1	5.1	6.3	7.4	7.1	7.9	16.2	18.7	41
Austria	9.3	9.9	10.3	10.6	10.8	11.5	13.0	14.0	15.0	15.5	16.2	47
United States	7.8	8.2	8.4	8.7	9.0	9.4	9.1	9.5	9.8	9.9	10.0	47
Former Czechoslovakia	6.2	6.2	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.8	8.6	9.5	9.9	10.0	9.9	57
Philippines	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.1	2.9	8.4	8.9	32
India	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.2	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.9	5.3	7.1	7.7	24
Italy	4.7	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.4	38
Other countries	78.3	83.1	86.6	90.5	97.6	104.9	106.9	110.3	125.3	140.7	139.7	
Total	**476.1**	**504.3**	**514.1**	**536.6**	**565.1**	**594.3**	**597.6**	**612.7**	**649.2**	**682.5**	**693.2**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Iceland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	11.0	12.0	13.8	17.0	19.2	20.5	20.6	20.9	23.1	22.4	23.0	43
Ukraine	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.7	3.7	4.2	56
Lithuania	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.9	3.6	3.8	36
Denmark	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	49
Romania	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.5	3.2	3.0	3.2	30
Philippines	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.8	66
United States	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	50
Sweden	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	51
Latvia	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.2	2.4	33
Germany	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.1	62
Viet Nam	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.8	53
United Kingdom	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.8	40
Venezuela	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.4	1.6	48
Thailand	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	74
Spain	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.4	43
Other countries	11.2	12.1	13.6	16.2	18.5	20.5	19.9	21.9	24.9	24.6	26.3	
Total	**39.2**	**42.0**	**46.5**	**54.6**	**61.4**	**66.8**	**67.4**	**71.8**	**82.2**	**80.7**	**85.0**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Ireland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
United Kingdom	..	277.2	..	..	..	..	..	289.1	..	..	..	..
Poland	..	115.2	..	..	..	..	..	106.1	..	..	..	..
India	..	21.0	..	..	..	..	..	56.6	..	..	..	..
Romania	..	28.7	..	..	..	..	..	42.5	..	..	..	..
Brazil	..	15.8	..	..	..	..	..	39.6	..	..	..	..
Lithuania	..	33.3	..	..	..	..	..	34.2	..	..	..	..
United States	..	28.7	..	..	..	..	..	34.2	..	..	..	..
Nigeria	..	16.6	..	..	..	..	..	20.6	..	..	..	..
Latvia	..	19.0	..	..	..	..	..	20.3	..	..	..	..
Philippines	..	14.7	..	..	..	..	..	19.8	..	..	..	..
China	..	12.9	..	..	..	..	..	18.5	..	..	..	..
Spain	..	11.8	..	..	..	..	..	18.4	..	..	..	..
Moldova	..	6.5	..	..	..	..	..	16.2	..	..	..	..
South Africa	..	8.1	..	..	..	..	..	15.9	..	..	..	..
Italy	..	10.9	..	..	..	..	..	15.7	..	..	..	..
Other countries	..	190.1	..	..	..	..	..	269.7	..	..	..	
Total	**805**	**810**	**845**	**879**	**914**	**948**	**983**	**1 017**	**1 114**	**1 220**	**1 275**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Israel

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Former USSR	859.4	863.1	867.1	873.3	882.2	895.6	891.0	886.7	942.9	902.1	903.4	56
Morocco	143.1	140.9	138.8	136.1	133.2	130.3	126.9	123.8	120.5	119.4	115.7	54
United States	90.5	92.6	94.6	96.9	98.8	101.4	103.5	103.4	109.1	110.0	111.1	52
Ethiopia	85.6	85.7	85.5	87.0	86.9	87.5	88.6	90.6	92.1	93.6	93.4	51
France	51.1	57.0	60.1	62.6	64.0	65.3	66.5	68.8	69.8	67.8	68.0	54
Romania	80.8	77.8	74.8	71.8	68.8	66.0	63.2	60.6	57.8	55.5	52.7	56
Iran	46.0	45.2	44.4	43.5	42.7	41.8	40.9	40.0	39.1	39.0	37.7	52
Iraq	54.9	53.0	51.1	49.3	47.4	45.4	43.4	41.3	39.1	37.9	35.9	55
Argentina	36.0	35.6	35.4	35.1	34.8	34.9	35.1	35.5	35.8	35.5	34.8	53
United Kingdom	23.5	24.0	24.4	24.6	24.8	25.2	25.3	26.1	26.0	25.9	25.9	52
Tunisia	28.6	28.3	27.7	27.1	26.4	25.6	24.9	24.4	23.8	23.1	22.1	56
Poland	39.7	37.2	34.8	32.6	30.5	28.6	26.8	25.1	23.3	22.8	21.1	58
India	18.0	18.0	17.8	17.9	18.1	17.9	17.8	18.1	17.8	17.7	17.2	53
Türkiye	22.8	22.1	21.6	21.2	20.6	20.0	19.2	18.5	17.8	17.4	16.5	54
Yemen	22.5	21.6	22.7	21.7	20.9	19.9	18.9	16.4	15.5	16.3	15.2	58
Other countries	214.6	215.5	211.7	210.6	208.9	207.0	205.5	213.7	204.8	219.5	194.7	
Total	**1 817.0**	**1 817.5**	**1 812.4**	**1 811.2**	**1 808.9**	**1 812.2**	**1 797.3**	**1 792.9**	**1 835.3**	**1 803.5**	**1 765.7**	**55**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Italy

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Romania	1016.0	1 024.1	1 036.0	1 033.0	984.5	979.1	913.2	901.0	902.3	898.3	886.9	59
Albania	446.6	449.7	458.2	467.9	463.0	478.3	505.3	507.8	534.1	557.1	578.4	49
Morocco	424.1	428.9	434.5	437.8	432.4	442.4	457.0	456.0	472.6	489.0	508.0	45
Ukraine	222.9	231.6	237.6	240.9	239.4	40.9	44.2	43.7	56.9	297.0	315.7	75
China	200.4	212.2	220.1	223.7	218.3	222.4	259.1	228.6	235.0	236.9	238.0	51
Moldova	171.3	176.2	182.2	188.5	40.4	43.9	49.0	49.9	53.6	216.2	219.4	66
Bangladesh	105.5	111.3	119.5	128.5	125.9	129.5	146.7	148.4	165.9	188.2	214.2	23
Germany	214.3	211.6	210.4	209.0	205.5	204.7	198.3	198.3	201.0	203.9	206.0	56
India	139.1	149.5	155.6	157.8	154.4	160.6	172.0	170.2	180.4	190.3	200.1	42
Switzerland	194.0	192.8	192.1	191.7	190.4	190.1	187.3	187.7	187.9	188.2	188.5	54
Egypt	108.9	112.8	117.7	121.8	120.9	127.5	137.3	138.8	150.4	170.0	188.4	30
Pakistan	89.5	97.8	108.9	116.7	117.9	121.5	135.0	134.8	146.7	162.4	178.2	24
Peru	113.2	112.9	113.0	113.7	110.4	112.0	117.3	117.0	125.5	135.8	150.5	61
Brazil	100.0	104.8	111.8	121.8	129.4	140.7	128.9	121.0	133.4	141.1	149.4	62
Philippines	143.2	145.5	147.8	148.5	140.8	141.6	149.0	144.3	146.5	147.3	147.5	60
Other countries	2 116.3	2 145.7	2 208.5	2 274.0	2 395.4	2 626.3	2 662.7	2 613.3	2 725.1	2 451.8	2 558.9	
Total	**5 805.3**	**5 907.5**	**6 054.0**	**6 175.3**	**6 069.0**	**6 161.4**	**6 262.2**	**6 161.0**	**6 417.2**	**6 673.6**	**6 928.0**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Latvia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Russia	136.4	131.8	126.9	122.4	117.8	113.8	109.5	104.8	101.5	97.6	92.8	64
Ukraine	34.1	34.0	33.0	32.5	32.6	32.4	31.7	31.4	51.9	52.7	43.0	59
Belarus	48.6	47.2	45.5	43.9	42.6	41.3	39.8	38.5	37.1	35.9	34.2	68
Lithuania	16.7	16.1	15.4	14.9	14.3	13.9	13.4	12.8	12.2	11.8	11.7	64
United Kingdom	2.2	2.6	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.8	5.3	47
Kazakhstan	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.1	58
Estonia	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	55
Germany	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	54
Uzbekistan	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.2	3.4	2.1	50
Azerbaijan	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	43
Moldova	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.5	54
India	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.6	1.5	31
Ireland	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	47
Georgia	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	48
Kyrgyzstan	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	60
Other countries	7.4	7.4	7.7	8.3	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.5	11.4	12.4	8.6	
Total	**265.4**	**258.9**	**251.5**	**246.0**	**241.8**	**237.0**	**230.1**	**223.6**	**241.1**	**238.6**	**215.6**	**62**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Lithuania

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Belarus	33.6	31.1	30.0	30.8	32.2	36.0	39.6	41.5	53.9	65.9	64.1	40
Russia	58.5	54.9	52.3	50.5	49.1	48.3	47.2	60.9	63.2	63.6	62.1	58
Ukraine	12.3	11.3	12.4	15.4	19.6	25.7	30.6	17.9	58.8	60.6	61.9	54
United Kingdom	4.3	5.2	5.0	5.4	6.3	8.0	9.1	11.2	12.1	13.0	13.9	49
Uzbekistan	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.5	2.2	6.5	8.5	9
Kazakhstan	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.5	6.1	6.7	8.1	8.5	43
Latvia	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.5	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.1	56
Tajikistan	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.2	4.3	5.9	4
India	0.0	..	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.4	2.7	5.3	9
Kyrgyzstan	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.9	4.7	5.0	8
Azerbaijan	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.6	3.1	4.3	13
Norway	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.1	3.4	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.6	50
Ireland	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	50
Germany	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.6	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	46
Georgia	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.8	1.8	27
Other countries	9.4	9.3	9.9	10.8	12.1	14.0	15.9	11.9	13.6	18.0	23.1	
Total	**136.0**	**129.7**	**127.4**	**131.0**	**138.2**	**152.6**	**165.2**	**168.8**	**231.8**	**268.3**	**281.0**	**44**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Portugal	..	..	72.5	72.8	73.2	73.3	73.1	72.9	72.4	72.1	71.7	48
France	..	..	39.0	40.6	41.9	43.2	44.0	44.8	45.0	45.6	46.0	47
Italy	..	..	17.0	17.7	18.4	19.0	19.3	19.8	20.3	20.8	21.1	42
Belgium	..	..	20.5	20.8	21.0	21.3	21.4	21.3	21.2	21.2	21.0	45
Germany	..	..	16.5	16.5	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.7	52
Cape Verde	..	..	6.4	6.6	6.9	7.4	7.7	8.2	8.7	9.2	9.7	53
Spain	..	..	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.6	7.1	7.5	7.7	48
Brazil	..	..	2.9	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.6	5.2	5.8	6.4	7.0	58
Romania	..	..	4.2	4.6	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.6	58
Ukraine	..	..	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	5.7	5.9	6.3	65
India	..	..	1.8	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.6	4.3	5.2	5.7	6.2	47
United Kingdom	..	..	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.8	44
Poland	..	..	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.7	58
China	..	..	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.9	5.1	5.4	5.4	56
Russia	..	..	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.3	4.0	4.3	4.6	63
Other countries	..	..	68.6	72.8	77.4	83.1	86.8	91.9	98.7	104.8	110.4	
Total	**248.9**	**260.6**	**270.7**	**280.8**	**291.2**	**302.2**	**309.6**	**319.0**	**333.6**	**343.5**	**352.0**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Mexico

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
United States	739.2			799.1		797.2	..	..	..	..	..	..
Guatemala	42.9			32.4		56.8	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	15.7			24.4		52.9	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colombia	18.7			27.9		36.2	..	..	..	..	..	..
Venezuela	14.5			18.4		35.4	..	..	..	..	..	..
Argentina	12.8			18.2		26.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
Honduras	22.6			19.7		20.8	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cuba	10.6			13.6		19.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
El Salvador	14.7			10.5		18.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Canada	9.8			14.8		12.4	..	..	..	..	..	..
China	8.9			4.6		10.5	..	..	..	..	..	..
France	8.6			14.2		9.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	5.8			7.5		8.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Germany	5.4			4.1		8.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Brazil	6.4			5.7		6.9	..	..	..	..	..	..
Other countries	70.3	..	..	59.6	..	92.2	..	..	..	..	..	
Total	**1 007.1**	..	..	**1 074.8**	..	**1 212.3**	..	..	..	**1 566.9**	..	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Netherlands

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Türkiye	192.7	191.0	190.8	192.0	194.3	198.0	200.0	205.0	215.7	225.5	234.4	48
Poland	108.5	117.9	126.6	135.6	145.2	155.2	164.2	173.5	183.0	189.4	191.3	52
Suriname	181.0	179.5	178.6	178.2	178.3	178.8	178.4	177.9	177.9	178.7	179.8	56
Morocco	168.6	168.5	168.7	169.2	170.5	172.2	172.7	173.4	175.3	176.3	177.3	50
Syria	17.9	38.5	65.9	81.8	86.7	91.9	97.4	108.4	124.5	142.3	166.0	40
Ukraine	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.6	14.0	15.0	97.7	114.6	127.7	61
Germany	119.1	118.6	118.8	119.5	120.6	122.0	122.5	124.0	124.6	124.6	123.0	58
Indonesia	126.4	123.5	120.8	117.9	115.1	112.5	108.8	106.1	103.8	101.5	98.7	58
China	62.5	64.4	66.0	68.3	71.0	74.1	73.5	75.6	78.5	92.1	95.2	57
India	24.3	27.0	30.6	35.3	41.2	48.2	49.2	55.1	65.9	73.7	77.6	46
Belgium	54.0	55.3	56.9	58.6	60.2	61.8	63.5	64.9	65.9	66.9	67.3	53
United Kingdom	49.1	50.2	51.7	53.4	55.8	59.0	61.1	60.9	60.9	61.3	61.4	45
Romania	16.4	18.0	20.2	23.7	28.0	32.7	36.0	40.8	46.8	50.5	54.2	48
Bulgaria	20.1	21.9	23.7	26.4	29.9	34.7	38.8	43.5	49.0	52.7	53.6	49
Iraq	40.7	40.9	43.1	43.9	44.8	45.4	45.9	46.4	47.3	48.3	50.9	44
Other countries	813.6	839.6	872.7	909.5	954.2	1 009.8	1 025.1	1 080.2	1 160.1	1 216.5	1 267.2	
Total	**1 996.3**	**2 056.5**	**2 137.2**	**2 215.9**	**2 298.7**	**2 399.8**	**2 451.2**	**2 550.8**	**2 777.0**	**2 914.9**	**3 025.7**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – New Zealand

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2023 (%)
United Kingdom	..	..	..	264.2	..	..	..	..	254.2	..	..	49
China	..	..	..	144.2	..	..	..	..	159.0	..	..	54
India	..	..	..	117.3	..	..	..	..	142.9	..	..	45
Philippines	..	..	..	67.6	..	..	..	..	99.3	..	..	49
South Africa	..	..	..	71.4	..	..	..	..	95.6	..	..	51
Australia	..	..	..	75.8	..	..	..	..	86.4	..	..	52
Fiji	..	..	..	62.3	..	..	..	..	68.8	..	..	51
Samoa	..	..	..	55.5	..	..	..	..	61.5	..	..	49
United States	..	..	..	28.6	..	..	..	..	32.8	..	..	54
Korea	..	..	..	31.0	..	..	..	..	31.7	..	..	54
Tonga	..	..	..	26.9	..	..	..	..	29.3	..	..	47
Malaysia	..	..	..	19.9	..	..	..	..	22.5	..	..	54
Sri Lanka	..	..	..	14.3	..	..	..	..	19.5	..	..	47
Netherlands	..	..	..	19.4	..	..	..	..	17.5	..	..	50
Germany	..	..	..	16.6	..	..	..	..	16.3	..	..	57
Other countries	..	..	..	314.6	..	..	..	..	330.9	..	..	
Total	**..**	**..**	**..**	**1 329.6**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**1 468.2**	**..**	**..**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Norway

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	91.2	96.1	97.6	98.6	99.1	101.5	102.5	105.9	107.8	110.0	111.8	38
Ukraine	4.2	4.6	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.2	6.4	6.7	37.0	65.7	79.8	57
Sweden	49.2	49.1	48.3	47.9	47.7	47.7	47.8	48.2	48.5	49.0	49.6	49
Lithuania	35.9	37.4	37.7	38.4	39.4	40.7	41.4	42.1	42.5	42.8	43.1	42
Syria	5.5	9.7	20.8	27.4	30.8	32.0	32.8	34.4	36.2	38.7	40.8	42
Germany	28.2	28.2	28.0	27.8	28.0	28.4	28.7	29.4	29.9	30.4	30.9	49
Somalia	27.0	28.3	28.7	28.8	28.7	28.6	28.4	28.1	27.8	27.7	27.7	47
Philippines	20.6	21.4	22.2	23.1	24.1	25.1	25.0	24.8	26.0	26.8	27.4	75
Eritrea	14.8	17.7	20.1	21.9	22.7	23.2	23.6	24.5	24.8	25.3	25.6	44
Thailand	18.0	18.9	20.1	21.1	22.0	22.8	23.3	23.6	24.2	24.6	24.9	81
Pakistan	19.4	19.7	20.1	20.6	20.9	21.3	21.6	22.2	23.0	23.9	24.6	48
Denmark	25.3	25.1	24.8	24.6	24.5	24.4	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.2	24.0	47
Iraq	22.2	22.2	22.5	23.1	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.4	23.6	23.8	45
Russia	17.2	17.5	17.7	17.9	18.3	18.7	18.9	19.0	20.7	22.2	22.8	66
United Kingdom	19.3	19.5	19.4	19.4	19.7	20.3	20.8	21.4	21.7	22.2	22.6	38
Other countries	343.7	357.0	366.9	376.5	387.0	403.5	409.3	420.5	439.0	454.1	466.3	
Total	**741.8**	**772.5**	**799.8**	**822.4**	**841.6**	**867.8**	**878.2**	**898.2**	**956.8**	**1 011.2**	**1 045.7**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Poland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
EU countries	219.0	216.3	220.9	247.2	277.1	311.8	225.1	227.1	231.5	236.0	239.5	53
Non-EU countries	392.9	410.1	431.0	448.7	483.7	537.5	710.6	704.0	701.7	699.9	700.7	53
Total	**611.9**	**626.4**	**651.8**	**695.9**	**760.8**	**849.3**	**935.7**	**931.2**	**933.1**	**935.9**	**940.3**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Portugal

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Brazil	..	..	..	..	..	..	271.2	..	..	..	..	56
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	157.0	..	..	..	..	56
France	..	..	..	..	..	..	103.3	..	..	..	..	54
Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	65.3	..	..	..	..	55
Cape Verde	..	..	..	..	..	..	55.3	..	..	..	..	56
Venezuela	..	..	..	..	..	..	41.0	..	..	..	..	56
Ukraine	..	..	..	..	..	..	33.6	..	..	..	..	54
United Kingdom	..	..	..	..	..	..	32.0	..	..	..	..	48
Germany	..	..	..	..	..	..	28.2	..	..	..	..	52
Guinea-Bissau	..	..	..	..	..	..	26.1	..	..	..	..	49
Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	20.9	..	..	..	..	49
Sao Tome and Principe	..	..	..	..	..	..	20.4	..	..	..	..	58
Spain	..	..	..	..	..	..	18.2	..	..	..	..	55
India	..	..	..	..	..	..	17.4	..	..	..	..	28
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	14.6	..	..	..	..	52
Other countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	184.6	..	..	..	..	
Total	**958.7**	**980.4**	**1 002.1**	**1 023.9**	**1 045.6**	**1 067.3**	**1 089.0**	**1 105.4**	**1 222.0**	**..**	**..**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Czechia	88.0	87.8	88.0	88.0	88.1	88.2	88.2	106.4	104.9	103.8	102.5	55
United Kingdom	5.5	6.3	7.2	8.1	9.1	10.2	11.0	14.4	14.8	15.3	15.8	47
Ukraine	10.1	10.5	10.7	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	13.2	13.3	13.6	14.7	54
Hungary	17.1	16.8	16.6	16.3	16.1	15.8	15.7	13.1	12.6	12.4	12.1	51
Austria	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.9	6.1	6.3	6.4	47
Germany	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.5	6.9	5.5	5.8	6.0	6.3	45
Romania	8.3	8.7	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.7	9.8	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	41
Poland	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	56
Serbia	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.4	36
Italy	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	33
United States	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	47
Russia	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	59
Viet Nam	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.3	40
Ireland	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	49
China	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	45
Other countries	19.9	21.3	22.8	24.0	25.1	26.1	27.2	37.2	37.5	37.8	38.3	
Total	**177.6**	**181.6**	**186.2**	**190.3**	**194.4**	**198.4**	**201.9**	**227.3**	**227.0**	**227.5**	**229.1**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovenia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	100.9	102.8	104.7	107.7	116.4	126.4	132.6	133.8	138.5	143.6	146.8	38
Croatia	47.0	46.1	45.6	45.0	44.4	43.9	43.3	42.0	40.9	40.1	39.4	53
Serbia	27.1	24.3	24.6	25.4	27.4	29.5	30.2	29.7	30.2	31.0	32.3	40
North Macedonia	15.6	15.9	16.5	17.1	18.2	19.3	19.8	19.9	20.7	21.6	22.9	43
Ukraine	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0	8.7	9.0	10.3	62
Germany	7.6	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.8	49
Russia	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.9	5.9	6.8	55
Italy	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.0	40
Montenegro	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	47
Austria	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	50
China	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	46
Türkiye	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.1	19
Switzerland	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	45
India	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.1	15
United States	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	45
Other countries	23.4	27.7	28.4	29.1	31.5	34.8	37.7	39.4	42.8	45.5	47.2	
Total	**237.6**	**241.2**	**245.4**	**250.2**	**265.1**	**281.6**	**292.8**	**294.5**	**309.3**	**319.9**	**329.5**	**43**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Spain

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Morocco	699.9	696.8	699.5	713.8	752.2	803.8	930.2	960.0	1 026.4	1 092.9	1 166.0	41
Colombia	347.5	347.2	361.5	386.1	431.1	499.2	532.3	564.2	715.7	856.6	978.0	56
Venezuela	160.5	174.0	199.4	245.0	311.8	383.5	412.0	441.0	518.9	599.8	692.3	54
Romania	646.2	627.8	611.9	595.7	587.1	579.3	565.7	547.0	538.7	532.5	521.2	53
Ecuador	416.4	409.4	408.2	408.7	411.9	418.9	415.9	419.0	430.8	448.6	468.8	54
Argentina	251.8	252.1	255.5	261.0	272.8	296.0	302.6	327.5	373.1	416.0	450.9	50
Peru	184.8	185.8	190.5	200.5	216.8	241.5	249.6	264.1	322.4	378.9	430.3	56
Cuba	131.1	134.8	139.0	145.0	155.4	169.8	166.1	176.8	198.6	223.5	252.3	54
Honduras	41.3	47.4	56.8	73.4	95.2	121.4	140.3	149.8	177.6	201.3	220.6	67
France	203.7	204.4	205.7	207.9	211.9	216.1	209.5	212.2	215.3	217.2	219.8	51
Ukraine	81.6	88.3	92.5	96.8	101.8	106.9	111.6	113.2	197.2	215.7	209.6	59
China	155.7	158.7	161.9	165.9	171.5	176.7	190.8	189.7	192.3	198.8	209.3	54
Dominican Republic	156.9	159.7	164.3	170.5	176.9	183.7	185.2	187.7	193.7	201.2	207.1	59
Bolivia	150.7	148.3	148.6	150.2	153.1	156.6	176.8	178.7	183.7	189.3	193.3	59
Brazil	99.2	101.5	107.7	115.5	127.6	140.7	153.9	153.5	167.3	179.0	189.7	61
Other countries	2 163.9	2 182.0	2 221.6	2 262.8	2 361.8	2 502.7	2 512.3	2 583.9	2 752.5	2 886.9	3 055.1	
Total	**5 891.2**	**5 918.3**	**6 024.5**	**6 198.8**	**6 539.0**	**6 996.8**	**7 254.8**	**7 468.1**	**8 204.2**	**8 838.2**	**9 464.2**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Sweden

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Syria	67.7	98.2	149.4	172.3	186.0	191.5	193.6	196.1	197.8	197.2	196.2	45
Iraq	130.2	131.9	135.1	140.8	144.0	146.0	146.4	146.8	146.8	145.6	143.2	46
Finland	158.5	156.0	153.6	150.9	147.9	144.6	140.3	136.6	133.1	129.4	125.9	61
Poland	81.7	85.5	88.7	91.2	92.8	93.7	93.8	95.1	98.4	100.7	100.1	51
Iran	68.4	69.1	70.6	74.1	77.4	80.1	81.3	83.1	85.5	86.8	87.1	48
Afghanistan	28.4	31.3	34.8	44.0	52.0	58.8	60.9	62.8	65.7	67.7	68.2	37
Somalia	57.9	60.6	63.9	66.4	68.7	70.2	70.2	70.1	69.5	68.3	66.8	50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	57.3	57.7	58.2	58.9	59.4	60.0	60.2	60.2	60.3	60.0	59.3	51
India	21.9	23.2	25.7	29.7	35.2	40.6	42.8	47.4	54.0	58.1	59.3	48
Germany	49.4	49.6	50.2	50.9	51.1	51.4	51.4	53.0	55.6	57.0	57.9	52
Türkiye	46.1	46.4	47.1	48.3	49.9	51.7	52.6	54.0	56.0	56.9	57.4	46
Eritrea	21.8	28.6	35.1	39.1	42.3	45.7	47.2	48.3	49.2	49.6	49.7	46
Thailand	38.1	38.8	39.9	41.2	42.4	43.6	44.3	45.1	45.6	45.9	45.9	79
Ukraine	6.8	7.3	7.9	8.8	9.9	11.1	11.9	12.9	13.9	14.3	41.8	59
Norway	42.3	42.1	42.1	42.0	41.7	41.6	41.1	40.6	40.3	40.0	39.4	54
Other countries	726.9	749.9	782.2	818.5	854.8	889.1	908.8	938.5	974.1	993.1	1 002.2	
Total	**1 603.6**	**1 676.3**	**1 784.5**	**1 877.1**	**1 955.6**	**2 019.7**	**2 046.7**	**2 090.5**	**2 145.7**	**2 170.6**	**2 200.2**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Switzerland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Germany	348.1	350.5	352.2	353.4	355.3	357.4	360.5	364.5	371.1	379.6	387.0	50
Italy	258.3	263.3	267.3	267.9	268.8	268.9	270.0	271.1	272.7	275.2	276.8	44
Portugal	218.7	222.3	223.1	220.9	217.7	214.1	210.7	207.3	203.8	203.7	203.9	46
France	153.1	158.6	162.5	166.3	169.4	172.8	178.5	183.3	188.6	196.1	203.7	48
Türkiye	78.2	78.7	79.2	79.8	80.4	81.6	82.8	84.5	87.3	92.4	97.1	47
North Macedonia	59.2	61.4	64.3	66.9	69.3	72.3	74.8	77.4	80.3	83.2	85.1	48
Spain	67.1	68.9	69.4	68.9	68.6	68.3	69.0	69.9	71.0	72.3	73.9	49
Ukraine	8.6	9.3	9.8	10.1	10.6	11.2	11.8	12.5	13.6	61.1	69.6	65
Serbia	63.4	64.6	65.3	65.7	65.9	66.8	67.2	67.4	67.6	67.8	67.5	52
Austria	60.0	60.1	59.8	59.6	59.2	58.8	58.5	58.2	58.2	58.4	58.3	57
Bosnia and Herzegovina	55.4	56.4	56.9	57.1	57.4	57.7	57.8	57.7	58.1	58.2	58.0	53
Poland	31.6	34.7	36.7	38.7	40.8	42.9	44.8	46.9	50.6	54.8	57.1	51
Brazil	36.6	37.8	39.1	40.9	42.5	44.0	45.4	46.8	48.5	50.6	52.5	67
United Kingdom	45.2	45.2	45.0	45.3	45.7	46.3	47.4	47.6	47.4	47.5	47.6	46
United States	36.3	36.6	37.0	37.6	38.6	39.0	40.0	40.9	41.7	42.3	42.8	52
Other countries	835.2	868.0	912.4	939.9	963.2	987.8	1 011.2	1 036.6	1 073.4	1 122.9	1 158.3	
Total	**2 354.8**	**2 416.4**	**2 480.0**	**2 519.1**	**2 553.4**	**2 590.0**	**2 630.4**	**2 672.4**	**2 733.9**	**2 865.9**	**2 939.2**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Türkiye

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Bulgaria	378.7	374.0	366.2	362.7	361.9	365.1	358.5	351.7	344.6	336.9	336.7	55
Germany	263.3	272.7	277.9	281.9	292.4	316.6	330.3	337.2	333.7	336.3	341.3	52
Syria	76.4	98.1	109.4	163.8	217.9	225.4	276.9	304.1	293.2	286.6	288.3	49
Iraq	97.5	146.1	199.7	283.8	313.8	285.7	327.9	284.9	229.3	191.5	163.3	50
Afghanistan	38.7	59.3	78.7	115.2	142.4	153.9	180.5	186.3	167.4	146.0	142.1	42
Iran	36.2	47.5	53.8	80.2	108.5	89.4	155.0	151.3	139.0	134.4	132.0	53
Azerbaijan	52.8	64.2	71.2	85.3	97.8	85.0	107.1	110.2	113.9	124.7	140.3	59
Turkmenistan	24.9	30.3	45.2	71.2	136.9	97.3	130.3	123.6	118.2	122.3	179.0	54
Russia	34.5	37.8	37.4	47.2	57.0	64.3	86.8	161.5	126.9	116.8	113.6	59
Uzbekistan	36.1	43.7	52.1	63.2	78.0	72.7	109.9	106.0	101.6	107.5	114.7	61
Kazakhstan	21.5	23.1	21.6	29.5	36.2	41.1	58.8	67.9	67.9	69.1	69.1	59
Saudi Arabia	14.6	17.3	25.6	41.3	53.2	49.8	55.7	58.9	55.3	54.1	53.5	47
Ukraine	20.5	23.4	23.9	26.0	29.8	29.0	35.9	63.8	55.3	51.4	52.7	73
France	28.5	33.3	35.3	33.9	37.5	39.5	46.0	46.4	40.7	40.9	42.5	52
Kyrgyzstan	17.2	20.6	23.0	26.7	32.7	29.2	39.5	39.4	38.4	40.5	43.1	67
Other countries	450.9	486.1	502.9	566.8	672.4	666.0	842.5	849.4	777.9	771.7	803.8	
Total	**1 592.4**	**1 777.3**	**1 923.9**	**2 278.5**	**2 668.6**	**2 610.0**	**3 141.4**	**3 242.7**	**3 003.2**	**2 930.8**	**3 015.9**	**54**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	784	807	809	862	837	847	896	..	..	..	..	49
Poland	783	883	907	889	827	746	682	..	..	..	..	56
Pakistan	510	525	523	529	533	519	456	..	..	..	..	46
Ireland	372	391	398	380	358	364	412	..	..	..	..	55
Germany	252	299	299	309	305	310	347	..	..	..	..	56
Romania	220	264	340	410	434	370	329	..	..	..	..	48
Nigeria	206	212	190	205	207	219	312	..	..	..	..	53
South Africa	178	200	245	235	255	229	298	..	..	..	..	52
Italy	168	188	220	237	246	240	280	..	..	..	..	47
China	114	209	226	210	198	211	245	..	..	..	..	56
Bangladesh	198	220	247	259	259	251	223	..	..	..	..	45
United States	158	179	163	159	174	168	196	..	..	..	..	57
Portugal	141	141	142	132	149	175	170	..	..	..	..	51
France	174	146	164	178	183	169	169	..	..	..	..	54
Australia	131	131	135	142	145	155	165	..	..	..	..	50
Other countries	4 093	4 193	4 361	4 252	4 372	4 566	4 434	..	..	..	..	
Total	**8 482**	**8 988**	**9 369**	**9 388**	**9 482**	**9 539**	**9 614**	**11 457**	**12 411**	**13 115**	**..**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United States

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Mexico	11643.3	11 573.7	11 269.9	11 171.9	10 931.9	11 295.3	11 780.9	11 969.8	11 808.6	12 383.9	11 878.1	48
India	2 389.6	2 434.5	2 610.5	2 652.9	2 688.1	3 075.1	3 020.6	2 982.1	3 400.7	3 646.8	3 935.8	47
China	2 298.8	2 342.6	2 452.5	2 455.2	2 481.7	2 135.5	2 148.3	2 379.3	2 374.2	2 297.2	2 491.4	54
Philippines	1 982.4	1 941.7	2 008.1	2 013.8	2 045.2	1 704.0	1 747.2	1 822.4	1 946.8	1 846.2	2 008.9	61
Cuba	1 210.7	1 271.6	1 311.8	1 344.0	1 360.0	1 430.0	1 465.9	1 584.0	1 618.5	1 727.4	1 806.2	50
Guatemala	927.6	935.7	958.8	1 007.0	1 111.5	1 082.1	1 136.7	1 178.4	1 425.1	1 583.9	1 486.5	45
Dominican Republic	1 063.2	1 085.3	1 162.6	1 177.9	1 169.4	1 244.8	1 248.0	1 347.7	1 311.8	1 333.6	1 486.2	56
El Salvador	1 352.4	1 387.0	1 401.8	1 419.3	1 412.1	1 484.3	1 424.9	1 347.5	1 484.2	1 436.2	1 466.3	49
Viet Nam	1 300.5	1 352.8	1 342.6	1 345.8	1 383.8	1 187.9	1 252.4	1 295.4	1 307.1	1 269.3	1 271.7	57
Colombia	699.4	704.6	783.0	789.6	808.1	803.0	864.3	920.2	1 043.2	1 168.9	1 228.2	54
Venezuela	255.5	290.2	351.1	393.8	465.2	527.8	582.6	668.1	839.8	1 133.6	1 204.2	48
Honduras	599.0	651.1	655.4	646.3	745.8	831.1	900.7	1 114.8	1 184.7	1 297.0	1 125.4	50
Korea	1 060.0	1 041.7	1 063.1	1 039.1	1 038.9	891.9	816.8	789.8	805.2	914.8	992.9	57
Haiti	675.5	668.2	679.8	687.2	701.7	735.8	732.0	726.5	827.5	998.3	977.6	51
Jamaica	711.1	736.3	744.7	733.4	772.2	680.2	721.9	769.9	882.8	858.4	846.7	56
Other countries	15 120.5	15 321.9	15 729.8	15 851.5	15 817.0	15 149.6	15 429.7	16 435.6	16 799.3	17 331.7	17 802.7	
Total	**43 289.6**	**43 738.9**	**44 525.5**	**44 728.5**	**44 932.8**	**44 258.3**	**45 272.9**	**47 331.5**	**49 059.8**	**51 227.0**	**52 008.8**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/2d1v8s.

Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4. **Stocks of foreign-born population**

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	Estimated residential population. Reference date: 30 June.	Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).
Austria	Stock of foreign-born residents recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	From 2011 on, includes persons who have lived in Belgium for a continuous period of at least 12 months and persons who arrived in Belgium less than 12 months before the reference time with the intention of staying there for at least one year; also includes asylum seekers. Data for the year 2019 are provisional.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	The foreign-born population covers all persons who are or have ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident in Canada. The foreign-born population does not include non-permanent residents, on employment or student authorizations, or who are refugee claimants. 2016 and 2021: Census, 25% sample data.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	2017: census (INE). 2018-2023: estimate of foreign-born residents in Chile (INE-SERMIG)	INE. Servicio Nacional de Migraciones (SERMIG), Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Colombia	UN Migrant stock 2015, 2020 and 2024	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024.
Costa Rica	UN Migrant stock 2015, 2020 and 2024	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). International Migrant Stock 2024.
Czechia	In Table B4, data broken down by country of birth from 2014 to 2024 are from Eurostat. Break in series in 2021.	Czech Statistical Office, Eurostat
Denmark	Immigrants according to the national definition, e.g. persons born abroad to parents both foreigner or born abroad. When no information is available on the parents' nationality/country of birth, foreign-born persons are classified as immigrants.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	National population register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Population register. Includes foreign-born persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	From 2014 on, includes the département of Mayotte. Data by country of birth are available only for EU countries for the most recent years. Includes persons who were born French abroad.	National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Eurostat.
Germany	Annual average. Data of the sample survey data (Microcensus). Estimation up to 2020 are based on the intercensal population updates on the basis of the 2011 census. Microcensus. Data since 2021 are based on data from the 2022 Census. Up to 2016, data refers to country of citizenship or former citizenship; from 2017 on, it refers to country of birth. Includes ethnic Germans (Aussiedler). Persons with a migration background and migrant experience of their own in microcensus. Excludes people in shared/community accommodation. For details please refer to the methodological notes: www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Households-Families/Methods/mz2020-redesigned-changed.html?nn=23832	Federal Statistical Office.
Greece		Eurostat.
Hungary	From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From February 2022 on, includes those with temporary protection mostly from Ukraine. From 2012 on, includes refugees and persons under subsidiary protection. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (NDGAP), Central Statistical Office; Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register); Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	National population register. Numbers from the register are likely to be overestimated. Reference date: 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	2011, 2016 and 2022 Censuses. Interpolation for 2017-2021. Persons usually resident and present in their usual residence on census night.	Central Statistics Office.

Country	Comments	Source
	2022-2024: estimates based on Eurostat figures.	
Israel	Estimates are based on the results of the Population Censuses and on the changes that occurred in the population after the Censuses, as recorded in the Population Register. They include Jews and foreign-born members of other religions (usually family members of Jewish immigrants). The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	Population register. From 2019 on, the data on foreign resident population takes into account the results of the permanent population census. Reference date: 1 January.	National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Latvia	Population register. Reference date: 1 January. In 2025, CSB changed the method for producing population estimates. To ensure comparability, the data for 2023 and 2024 have also been recalculated using the new method. The population estimate published on 2 June was revised on 2 October 2025, and the usually resident population now includes foreign students.	Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	Reference date: 1 January.	Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	2011: Census.	Population register. Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	2010 and 2020 censuses; 2015 Intercensal Survey. Other years, estimation from the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (ENOE).	National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
Netherlands	Reference date: 1 January.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	2013, 2018 and 2023 Censuses.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland		Eurostat.
Portugal	Total foreign-born population in Table A.4: Eurostat. Data by nationality in Table B.4: 2011 and 2021 censuses. Interpolation for 2012-2020. 2022 and 2023 totals estimated using percent change of the series on Eurostat website.	National Statistical Institute (INE), Eurostat
Slovak Republic	Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia		Eurostat.
Spain	Population register. Foreign-born recorded in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. Reference date: 1 January.	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Population Register of the Confederation.	Federal Statistical Office.
Türkiye		Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	Before 2021: Foreign-born residents in the Labour Force Survey. England and Wales Census 2021. Estimates for 2022 to 2024 based on 2021 census data using mortality, and long-term international migration data from the Office for National Statistics.	Office for National Statistics.
United States	Includes persons who are naturalised and persons who are in an unauthorised status. Excludes children born abroad to US citizen parents. Break in series in 2020: for 2020-24, CPS instead of ACS.	American Community Survey and Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Notes: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/312.

Table A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries

Thousands and percentages

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Austria	1 146	1 268	1 342	1 396	1 439	1 486	1 531	1 587	1 730	1 801	1 855
% of total population	13.3	14.6	15.3	15.8	16.2	16.7	17.1	17.6	18.9	19.7	20.4
Belgium	1 277	1 333	1 354	1 376	1 414	1 479	1 489	1 515	1 613	1 658	1 683
% of total population	11.4	11.8	11.9	12.1	12.3	12.8	12.9	13.1	13.8	14.1	14.3
Canada	..	2 405	..	..	..	..	3 185	..	..	..	..
% of total population	..	6.7	..	..	..	..	8.3	..	..	..	..
Czechia	449	465	493	524	564	593	633	659	1 114	1 066	1 094
% of total population	4.3	4.4	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.0	6.3	10.3	9.9	10.2
Denmark	423	463	485	506	526	537	539	562	621	650	678
% of total population	7.5	8.1	8.4	8.8	9.1	9.2	9.2	9.6	10.5	10.9	11.3
Estonia	211	212	212	214	216	216	200	203	237	247	247
% of total population	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.2	15.1	15.2	17.3	18.1	18.2
Finland	220	230	244	249	258	268	279	296	324	373	411
% of total population	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.8	6.6	7.3
France	4 431	4 545	4 606	4 951	5 042	5 174	5 303	5 458	5 629	6 045	6 468
% of total population	6.8	7.0	7.1	7.6	7.7	7.9	8.0	8.2	8.5	9.1	9.7
Germany	8 153	9 108	10 039	10 624	10 915	11 228	11 432	11 818	13 384	13 896	14 062
% of total population	10.0	11.0	12.1	12.8	13.1	13.4	13.7	14.1	15.9	16.4	16.7
Greece	822	798	810	816	832	906	922	748	764	744	737
% of total population	7.6	7.4	7.5	7.6	7.8	8.5	8.6	7.1	7.4	7.3	7.4
Hungary	146	157	151	162	181	200	194	203	226	251	255
% of total population	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.6
Iceland	23	24	29	36	41	44	45	48	57	64	68
% of total population	6.9	7.3	8.4	10.2	11.4	12.0	12.1	12.7	14.7	16.3	17.1
Ireland	606	607	567	594	623	644	646	801	..	..	..
% of total population	12.9	12.8	11.9	12.3	12.7	13.0	12.9	15.9	..	..	..
Italy	5 014	5 027	5 047	5 144	4 996	5 040	5 172	5 031	5 141	5 254	5 371
% of total population	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.5	8.3	8.4	8.7	8.4	8.6	8.8	9.1
Japan	2 122	2 232	2 383	2 562	2 731	2 933	2 887	2 761	3 075	3 411	3 769
% of total population	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.1
Korea	1 489	1 595	1 663	1 750	1 951	2 025	1 889	1 830	1 956	2 163	2 044
% of total population	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.9	3.6	3.5	3.8	4.2	4.0
Latvia	298	289	279	273	267	260	252	245	253	241	230
% of total population	15.0	14.7	14.3	14.1	13.9	13.6	13.3	13.1	13.4	12.8	12.3
Lithuania	22	19	20	27	47	66	80	100	189	222	217
% of total population	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.7	2.4	2.9	3.6	6.7	7.7	7.6
Luxembourg	259	269	281	288	291	296	299	304	313	318	321
% of total population	46.0	46.7	47.6	47.9	47.5	47.3	47.2	47.1	47.4	47.5	47.4
Mexico	..	..	382	424	462	480	580	720	..	..	..
% of total population	..	..	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	..	..	..
Netherlands	847	901	972	1 041	1 111	1 192	1 203	1 256	1 445	1 544	1 616
% of total population	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.0	6.4	6.8	6.8	7.1	8.0	8.5	8.8
Norway	512	538	559	568	584	605	602	586	611	633	646
% of total population	9.9	10.3	10.6	10.7	11.0	11.3	11.2	10.8	11.1	11.4	11.5
Poland	108	150	210	239	290	358	447	442	436	430	425
of total population	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Portugal	395	389	398	422	480	590	748	1 074	1 350	1 538	1 597
% of total population	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.7	7.2	10.3	12.9	14.7	15.3

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Slovak Republic	62	66	70	73	76	79	82	63	64	66	69
% of total population	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3
Slovenia	102	108	114	122	207	197	216	231	207	203	215
% of total population	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.9	9.9	9.4	10.2	10.9	9.8	9.6	10.1
Spain	4 454	4 418	4 419	4 563	4 840	5 227	5 403	5 509	6 090	6 502	6 912
% of total population	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.7	10.2	11.0	11.3	11.5	12.7	13.6	14.4
Sweden	739	783	852	897	932	941	892	868	865	844	832
% of total population	7.6	7.9	8.5	8.9	9.1	9.1	8.6	8.3	8.2	8.0	7.8
Switzerland	1 947	1 994	2 030	2 054	2 081	2 111	2 152	2 190	2 242	2 313	2 368
% of total population	23.6	23.9	24.1	24.2	24.4	24.5	24.8	25.1	25.4	26.0	26.5
Türkiye	518	650	816	919	1 211	1 531	1 792	1 824	1 571	1 481	1 520
% of total population	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.7
United Kingdom	5 592	5 951	6 137	5 991	6 194	6 101	6 013	..	..	..	..
% of total population	8.6	9.1	9.3	9.0	9.3	9.1	8.9	..	..	..	..
United States	22 236	22 824	22 759	22 942	22 519	21 434	22 165	23 825	24 595	26 287	25 788
% of total population	6.8	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.7	6.3	6.5	7.0	7.2	7.6	7.4

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.5.

StatLink https://stat.link/qz4crd

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Austria

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Germany	170.5	176.5	181.6	186.8	192.4	200.0	208.7	216.7	225.0	232.7	239.5	50
Romania	73.4	82.9	92.1	102.3	112.7	123.5	131.8	138.4	147.5	153.4	155.7	50
Türkiye	115.4	116.0	116.8	117.3	117.2	117.6	117.6	117.6	119.7	124.1	124.8	48
Serbia	114.3	116.6	118.5	120.2	121.3	122.1	122.0	121.6	121.9	122.2	122.5	49
Hungary	54.9	63.6	70.6	77.1	82.7	87.5	91.4	94.4	99.7	107.3	112.4	52
Croatia	66.5	70.2	73.3	76.7	80.0	83.6	89.0	95.3	101.8	106.7	109.4	47
Syria	11.3	33.3	41.7	48.1	49.8	51.5	55.4	68.4	82.2	95.2	104.8	38
Bosnia and Herzegovina	92.5	94.0	94.6	95.2	95.8	96.6	97.0	97.3	98.5	99.8	100.8	47
Ukraine	8.6	9.7	10.2	10.7	11.2	11.6	11.9	12.7	79.6	80.7	87.9	63
Poland	54.3	57.6	60.1	62.2	63.4	64.4	65.6	66.1	67.2	67.9	67.5	48
Afghanistan	16.8	35.6	45.3	45.7	44.4	43.7	44.0	45.1	47.4	49.8	50.8	37
Slovak Republic	32.1	35.3	38.1	40.2	42.0	43.6	45.4	46.7	48.5	49.8	50.4	59
Italy	22.5	25.3	27.3	29.2	30.9	32.5	34.3	35.7	37.7	39.4	41.0	43
Bulgaria	19.6	22.4	24.9	27.4	29.9	32.5	34.2	35.9	38.5	39.8	40.3	51
Russia	30.0	31.2	32.0	32.4	32.6	32.9	33.3	33.9	35.6	37.3	38.1	58
Other countries	263.5	297.4	314.9	324.4	332.5	342.7	349.5	360.8	379.2	394.7	409.6	
Total	**1 146.1**	**1 267.7**	**1 341.9**	**1 395.9**	**1 438.9**	**1 486.2**	**1 531.1**	**1 586.7**	**1 729.8**	**1 800.9**	**1 855.4**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Belgium

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
France	158.8	161.8	163.7	164.9	166.9	170.9	173.8	175.6	178.6	180.5	182.4	52
Netherlands	148.9	151.7	153.2	154.7	157.1	159.5	160.9	163.1	166.0	167.9	169.5	48
Italy	156.6	156.8	156.3	155.6	155.5	155.7	154.7	153.4	153.0	152.1	150.9	46
Romania	65.3	73.2	79.8	86.6	94.9	105.5	111.3	116.0	123.4	127.5	130.0	43
Spain	59.9	61.7	62.6	63.6	65.1	67.9	70.0	73.1	77.0	80.3	83.2	49
Morocco	82.3	83.0	82.6	81.3	80.3	80.9	80.9	81.7	82.1	82.2	81.6	55
Ukraine	4.9	5.1	5.0	5.1	5.3	5.8	5.9	6.2	55.6	64.1	71.3	59
Poland	68.1	70.4	71.1	71.2	71.0	71.0	70.1	68.8	68.6	67.9	65.7	53
Portugal	42.6	44.2	45.6	46.4	47.5	49.1	50.2	51.5	53.3	55.3	57.6	46
Bulgaria	28.6	31.3	32.9	34.8	37.0	40.6	43.1	45.2	48.0	49.0	49.1	48
Türkiye	37.2	37.1	37.0	37.0	37.5	38.8	39.0	40.0	42.2	45.2	47.3	44
Germany	39.1	39.3	39.3	39.2	39.5	39.7	40.0	40.2	40.6	41.0	41.0	52
Syria	7.4	18.0	22.1	27.5	30.8	33.1	32.8	32.3	32.3	33.8	36.8	44
Afghanistan	9.6	17.5	19.0	19.2	19.7	22.7	23.3	27.8	32.4	32.5	32.4	32
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	22.1	22.3	22.3	22.5	22.5	22.8	22.7	22.8	23.1	23.5	24.6	50
Other countries	345.6	360.1	361.3	366.9	383.2	415.0	410.5	417.1	436.3	455.2	460.0	
Total	**1 276.9**	**1 333.2**	**1 353.8**	**1 376.4**	**1 413.8**	**1 478.8**	**1 489.2**	**1 514.9**	**1 612.5**	**1 657.9**	**1 683.4**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Canada

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
India	..	274.2	..	..	..	..	644.3	..	..	..	..	46
China	..	340.6	..	..	..	..	387.0	..	..	..	..	54
Philippines	..	259.2	..	..	..	..	289.4	..	..	..	..	55
United States	..	149.7	..	..	..	..	133.4	..	..	..	..	55
United Kingdom	..	113.9	..	..	..	..	95.4	..	..	..	..	46
France	..	65.2	..	..	..	..	87.8	..	..	..	..	46
Korea	..	60.5	..	..	..	..	72.0	..	..	..	..	58
Nigeria	..	27.2	..	..	..	..	71.6	..	..	..	..	49
Syria	..	35.9	..	..	..	..	65.8	..	..	..	..	48
Iran	..	52.2	..	..	..	..	65.2	..	..	..	..	50
Pakistan	..	59.2	..	..	..	..	59.3	..	..	..	..	50
Mexico	..	35.6	..	..	..	..	58.3	..	..	..	..	47
Brazil	..	19.7	..	..	..	..	48.6	..	..	..	..	51
Viet Nam	..	23.5	..	..	..	..	37.9	..	..	..	..	60
Germany	..	46.6	..	..	..	..	37.4	..	..	..	..	52
Other countries	..	841.6	..	..	..	..	1 031.9	..	..	..	..	
Total	**..**	**2 404.8**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**3 185.3**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Czechia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Ukraine	104.2	105.6	109.9	117.1	131.3	145.2	165.4	196.6	635.9	574.4	589.5	53
Slovak Republic	96.2	101.6	107.3	111.8	116.8	121.3	124.5	114.6	117.3	119.2	121.5	49
Viet Nam	56.6	56.9	58.0	59.8	61.1	61.9	62.8	64.8	66.3	67.8	69.0	47
Russia	34.4	34.7	35.8	36.6	38.0	38.0	41.7	45.2	43.3	41.0	39.0	56
Romania	7.7	9.1	10.8	12.6	14.7	16.8	18.4	18.8	19.7	20.5	21.0	35
Bulgaria	10.1	11.0	12.3	13.8	15.6	17.2	17.9	17.3	17.7	17.9	17.7	36
Poland	19.6	19.8	20.3	20.7	21.3	21.8	20.7	17.9	17.9	17.8	17.7	55
Mongolia	5.5	6.0	6.8	7.9	9.1	9.8	10.1	11.0	12.0	12.7	14.1	50
Germany	19.7	20.5	21.2	21.3	21.3	21.5	20.9	14.8	14.0	12.7	11.8	26
Hungary	2.3	3.1	4.1	5.4	6.6	7.7	8.9	9.7	10.5	11.1	11.7	38
United States	6.5	6.5	8.8	9.6	9.5	7.2	7.5	8.7	9.7	10.1	10.5	43
India	1.7	2.0	2.8	3.6	4.5	4.9	5.8	6.9	8.5	9.6	10.4	32
Philippines	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.3	2.6	3.2	4.9	7.0	10.4	36
Kazakhstan	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.7	6.0	5.9	6.9	8.0	9.1	9.8	10.2	52
China	5.6	5.7	6.2	6.9	7.6	7.7	8.0	7.9	8.0	8.9	10.0	48
Other countries	73.9	76.4	83.0	90.5	99.5	104.2	110.3	113.0	119.0	125.3	129.6	
Total	**449.4**	**464.7**	**493.4**	**524.1**	**564.3**	**593.4**	**632.6**	**658.6**	**1 113.7**	**1 065.7**	**1 094.1**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Denmark

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	32.3	35.3	37.6	39.3	40.5	40.8	41.2	43.6	46.6	48.5	48.6	45
Ukraine	7.9	8.6	9.2	10.2	11.7	12.7	12.8	13.7	40.6	42.8	47.6	58
Romania	18.8	22.4	25.3	27.8	30.7	32.4	33.8	38.3	43.2	45.1	45.2	42
Syria	9.8	21.6	31.0	33.6	34.7	34.9	35.6	35.8	35.8	36.3	36.8	45
Germany	23.0	23.7	24.4	24.8	25.5	26.1	26.5	28.2	31.1	33.3	35.2	51
Türkiye	28.8	28.8	28.1	28.2	28.3	28.4	28.4	28.5	29.0	29.5	30.1	49
Sweden	14.4	14.9	15.1	15.7	16.1	16.5	17.0	17.6	18.2	18.6	19.3	55
Italy	7.2	8.1	9.0	9.6	10.2	10.9	11.7	13.5	15.5	16.7	18.1	42
India	6.3	7.5	8.7	9.6	10.9	12.0	11.9	12.8	14.9	16.7	17.8	45
United Kingdom	16.1	16.7	17.6	18.3	18.8	19.0	18.7	18.2	18.0	17.9	17.6	35
Norway	15.8	16.4	16.7	16.8	16.8	17.0	17.0	17.1	17.3	17.3	17.4	61
Iran	7.2	7.9	8.0	8.9	9.3	9.6	10.0	10.6	11.8	13.5	15.5	47
Lithuania	10.4	11.5	12.4	13.5	14.5	14.7	14.7	15.4	15.8	15.7	15.5	48
Bulgaria	7.2	8.2	9.0	9.7	10.4	10.8	11.2	12.4	13.6	14.0	14.2	42
China	8.9	9.6	10.1	10.5	10.9	11.3	10.9	11.2	11.5	12.1	12.9	57
Other countries	208.3	221.9	222.7	229.5	236.5	240.0	238.2	245.3	258.4	271.9	286.0	
Total	**422.6**	**463.1**	**485.0**	**506.0**	**525.9**	**537.1**	**539.5**	**562.2**	**621.2**	**650.0**	**677.5**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Estonia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Russia	92.6	91.4	90.3	89.0	88.1	86.0	82.9	81.7	81.0	79.3	77.0	54
Ukraine	6.3	7.2	7.8	8.3	9.3	10.4	13.4	15.9	48.7	60.4	63.8	54
Stateless	84.3	81.4	78.9	76.8	74.6	70.4	69.1	66.6	64.3	62.2	60.2	47
Latvia	3.6	3.9	4.2	5.0	5.6	6.3	4.8	5.0	5.4	5.5	5.4	43
Finland	6.3	6.9	7.6	8.2	8.8	9.2	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.4	37
Belarus	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.9	48
Germany	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.9	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	40
India	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	..	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.9	34
Lithuania	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	44
Nigeria	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	..	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	43
Italy	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.2	..	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	30
France	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0	..	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	32
Türkiye	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	..	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.2	32
United Kingdom	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	..	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	18
United States	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	..	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	34
Other countries	8.4	9.6	11.0	12.6	14.4	16.3	19.6	14.7	17.1	19.4	19.8	
Total	**211.4**	**211.5**	**212.2**	**213.7**	**216.4**	**215.6**	**200.5**	**202.7**	**236.8**	**247.4**	**246.6**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Finland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Estonia	48.4	50.4	51.5	51.5	51.5	50.9	50.9	51.8	51.8	51.6	50.4	47
Ukraine	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.6	5.1	5.8	7.2	8.4	28.1	41.4	54
Russia	30.6	30.8	31.0	29.2	28.7	28.5	28.9	30.0	33.4	35.4	35.2	50
China	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.7	9.2	9.8	10.5	11.4	12.3	14.0	15.7	52
Philippines	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.5	4.2	4.7	5.4	8.1	11.5	15.1	61
India	4.7	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.7	6.8	7.2	8.2	10.5	13.1	15.1	42
Iraq	6.8	7.1	9.8	11.7	13.1	13.9	14.7	15.1	15.3	14.7	14.0	37
Viet Nam	4.0	4.6	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.4	6.6	7.2	7.8	8.8	10.1	50
Afghanistan	3.5	3.7	5.3	5.8	6.2	6.7	7.1	7.7	8.4	9.2	9.2	43
Bangladesh	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.9	6.3	8.7	35
Serbia and Montenegro	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.4	6.5	7.9	8.6	39
Thailand	6.9	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.8	7.9	7.9	8.1	8.4	8.5	82
Türkiye	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.2	5.7	6.1	6.7	7.4	8.3	38
Nepal	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.8	4.4	5.6	8.2	40
Sri Lanka	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	2.0	5.2	7.9	50
Other countries	89.4	93.8	99.3	102.7	106.6	111.6	117.4	125.5	136.0	145.7	154.7	
Total	**219.7**	**229.8**	**243.6**	**249.5**	**257.6**	**267.6**	**278.9**	**296.5**	**323.7**	**373.0**	**411.1**	**46**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – France

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Algeria	496.1	505.9	518.4	530.9	537.6	559.8	567.2	..	..	..	..	49
Portugal	541.9	546.4	548.9	548.9	540.0	533.0	533.5	535.1	549.5	539.0	570.9	47
Morocco	458.6	465.2	472.8	480.6	489.3	504.3	510.9	..	..	..	..	51
Italy	188.0	194.7	202.7	202.7	211.8	218.3	224.2	231.0	246.0	256.6	252.6	46
Tunisia	173.1	178.9	187.1	195.4	206.8	216.2	219.0	..	..	..	..	44
Türkiye	215.6	212.6	211.9	210.4	214.2	207.7	210.4	..	..	..	..	47
Spain	152.3	157.5	163.7	163.7	168.7	173.9	180.4	187.1	192.4	214.1	207.4	50
Comoros	116.1	121.8	147.3	155.1	162.1	171.0	175.3	..	..	..	..	54
United Kingdom	150.5	148.4	146.2	146.2	149.4	144.7	138.0	..	..	..	..	49
Romania	96.9	106.2	116.8	116.8	127.2	128.4	134.0	140.4	147.1	161.2	158.2	50
Belgium	99.3	100.5	101.8	101.8	104.2	104.0	106.4	109.3	117.3	119.3	129.9	52
China	100.7	100.5	102.2	103.1	108.1	100.4	101.8	..	..	..	..	59
China	100.7	100.5	102.2	103.1	108.1	100.4	101.8	..	..	..	..	59
Côte d'Ivoire	59.6	63.4	68.3	74.5	79.1	90.9	92.0	..	..	..	..	52
Mali	73.4	75.5	78.1	79.1	85.5	88.7	89.9	..	..	..	..	35
Other countries	1 408.8	1 466.7	1 437.3	1 738.5	1 750.0	1 831.9	1 917.7	..	..	..	..	
Total	**4 431.4**	**4 544.8**	**4 605.7**	**4 950.7**	**5 042.2**	**5 173.6**	**5 302.5**	**5 458.0**	**5 628.7**	**6 044.9**	**6 468.2**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Germany

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Türkiye	1 527.1	1 506.1	1 492.6	1 483.5	1 476.4	1 472.4	1 461.9	1 458.4	1 487.1	1 548.1	1 544.5	47
Ukraine	127.9	133.8	136.3	138.0	141.4	143.5	145.5	155.3	1 164.2	1 239.7	1 334.0	60
Syria	118.2	366.6	637.8	699.0	745.6	789.5	818.5	867.6	923.8	972.5	975.1	40
Romania	355.3	452.7	533.7	622.8	696.3	748.2	799.2	844.5	883.7	909.8	909.8	43
Poland	674.2	741.0	783.1	866.9	860.1	862.5	866.7	871.0	880.8	887.7	865.0	47
Italy	574.5	596.1	611.5	643.1	643.5	646.5	648.4	646.8	645.0	644.0	636.7	43
Afghanistan	75.4	131.5	253.5	251.6	257.1	263.4	271.8	309.8	377.2	419.4	442.0	36
Bulgaria	183.3	226.9	263.3	310.4	337.0	360.2	388.7	410.9	429.7	436.9	432.1	47
Croatia	263.3	297.9	332.6	367.9	395.7	414.9	426.8	434.6	436.3	434.0	425.8	48
Greece	328.6	339.9	348.5	362.2	363.2	363.7	364.3	362.6	361.3	359.0	353.7	46
Russia	221.4	231.0	245.4	249.2	254.3	260.4	263.3	268.6	290.6	308.0	302.3	61
India	76.1	86.3	97.9	109.0	124.1	143.7	150.8	171.9	210.4	246.1	277.5	41
Serbia	220.9	230.4	223.1	225.5	231.2	237.8	242.6	252.3	263.1	270.8	272.7	48
Iraq	88.7	136.4	227.2	237.4	247.8	255.1	259.5	276.9	284.6	281.3	268.8	44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	163.5	168.0	172.6	181.0	190.5	203.3	211.3	222.1	233.8	245.3	249.7	47
Other countries	3 154.5	3 463.3	3 680.1	3 876.5	3 951.2	4 063.4	4 113.1	4 264.4	4 512.4	4 693.2	4 772.0	
Total	**8 153.0**	**9 107.9**	**10 039.1**	**10 623.9**	**10 915.5**	**11 228.3**	**11 432.5**	**11 817.8**	**13 383.9**	**13 895.9**	**14 061.6**	**48**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Greece

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
EU	198.7	206.7	205.2	211.2	213.2	191.1	168.6	116.5	114.9	114.7	114.1	64
Non-EU	623.2	584.7	604.8	604.9	618.5	715.2	752.9	645.6	649.2	629.1	622.9	46
Total	**822.0**	**798.4**	**810.0**	**816.1**	**831.7**	**906.3**	**921.5**	**762.0**	**764.1**	**743.8**	**737.1**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Hungary

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Germany	18.8	19.4	18.6	17.9	16.5	18.3	17.5	19.7	22.3	23.3	25.4	48
China	16.5	19.8	19.1	19.9	18.9	19.7	18.6	17.7	18.2	21.2	24.3	44
Ukraine	6.9	6.7	5.8	10.5	24.2	30.3	27.4	30.7	36.0	27.4	20.5	54
Viet Nam	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.7	5.7	6.7	6.4	7.2	15.4	17.9	40
Slovak Republic	8.7	9.4	9.5	9.7	9.6	10.6	14.7	16.0	16.7	16.9	17.1	54
Romania	28.6	29.7	24.0	22.7	21.0	22.2	18.2	16.6	16.5	15.7	15.6	35
Philippines	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.0	2.7	8.3	8.7	32
Russia	4.3	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.0	5.0	6.2	7.8	7.8	54
India	1.0	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.2	3.3	3.8	5.2	7.0	7.7	25
Korea	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.4	3.2	3.6	4.5	6.0	5.8	30
Türkiye	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.5	3.9	5.2	5.6	28
Austria	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.1	3.3	4.1	4.6	5.0	5.0	5.2	41
Netherlands	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.7	3.8	4.2	43
Italy	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.0	31
Mongolia	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.7	4.2	3.9	51
Other countries	44.8	48.3	49.9	55.5	61.9	66.2	63.4	65.1	71.5	79.8	81.7	
Total	**146.0**	**156.6**	**151.1**	**161.8**	**180.8**	**200.0**	**194.5**	**202.5**	**226.3**	**250.9**	**255.4**	**43**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Iceland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	10.7	11.5	13.3	16.2	18.1	18.8	18.7	19.0	21.1	22.7	23.3	42
Lithuania	1.6	1.7	2.2	3.1	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.8	35
Ukraine	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	2.4	3.6	4.1	56
Romania	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.4	1.7	1.8	2.2	2.9	3.4	3.7	28
Latvia	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4	32
Portugal	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	36
Spain	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.7	43
Venezuela	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.3	1.4	1.6	46
Philippines	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	62
Germany	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	65
Viet Nam	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.1	49
United States	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	52
Czechia	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	49
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	34
Italy	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	42
Other countries	5.9	6.3	7.1	8.3	9.2	10.0	10.8	11.8	13.2	14.9	16.2	
Total	**22.7**	**24.4**	**28.5**	**35.5**	**40.8**	**43.6**	**44.8**	**47.8**	**56.7**	**63.5**	**67.6**	**43**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Ireland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2022 (%)
Poland	..	122.5	..	..	..	..	..	93.7	..	..	..	50
United Kingdom	115.5	103.1	107.7	110.8	114.5	116.9	118.2	83.3	..	..	..	46
India	..	11.5	..	..	..	..	..	45.4	..	..	..	46
Romania	..	29.2	..	..	..	..	..	43.3	..	..	..	46
Lithuania	..	36.6	..	..	..	..	..	31.2	..	..	..	54
Brazil	..	13.6	..	..	..	..	..	27.3	..	..	..	53
Italy	..	11.7	..	..	..	..	..	18.3	..	..	..	47
Latvia	..	19.9	..	..	..	..	..	18.3	..	..	..	56
Spain	..	12.1	..	..	..	..	..	18.0	..	..	..	57
France	..	11.7	..	..	..	..	..	13.9	..	..	..	51
Croatia	..	5.3	..	..	..	..	..	13.6	..	..	..	45
United States	..	10.5	..	..	..	..	..	13.4	..	..	..	61
China	..	1.0	..	..	..	..	..	13.1	..	..	..	53
China	..	1.0	..	..	..	..	..	13.1	..	..	..	53
Germany	..	11.5	..	..	..	..	..	12.4	..	..	..	57
Other countries	..	206.2	..	..	..	..	..	343.1	..	..	..	
Total	**605.6**	**607.4**	**566.6**	**593.5**	**622.7**	**644.4**	**645.6**	**801.4**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Italy

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Romania	1 131.8	1 151.4	1 168.6	1 190.1	1 143.9	1 145.7	1 076.4	1 083.8	1 081.8	1 073.2	1 053.0	56
Albania	490.5	467.7	448.4	440.5	423.2	421.6	433.2	420.0	416.8	416.2	414.6	49
Morocco	449.1	437.5	420.7	416.5	406.1	414.2	428.9	420.2	415.1	412.3	412.5	45
China	265.8	271.3	282.0	290.7	283.4	288.9	330.5	300.2	307.0	309.0	311.3	50
Ukraine	226.1	230.7	234.4	237.0	227.9	228.6	236.0	225.3	249.6	273.5	287.2	75
Bangladesh	115.3	118.8	122.4	132.0	131.0	138.9	158.0	159.0	174.1	192.7	213.6	26
Egypt	103.7	109.9	112.8	119.5	119.9	128.1	139.6	140.3	147.8	161.6	174.1	32
India	147.8	150.5	151.4	151.8	147.2	153.2	165.5	162.5	167.3	170.9	171.4	43
Pakistan	96.2	101.8	108.2	114.2	116.6	121.6	135.5	134.2	144.1	159.3	171.2	26
Philippines	168.2	165.9	166.5	167.9	158.0	157.7	165.4	159.0	158.9	156.6	153.5	57
Nigeria	71.2	77.3	88.5	106.1	114.1	113.0	119.1	119.4	123.6	128.5	132.1	43
Tunisia	96.0	95.6	94.1	93.8	90.6	93.4	97.4	99.0	102.4	110.4	123.8	37
Senegal	94.0	98.2	101.2	105.9	105.3	106.2	111.1	110.8	112.6	115.0	119.1	27
Peru	109.7	103.7	99.1	97.4	91.9	91.7	96.5	94.1	98.7	105.3	116.2	57
Sri Lanka	100.6	102.3	104.9	108.0	104.8	107.6	112.0	108.1	109.8	110.5	113.7	48
Other countries	1 348.5	1 344.3	1 344.0	1 373.2	1 332.3	1 329.3	1 366.7	1 294.9	1 331.5	1 358.6	1 404.0	
Total	**5 014.4**	**5 026.9**	**5 047.0**	**5 144.4**	**4 996.2**	**5 039.6**	**5 171.9**	**5 030.7**	**5 141.3**	**5 253.7**	**5 371.3**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Japan

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
China, incl. Hong Kong, Macau	654.8	665.8	695.5	730.9	764.7	813.7	778.1	716.6	761.6	821.8	873.3	53
Viet Nam	99.9	147.0	200.0	262.4	330.8	412.0	448.1	432.9	489.3	565.0	634.4	46
Korea	501.2	457.8	453.1	450.7	449.6	446.4	426.9	409.9	411.3	410.2	409.2	54
Philippines	217.6	229.6	243.7	260.6	271.3	282.8	279.7	276.6	298.7	322.0	341.5	65
Nepal	42.3	54.8	67.5	80.0	89.0	96.8	96.0	97.1	139.4	176.3	233.0	47
Brazil	175.4	173.4	180.9	191.4	201.9	211.7	208.5	204.9	209.4	211.8	211.9	46
Indonesia	30.2	35.9	42.9	50.0	56.3	66.9	66.8	59.8	98.9	149.1	199.8	32
Myanmar	10.3	13.7	17.8	22.5	26.5	32.0	35.0	37.2	56.2	86.5	134.6	59
Chinese Taipei	40.2	48.7	52.8	56.7	60.7	64.8	55.9	51.2	57.3	64.7	70.1	64
United States	51.3	52.3	53.7	55.7	57.5	59.2	55.8	54.2	60.8	63.4	66.1	33
Thailand	43.1	45.4	47.6	50.2	52.3	54.8	53.4	50.3	56.7	61.8	65.4	71
Sri Lanka	10.7	13.2	17.3	23.3	25.4	27.4	29.3	29.0	37.3	46.9	63.5	34
India	24.5	26.2	28.7	31.7	35.4	40.2	38.6	36.1	43.9	48.8	54.0	33
Peru	48.0	47.7	47.7	48.0	48.4	48.7	48.3	48.3	48.9	49.1	49.2	48
Bangladesh	9.6	10.8	12.4	14.1	15.5	16.6	17.5	17.5	22.7	28.0	35.1	29
Other countries	162.7	209.8	221.3	233.7	245.8	259.3	249.4	239.0	282.8	305.4	327.8	
Total	**2 121.8**	**2 232.2**	**2 382.8**	**2 561.8**	**2 731.1**	**2 933.1**	**2 887.1**	**2 760.6**	**3 075.2**	**3 411.0**	**3 769.0**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Korea

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
China	756.4	810.6	826.1	838.9	888.1	889.2	818.8	780.9	779.8	828.7	859.1	51
Viet Nam	122.6	128.0	137.8	151.4	170.7	187.3	181.4	178.9	196.9	227.9	261.6	48
Uzbekistan	39.3	42.5	49.3	56.7	63.1	68.1	61.1	62.5	73.9	82.7	90.6	35
United States	71.1	70.6	69.7	69.1	69.3	71.3	69.5	71.5	75.9	80.3	86.1	53
Nepal	25.5	29.2	33.1	35.4	38.9	40.9	38.5	35.4	44.8	60.7	72.2	18
Cambodia	37.3	42.0	44.5	45.7	45.3	45.0	40.2	40.3	45.2	53.9	61.0	31
Indonesia	38.9	40.2	39.3	37.1	37.6	37.3	33.5	30.7	40.5	50.6	58.5	10
Russia	9.8	13.2	21.5	28.7	35.3	40.5	38.9	39.6	45.5	55.1	58.4	49
Myanmar	14.7	18.1	21.3	23.5	26.7	27.5	25.0	24.3	30.8	39.6	52.0	15
Philippines	43.2	45.3	46.1	45.2	45.3	45.4	40.7	38.0	43.0	48.7	52.0	42
Thailand	26.8	27.9	29.3	30.2	31.4	32.6	30.8	31.4	33.8	40.1	43.5	41
Mongolia	17.3	18.5	20.1	22.6	24.2	24.8	24.5	23.7	27.9	32.5	37.7	55
Kazakhstan	3.0	3.9	7.6	12.7	18.5	22.7	19.9	22.0	28.5	33.4	35.0	49
Sri Lanka	24.6	25.2	26.0	25.3	24.3	23.5	21.2	18.9	22.3	28.3	34.0	9
Japan	24.0	23.8	24.1	24.1	24.7	25.1	23.5	25.1	27.4	28.2	28.9	81
Other countries	234.5	255.8	267.0	302.9	407.7	443.2	421.8	406.5	439.6	471.9	213.8	
Total	**1 488.9**	**1 594.8**	**1 662.8**	**1 749.6**	**1 951.1**	**2 024.6**	**1 889.5**	**1 829.8**	**1 955.8**	**2 162.6**	**2 044.3**	**44**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Latvia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Russia	51.6	56.0	55.4	54.7	53.9	53.1	52.3	51.5	49.4	45.2	42.8	..
Ukraine	4.1	5.9	6.4	7.0	8.2	9.2	9.4	9.7	8.9	8.3	7.2	..
India	..	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.6	4.4	5.4	..
Lithuania	4.3	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	..
Belarus	2.6	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	3.9	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	..
Uzbekistan	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.4	2.5	3.5	4.1	4.3	..
Germany	1.8	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.9	..
United Kingdom	..	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	..
Estonia	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	..
Israel	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.2	..
Italy	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	..
France	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	..
Azerbaijan	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	..
Türkiye	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	..
Sweden	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	..
Other countries	..	210.3	199.5	191.4	183.4	174.9	167.4	160.0	168.7	158.3	148.8	
Total	**298.4**	**288.9**	**279.4**	**272.5**	**266.6**	**260.4**	**252.4**	**245.0**	**252.7**	**241.1**	**229.7**	**58**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Ukraine	2.1	1.5	2.5	6.2	13.9	21.4	26.9	31.8	94.9	86.4	77.1	..
Belarus	1.9	0.8	0.9	3.2	8.9	15.6	20.8	31.0	48.8	62.2	57.5	..
Russia	10.7	8.9	8.3	8.1	10.9	12.3	12.6	13.4	15.7	15.9	15.0	..
Uzbekistan	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	1.0	1.8	8.3	9.1	..
India	0.0	..	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.5	4.7	7.2	..
Tajikistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.4	5.7	6.7	..
Kyrgyzstan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.7	2.0	6.2	5.3	..
Azerbaijan	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	1.4	3.8	4.7	..
Kazakhstan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.2	3.1	3.3	..
Türkiye	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.9	2.4	..
Stateless	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	..
Pakistan	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.9	2.2	..
Georgia	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	1.2	2.0	1.8	..
Latvia	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	..
Moldova	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.3	..
Other countries	4.6	4.8	5.6	6.6	9.1	11.0	12.4	12.9	13.6	15.9	20.0	
Total	**22.5**	**18.7**	**20.1**	**27.3**	**47.2**	**65.8**	**79.9**	**100.1**	**189.4**	**221.8**	**217.3**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Portugal	92.1	93.1	96.8	96.5	95.5	95.1	94.3	93.7	92.1	90.9	89.7	48
France	39.4	41.7	44.3	45.8	46.9	47.8	48.5	49.2	49.1	49.2	49.2	46
Italy	19.5	20.3	21.3	22.0	22.5	23.0	23.5	24.1	24.7	25.1	25.4	44
Belgium	18.8	19.4	20.0	20.2	20.0	19.8	19.6	19.4	19.2	18.9	18.6	45
Germany	12.8	12.8	13.1	13.1	13.0	12.8	12.8	12.8	12.7	12.5	12.3	49
Spain	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.2	7.7	8.4	9.1	9.5	9.9	47
Romania	3.2	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.2	5.7	6.1	6.4	6.6	6.8	6.9	56
Ukraine	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	5.2	5.4	5.6	65
India	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.8	4.7	5.1	5.5	47
Poland	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.2	56
China	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.8	56
Greece	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.7	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.6	50
Syria	0.1	0.8	1.2	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.2	3.7	4.0	39
Netherlands	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.8	46
United Kingdom	6.0	6.1	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.6	42
Other countries	47.6	50.3	51.6	53.4	54.6	57.0	58.7	61.2	65.1	68.6	71.8	
Total	**258.7**	**269.2**	**281.5**	**288.2**	**291.5**	**296.5**	**299.4**	**304.2**	**313.4**	**317.7**	**320.7**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Mexico

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
United States	65.3	67.5	68.9	74.6	79.6	82.5	71.5	85.8	..	..	..	..
Venezuela	15.3	18.6	22.3	28.2	35.1	39.3	58.2	73.0	..	..	..	..
Cuba	17.0	18.4	20.5	24.3	26.5	27.9	33.7	72.5	..	..	..	..
Honduras	7.8	9.3	12.0	15.6	19.5	22.5	46.9	67.8	..	..	..	..
Colombia	18.3	20.6	23.0	26.3	30.0	32.0	36.0	44.7	..	..	..	..
Haiti	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.7	3.3	48.9	33.5	..	..	..	..
El Salvador	6.2	7.2	9.0	12.2	15.3	17.3	23.8	31.0	..	..	..	..
Canada	13.2	14.1	14.6	16.0	17.2	18.3	20.4	27.7	..	..	..	..
China	18.4	20.6	21.5	22.7	23.6	24.5	24.4	27.2	..	..	..	..
China	18.3	20.5	21.5	22.7	23.5	24.5	24.4	27.2	..	..	..	..
Argentina	16.8	18.0	19.0	19.8	20.7	20.8	21.7	24.9	..	..	..	..
Spain	24.7	26.7	27.7	28.5	28.9	26.9	22.6	23.8	..	..	..	..
Guatemala	10.3	11.6	13.2	15.8	18.5	19.9	15.4	23.1	..	..	..	..
Brazil	7.2	8.2	9.3	10.5	11.4	11.6	16.4	17.1	..	..	..	..
Nicaragua	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.8	4.3	7.5	14.5	..	..	..	..
Other countries	83.6	89.9	95.1	102.0	105.7	104.7	108.1	126.6	..	..	..	
Total	**326.0**	**355.2**	**381.8**	**423.9**	**462.0**	**480.3**	**579.8**	**720.4**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	99.6	110.9	121.4	132.4	144.0	155.9	164.9	176.1	186.8	194.4	197.3	50
Ukraine	3.8	4.4	5.1	5.6	6.3	7.0	7.1	7.5	94.4	111.7	124.7	60
Türkiye	77.5	75.4	74.1	73.8	74.8	77.0	77.3	80.2	87.6	92.3	93.8	47
Syria	8.2	25.4	51.4	67.5	74.1	79.5	71.2	57.0	60.1	69.2	86.4	38
Germany	71.8	72.3	73.3	75.0	77.1	79.5	80.6	82.9	84.4	85.2	84.5	56
Bulgaria	19.8	21.9	24.1	27.3	31.2	36.8	41.8	47.7	54.9	60.5	62.9	47
Italy	27.1	29.5	32.3	35.5	39.1	43.3	45.1	49.1	53.4	57.6	60.7	44
Romania	11.9	13.7	16.1	20.0	24.9	30.7	34.6	40.6	47.8	52.3	56.7	45
India	14.7	17.1	20.4	24.9	30.6	37.4	37.1	42.1	50.8	55.6	56.0	46
Spain	25.3	26.8	28.3	30.3	32.7	35.6	37.4	42.1	46.9	50.5	53.3	49
China	28.2	29.7	31.4	33.9	36.5	39.4	38.9	40.9	43.7	47.4	50.0	54
United Kingdom	43.0	44.2	45.3	46.0	47.3	47.9	48.8	47.1	45.9	45.3	44.5	41
Belgium	29.6	30.6	31.9	33.2	34.4	35.9	37.0	38.2	39.0	39.7	39.9	53
Portugal	18.7	19.4	20.2	21.1	22.4	24.2	25.4	28.0	31.2	34.6	37.8	45
France	19.7	20.9	22.6	24.2	25.8	27.8	29.0	31.5	33.7	34.9	35.4	52
Other countries	348.2	358.3	374.4	390.1	409.7	434.5	426.7	445.3	484.8	512.9	532.1	
Total	**847.3**	**900.5**	**972.3**	**1 040.8**	**1 110.9**	**1 192.3**	**1 203.0**	**1 256.2**	**1 445.4**	**1 544.1**	**1 616.0**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Norway

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	93.6	99.6	102.0	103.8	105.2	108.6	110.3	112.7	111.7	111.1	111.1	36
Ukraine	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.8	3.6	35.4	65.8	80.3	57
Lithuania	39.5	41.7	42.5	43.7	45.1	46.9	47.9	48.8	49.0	48.9	48.9	42
Sweden	45.1	45.1	44.4	44.0	44.0	44.2	43.6	39.6	36.7	35.4	34.6	46
Germany	25.0	25.2	24.9	24.7	24.8	25.3	25.6	26.2	26.6	26.5	26.4	48
Syria	3.6	7.6	18.9	26.0	30.2	32.0	32.8	34.0	32.6	27.0	26.0	45
Romania	12.0	13.8	14.5	15.0	15.6	16.6	17.2	17.4	17.6	18.0	18.7	40
Denmark	23.5	23.3	23.0	22.8	22.8	22.9	22.3	20.8	20.0	19.3	18.5	45
United Kingdom	16.3	16.3	16.3	16.2	16.5	17.2	17.5	16.4	15.7	15.2	14.9	33
Latvia	10.3	10.8	11.0	11.1	11.5	12.1	12.5	12.9	13.2	13.4	13.7	40
Spain	6.9	7.6	8.1	8.5	8.8	9.5	9.8	10.4	10.9	11.5	12.4	45
India	6.8	7.0	6.8	7.1	8.3	9.7	9.5	9.1	10.4	11.6	12.0	45
Philippines	11.7	11.8	12.1	11.7	12.3	12.8	12.1	10.0	9.8	9.8	9.7	73
Thailand	11.5	11.6	12.1	11.3	11.9	12.0	11.9	10.6	10.1	10.0	9.7	85
Netherlands	8.3	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.7	8.9	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.4	9.7	44
Other countries	195.3	205.3	210.8	210.2	215.1	222.1	215.8	204.3	201.8	200.6	199.1	
Total	**512.2**	**538.2**	**559.2**	**567.8**	**584.2**	**604.5**	**601.6**	**586.0**	**610.9**	**633.4**	**645.6**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Poland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
EU27	..	..	27.2	27.7	29.0	33.2	32.9	32.7	32.6	32.4	32.3	28
Non-EU27	..	..	182.6	211.0	260.2	324.4	413.9	408.3	402.8	397.2	392.2	48
Total	**..**	**..**	**210.3**	**239.2**	**289.8**	**358.2**	**447.4**	**441.7**	**436.0**	**430.2**	**425.1**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Portugal

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Brazil	73.7	72.4	74.4	94.7	134.1	167.3	278.1	427.1	530.7	565.3	574.2	50
Angola	16.7	15.5	15.0	16.3	19.6	21.6	33.1	44.7	62.8	89.5	103.1	50
India	6.4	6.2	6.9	10.1	15.1	22.0	37.9	56.9	82.1	96.3	93.7	15
Cape Verde	35.3	33.0	31.3	29.7	30.5	30.4	36.1	43.8	53.8	66.1	76.1	49
Nepal	4.8	5.8	7.2	10.9	15.1	19.4	24.0	33.1	46.5	55.6	56.9	33
Bangladesh	2.6	2.8	3.4	5.0	6.9	8.9	17.2	29.5	44.2	55.0	56.7	11
Guinea-Bissau	15.1	13.6	13.3	14.0	15.4	16.3	25.7	31.6	39.1	49.1	53.6	38
Ukraine	32.6	31.5	29.8	26.9	25.4	24.8	27.5	48.5	48.1	47.7	47.5	57
Sao Tome and Principe	8.6	7.9	7.5	7.7	8.2	8.9	12.9	18.7	30.0	42.6	46.7	49
Pakistan	3.0	2.9	3.3	4.2	4.2	5.2	12.6	19.5	31.5	40.7	39.6	13
United Kingdom	17.2	19.4	22.4	26.4	33.9	45.8	27.2	36.4	38.1	38.9	38.7	44
Italy	6.1	8.5	12.9	18.9	25.2	27.9	22.5	28.2	29.9	31.3	32.8	44
France	8.4	11.3	15.3	19.8	22.8	24.5	21.7	25.8	25.9	25.8	26.6	46
China	18.1	20.1	18.3	18.5	19.1	19.0	20.2	22.5	23.5	24.4	23.6	49
Germany	9.0	10.0	11.2	12.8	14.5	15.9	12.5	17.0	19.0	20.3	21.6	48
Other countries	103.3	109.3	115.8	126.0	130.6	137.8	139.0	191.0	245.0	289.9	306.0	
Total	**361.0**	**370.1**	**387.9**	**441.9**	**520.5**	**595.8**	**748.1**	**1 074.2**	**1 350.1**	**1 538.4**	**1 597.4**	**43**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Czechia	11.9	12.5	13.0	13.5	14.0	14.4	15.1	10.3	10.5	10.6	10.7	49
Ukraine	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.4	6.5	6.6	7.0	8.2	49
Hungary	8.6	9.2	9.8	10.2	10.7	11.1	11.6	6.8	7.1	7.3	7.5	34
Romania	5.3	5.8	6.3	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.3	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	31
Poland	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.3	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	54
Russia	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	59
Viet Nam	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.4	42
Italy	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	17
Germany	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	27
China	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	48
United Kingdom	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	21
Serbia	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.5	29
Austria	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	29
Bulgaria	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	31
Croatia	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	30
Other countries	12.1	13.0	13.8	14.5	15.1	15.6	16.2	14.2	14.5	14.9	15.4	
Total	**61.8**	**65.8**	**69.7**	**72.9**	**76.1**	**78.9**	**82.1**	**63.1**	**64.3**	**66.0**	**68.7**	**40**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	44.9	47.7	50.4	54.0	93.5	88.7	97.2	102.6	108.3	94.3	97.8	32
Serbia	9.7	9.8	10.6	11.8	23.0	21.3	21.8	22.8	23.6	18.4	20.1	31
North Macedonia	10.1	10.4	10.8	11.3	15.6	15.5	16.2	17.0	18.7	15.9	17.0	45
Ukraine	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	8.8	10.1	62
Croatia	8.8	8.9	9.2	9.5	12.9	12.9	13.3	13.0	13.4	9.7	10.0	43
Russia	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.6	3.8	3.6	4.1	4.6	5.5	5.1	5.9	53
Bulgaria	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.2	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.7	3.2	3.2	32
Italy	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.6	2.5	2.5	36
China	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.5	46
Montenegro	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	42
Germany	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	49
India	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.1	0.5	1.0	14
Türkiye	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.0	1.0	19
Hungary	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.8	48
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.7	37
Other countries	17.3	18.9	20.2	21.0	40.1	37.6	44.9	52.1	17.2	38.8	40.9	
Total	**101.5**	**107.8**	**114.4**	**121.9**	**206.5**	**197.0**	**215.8**	**230.9**	**206.5**	**203.3**	**214.9**	**38**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Spain

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Morocco	688.7	680.5	665.6	682.0	713.8	760.7	860.2	866.7	894.0	920.7	969.0	42
Colombia	145.5	135.9	138.4	159.6	199.2	261.2	285.5	311.5	453.9	578.5	676.5	54
Romania	708.4	695.0	683.8	673.6	670.2	665.9	658.3	639.5	629.8	620.5	609.3	52
Venezuela	44.2	50.0	63.3	91.1	134.0	187.2	196.7	213.7	278.2	325.3	377.8	55
Italy	182.7	191.6	203.8	221.4	243.7	267.7	259.6	275.2	301.8	325.4	345.8	46
Peru	66.4	61.3	59.5	66.7	79.9	101.0	108.6	118.7	172.0	219.6	260.5	55
China	167.5	172.2	177.5	183.5	190.6	197.2	218.1	217.1	219.9	226.7	238.4	51
Ukraine	84.1	90.8	94.5	99.0	103.6	107.6	110.1	109.8	193.2	210.0	202.1	58
Honduras	35.9	40.8	48.1	64.1	84.8	109.5	126.6	133.3	157.0	171.8	177.9	64
Argentina	73.2	71.3	71.2	74.3	80.0	92.0	88.3	96.1	119.3	137.1	148.6	51
Ecuador	174.4	159.0	145.2	139.4	134.9	132.6	122.2	118.1	120.0	124.8	132.4	46
Germany	145.0	142.1	141.1	138.8	138.3	139.0	113.5	120.5	125.8	128.0	131.8	52
France	98.7	100.7	103.2	106.2	111.5	117.1	112.2	116.5	120.8	123.4	127.0	50
Paraguay	51.9	51.3	52.4	56.9	61.3	68.3	83.3	82.7	97.7	111.1	122.6	62
Pakistan	52.8	49.8	49.0	50.7	55.4	62.0	96.7	97.9	103.7	108.6	116.6	32
Other countries	1 734.9	1 725.3	1 722.9	1 755.6	1 839.1	1 957.9	1 962.9	1 991.7	2 102.7	2 170.9	2 275.6	
Total	**4 454.4**	**4 417.5**	**4 419.5**	**4 563.0**	**4 840.2**	**5 226.9**	**5 402.7**	**5 509.1**	**6 089.6**	**6 502.3**	**6 912.0**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Sweden

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Poland	48.2	50.8	52.5	54.0	54.9	55.5	53.8	54.0	56.2	57.1	54.6	41
Afghanistan	23.6	26.0	28.0	37.4	45.4	49.6	48.5	46.7	45.1	44.7	39.5	37
Syria	42.2	70.0	116.4	132.1	137.1	116.4	95.1	68.5	53.7	44.7	38.2	46
India	10.4	11.4	13.5	17.1	22.2	27.0	28.3	31.7	36.3	38.6	37.8	45
Finland	59.7	57.6	55.8	53.8	51.0	48.7	46.1	43.1	40.2	37.8	35.5	58
Ukraine	3.6	3.8	4.1	4.4	5.1	5.8	6.1	6.7	7.0	6.6	35.5	58
Germany	28.2	28.2	28.7	29.0	29.2	29.5	29.0	29.9	32.2	33.4	33.7	51
Norway	34.5	34.4	34.6	34.7	34.5	34.5	32.6	30.7	29.3	28.3	27.1	51
Denmark	38.4	37.1	35.2	33.4	31.5	30.2	29.1	27.4	26.4	25.6	24.9	42
China	17.5	16.6	17.3	18.6	20.2	21.9	22.3	23.2	24.0	23.4	24.0	55
Eritrea	18.0	25.1	32.1	36.4	39.7	43.0	43.5	42.4	36.2	28.7	24.0	44
Romania	13.0	14.4	15.5	16.9	18.2	19.3	18.9	19.6	20.9	21.4	20.8	40
Pakistan	7.3	7.3	7.8	8.3	9.4	11.7	13.2	15.7	18.2	18.9	19.3	44
Lithuania	10.4	11.3	12.2	13.6	14.6	15.5	15.6	16.0	16.9	17.3	16.9	43
Iran	14.9	14.1	14.2	14.6	15.2	15.9	15.6	16.3	16.8	17.1	16.9	47
Other countries	369.6	374.7	384.1	393.1	404.2	416.0	394.7	396.4	405.9	400.4	383.0	
Total	**739.4**	**782.8**	**851.9**	**897.3**	**932.3**	**940.6**	**892.3**	**868.2**	**865.3**	**844.1**	**831.8**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Italy	308.6	313.7	318.7	319.4	322.1	323.7	328.3	331.4	335.8	342.5	347.0	42
Germany	298.6	301.5	304.7	305.8	307.9	309.4	311.5	313.7	317.5	326.0	332.1	45
Portugal	263.0	268.1	269.5	268.0	265.5	262.9	260.9	258.9	257.8	260.5	263.0	45
France	116.8	123.1	127.3	131.5	135.3	139.6	146.4	151.6	157.8	165.7	173.4	45
Spain	79.5	82.4	83.5	83.7	84.3	85.2	87.2	89.5	92.4	96.7	100.5	46
Türkiye	69.1	68.6	68.0	67.3	66.7	66.3	67.1	68.1	69.2	71.1	72.8	47
North Macedonia	63.3	64.2	65.2	65.8	66.5	67.0	67.6	68.5	69.0	70.0	70.5	52
Serbia	69.7	65.3	64.3	63.2	61.9	60.7	59.7	58.6	57.6	56.8	55.8	51
Poland	21.4	24.7	26.9	29.2	31.6	33.9	36.2	38.4	42.2	46.6	48.9	47
Austria	40.4	41.3	42.1	42.7	43.2	43.9	44.5	45.2	46.1	47.5	48.2	47
Romania	11.3	12.1	13.8	15.6	16.7	19.9	23.1	26.3	30.6	35.1	38.1	51
United Kingdom	41.1	41.3	41.0	41.0	41.0	41.4	42.4	41.4	40.0	38.8	37.6	42
Eritrea	14.0	16.6	19.8	23.2	26.2	29.0	30.9	32.6	33.9	35.4	36.9	46
Croatia	30.2	29.6	29.0	28.5	28.5	28.3	28.3	28.3	30.7	32.1	32.8	48
Hungary	14.9	17.6	19.7	21.4	22.7	24.0	25.3	26.4	27.9	30.1	31.1	48
Other countries	505.1	524.0	536.1	547.4	561.1	576.2	592.6	611.4	633.4	658.6	679.6	
Total	**1 947.0**	**1 993.9**	**2 029.5**	**2 053.6**	**2 081.2**	**2 111.4**	**2 151.9**	**2 190.3**	**2 241.9**	**2 313.2**	**2 368.4**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Türkiye

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2025 (%)
Iraq	47.2	93.7	149.7	201.1	283.9	313.8	322.0	275.3	217.5	178.0	147.5	50
Afghanistan	33.6	38.5	59.9	79.6	120.4	152.2	183.6	186.2	164.1	139.3	132.7	42
Germany	63.2	69.9	75.1	77.2	82.0	88.5	102.6	110.5	114.3	116.0	111.2	50
Turkmenistan	18.4	23.4	28.3	42.8	68.1	133.7	124.0	116.4	110.3	113.8	170.4	53
Iran	21.9	27.8	37.9	44.9	68.8	92.7	128.9	117.0	101.2	95.9	91.7	54
Russia	21.6	25.3	27.7	24.3	33.4	40.2	66.8	151.0	102.6	85.8	75.9	56
Azerbaijan	30.2	36.5	47.0	51.6	61.8	68.5	68.6	68.9	71.0	80.1	92.8	52
Syria	50.9	56.6	75.2	64.6	88.0	114.3	104.6	99.4	80.0	72.4	75.2	50
Uzbekistan	11.0	16.1	21.7	31.6	34.1	44.9	71.1	61.8	54.6	59.1	64.3	65
Kazakhstan	11.9	13.7	14.9	12.6	16.8	21.2	39.5	45.5	44.1	44.4	42.6	59
Ukraine	12.9	17.1	19.9	18.7	18.5	20.2	23.4	50.4	40.5	35.4	35.7	71
Egypt	2.7	4.4	7.6	14.5	26.2	31.1	34.2	33.0	28.5	28.3	43.3	42
Kyrgyzstan	10.6	14.0	17.1	18.6	19.6	23.5	26.5	24.5	22.5	23.8	24.8	69
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2.5	3.3	4.8	8.3	15.7	21.5	28.0	26.3	21.6	23.6	24.5	44
Austria	10.5	12.0	13.3	14.4	16.0	17.3	19.9	21.3	22.1	22.2	22.4	46
Other countries	169.2	197.9	216.3	214.3	257.6	347.5	448.5	436.4	375.8	362.5	364.5	
Total	**518.3**	**650.3**	**816.4**	**919.1**	**1 211.0**	**1 531.2**	**1 792.0**	**1 823.8**	**1 570.5**	**1 480.5**	**1 519.5**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2021 (%)
Poland	855	1 006	994	829	..	..	696	..	..	..	..	55
India	379	347	317	370	..	..	370	..	..	..	..	50
Ireland	329	330	343	350	..	..	370	..	..	..	..	54
Romania	219	324	382	478	..	..	342	..	..	..	..	48
Italy	212	262	296	311	..	..	342	..	..	..	..	48
Portugal	235	247	269	195	..	..	268	..	..	..	..	50
Spain	167	162	191	156	..	..	206	..	..	..	..	51
Pakistan	184	175	167	186	..	..	181	..	..	..	..	47
Nigeria	104	95	106	100	..	..	178	..	..	..	..	53
United States	132	127	130	149	..	..	166	..	..	..	..	57
Lithuania	192	204	196	181	..	..	153	..	..	..	..	60
France	189	181	186	179	..	..	149	..	..	..	..	56
Germany	119	166	131	120	..	..	135	..	..	..	..	62
China	122	113	132	148	..	..	124	..	..	..	..	56
Hungary	103	101	91	66	..	..	118	..	..	..	..	57
Other countries	2 051	2 111	2 206	2 173	..	..	2 215	..	..	..	..	
Total	**5 592**	**5 951**	**6 137**	**5 991**	**6 194**	**6 101**	**6 013**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United States

Thousands

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Of which: Women 2023 (%)
Mexico	8 524.7	8 340.2	8 165.7	8 021.2	7 644.3	7 186.5	7 700.9	8 006.3	7 825.2	8 226.1	7 470.1	46
India	1 203.8	1 443.8	1 606.6	1 679.1	1 765.4	1 686.7	1 657.0	1 706.5	1 917.6	2 105.5	2 315.9	47
China	965.7	1 093.5	1 110.7	1 140.9	1 092.3	1 057.6	985.0	1 094.5	1 072.6	1 064.5	1 158.7	53
Guatemala	686.3	732.5	672.2	664.3	686.1	780.5	865.7	923.8	1 132.5	1 275.3	1 148.5	43
Venezuela	123.7	176.9	220.8	256.2	314.2	366.7	424.3	496.0	653.5	930.7	999.0	48
El Salvador	913.5	908.1	997.6	930.6	927.0	909.7	901.9	895.5	985.9	930.9	887.9	49
Cuba	532.8	619.7	648.7	673.6	635.2	524.6	521.0	581.6	673.3	852.6	887.5	47
Honduras	482.1	531.0	471.6	513.2	543.3	651.4	734.2	948.4	961.1	1 060.2	887.2	48
Colombia	274.7	300.8	278.9	245.9	331.9	265.7	353.4	407.1	510.5	637.5	675.7	52
Dominican Republic	498.6	569.7	509.7	580.9	560.6	540.8	590.7	684.6	599.9	585.0	654.2	52
Philippines	565.7	599.5	510.8	516.1	505.6	456.0	414.4	410.6	471.0	465.2	505.8	58
Brazil	251.2	279.2	310.4	403.2	416.4	319.6	319.9	494.1	554.2	582.3	498.9	53
Haiti	297.8	276.2	269.0	285.7	233.9	285.1	309.6	246.5	304.9	473.6	479.2	49
Ecuador	238.3	219.8	198.8	217.2	217.5	181.5	172.2	244.4	326.8	385.1	360.7	50
Korea	412.6	387.3	330.5	328.3	321.9	327.6	268.0	273.6	261.9	317.3	353.2	57
Other countries	6 264.7	6 346.0	6 456.6	6 485.6	6 323.1	5 893.7	5 946.4	6 411.8	6 344.4	6 395.0	6 505.6	
Total	**22 236.2**	**22 824.2**	**22 758.7**	**22 941.9**	**22 518.8**	**21 433.7**	**22 164.7**	**23 825.2**	**24 595.3**	**26 286.8**	**25 788.1**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/qz4crd.

Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5. **Stocks of foreign population**

Country	Comments	Source
Austria	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	From 2011 on, includes foreigners who have lived in Belgium for a continuous period of at least 12 months and persons who arrived in Belgium less than 12 months before the reference time with the intention of staying there for at least one year; also includes asylum seekers. Data for the year 2019 are provisional. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Eurostat.
Canada	2016 and 2021 Censuses - Countries of Citizenship for the Population in Private Households of Canada - 25% Sample Data	Statistics Canada.
Chile	2017 Census. Estimates for the total and for selected countries for other years.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Czechia	Numbers of foreigners residing in the country on the basis of permanent or temporary residence permits (i.e. long-term visa, long-term residence permit or temporary residence permit of EU nationals). Reference date: 1 January.	Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of Alien Police.
Denmark	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Statistics Estonia.
Finland	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France		Eurostat.
Germany	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes all foreigners regardless of their housing situation (private or non-private dwelling). Excludes persons which (also) have the German citizenship as well as foreigners with temporary residence (mostly <= 3 months). Excludes ethnic Germans *(Aussiedler)*. Figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of five and numbers below 3 are not not disclosed. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Population by group of citizenship. Reference date: 1 January.	Eurostat.
Hungary	Foreigners having a residence or a settlement document. From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2012 on, includes refugees and persons under subsidiary protection as well as those whith temporary protection since February 24, 2022. Since 2018, data on recognised refugees and persons under subsidiary protection is partially based on statistical estimations. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (NDGAP), Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Data are from the National Register of Persons. It is to be expected that figures are overestimates. Reference date: 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Census data for 2016 and 2022. Other years: Annual population estimates - Estimated population.	Central Statistics Office (CSO).
Italy	Data refer to resident foreigners (registered in municipal registry offices). Excludes children under 18 who are registered on their parents' permit. Includes foreigners who were regularised following the 2009 programme. From 2019 on, the data takes into account the results of the permanent population census. Reference date: 1 January.	National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).
Japan	Foreigners staying in Japan for the mid- to long-term with a resident status under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Reference date: 1 January.	Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	Registered foreigners, Ethnic Koreans (F-4) visa holders and foreigners who stayed for more than 90 days with a short-term visa	Ministry of Justice and Korean Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

Country	Comments	Source
Latvia	Population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania	*Reference date:* 1 January.	Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in population register. Excludes visitors (staying for less than 3 months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Number of foreigners who hold a valid permit for permanent or temporary residence. Data until 2013 are estimates under the terms of the 1974 Act; they include immigrants FM2 "inmigrante" and "inmigrado" (boths categories refer to permanent residence) and non-immigrants FM3 with specific categories (temporary residence). Data from 2015 are estimates under the terms of the 2011 Migration Act.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Figures include administrative corrections and asylum seekers (except those staying in reception centres). Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Norway	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. It excludes visitors (staying for less than six months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland		Eurostat.
Portugal	Figures include holders of a valid residence permit and holders of a renewed long-term visa. From 2021 onwards, the Annual Resident Population Estimates are based on administrative sources	AIMA; National Statistical Institute (INE).
Slovak Republic	Holders of a permanent or long-term residence permit.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Number of valid residence permits, regardless of the administrative status of the foreign national. Reference date: 1 January.	Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	All foreign citizens in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. Reference date: 1 January.	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Stock of all those with residence or settlement permits (permits B and C, respectively). Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. Does not include seasonal or cross-border workers. Reference date: 1 January.	Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Türkiye	Reference date: 1 January.	Turkish Statistical Institute.
United Kingdom	Foreign residents. Those with unknown nationality from the New Commonwealth are not included (around 10 000 to 15 000 persons). Reference date: 1 January.	Labour Force Survey, Home Office.
United States	Foreigners born abroad.	Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/312.

Acquisitions of nationality

The provisions of nationality law play a key role in shaping the relative size of the national and foreign populations. For example, countries where foreigners can easily be naturalised, provided they spent a minimum number of years as residents, increases in the foreign population through immigration and births can eventually contribute to a significant rise in the population of nationals. On the other hand, in countries where naturalisation is more difficult, increases in immigration and births among foreigners manifest themselves almost exclusively as growth in the foreign population. In addition, changes in rules regarding naturalisation can have significant impact. For example, during the 1980s, a number of OECD countries made naturalisation easier and this resulted in noticeable falls in the foreign population (and rises in the population of nationals).

However, host-country legislation is not the only factor affecting naturalisation. For example, where naturalisation involves renouncing citizenship of the country of origin, there may be incentives to remain a foreign citizen. Otherwise, the decision to apply for naturalisation may largely be influenced by the time and effort required to make the application, and the symbolic and political value individuals attach to being citizens of one country or another.

Data on naturalisations are usually readily available from administrative sources. The statistics generally cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age or residency, etc., as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of the country.

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries

Numbers and percentages

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Australia	162 002	135 596	133 126	137 750	80 562	127 674	204 817	140 748	167 232	192 472	191 702
% of foreign population	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Austria	8 350	8 265	8 626	9 271	9 450	10 606	8 996	16 171	20 606	19 939	21 891
% of foreign population	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3
Belgium	18 726	27 071	31 935	37 399	36 200	40 594	33 915	39 233	48 482	55 213	60 108
% of foreign population	1.5	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.4	2.7	3.3	3.6	3.7
Canada	262 645	252 197	147 822	106 378	176 502	250 557	110 994	137 175	375 677	379 991	375 440
% of foreign population	..	..	..	..	4.4	..	..	..	11.8	11.4	10.7
Chile	1 048	691	792	2 991	1 801	354	504	2 984	2 051	3 076	2 208
% of foreign population	..	..	..	..	..	0.2	..	..	0.1	..	..
Costa Rica	2 018	3 791	5 562	5 875	5 831	5 808	4 070	3 572	5 493	6 277	5 541
% of foreign population	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czechia	5 114	4 925	5 536	6 440	5 260	4 456	4 214	6 205	6 453	6 389	6 850
% of foreign population	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.6
Denmark	4 747	11 745	15 028	7 272	2 836	1 781	7 076	6 483	5 149	3 355	6 255
% of foreign population	1.3	3.0	3.6	1.6	0.6	0.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.6	1.0
Estonia	1 614	897	1 775	882	766	779	770	1 034	812	1 078	758
% of foreign population	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3
Finland	8 260	7 921	9 375	12 219	9 211	9 649	7 816	6 643	10 198	12 224	11 512
% of foreign population	4.2	3.8	4.3	5.3	3.8	3.9	3.0	2.5	3.7	4.1	3.6
France	105 613	113 608	119 152	114 274	110 014	109 821	86 483	130 385	114 483	97 288	103 661
% of foreign population	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.2	1.7	2.5	2.2	1.8	1.8
Germany	108 422	107 317	110 383	112 211	112 340	128 905	109 880	131 595	168 775	200 095	292 020
% of foreign population	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.2
Greece	21 829	12 837	32 819	34 305	27 857	16 328	13 272	10 120	12 733	13 319	14 896
% of foreign population	2.5	1.5	4.0	4.3	3.4	2.0	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.8	1.9
Hungary	8 745	4 048	4 315	2 787	3 508	3 255	2 139	2 511	2 973	2 429	1 742
% of foreign population	6.2	2.9	3.0	1.8	2.3	2.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.2	0.8
Iceland	595	801	703	637	569	437	395	905	706	649	638
% of foreign population	2.8	3.5	2.9	2.4	1.9	1.2	0.9	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.0
Ireland	21 090	13 565	10 044	8 195	8 223	5 791	5 475	9 778	13 597	18 265	24 037
% of foreign population	3.5	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.0	0.9	1.5	2.1	2.3	..
Italy	129 887	178 035	201 591	146 605	112 523	127 001	131 803	121 457	213 716	213 567	217 448
% of foreign population	3.0	3.6	4.0	2.9	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.4	4.1	4.2	4.2
Japan	9 277	9 469	9 554	10 315	9 074	8 453	9 079	8 167	7 059	8 800	8 863
% of foreign population	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Korea	14 200	13 934	12 854	13 293	14 758	12 875	16 065	14 057	13 878	15 148	15 236
% of foreign population	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Latvia	2 141	1 897	1 957	962	930	808	725	419	518	595	694
% of foreign population	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Lithuania	179	177	173	166	196	123	176	236	126	55	90
% of foreign population	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.0
Luxembourg	4 991	5 306	7 140	9 030	11 864	11 450	9 387	6 801	10 499	11 904	7 415
% of foreign population	2.1	2.1	2.8	3.4	4.2	4.0	3.2	2.3	3.5	3.9	2.4
Mexico	2 341	2 736	2 940	3 067	3 872	3 070	2 044	718	1 106	5 294	6 125
% of foreign population	..	..	..	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.7	..
Netherlands	32 578	27 877	28 534	27 663	27 851	34 191	55 943	62 959	53 678	56 900	58 999
% of foreign population	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.3	5.0	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.1

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
New Zealand	27 894	27 600	31 983	36 447	35 709	31 011	22 749	18 159	40 374	36 426	39 918
% of foreign population	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	15 336	12 432	13 712	21 648	10 361	13 201	19 698	41 092	39 369	37 340	27 460
% of foreign population	3.4	2.6	2.7	4.0	1.9	2.3	3.4	6.8	6.5	6.4	4.5
Poland	4 518	4 048	4 086	4 259	4 593	12 917	7 159	7 537	9 822	6 921	8 479
% of foreign population	4.8	4.0	3.8	2.8	2.2	5.4	2.5	2.1	2.2	1.6	1.9
Portugal	21 124	20 396	25 104	18 022	21 333	21 099	32 147	24 516	20 844	16 985	20 624
% of foreign population	5.1	5.1	6.4	4.6	5.4	5.0	6.7	4.2	3.1	2.4	2.6
Slovak Republic	234	309	484	645	721	586	548	592	677	552	881
% of foreign population	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4
Slovenia	1 057	1 255	1 297	1 563	1 978	2 360	2 042	1 782	1 946	2 052	1 654
% of foreign population	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8
Spain	205 880	114 351	150 944	66 498	90 774	98 954	126 266	144 012	181 581	240 208	252 476
% of foreign population	4.1	2.4	3.4	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.8	3.4	4.4	4.1
Sweden	42 918	48 249	60 343	68 898	63 818	64 206	80 175	89 354	92 225	67 789	62 989
% of foreign population	6.4	6.9	8.2	8.8	7.5	7.2	8.6	9.5	10.3	7.8	7.3
Switzerland	33 321	40 885	41 584	44 509	42 625	40 273	34 061	37 128	41 566	41 299	40 290
% of foreign population	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8
United Kingdom	125 715	118 054	149 378	123 207	157 011	159 356	130 568	189 803	175 972	206 619	269 621
% of foreign population	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.1	2.6	2.7	2.1	..	..	..	..
United States	653 416	730 259	753 060	707 265	761 901	843 593	628 254	813 861	1 004 384	824 250	843 170
% of foreign population	3.0	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.7	2.8	3.8	4.5	3.5	3.4

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.6.

StatLink https://stat.link/zmq54t

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Australia

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	27 827	24 236	21 989	24 181	17 716	28 470	38 209	24 205	30 160	40 361	28 969	52
New Zealand	5 361	4 091	4 390	3 593	1 840	3 027	5 367	5 643	6 254	5 289	27 825	50
United Kingdom	25 884	20 583	20 949	21 069	13 875	13 366	25 018	17 374	19 259	17 303	16 503	47
Philippines	11 628	8 996	8 333	9 112	4 921	9 267	12 838	8 788	11 156	12 650	10 449	62
China	10 613	8 610	7 999	7 580	1 990	8 966	17 008	7 383	7 213	7 563	9 533	55
Iraq	3 150	2 054	1 417	1 930	788	3 087	3 883	3 808	5 114	7 198	7 048	51
Viet Nam	3 514	3 835	4 173	3 859	1 216	3 501	6 804	4 942	6 171	7 110	7 013	64
Afghanistan	2 620	2 103	991	1 102	387	620	5 102	3 674	4 777	6 042	6 515	47
Pakistan	2 739	2 341	3 077	4 480	919	3 360	8 821	5 615	6 247	8 513	5 715	49
South Africa	9 286	6 211	5 629	4 906	3 370	2 680	5 438	3 854	4 869	5 076	4 849	49
Nepal	1 810	2 401	2 959	2 402	1 665	3 294	3 676	2 232	3 029	3 846	4 176	55
Sri Lanka	3 957	3 179	3 752	4 487	3 262	4 861	6 195	2 888	3 209	4 611	3 666	52
Iran	2 155	2 198	2 416	3 182	1 108	2 770	4 634	2 580	2 797	3 642	3 309	51
Syria	207	196	185	281	78	290	1 351	2 524	4 435	5 353	3 205	50
Myanmar	2 391	1 997	1 250	1 481	557	206	161	..	1 968	2 978	3 002	53
Other countries	48 860	42 565	43 617	44 105	26 870	39 909	60 312	45 238	50 574	54 937	49 925	
Total	**162 002**	**135 596**	**133 126**	**137 750**	**80 562**	**127 674**	**204 817**	**140 748**	**167 232**	**192 472**	**191 702**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Austria

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Israel	342	41	41	97	44	60	67	2 635	5 006	4 270	5 102	50
Syria	95	79	134	98	103	164	211	543	1 165	1 866	2 241	40
United States	95	37	25	29	30	23	50	1 659	1 917	1 637	1 914	47
Türkiye	885	998	820	779	828	912	847	1 101	1 087	1 142	1 392	51
Afghanistan	232	187	332	424	328	372	298	545	720	788	1 056	35
United Kingdom	7	10	10	24	44	96	125	1 190	1 593	1 123	938	45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 120	1 218	1 262	1 288	1 033	1 183	967	921	800	803	814	54
Iran	160	184	226	217	306	325	355	389	462	587	655	49
Russia	433	299	337	323	375	464	355	472	628	635	567	58
Serbia	671	636	752	557	625	1 008	943	785	667	535	482	57
Germany	251	160	195	244	274	248	227	273	280	313	381	55
Iraq	100	109	106	102	100	109	103	120	180	363	367	40
Hungary	112	120	155	227	258	237	221	259	307	358	347	59
Ukraine	137	299	225	181	221	360	184	262	665	339	314	65
Romania	244	221	258	291	456	376	301	315	293	284	303	59
Other countries	3 466	3 667	3 748	4 390	4 425	4 669	3 742	4 702	4 836	4 896	5 018	
Total	**8 350**	**8 265**	**8 626**	**9 271**	**9 450**	**10 606**	**8 996**	**16 171**	**20 606**	**19 939**	**21 891**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Belgium

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Morocco	2 408	3 170	3 996	5 084	4 856	4 975	3 756	3 698	4 842	5 289	5 647	56
Syria	92	185	253	243	474	979	1 431	3 385	3 615	3 776	3 639	46
Romania	824	1 192	1 535	2 031	2 219	2 409	2 079	1 968	2 791	3 460	3 336	51
Afghanistan	194	326	534	875	1 067	1 418	1 464	1 460	1 979	2 551	2 771	36
Türkiye	691	843	989	1 061	985	1 073	882	911	1 797	1 978	2 463	47
Italy	1 199	1 067	1 048	1 174	1 352	1 589	1 217	1 229	1 536	2 091	2 225	47
Poland	742	1 136	1 243	1 498	1 528	1 710	1 096	1 064	1 727	1 834	2 044	57
France	586	647	673	795	869	952	862	1 038	1 225	1 446	1 829	52
Netherlands	705	993	1 390	1 368	1 064	1 296	939	1 040	1 433	1 552	1 720	47
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	713	1 061	1 016	1 201	1 191	1 359	1 178	1 240	1 384	1 607	1 717	57
Iraq	377	546	655	930	672	759	888	1 891	2 001	1 829	1 499	46
Cameroon	546	738	845	872	955	1 046	945	1 196	1 266	1 311	1 454	53
West Bank and Gaza Strip	24	37	71	46	49	82	135	174	381	573	1 445	39
Guinea	416	635	681	972	855	832	711	790	1 069	1 271	1 317	55
Spain	266	443	513	717	706	741	612	716	925	1 064	1 251	50
Other countries	8 943	14 052	16 493	18 532	17 358	19 374	15 720	17 433	20 511	23 581	25 751	
Total	**18 726**	**27 071**	**31 935**	**37 399**	**36 200**	**40 594**	**33 915**	**39 233**	**48 482**	**55 213**	**60 108**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Canada

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	26 494	28 095	16 571	9 964	19 407	31 207	15 368	20 797	59 405	78 487	87 320	..
Philippines	27 930	31 876	23 804	14 016	19 592	33 806	15 956	18 207	41 501	36 803	37 755	..
China	22 895	21 255	11 336	6 342	10 476	14 539	5 126	5 831	12 711	14 690	15 920	..
Nigeria	3 007	4 217	2 154	1 888	4 382	5 005	2 278	3 283	12 633	14 277	13 120	..
Pakistan	9 073	8 659	5 768	5 084	9 386	11 166	4 733	5 539	15 186	13 368	10 815	..
Iran	9 414	8 992	3 926	3 520	10 019	14 027	4 885	4 847	13 074	10 748	10 315	..
United States	7 359	6 666	4 495	3 385	4 227	5 621	2 479	3 478	9 240	8 626	9 610	..
Brazil	2 477	2 044	1 007	711	1 296	2 044	843	1 353	5 285	6 880	9 345	..
France	5 724	4 544	2 204	2 081	3 835	5 500	2 317	2 733	8 171	8 263	9 245	..
Syria	1 099	1 255	654	587	1 596	6 453	7 237	10 046	20 507	13 027	6 945	..
United Kingdom	7 333	6 255	4 170	3 009	3 519	4 842	2 021	3 039	6 886	6 767	6 895	..
Viet Nam	2 231	1 955	1 161	811	1 766	2 603	1 152	1 504	4 419	5 386	5 860	..
Jamaica	2 600	1 915	1 577	1 079	1 716	2 735	1 417	1 755	5 427	5 131	5 400	..
Mexico	3 600	3 492	2 110	1 535	2 427	3 767	1 535	1 738	4 740	4 221	4 870	..
Algeria	7 277	5 693	2 468	2 003	3 337	4 243	1 593	1 543	5 205	5 463	4 780	..
Other countries	124 132	115 284	64 417	50 363	79 521	102 999	42 054	51 482	151 287	147 854	137 245	
Total	**262 645**	**252 197**	**147 822**	**106 378**	**176 502**	**250 557**	**110 994**	**137 175**	**375 677**	**379 991**	**375 440**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Chile

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Colombia	24	26	44	95	144	25	58	401	711	1 835	1 234	49
Peru	166	122	121	598	155	68	111	606	337	458	242	59
Ecuador	113	84	70	180	175	12	18	188	105	79	148	49
Venezuela	6	4	14	43	86	3	11	88	38	73	142	24
Bolivia	238	142	167	948	226	74	90	484	224	111	102	68
Dominican Republic	126	83	94	271	272	53	68	309	146	109	69	52
Cuba	14	10	15	103	41	20	32	250	128	105	64	64
Argentina	95	55	66	225	236	29	33	222	103	80	57	63
Haiti	31	29	28	66	68	14	16	66	35	49	23	43
Spain	5	6	4	26	33	2	7	30	18	18	15	60
Russia	6	2	3	7	11	2	3	12	10	8	10	..
Brazil	16	8	6	35	26	6	8	43	29	27	8	38
India	20	11	18	48	25	8	5	29	14	7	8	38
Mexico	6	5	8	28	21	3	6	13	12	4	7	43
Türkiye	3	..	6	5	5	1	..	5	6	3	6	67
Other countries	179	103	128	313	277	34	38	238	135	110	73	
Total	**1 048**	**690**	**792**	**2 991**	**1 801**	**354**	**504**	**2 984**	**2 051**	**3 076**	**2 208**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Costa Rica

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Nicaragua	1 043	1 971	3 010	3 576	3 617	3 690	2 811	2 447	3 256	3 900	3 321	..
Venezuela	25	54	136	191	286	448	263	231	378	658	501	..
Colombia	394	667	757	658	594	457	242	259	351	422	399	..
El Salvador	73	160	196	274	246	234	148	105	162	231	221	..
Panama	39	61	118	86	87	70	39	34	628	104	207	..
United States	70	146	182	153	142	108	74	49	126	159	125	..
Honduras	27	57	107	94	111	101	61	56	79	123	102	..
Peru	46	77	134	87	69	64	59	26	60	78	75	..
Mexico	22	25	44	28	45	59	20	20	36	46	66	..
Dominican Republic	46	65	182	113	125	94	43	44	53	62	56	..
Stateless	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13	53	..
Cuba	52	80	113	104	107	78	64	34	45	76	52	..
Guatemala	17	43	43	32	59	57	28	34	37	54	42	..
Spain	5	15	40	43	42	39	27	23	37	42	36	..
Argentina	8	12	28	21	21	21	11	13	39	38	31	..
Other countries	151	358	472	415	280	288	180	197	206	271	254	
Total	**2 018**	**3 791**	**5 562**	**5 875**	**5 831**	**5 808**	**4 070**	**3 572**	**5 493**	**6 277**	**5 541**	**58**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Czechia

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	2 075	1 044	1 429	1 891	1 319	1 002	940	1 484	1 573	1 254	1 487	..
Russia	463	305	563	752	633	574	516	921	921	1 175	1 077	..
Slovak Republic	574	111	372	630	501	421	365	587	684	858	967	..
Belarus	137	94	135	215	139	107	115	139	141	167	127	..
Viet Nam	298	271	405	223	231	129	89	174	176	125	102	..
Kazakhstan	122	48	50	64	53	41	60	87	91	122	77	..
Poland	105	34	96	110	60	58	54	78	122	57	76	..
Moldova	175	55	93	138	118	92	58	88	72	62	60	..
Romania	311	111	115	108	82	69	33	44	58	33	53	..
Bulgaria	52	51	65	87	53	30	31	46	49	50	50	..
Stateless	10	4	8	28	5	3	3	6	17	12	34	..
Serbia	57	65	66	90	57	38	47	42	22	35	32	..
Bosnia and Herzegovina	59	47	49	51	38	28	32	22	29	19	28	..
Azerbaijan	16	4	5	3	3	6	2	12	27	21	25	..
North Macedonia	20	23	28	47	31	22	15	32	49	25	22	..
Other countries	640	2 658	2 057	2 003	1 937	1 836	1 854	2 443	2 422	2 374	2 633	
Total	**5 114**	**4 925**	**5 536**	**6 440**	**5 260**	**4 456**	**4 214**	**6 205**	**6 453**	**6 389**	**6 850**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Denmark

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
United Kingdom	21	20	85	164	143	118	692	546	327	202	362	43
Pakistan	38	191	641	199	82	43	630	470	332	213	344	42
Germany	27	38	110	248	168	129	375	290	278	159	315	49
India	34	31	211	85	48	45	241	269	302	130	300	46
Ukraine	10	72	228	329	73	79	362	380	258	144	289	45
Iran	130	100	453	157	30	25	100	127	94	113	286	43
Stateless	161	130	415	274	92	14	353	166	193	147	255	44
Syria	14	13	88	20	6	5	22	26	29	26	255	29
Poland	29	45	174	372	122	78	384	232	201	143	255	66
Romania	8	43	101	164	49	38	197	202	139	131	244	62
Türkiye	150	193	977	353	113	71	192	214	155	83	176	53
Sweden	47	105	277	164	185	117	140	128	213	129	152	70
Afghanistan	917	408	1 621	297	67	62	164	176	101	83	149	36
Russia	31	76	232	330	110	62	209	170	119	54	125	82
Iraq	1 588	1 131	2 917	357	96	82	195	158	139	85	119	48
Other countries	1 542	9 149	6 498	3 759	1 452	813	2 820	2 929	2 269	1 513	2 629	
Total	**4 747**	**11 745**	**15 028**	**7 272**	**2 836**	**1 781**	**7 076**	**6 483**	**5 149**	**3 355**	**6 255**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Estonia

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Stateless	1 360	737	1 452	590	497	483	501	640	377	516	409	53
Russia	204	132	244	225	199	230	198	298	365	467	201	55
Belarus	3	..	5	6	6	4	5	7	15	17	23	74
Ukraine	30	19	29	30	26	33	19	34	10	12	21	62
Pakistan	4	..	..	1	1	2	8	1	1	5	21	38
Azerbaijan	..	..	1	4	1	3	1	1	1	..	10	80
Latvia	3	1	8	2	7	1	5	10	4	9	9	89
Türkiye	1	1	2	1	2	5	3	3	6	8	7	14
Armenia	..	1	12	4	6	1	8	5	2	4	5	20
Sudan	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	25
India	2	..	3	2	2	1	3	4	4	2	4	25
Bangladesh	..	1	..	2	..	..	..	4	4	..	4	50
Yemen	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	0
Georgia	1	..	3	3	1	5	1	3	3	4	4	75
Israel	..	..	..	1	1	1	..	1	1	3	4	100
Other countries	6	..	16	10	17	10	18	23	19	31	28	
Total	**1 614**	**897**	**1 775**	**882**	**766**	**779**	**770**	**1 034**	**812**	**1 078**	**758**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Finland

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Russia	2 317	1 728	2 028	2 758	1 766	1 946	1 546	1 161	2 062	1 906	1 624	61
Iraq	405	560	534	742	621	589	602	744	950	1 517	1 352	43
Afghanistan	251	242	376	469	339	309	264	227	363	681	739	40
Syria	16	28	47	118	118	299	205	360	352	805	707	48
Somalia	834	955	1 066	957	856	583	541	436	554	728	653	52
Estonia	382	420	459	705	541	658	516	370	626	486	541	60
Thailand	125	150	193	261	249	281	304	209	325	296	369	79
Ukraine	141	145	163	281	202	255	220	171	321	309	357	61
Viet Nam	114	146	225	249	197	221	148	140	331	293	317	66
Iran	219	140	222	309	244	205	156	155	219	288	304	46
Sweden	186	165	206	212	210	248	196	282	199	332	264	44
India	152	137	193	245	154	174	181	105	174	257	249	59
Türkiye	257	229	264	313	210	260	172	125	238	243	230	46
Philippines	67	79	106	141	182	225	124	97	158	177	216	74
Nepal	48	74	123	178	125	132	119	106	171	197	214	62
Other countries	2 746	2 723	3 170	4 281	3 197	3 264	2 522	1 955	3 155	3 709	3 376	
Total	**8 260**	**7 921**	**9 375**	**12 219**	**9 211**	**9 649**	**7 816**	**6 643**	**10 198**	**12 224**	**11 512**	**54**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – France

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Morocco	18 051	19 110	17 769	16 687	15 390	15 776	12 759	18 905	16 131	13 302	14 454	50
Algeria	15 142	17 377	17 662	16 283	14 867	14 785	11 072	15 228	13 368	11 411	12 002	51
Tunisia	6 274	7 018	7 663	7 045	6 687	6 640	5 346	8 710	7 555	6 364	7 250	50
Türkiye	5 835	5 595	5 757	5 332	5 101	5 198	3 982	5 543	5 394	4 715	4 831	48
Côte d'Ivoire	3 055	3 188	3 652	3 363	3 012	2 863	2 399	3 887	3 319	2 556	2 858	51
Senegal	3 048	3 382	3 369	3 249	2 949	2 940	2 224	3 569	2 999	2 407	2 642	48
Mali	3 345	3 621	4 111	4 057	3 662	3 638	2 666	4 029	3 293	2 592	2 593	45
Congo	1 797	2 089	2 181	2 967	2 935	2 994	2 248	4 282	3 687	2 678	2 535	51
Russia	3 040	2 654	4 094	3 550	2 011	2 414	1 775	2 775	2 434	2 330	2 514	68
Comoros	2 175	1 881	2 869	2 917	3 903	2 613	1 834	2 510	2 127	2 770	2 404	50
Cameroon	3 010	3 125	3 377	3 137	2 502	2 463	2 108	3 841	2 859	2 081	2 196	56
Guinea	1 457	1 678	1 820	1 995	1 828	1 878	1 545	2 760	2 336	1 752	1 950	41
Haiti	2 181	2 228	2 922	2 574	2 496	2 603	2 059	2 870	2 365	2 001	1 920	53
Romania	1 486	1 557	1 695	1 882	1 956	1 896	1 522	2 598	2 283	1 788	1 741	56
Madagascar	1 621	1 734	1 728	1 624	1 697	1 639	1 199	1 756	1 510	1 562	1 659	68
Other countries	34 096	37 371	38 483	37 612	39 018	39 481	31 745	47 122	42 823	36 979	40 112	
Total	**105 613**	**113 608**	**119 152**	**114 274**	**110 014**	**109 821**	**86 483**	**130 385**	**114 483**	**97 288**	**103 661**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Germany

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Syria	1 820	2 027	2 263	2 479	2 880	3 860	6 700	19 095	48 385	75 485	83 185	39
Türkiye	22 463	19 695	16 290	14 984	16 700	16 235	11 630	12 245	14 265	10 735	22 525	46
Iraq	3 172	3 450	3 553	3 480	4 080	4 645	4 770	4 420	6 815	10 710	13 545	41
Russia	2 743	2 329	2 375	2 123	1 930	2 125	1 950	1 895	1 755	1 995	12 980	67
Afghanistan	3 000	2 572	2 482	2 400	2 545	2 675	2 880	3 175	4 205	6 520	10 095	35
Ukraine	3 142	4 168	4 048	2 718	2 455	4 260	2 260	1 915	5 565	5 910	8 920	65
Romania	2 566	3 001	3 828	4 238	4 325	5 830	5 930	6 920	6 990	7 575	8 675	57
Iran	2 546	2 533	2 661	2 689	3 080	3 805	3 965	4 020	4 790	6 420	8 245	46
Poland	5 932	5 957	6 632	6 613	6 220	6 020	5 000	5 490	5 555	5 440	6 215	66
Pakistan	1 300	1 393	1 474	1 187	1 320	1 790	1 955	2 170	1 980	2 295	5 000	38
India	1 295	1 343	1 549	1 619	1 760	2 130	2 235	2 515	2 775	3 405	4 705	42
Serbia	2 223	1 941	2 596	1 950	2 475	3 115	2 765	2 225	1 710	1 420	4 680	51
Italy	3 245	3 406	3 597	4 256	4 050	4 475	4 075	5 045	4 510	4 000	4 295	49
Israel	1 432	1 481	1 428	1 080	680	1 000	1 025	2 485	3 685	3 170	4 275	49
Stateless	999	897	868	782	705	735	795	1 355	2 580	3 595	4 135	42
Other countries	50 544	51 124	54 739	59 613	57 135	66 205	51 945	56 625	53 210	51 420	90 545	
Total	**108 422**	**107 317**	**110 383**	**112 211**	**112 340**	**128 905**	**109 880**	**131 595**	**168 775**	**200 095**	**292 020**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Greece

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Albania	18 409	10 665	28 251	29 769	24 203	14 050	10 795	7 736	9 631	9 943	10 903	..
Russia	309	289	386	345	353	184	186	195	291	303	385	..
Ukraine	231	188	504	449	388	171	223	183	334	384	365	..
Romania	156	136	234	306	291	205	273	219	248	317	343	..
Georgia	226	189	331	323	300	207	148	129	207	247	255	..
Bulgaria	200	142	287	329	220	136	230	181	213	195	217	..
India	18	18	255	278	245	190	171	131	110	141	211	..
Egypt	57	45	358	283	144	114	78	56	84	112	203	..
Moldova	124	114	365	378	241	137	115	104	171	184	200	..
United States	65	62	52	48	51	20	46	51	61	82	198	..
Armenia	150	109	296	287	240	154	82	107	118	152	181	..
Cyprus	93	73	95	76	38	46	61	60	152	159	138	..
Türkiye	151	139	141	107	106	63	84	73	61	72	131	..
United Kingdom	43	43	31	58	52	30	118	264	142	99	91	..
Syria	87	46	123	133	78	68	37	44	73	94	81	..
Other countries	1 510	579	1 110	1 136	907	553	625	587	837	835	994	
Total	**21 829**	**12 837**	**32 819**	**34 305**	**27 857**	**16 328**	**13 272**	**10 120**	**12 733**	**13 319**	**14 896**	**54**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Hungary

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Romania	6 200	2 605	2 874	1 757	2 123	1 822	1 058	1 319	1 523	1 126	753	44
Slovak Republic	310	208	282	136	223	260	234	298	454	311	211	57
Russia	170	131	119	75	89	93	74	61	100	138	94	71
Ukraine	858	386	365	186	192	142	82	75	75	72	84	64
Venezuela	3	1	..	2	46	129	97	93	229	134	64	61
Viet Nam	67	39	36	46	87	100	62	36	51	39	49	67
Serbia	410	158	144	93	105	88	52	59	58	61	44	39
Egypt	81	93	101	119	191	103	124	105	30	82	42	40
Germany	59	29	15	38	50	59	45	60	69	47	34	65
China	13	12	15	14	12	4	5	8	17	22	33	70
Türkiye	58	19	20	23	20	26	18	23	21	38	28	18
Iran	16	10	21	10	11	21	13	14	24	19	20	25
United Kingdom	4	3	11	14	22	52	35	53	23	20	19	21
Syria	57	21	11	21	15	13	5	16	15	12	12	25
United States	25	13	17	10	17	25	25	18	18	26	12	58
Other countries	414	320	284	243	305	318	210	273	266	282	243	
Total	**8 745**	**4 048**	**4 315**	**2 787**	**3 508**	**3 255**	**2 139**	**2 511**	**2 973**	**2 429**	**1 742**	**49**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Iceland

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Poland	149	265	224	223	149	131	134	190	180	156	110	58
Philippines	52	74	55	41	20	27	13	46	39	32	37	62
Iraq	3	1	2	1	6	..	3	9	10	9	30	50
Viet Nam	33	33	26	22	27	30	18	87	49	32	24	54
Syria	1	3	8	3	57	4	1	23	15	17	22	45
Thailand	43	42	48	34	37	19	19	45	25	40	22	64
Denmark	5	11	35	22	9	9	6	22	22	9	21	57
United States	14	18	11	17	28	12	9	34	21	17	19	47
Lithuania	16	10	16	15	13	4	15	30	23	11	16	31
Iran	1	..	1	5	6	2	4	10	7	14	15	40
Hungary	..	7	1	2	3	8	3	5	8	4	15	40
Russia	13	25	14	20	10	11	7	14	7	21	15	67
Sweden	6	11	17	10	15	5	12	18	15	13	12	67
Serbia	7	15	13	5	2	3	6	6	11	4	12	75
Romania	10	24	5	4	3	11	2	16	20	6	12	50
Other countries	242	262	227	213	184	..	143	350	254	264	256	
Total	**595**	**801**	**703**	**637**	**569**	**437**	**395**	**905**	**706**	**649**	**638**	**55**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Ireland

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	2 939	1 611	1 028	665	629	515	465	746	1 176	2 503	3 947	46
Brazil	459	393	304	264	220	188	180	334	524	844	1 708	53
United Kingdom	51	54	98	529	687	665	945	1 186	1 257	1 009	1 541	45
Romania	1 029	901	756	763	819	552	538	720	895	1 007	1 355	48
Nigeria	3 293	1 360	776	509	478	305	227	743	783	1 173	1 237	50
Philippines	2 184	1 167	729	362	320	191	157	217	333	698	1 122	65
Poland	939	1 161	1 326	1 357	1 464	925	758	819	875	990	1 047	50
China	576	494	304	225	234	162	129	293	389	857	993	55
Pakistan	1 244	732	419	341	364	125	136	611	1 068	1 068	765	42
South Africa	563	..	213	140	143	97	85	176	257	370	761	51
United States	304	246	233	177	195	154	132	199	333	389	579	62
Egypt	161	125	81	60	71	52	46	108	193	396	432	38
Syria	55	26	31	24	28	21	35	152	635	730	404	48
Russia	320	154	109	96	91	70	66	113	198	323	389	62
Zimbabwe	204	133	88	41	40	19	29	90	113	222	379	63
Other countries	6 769	5 008	3 549	2 642	2 440	1 750	1 547	3 271	4 568	5 686	7 378	
Total	**21 090**	**13 565**	**10 044**	**8 195**	**8 223**	**5 791**	**5 475**	**9 778**	**13 597**	**18 265**	**24 037**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Italy

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Albania	21 148	35 134	36 920	27 112	21 841	26 033	28 107	22 493	38 129	31 728	31 643	50
Morocco	29 025	32 448	35 212	22 645	15 496	15 812	18 024	16 588	30 953	27 901	27 638	47
Romania	6 442	14 403	12 967	8 042	6 542	10 201	11 449	9 435	16 302	14 409	14 763	58
Argentina	331	404	753	956	1 348	2 304	1 717	3 669	10 041	16 076	13 559	49
India	5 015	6 176	9 527	8 200	5 425	4 683	5 602	4 489	8 509	9 736	12 258	37
Brazil	1 579	1 458	5 799	9 936	10 660	10 762	7 149	5 460	11 239	12 891	11 058	51
Bangladesh	5 323	5 953	8 442	4 411	1 873	1 541	5 661	5 116	6 921	8 066	9 726	36
Moldova	1 475	2 464	5 605	3 827	3 068	3 788	4 340	3 633	7 527	8 020	9 154	61
Egypt	3 138	4 422	3 438	1 477	1 122	1 245	2 791	3 531	7 029	8 675	9 073	37
Pakistan	4 216	5 617	7 678	6 170	1 974	2 722	5 629	4 410	4 936	3 580	7 203	38
Ukraine	1 443	1 822	2 890	2 698	2 423	2 400	2 305	2 682	5 393	5 881	6 280	69
Peru	3 136	5 503	5 783	3 689	2 421	2 685	2 553	2 748	4 851	5 131	5 372	59
Tunisia	4 411	5 585	4 882	3 187	2 484	2 471	2 718	3 036	5 361	5 351	5 189	44
Philippines	1 937	3 050	2 737	1 964	1 856	2 338	1 818	2 342	3 488	4 044	4 465	55
Ecuador	1 182	2 660	4 604	3 426	2 306	3 041	2 579	3 362	5 739	5 801	4 426	57
Other countries	40 086	50 936	54 354	38 865	31 684	34 975	29 361	28 463	47 298	46 277	45 641	
Total	**129 887**	**178 035**	**201 591**	**146 605**	**112 523**	**127 001**	**131 803**	**121 457**	**213 716**	**213 567**	**217 448**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Japan

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
China	3 060	2 813	2 626	3 088	3 025	2 374	2 881	2 526	2 262	2 651	3 122	..
Korea	4 744	5 247	5 434	5 631	4 357	4 360	4 113	3 564	2 663	2 807	2 283	..
Nepal	..	..	..	..	..	..	100	108	139	331	585	..
Brazil	..	..	..	..	..	383	409	444	340	526	498	..
Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	264	301	269	360	625	408	..
Philippines	..	..	..	..	..	235	301	237	217	347	323	..
Sri Lanka	..	..	..	..	..	46	55	77	80	160	220	..
Peru	..	..	..	..	..	168	172	175	185	206	210	..
Bangladesh	..	..	..	..	..	81	125	129	125	147	196	..
Myanmar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	153	..
Other countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	622	638	688	1 000	865	
Total	**9 277**	**9 469**	**9 554**	**10 315**	**9 074**	**8 453**	**9 079**	**8 167**	**7 059**	**8 800**	**8 863**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Korea

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
China	7 056	6 755	5 331	5 097	5 092	4 620	8 122	5 398	4 654	5 081	6 414	..
Viet Nam	3 044	2 834	3 429	3 894	4 988	4 008	4 194	4 335	4 580	3 952	3 096	..
United States	1 764	1 681	1 498	1 667	1 694	1 490	1 075	1 734	1 976	2 693	2 314	..
Canada	250	305	289	359	339	280	228	357	415	678	617	..
Philippines	400	412	476	496	750	612	500	363	370	433	482	..
Chinese Taipei	286	479	303	249	279	388	418	466	286	435	400	..
Cambodia	404	427	503	418	464	365	327	278	291	370	347	..
Thailand	84	81	75	94	99	115	116	128	187	190	236	..
Russia	93	134	138	100	77	119	104	97	109	122	199	..
Japan	82	95	68	68	71	59	72	110	127	150	137	..
Australia	95	96	102	112	116	122	64	65	130	165	136	..
Uzbekistan	96	120	87	82	86	93	151	115	136	133	124	..
Mongolia	133	119	125	121	125	117	159	122	78	154	106	..
New Zealand	22	17	31	35	37	35	14	46	67	122	95	..
Kyrgyzstan	27	34	41	25	37	23	58	27	30	33	48	..
Other countries	364	345	358	476	504	429	463	416	442	437	485	
Total	**14 200**	**13 934**	**12 854**	**13 293**	**14 758**	**12 875**	**16 065**	**14 057**	**13 878**	**15 148**	**15 236**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Latvia

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Russia	109	70	127	53	50	59	92	40	114	142	121	..
Belarus	15	12	14	5	13	12	11	4	16	6	9	..
China	..	..	..	1	2	..	..	..	..	3	4	..
United Kingdom	16	19	130	..	..	2	..	..	2	..	2	..
North Macedonia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..
Moldova	4	2	9	1	3	1	1	..	..	..	2	..
Armenia	4	5	5	3	3	1	5	3	..	..	2	..
Stateless	..	3	..	..	5	..	3	..	..	1	2	..
Germany	11	6	18	1	1	1	3	..	1	..	2	..
United States	25	10	20	2	..	3	4	3	..	..	2	..
Lithuania	5	9	13	9	3	3	1	2	2	..	2	..
Nepal	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	2	..	1	..
Azerbaijan	..	1	6	5	2	..	2	..	1	..	1	..
Finland	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..
South Africa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..
Other countries	..	..	..	881	848	..	..	..	..	443	540	
Total	**2 141**	**1 897**	**1 957**	**962**	**930**	**808**	**725**	**419**	**518**	**595**	**694**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Lithuania

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Stateless	61	50	33	31	50	38	45	88	29	14	23	..
Ukraine	26	28	36	29	26	16	20	31	15	12	22	..
Türkiye	2	..	2	6	8	..	4	3	..	3	8	..
Armenia	6	9	5	8	7	5	5	7	2	..	5	..
Israel	..	2	1	2	..	..	2	..	1	..	4	..
Kazakhstan	7	5	7	2	1	2	6	6	..	..	4	..
Egypt	1	2	3	1	7	3	2	2	3	..	3	..
Azerbaijan	..	..	1	1	2	5	2	..	2	5	3	..
Georgia	1	2	5	1	3	..	2	1	1	2	3	..
Algeria	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	2	..
India	..	..	1	1	2	..	1	..	3	1	2	..
Pakistan	..	2	1	..	1	..	..	..	4	1	1	..
Tunisia	1	1	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	..
Russia	49	38	49	43	39	34	47	45	29	1	1	..
Iran	..	..	1	1	1	..	2	1	2	..	1	..
Other countries	25	..	27	40	48	..	37	51	..	16	7	
Total	**179**	**177**	**173**	**166**	**196**	**123**	**176**	**236**	**126**	**55**	**90**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Luxembourg

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
France	860	1 205	2 262	2 468	2 784	2 466	2 264	1 704	1 191	1 131	975	..
Brazil	15	30	100	280	931	2 116	1 799	137	3 275	4 404	606	..
United States	80	100	233	412	665	730	438	139	889	936	475	..
Belgium	1 346	1 264	1 836	1 624	1 598	1 335	1 013	844	551	516	366	..
Italy	418	313	304	379	461	339	256	283	273	320	316	..
Germany	209	279	246	288	364	360	360	289	289	308	307	..
India	5	7	13	24	28	52	34	68	99	124	156	..
Cape Verde	27	47	33	142	220	167	129	128	186	159	140	..
United Kingdom	66	75	128	384	440	431	291	201	158	189	138	..
Montenegro	118	127	134	264	490	372	260	198	172	101	104	..
Morocco	9	6	11	28	36	36	24	35	58	59	95	..
Spain	48	42	44	85	124	90	79	98	83	100	82	..
Bosnia and Herzegovina	56	70	71	161	394	186	100	60	96	86	73	..
Iraq	2	..	1	7	12	10	13	62	92	120	70	..
Hungary	7	6	12	14	24	42	47	33	..	38	61	..
Other countries	1 725	1 735	1 712	2 470	3 293	2 718	2 280	2 522	3 087	3 313	3 451	
Total	**4 991**	**5 306**	**7 140**	**9 030**	**11 864**	**11 450**	**9 387**	**6 801**	**10 499**	**11 904**	**7 415**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Mexico

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Venezuela	259	484	580	725	1 245	1 096	801	253	552	..	..	55
Cuba	287	305	341	403	467	376	280	145	161	..	..	49
Colombia	397	378	358	346	364	265	201	66	78	..	..	63
Spain	119	169	166	165	173	116	70	16	29	..	..	34
Argentina	130	126	172	141	147	93	63	18	20	..	..	50
Ecuador	40	62	56	63	78	49	31	15	18	..	..	39
Haiti	6	9	14	13	14	13	13	9	17	..	..	12
Russia	44	29	28	38	41	45	24	7	16	..	..	94
Peru	100	93	79	79	72	58	35	6	16	..	..	25
Honduras	60	74	89	66	94	78	57	17	15	..	..	40
United States	120	136	119	127	189	139	46	22	13	..	..	38
Nicaragua	28	23	32	36	35	28	19	3	12	..	..	50
El Salvador	66	66	75	73	100	79	47	26	11	..	..	18
Guatemala	62	57	98	84	75	62	38	18	10	..	..	50
Dominican Republic	53	63	81	72	69	52	30	6	8	..	..	25
Other countries	570	662	652	636	709	521	289	91	130	..	..	
Total	**2 341**	**2 736**	**2 940**	**3 067**	**3 872**	**3 070**	**2 044**	**718**	**1 106**	**5 294**	**6 125**	**50**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Netherlands

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Syria	235	210	86	94	214	1 587	15 898	27 040	14 937	11 439	9 586	45
Türkiye	3 119	2 824	2 764	2 947	2 675	2 828	3 052	2 886	3 292	4 585	6 473	49
Eritrea	52	70	51	63	70	237	3 911	7 391	5 709	5 219	4 610	54
India	794	638	574	616	661	756	2 035	1 739	3 012	3 953	4 519	47
Morocco	4 251	3 272	3 364	2 944	3 005	2 582	2 973	2 191	2 284	2 781	2 677	56
Iran	690	464	449	492	443	463	1 338	1 055	1 379	1 569	2 415	49
Russia	446	355	403	376	399	409	847	846	1 238	1 868	1 594	62
Afghanistan	1 027	510	477	453	392	390	1 253	1 014	1 215	1 293	1 322	51
Iraq	1 331	909	922	738	761	849	1 653	1 430	1 503	1 422	1 259	45
Yemen	27	17	25	13	15	23	57	80	95	367	1 205	39
Suriname	828	594	601	536	560	593	721	678	674	964	1 097	63
South Africa	204	149	139	136	158	165	283	272	432	782	1 044	49
Ukraine	337	277	256	277	304	343	708	631	664	902	1 042	60
China	628	745	499	289	455	694	334	403	620	773	992	54
Stateless	116	123	101	360	2 380	5 257	3 147	1 537	1 126	1 059	955	42
Other countries	18 493	16 720	17 823	17 329	15 359	17 015	17 733	13 766	15 498	17 924	18 209	
Total	**32 578**	**27 877**	**28 534**	**27 663**	**27 851**	**34 191**	**55 943**	**62 959**	**53 678**	**56 900**	**58 999**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – New Zealand

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	2 214	2 394	3 339	4 665	4 845	4 680	3 309	2 727	8 169	6 609	5 778	51
United Kingdom	4 413	3 996	4 926	5 955	5 472	4 413	3 747	3 054	6 093	4 836	4 602	48
South Africa	3 690	3 531	3 636	2 895	2 691	2 463	1 740	1 245	4 065	3 387	4 131	50
Philippines	2 715	2 988	3 018	3 567	3 078	2 556	2 016	1 521	4 431	3 822	3 921	57
Samoa	2 589	2 721	3 030	2 952	3 186	2 814	1 596	1 287	1 458	1 815	3 072	48
China	1 320	1 005	1 221	1 314	1 176	1 107	738	573	1 326	1 668	2 472	53
Fiji	2 235	2 367	2 694	3 243	2 541	2 013	1 299	966	1 668	1 821	2 217	53
United States	564	516	627	774	813	663	525	522	957	786	819	58
Tonga	501	504	765	684	849	702	384	312	270	531	792	50
Germany	222	195	246	315	282	225	195	123	252	252	765	58
New Zealand	201	225	321	372	435	408	291	240	558	522	660	50
Sri Lanka	330	438	519	678	636	546	327	285	807	618	606	53
Malaysia	399	408	507	552	513	393	273	213	342	423	540	50
Brazil	153	207	243	375	291	333	204	216	480	456	519	54
Pakistan	156	153	195	201	363	537	471	348	753	513	474	50
Other countries	6 192	5 952	6 696	7 905	8 538	7 158	5 634	4 527	8 745	8 367	8 550	
Total	**27 894**	**27 600**	**31 983**	**36 447**	**35 709**	**31 011**	**22 749**	**18 159**	**40 374**	**36 426**	**39 918**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Norway

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Syria	65	84	107	289	144	253	817	1 361	4 188	9 033	3 748	46
Poland	324	241	276	442	122	152	258	1 727	3 735	3 358	2 266	53
Sweden	253	300	233	257	235	133	1 172	4 590	3 657	2 384	2 062	51
Eritrea	563	1 114	1 879	2 971	1 091	1 406	2 790	3 559	3 592	2 588	1 808	42
Afghanistan	1 371	1 088	999	1 264	451	655	360	1 361	1 369	867	934	46
Philippines	851	704	567	1 389	410	682	718	1 955	1 359	861	823	78
Germany	139	125	141	245	89	101	86	271	390	660	804	50
Russia	401	444	457	464	353	186	638	3 216	1 702	910	789	63
Denmark	161	120	39	77	63	26	487	1 576	945	719	712	47
Somalia	1 138	451	1 200	1 746	1 881	2 986	3 051	1 831	1 185	899	659	50
Serbia	173	177	124	154	86	56	360	1 161	1 067	778	642	55
United Kingdom	62	54	27	71	66	23	230	1 578	818	1 054	537	40
Thailand	547	683	677	1 666	300	583	586	1 560	1 005	567	515	78
Lithuania	105	72	105	248	112	122	205	256	473	601	511	46
Iran	336	353	414	626	365	333	621	559	600	406	485	47
Other countries	8 847	6 422	6 467	9 739	4 593	5 504	7 319	14 531	13 284	11 655	10 165	
Total	**15 336**	**12 432**	**13 712**	**21 648**	**10 361**	**13 201**	**19 698**	**41 092**	**39 369**	**37 340**	**27 460**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Poland

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Belarus	741	527	512	229	833	2 145	2 010	2 211	3 005	4 466	5 830	..
Ukraine	1 911	2 010	1 432	900	2 608	7 072	3 985	4 007	5 201	887	759	..
Russia	370	251	112	63	219	367	311	329	404	597	753	..
Armenia	367	285	160	113	119	120	90	67	107	106	147	..
Viet Nam	289	222	68	120	136	246	93	143	154	86	136	..
Egypt	5	15	9	2	30	36	27	23	40	35	49	..
Kazakhstan	36	36	17	13	40	32	27	23	12	32	47	..
India	14	36	6	10	23	33	20	26	27	35	40	..
Germany	38	17	31	34	39	31	15	31	46	37	37	..
United States	26	22	23	11	19	32	15	31	35	27	33	..
Algeria	6	11	8	1	7	15	9	10	22	25	27	..
Romania	25	22	15	11	19	14	15	18	15	21	26	..
Morocco	6	7	4	4	11	15	16	11	22	18	25	..
Türkiye	33	36	34	22	33	57	43	56	77	30	25	..
Serbia and Montenegro	7	14	14	3	15	20	12	5	14	20	20	..
Other countries	644	537	1 641	2 723	442	2 682	471	546	641	499	525	
Total	**4 518**	**4 048**	**4 086**	**4 259**	**4 593**	**12 917**	**7 159**	**7 537**	**9 822**	**6 921**	**8 479**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Portugal

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Brazil	4 656	6 394	7 804	6 084	6 928	6 468	10 109	7 736	6 404	5 473	7 187	57
Cape Verde	3 200	2 854	3 607	2 591	3 640	3 462	4 701	2 913	2 225	1 539	2 265	55
Angola	1 630	1 316	1 507	1 225	1 438	1 387	2 118	1 587	1 598	1 287	2 003	54
Guinea-Bissau	1 915	1 676	1 884	1 226	1 542	1 451	2 257	1 304	1 095	859	1 440	46
Ukraine	3 310	2 895	3 240	1 909	1 752	1 620	2 111	1 603	1 797	1 441	971	55
Nepal	53	102	293	319	426	1 103	1 249	1 406	1 215	1 149	860	30
Sao Tome and Principe	938	809	1 061	753	1 006	951	1 271	732	640	531	799	58
India	490	454	1 002	693	855	747	1 326	1 113	1 104	715	680	25
Bangladesh	71	98	230	189	284	629	678	788	528	510	451	23
Romania	687	515	621	412	434	484	582	400	260	242	434	58
Pakistan	333	189	407	239	285	291	688	507	422	339	375	34
Israel	5	4	10	18	14	22	742	1 013	668	521	344	46
Russia	395	327	359	194	272	196	368	228	216	112	245	57
Mozambique	148	148	206	158	175	161	283	202	174	129	233	62
China	147	147	173	102	117	108	150	129	134	89	185	54
Other countries	3 146	2 468	2 700	1 910	2 165	2 019	3 514	2 855	2 364	2 049	2 152	
Total	**21 124**	**20 396**	**25 104**	**18 022**	**21 333**	**21 099**	**32 147**	**24 516**	**20 844**	**16 985**	**20 624**	**51**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovak Republic

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Ukraine	62	73	77	129	127	76	90	74	128	108	177	49
United States	5	31	19	16	39	35	35	21	32	33	130	52
Germany	1	11	38	35	41	33	23	16	35	32	49	53
Hungary	1	4	6	13	15	8	8	9	13	29	47	38
United Kingdom	..	2	15	33	60	70	30	18	31	28	35	57
Canada	..	1	..	5	19	11	6	4	2	3	31	42
Serbia	5	8	94	124	42	26	55	242	171	32	27	30
Romania	7	5	26	24	25	17	17	9	14	25	24	38
Australia	..	..	4	12	10	20	16	16	16	6	17	59
Poland	2	4	4	6	9	7	9	6	7	6	13	62
Switzerland	..	4	3	9	9	24	3	13	4	8	12	58
North Macedonia	5	3	2	10	3	6	7	5	5	8	11	36
Israel	2	1	5	2	1	..	2	..	1	5	11	45
Russia	5	5	7	6	27	21	8	21	10	24	10	70
Belarus	5	1	2	5	10	3	4	3	12	10	10	30
Other countries	134	156	182	216	284	229	235	135	196	195	277	
Total	**234**	**309**	**484**	**645**	**721**	**586**	**548**	**592**	**677**	**552**	**881**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovenia

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	570	741	724	918	1 321	1 228	1 146	988	884	879	766	51
North Macedonia	117	145	166	208	222	209	174	242	234	206	271	55
Serbia	155	127	159	153	179	360	269	236	258	191	179	50
Russia	26	8	11	17	7	13	24	26	31	34	52	65
Croatia	34	30	30	22	40	66	42	50	29	30	38	50
Bulgaria	1	4	1	5	3	12	18	15	32	34	36	61
Ukraine	17	21	29	23	24	33	21	31	15	19	31	52
Montenegro	9	20	25	24	22	17	10	12	8	15	15	53
Poland	..	1	3	5	2	4	2	..	7	8	13	77
Venezuela	..	1	1	3	..	54	10	1	24	5	11	64
Iran	1	..	3	2	2	2	1	2	3	11	7	71
China	7	4	7	2	3	1	2	1	3	2	7	43
Türkiye	..	1	..	2	3	..	3	3	4	5	7	29
Moldova	10	6	6	7	3	6	9	3	12	4	6	50
Slovak Republic	2	3	4	..	2	5	1	5	4	4	5	80
Other countries	108	143	128	172	145	350	310	167	398	605	210	
Total	**1 057**	**1 255**	**1 297**	**1 563**	**1 978**	**2 360**	**2 042**	**1 782**	**1 946**	**2 052**	**1 654**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Spain

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Morocco	34 806	24 286	37 010	17 082	25 315	24 527	28 240	42 000	55 463	54 027	42 910	48
Venezuela	4 302	2 332	3 127	1 068	2 034	2 554	5 817	6 536	8 036	30 154	35 403	58
Colombia	25 114	11 881	14 299	5 647	6 826	7 515	9 021	8 328	11 125	18 738	26 224	60
Honduras	2 142	1 632	2 525	1 267	1 783	2 739	3 868	4 235	5 778	11 189	15 574	74
Ecuador	32 756	13 950	15 255	7 301	7 988	8 157	8 336	8 325	10 845	11 326	10 871	53
Peru	16 601	6 954	6 933	3 224	3 273	3 798	4 219	4 082	5 152	8 489	10 480	57
Dominican Republic	14 110	8 171	9 176	4 107	4 940	5 366	6 897	6 791	8 100	10 275	9 452	56
Argentina	7 059	3 054	3 716	1 445	2 043	2 493	3 581	3 120	3 792	7 208	8 558	55
Bolivia	20 895	11 164	15 802	6 124	8 157	7 417	7 794	8 311	9 016	9 103	8 385	59
Cuba	5 618	3 072	4 353	1 429	2 688	3 105	5 405	4 975	4 780	9 790	8 045	56
Nicaragua	729	599	1 280	473	1 069	1 201	2 100	2 181	2 756	5 160	7 167	73
Pakistan	3 326	2 798	3 148	1 708	2 054	3 057	4 458	5 921	6 400	6 829	6 395	38
Romania	1 608	966	1 469	696	991	1 696	2 771	3 006	4 217	4 932	5 973	59
Paraguay	3 003	1 935	3 358	1 265	2 500	2 726	3 647	3 219	4 172	4 947	5 401	75
Brazil	4 017	2 273	3 427	1 294	2 153	2 737	3 382	3 209	3 831	5 759	5 312	63
Other countries	29 794	19 284	26 066	12 368	16 960	19 866	26 730	29 773	38 118	42 282	46 326	
Total	**205 880**	**114 351**	**150 944**	**66 498**	**90 774**	**98 954**	**126 266**	**144 012**	**181 581**	**240 208**	**252 476**	**56**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Sweden

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Syria	495	1 370	4 479	8 635	10 626	20 066	24 470	31 113	19 069	11 133	7 625	49
Afghanistan	785	1 198	2 330	2 316	1 912	2 793	2 820	4 269	5 405	3 332	5 917	35
Eritrea	997	1 113	1 451	1 677	1 836	1 865	2 307	3 717	8 325	8 370	5 015	44
India	306	457	470	724	816	909	1 283	1 635	2 865	2 624	2 680	42
Poland	2 417	2 333	2 702	2 083	1 783	1 209	2 722	2 071	2 027	2 251	2 488	53
Somalia	2 925	4 776	9 069	8 140	6 746	2 952	2 120	4 522	5 678	2 638	2 333	54
Iraq	7 271	4 955	3 694	3 272	2 579	2 260	3 610	2 371	3 101	2 088	2 205	42
Finland	3 023	2 133	2 182	1 974	2 522	1 730	1 584	2 251	2 432	1 865	1 965	64
Romania	781	736	886	822	779	573	1 431	934	1 134	1 303	1 285	48
Germany	920	918	858	854	893	694	1 419	1 349	1 315	1 122	1 250	51
Stateless	1 711	3 264	4 395	7 072	5 629	3 197	3 227	2 758	2 338	1 537	1 228	43
Pakistan	330	552	748	1 108	1 145	722	775	833	1 149	1 026	1 136	40
Türkiye	1 005	1 182	1 320	1 488	796	915	1 431	1 050	1 630	1 039	1 116	41
Serbia	919	1 169	1 234	1 808	1 273	1 037	1 269	1 169	1 561	1 231	1 094	51
Norway	370	331	355	384	431	346	1 726	1 858	1 442	1 047	1 053	54
Other countries	18 663	21 762	24 170	26 541	24 052	22 938	27 981	27 454	32 754	25 183	24 599	
Total	**42 918**	**48 249**	**60 343**	**68 898**	**63 818**	**64 206**	**80 175**	**89 354**	**92 225**	**67 789**	**62 989**	**47**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Switzerland

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Germany	4 119	5 255	4 657	6 020	6 211	6 640	6 924	7 982	8 987	7 614	8 185	51
Italy	4 495	5 495	5 133	5 863	5 230	4 839	3 945	4 216	4 666	4 347	4 276	48
France	1 748	2 598	3 133	2 962	2 699	2 747	2 756	3 159	3 666	4 933	3 969	50
Portugal	2 458	3 626	3 941	3 920	3 352	2 801	2 055	2 092	2 228	2 356	1 845	55
Spain	1 071	1 501	1 564	1 583	1 491	1 280	994	1 082	1 290	1 419	1 377	52
Türkiye	1 399	1 808	1 729	1 796	1 678	1 802	1 363	1 484	1 658	1 413	1 335	47
North Macedonia	1 288	1 306	1 554	1 721	1 626	1 706	1 270	1 325	1 519	1 238	1 216	52
United Kingdom	449	617	665	883	1 006	844	727	866	946	1 097	1 038	50
Serbia	1 865	1 677	1 568	1 543	1 493	1 364	1 069	1 219	1 261	1 019	990	54
Russia	397	562	614	589	514	536	485	525	617	747	759	67
Eritrea	41	77	79	112	166	207	257	327	569	551	658	43
Poland	218	258	248	292	283	313	279	379	416	558	563	59
Romania	163	219	247	258	237	214	206	252	341	479	481	59
Sri Lanka	781	768	761	825	793	657	531	545	581	407	469	49
Hungary	126	159	136	161	158	184	180	240	317	384	469	57
Other countries	12 703	14 959	15 555	15 981	15 688	14 139	11 020	11 435	12 504	12 737	12 661	
Total	**33 321**	**40 885**	**41 584**	**44 509**	**42 625**	**40 273**	**34 061**	**37 128**	**41 566**	**41 299**	**40 291**	**52**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United Kingdom

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
India	22 425	18 391	24 615	16 687	15 104	14 680	11 444	11 598	15 689	18 319	24 888	55
Pakistan	12 995	13 083	16 737	10 379	11 802	12 914	11 459	11 139	14 947	16 553	22 153	53
Italy	479	846	1 282	3 515	5 255	5 774	6 049	8 614	8 608	10 772	12 871	49
Nigeria	8 074	8 049	9 810	6 941	8 696	8 839	8 065	6 734	8 713	8 900	12 630	51
South Africa	5 294	4 771	5 059	3 103	3 582	4 797	3 008	4 255	5 247	5 999	8 922	52
Syria	260	302	298	336	832	2 363	1 728	3 230	5 524	8 320	8 453	48
Romania	1 501	1 673	1 979	3 022	5 527	5 604	5 483	7 739	6 629	6 389	7 970	52
Türkiye	1 843	1 606	2 254	1 592	1 827	2 145	1 847	1 891	2 988	3 723	7 447	48
Poland	3 161	3 777	4 435	7 113	9 626	8 802	5 430	7 662	5 764	5 919	7 362	54
Bangladesh	3 891	3 611	4 648	3 080	3 572	3 780	3 424	3 909	4 438	5 261	6 768	59
Philippines	3 095	2 972	4 257	2 805	2 775	2 788	2 042	2 263	3 458	4 074	6 680	68
Iran	1 542	1 518	2 097	1 797	2 854	2 960	2 342	4 800	4 600	5 114	6 411	42
United States	3 761	2 961	4 024	3 182	3 270	3 496	2 749	3 360	3 882	3 983	5 768	62
Sri Lanka	2 335	2 287	3 431	2 465	2 907	2 986	1 541	4 002	3 839	4 306	5 133	53
Eritrea	874	1 417	1 593	1 106	1 678	1 223	824	2 027	2 300	3 288	4 954	47
Other countries	54 185	50 790	62 859	56 084	77 704	76 205	63 133	106 580	79 346	95 699	121 211	
Total	**125 715**	**118 054**	**149 378**	**123 207**	**157 011**	**159 356**	**130 568**	**189 803**	**175 972**	**206 619**	**269 621**	**53**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United States

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Of which: Women 2024 (%)
Mexico	94 843	105 910	103 487	118 469	131 950	121 983	83 436	112 910	133 661	102 760	116 210	..
India	36 931	41 178	45 183	49 815	51 325	63 579	47 233	56 085	66 670	52 360	48 820	..
Philippines	34 277	40 438	40 973	36 573	38 519	43 263	33 079	47 989	53 100	40 570	41 960	..
Dominican Republic	23 694	26 582	31 216	29 598	22 891	22 977	18 494	27 853	36 223	33 780	41 690	..
Cuba	23 975	25 674	31 939	25 836	31 940	35 974	31 013	47 427	44 411	30 280	35 870	..
Viet Nam	18 451	21 624	24 406	18 989	20 660	25 193	22 302	23 884	34 966	31 900	34 920	..
China	32 743	33 644	38 063	39 529	41 647	39 718	26 453	29 599	29 292	29 570	28 730	..
El Salvador	15 568	16 886	17 189	16 893	17 260	18 206	12 514	18 220	22 218	20 050	22 880	..
Jamaica	13 387	16 370	16 541	14 889	16 998	17 722	13 202	20 383	22 874	18 460	19 970	..
Canada	13 878	14 969	15 170	13 649	15 796	18 498	13 588	18 368	22 742	17 240	19 360	..
Colombia	16 283	17 024	18 374	16 012	17 402	16 914	12 562	17 253	18 052	16 240	18 140	..
Haiti	13 635	14 037	15 223	12 723	14 343	14 228	10 726	14 744	18 332	14 530	14 560	..
Brazil	8 574	10 476	10 234	9 634	10 455	10 341	8 214	12 281	13 498	12 400	14 280	..
United Kingdom	10 333	11 638	11 052	10 485	12 165	13 910	10 126	13 174	15 958	11 960	12 940	..
Korea	13 513	14 119	14 251	14 470	15 922	16 149	11 223	14 827	15 149	11 520	12 800	..
Other countries	283 331	319 690	319 759	279 701	302 628	364 938	274 089	338 864	457 238	380 630	360 040	
Total	**653 416**	**730 259**	**753 060**	**707 265**	**761 901**	**843 593**	**628 254**	**813 861**	**1 004 384**	**824 250**	**843 170**	**..**

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables. See https://stat.link/zmq54t.

Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6. **Acquisitions of nationality**

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Home Affairs.
Austria	Data refer to persons living in Austria at the time of acquisition.	Statistics Austria and BMI (Ministry of the Interior).
Belgium	Data refer to all acquisitions of Belgian nationality, irrespective of the type of procedure. Data only take into account those residing in Belgium at the time of the acquisition.	Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSEI) and Ministry of Justice.
Canada	Data refer to country of birth, not to country of previous nationality. Persons who acquire Canadian citizenship may also hold other citizenships at the same time if allowed by the country of previous nationality.	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Administrative records.	Servicio Nacional de Migraciones (SERMIG), Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.
Costa Rica		Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.
Czechia	Acquisitions of nationality by declaration or by naturalisation.	Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark		Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Acquisitions of citizenship by naturalisation.	Police and Border Guard Board.
Finland	Includes naturalisations of persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France		Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice.
Germany	Figures do not include ethnic Germans *(Aussiedler)*. From 2018 on, figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of five.	Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Data refer to all possible types of citizenship acquisition: naturalisation, declaration (for Greek descents), adoption by a Greek, etc.	Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction.
Hungary	Person naturalised in Hungary: naturalisation (the person was born foreign) or renaturalisation (his/her former Hungarian citizenship was abolished). The rules of naturalisation in Hungary were modified by the Act XLIV of 2010. The act introduced the simplified naturalisation procedure from 1 January 2011, and made it possible to obtain citizenship without residence in Hungary for the foreign citizens who have Hungarian ancestors. This data refer only to those new Hungarian citizens who have an address in Hungary.	Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register), Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Includes children who receive Icelandic citizenship with their parents.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Figures include naturalisations and post nuptial citizenship figures.	Department of Justice and Equality.
Italy		Ministry of the Interior.
Japan		Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau.
Korea		Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	Acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation including children who receive Latvian citizenship with their parents.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania		Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	Includes non-residents. Excludes children acquiring nationality as a consequence of the naturalisation of their parents.	Ministry of Justice.
Mexico		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
Netherlands		Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	Before 2016, the country of origin refers to the country of birth if birth documentation is available (if not, the country of origin is the country of citizenship as shown on the person's passport).	Department of Internal Affairs.
Norway	The statistics are based on population register data.	Statistics Norway.
Poland	Data include naturalisations by marriage and acknowledgment of persons of Polish descent, in addition to naturalisation by ordinary procedure.	Office for Repatriation and Aliens.
Portugal	Acquisition of nationality by foreigners living in Portugal.	Institute of registers and notarial regulations, Directorate General for Justice Policy (DGPJ).

Country	Comments	Source
Slovak Republic	Data refer to persons living in Slovak Republic at the time of acquisition.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Include all grounds on which the citizenship was obtained.	Internal Administrative Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation Directorate, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	Includes only naturalisations on the ground of residence in Spain. Excludes individuals recovering their former (Spanish) nationality.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on naturalisations registered by the Ministry of Justice.
Sweden		Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland		Federal Office of Migration.
United Kingdom		Home Office.
United States	Until 2021, data by country of birth refer to fiscal years (October to September of the year indicated). From 2022 to 2024, data by nationality, referring to calendar year.	Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/312.

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International Migration Outlook 2026

The 2026 edition of *International Migration Outlook* analyses recent developments in migration movements and the labour market situation of immigrants in OECD countries. It also monitors recent policy changes in migration governance and integration in OECD countries. This 50th edition includes two special chapters, one on the contribution of labour migration to addressing labour shortages in long-term care sector, and another one on the channels through which migration may affect productivity growth, based on a review of the available evidence across OECD countries and new empirical analysis. The Outlook also includes country notes and a detailed statistical annex.

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